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Giulia De Cesaris 
Abstract: 
 
 
 
Aristotle’s account of Speusippus’ and Xenocrates’ Metaphysical and Epistemological 
Theories 
 
This Ph.D. thesis aims at a novel reconstruction of the metaphysical and epistemological 
theories of the first two successors of Plato, Speusippus and Xenocrates. By advancing a 
new methodology for the selection and evaluation of the evidence and putting it to the test, 
this thesis will offer a picture of Speusippus’ and Xenocrates’ theories as grounded in the 
privileged testimony of Aristotle. 
The Early Academy has always been a riddle and a challenge for modern scholars. 
Indeed, for Plato’s immediate successors, Speusippus and Xenocrates, the sources at our 
disposal do not often encourage the project of a coherent reconstruction of their thought. 
Any exegesis of them faces the following difficulty: on the one hand, the earliest preserved 
chronological sources approach their doctrines polemically; on the other hand, later 
testimonia are to be found in authors who appropriated and reshaped Early Academic 
doctrines in their own philosophical frameworks. 
Through an in-depth analysis of Aristotelian testimonia, this thesis will show that 
Speusippus’ and Xenocrates’ doctrines can be better understood in the context of the 
Academy, and, in particular, with respect to the discussions undertaken with Aristotle. By 
exposing a set of problems the two philosophers target in order to defend Platonic theories 
from the inconsistencies detected by Aristotle, Speusippus’ and Xenocrates’ Platonic 
inheritance is finally revealed.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
Ph.D. Thesis 
 
Aristotle’s Account of Speusippus’ and Xenocrates’ 
Metaphysical and Epistemological Theories 
 
Department of Classics and Ancient History 
 
 
 
 
 
Giulia De Cesaris 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
First Supervisor: Dr Phillip S. Horky 
Second Supervisor: Prof. George Boys-Stones 
 
 
Wordcount: 110,519 
 
 
2019/2020 
 
  
Aristotle’s Account of Speusippus’ and Xenocrates’ 
Metaphysical and Epistemological Theories 
Giulia De Cesaris 
 
 
Table of Contents 
 
 
 
Acknowledgments 
 
Introduction          i-xxiv 
 
Section I: Speusippus 
 
CHAPTER ONE: Speusippus’ philosophy: a general framework   
1.1 Aristotle’s list of οὐσίαι (fr. 48)      1 
1.2 The episodicity of the world (frr. 86; 52)     15 
1.3 The rejection of Forms (fr. 77)      26 
1.4 Speusippus’ ontology: preliminary conclusions    29 
 
CHAPTER TWO: The absence of good in the principles: Speusippus’ re-thinking 
of Plato’s theory of Forms         
2.1 What is most beautiful and noble does not exist ἐν ἀρχῇ (fr. 53)  32 
2.2 Premise (i): what is most beautiful and noble does not exist in the  
principle/in the beginning (τὸ κάλλιστον καὶ ἄριστον μὴ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἶναι) 35 
2.3 Premise (ii): principles (of plants and animals) are causes (τῶν φυτῶν 
 καὶ τῶν ζῴων τὰς ἀρχὰς αἴτια μὲν εἶναι)     36 
2.4 Premise (iii): Beauty and Completeness are in the things that arise out the 
 principles (τὸ δὲ καλὸν καὶ τέλειον ἐν τοῖς ἐκ τούτων)   38 
2.5 The counterexample of the seed      39 
2.6 Another discussion on the good (frr. 58, 57)    42 
2.7 Why participation?         51 
 
CHAPTER THREE: Mathematical number      
3.1 The mathematical realm in Aristotle’s testimony (frr. 73; 74; 75; 76; 77) 58 
3.2 The generation of numbers: Aristotelian candidates (fr. 83)  62 
3.3 The generation of numbers: γένεσις      67 
3.4 A brief digression: Speusippus’ and Menaechmus on the right appellative 
 for mathematical prepositions (fr. 36)     70 
 
CHAPTER FOUR: The sensibles       
4.1 The inquiry into the sensibles: the collection of the ὅμοια (frr. 84; 123- 
146)          77 
4.2 The hunt for knowledge: Proclus’ report of Speusippus’ epistemology in  
the In Euclidem (fr. 35)       85 
4.2.1 Context and traditional scholarly interpretation   87 
4.2.2 The identification of τὰ μέν (lines 14-19)    93 
4.2.3 The identification of τὰ δέ (lines 19-22)    100 
4.2.4 The significance of the fragment within Speusippus’ epistemology 104 
 
CHAPTER FIVE: The principles        
5.1 Methodological clarifications: gathering information about first principles 
          106 
5.2 Problematising the data obtained      110 
5.3 Being an element, being a cause      111 
 
 
 Section II: Xenocrates 
 
CHAPTER SIX: The μία φύσις of τὰ μαθηματικά     
6.1 Aristotelian testimonia concerning Xenocrates: merging Forms with τὰ 
 μαθηματικά (frr. 27, 26, 29)       120 
6.2 Having one nature        128 
6.2.1  Interpretative clarifications (fr. 38)     135 
6.2.2  What is the comparability between?     138 
6.3 The ontological priority of the parts with respect to the whole (fr. 42) 143 
6.4 Conclusions         147 
 
CHAPTER SEVEN: The soul        
7.1. The definition of the soul: methodological choices for the analysis 149 
7.2. Xenocrates’ definition of the soul: self-movement as explanatory for 
 living (fr. 86)         150 
7.3. Xenocrates’ definition of the soul: a middle status (frr. 88-89)  157 
7.4. Xenocrates’ definition of the soul: Aristotle’s testimony in the De  
Anima (frr. 85 and 112)       160 
7.5. Conclusions         170 
 
Conclusions          174 
 
Bibliography          177 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be published without 
the author’s prior written consent and information derived from it should be acknowledged. 
 
  
Acknowledgements 
 
 
 
The first and greatest thanks I want to express is for my first supervisor, Phillip Horky. I 
will never be able to thank him enough for the love for research I have developed during 
these years in Durham: his guidance, support, and passion for his work were crucial for my 
growth. The (many) hours spent in his office discussing individual fragments and the 
enthusiasm these conversations produced so as to respond adequately to his critical 
comments have been invaluable gifts from both professional and personal perspectives.  
 
I owe a secondary thanks to my second supervisor, George Boys-Stones. His sharp 
comments and challenging questions offered me a totally new perspective on ancient texts 
and how to interrogate them.  
 
Furthermore, it is impossible to describe how much the whole Department of Classics 
and Ancient History in Durham, as well as the weekly debates at the Ancient Philosophy 
Reading Group, contributed to my development as a junior scholar. Individual conversations 
with members of the Department, and the weekly opportunity to join an exceptional group 
of scholars commenting on ancient texts, filled me with enthusiasm and motivation.  
 
These years in Durham wouldn’t have been the same without Andrea Giannotti, Carlo 
Cacciatori and Cesare Sinatti: they have been the best support and shelter I could hope for, 
as well as my home. I owe special thanks also to Federico Petrucci for the philosophical 
conversations we shared during his stay in Durham as a Post-Doc. 
 
Lastly, I need to thank my parents, Carla and Dario, my brother Filippo and my sister 
Isabella for the love I receive every day; my lovely Roman Ancient Philosophy Network 
(Giulia Scalas, Giulio Di Basilio and Roberto Granieri) for the sharing of our views and 
experiences — receiving unconditional support for our new challenges made me feel less 
far from home; Pedro, for having dealt with my ‘explosions’; my old friends from Rome, 
and the new ones, for the curiosity and the effort they put everyday into understanding my 
thoughts about Speusippus and Xenocrates, so far from where they come from. 
 
This Ph.D. thesis has been completed in Durham, funded by a Northern Bridge Doctoral 
Studentship. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
A Nonna Isabella e Nonno Mare 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 i 
Introduction 
 
 
 
Speusippus and Xenocrates: a riddle yet to be solved 
Over the past three years, it has often been complicated to explain to my family and 
friends why I chose as the focus of my doctoral thesis two philosophers they had hardly 
heard about: Speusippus and Xenocrates. When they could not remember their names, or 
they were making fun of how weird these sounded, my approach was consistent: I was not 
recovering the doctrines of two unknown philosophers from oblivion, but I was restoring the 
doctrines of the first two successors of Plato, and I was doing so by means of Aristotle. This 
apologetic strategy left me quite uncomfortable: in order to justify my interest in the Early 
Academy and the significance of my choice, I was relying on two names everybody would 
immediately recognise: Plato and Aristotle. My embarrassment for the answer is motivated 
by how unfair I believe this strategy is. In fact, the general assumptions motivating this thesis 
arise precisely out of the opposite beliefs. Namely (i) that we still have much to learn about 
Platonism as a tradition, and about the discussions taking place inside and outside the 
Academy – in particular with Aristotle; and (ii) that an effective way to start filling such a 
gap consists in a novel reconstruction of the doctrines of Speusippus and Xenocrates, the 
first two scholarchs of the Academy after Plato. 
 
Given these assumptions, this thesis aims at developing a novel picture of Speusippus’ 
and Xenocrates’ metaphysical and epistemological doctrines, obtained by advancing a new 
methodology for the selection and evaluation of the evidence, and putting it to the test.  
 
This objective emerges out of the following considerations, each of which will be dealt 
with in the course of this introduction: 
 
- Despite the precious pioneering work of Isnardi Parente and Tarán, the 
picture of Speusippus’ and Xenocrates’ doctrines one can gather from their 
collections of fragments1 is far from unitary and comprehensive. This is probably 
part of the reason why these collections are usually referred to by scholars only when 
 
1 Despite Barnes’ invitation to ‘all good scholars’ to ‘join pedants like me in fighting’ against the loose usage 
of the word fragment (1983: 308), I will use the term loosely throughout the thesis, whilst dealing with 
testimonia exclusively.  
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referencing specific fragments but are often underutilised when it comes to providing 
a more general picture of the doctrines of Early Academic philosophers. 
- There is need for a new methodology: previous methodological approaches 
(never thoroughly accounted for in the collections of the fragments) have often 
resulted in an inconsistent use of interpretative and methodological criteria.  
- There is an insufficient understanding of what Speusippus’ and Xenocrates’ 
Platonic legacy amounts to: Speusippus’ and Xenocrates’ Platonic legacy has been 
usually understood on the basis of a continuity or discontinuity with Plato’s 
doctrines. However, this approach does not allow us to do justice to individual 
philosophical reasons for preservation or rejection of Plato’s tenets. 
 
The lack of a global picture 
When I was first exposed to the material, I realised that, apart from established editions 
of the fragments published in the 1980s and Dillon’s influential monograph on the topic,2 
new research about the first successors of Plato in the Academy was all but absent. Curiously 
enough, studies on Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism underwent an opposite trend, and 
they have been much more prolific in the past years. This silence can be explained by many 
factors.  
 
One reason for this neglect is surely linked to the complexity of the material at our 
disposal and a result of the absence of direct evidence; original material about Speusippus’ 
and Xenocrates’ doctrines is, in fact, extremely limited.3 Moreover, this difficulty is 
exacerbated by the fact that evidence about Speusippus’ and Xenocrates’ doctrines has been 
transmitted by a surprisingly dichotomous reception.4 For both philosophers, the evidence 
preserved by Aristotle is mainly polemical and often does not address them by name.5 This 
aspect obviously implies that the identification of the passages where Speusippus and 
Xenocrates are referred to, needs to be brought forward a) by relying on commentators and 
scholia who identify the philosophers behind Aristotle’s claims; and b) through a chain of 
 
2 Dillon (2003). 
3 For Speusippus, genuine evidence is probably to be limited to the verbatim fragment quoted by ps-Iamblichus 
in his Theologoumena (Ps-Iambl., Theol. Arithm. 61ff = fr. 122 IP1); for Xenocrates, almost all evidence comes 
from late sources; moreover, the fact that (i) his doctrine is considered akin to that of Plato, and (ii) that Aristotle 
never mentions him by name, renders the attempt to recover his doctrine particularly difficult. 
4 This is especially true for Speusippus.  
5 Speusippus is explicitly referred to by Aristotle twice in the Metaphysics (frr. 48 and 53 IP1) and twice in the 
Nicomachean Ethics (frr. 63 and 108 IP1, although I will not take these latter fragments into account, as 
Speusippus’ ethical theory does not constitute the focus for this thesis), while Xenocrates is never named. It is 
also interesting that of the four times Aristotle mentions Speusippus, in two (frr. 63 and 53 IP1) he is associated 
with the Pythagoreans. 
 iii 
inferences based on the content of identified passages.6 In turn, this complicates the 
assessment of later evidence, which, on the other hand, is preserved by diverse authors 
(mainly Middle Platonists and Neoplatonists) whose sources are not always clearly 
traceable.7 In the case of Xenocrates, the assessment of the sources is even more problematic. 
Not only does Aristotle never mention Xenocrates by name, but he also often associates 
Xenocrates’ and Plato’s views: when the two positions are combined with formulas such as 
‘those who posit the Forms’, attempting a disctinction between them is further complicated.8 
In these and similar cases, the most immediate option is to rely on the information preserved 
by later authors and scholia. What constitutes a problematic aspect of the collections, 
however, is precisely that the assessment of later evidence sometimes influences the 
treatment of the material preserved by Aristotle. This is particularly clear when the content 
of Speusippus’ and Xenocrates’ doctrines preserved by late authors is not paralleled by 
Aristotle9 but it is used to identify other references in Aristotle’s texts. These interpretative 
decisions obviously have an impact on the overall picture of what Speusippus and 
Xenocrates one can gather from the collections, although the impact is not always 
immediately detectable for a reader who is unacquainted with the material. In order to give 
measure of what this means, I will provide a brief example. 
In the Supplementum Academicum,10 Isnardi Parente adds to her collection of Speusippus 
an Aristotelian passage from the De Caelo (3.4, 303a29-b3=fr. 122a IP2). The passage reads 
as follows: 
 
[FR. 122a IP2] Again, even their theory (viz. of the atomists) does not seem to demand 
an infinite number of elements. Bodies, they say, differ on account of differing shapes, 
but all shapes are constructed out of pyramids, rectilinear from rectilinear and the 
sphere from its eight parts.11  
 
6 See Dancy (2016: SEG, Speusippus): ‘The method followed in the reconstruction of Speusippus’ views is a 
matter of chaining: we start from our two anchor texts, and look for other passages in which the views ascribed 
to him in them are under discussion. Those passages will sometimes bring in new views; we then ascribe those 
views to Speusippus, and go looking for passages in which those views seem to be alluded to. No one needs to 
be told how tenuous such chaining is: each link is weak, and compounding probabilities would tell us that a 
chain of this type is actually weaker than its weakest link. But chaining in that way is all we can do. Fortunately, 
it results in a fairly coherent picture’. Similarly, for Xenocrates, Dancy (2017, SEG, Xenocrates) writes: 
‘Reconstruction of Xenocrates’ views turns, as in the case of Speusippus, on Aristotle, and, again as in the case 
of Speusippus, this is made the more difficult by Aristotle’s frequent failure actually to name Xenocrates when 
talking about his views. In fact, Aristotle never mentions Xenocrates by name in discussing his metaphysical 
views’. 
7 As, for example, determining the ultimate source for Proclus’ material in the In Euclidem (frr. 35, 36, 37 IP), 
or the source for Xenocrates’ definition of Form as ‘paradigmatic cause of whatever is always composed 
according to nature’, (αἰτία παραδειγματική τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἀεὶ συνέστώτων, fr. 14 IP). 
8 See, e.g. Xenocrates, fr. 25 IP (=Arist., Metaph. Z11 1036b12-7): τῶν τὰς ἰδέας λεγόντων. 
9 Among many examples, Iamblichus’ definition of Speusippus’ soul (frr. 96-97 IP1), or Xenocrates’ 
demonology (frr. 133-147 IP). 
10 Isnardi Parente (1995: 264-265). 
11 Fr. 122a IP2: ἔτι οὐδὲ κατὰ τὴν τούτων ὑπόληψιν δόξειεν ἂν ἄπειρα γίγνεσθαι τὰ στοιχεῖα, εἴπερ τὰ μὲν 
σώματα διαφέρει σχήμασι, τὰ δὲ σχήματα πάντα σύγκειται ἐκ πυραμίδων, τὰ μὲν εὐθύγραμμα ἐξ 
εὐθυγράμμων, ἡ δὲ σφαῖρα ἐξ ὀκτὼ μορίων, transl. Guthrie. 
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Isnardi Parente is careful in stating that any identification cannot but remain hypothetical, 
although a) she sees no reason for someone to reject the attribution, provided that the 
verbatim quotation in ps-Iamblichus’ Theologoumena Arithmeticae [FR. 122 IP1], is 
accepted as authentic as well;12 and b) she uses the fragment in order to identify principles 
for Speusippus’ soul.13 The passage is certainly evocative, but especially so, if taken without 
consideration of its context. Indeed, the Aristotelian passage affirms that the number of 
elements cannot be infinite because bodies differ in figure and ‘τὰ δὲ σχήματα πάντα 
σύγκειται ἐκ πυραμίδων’, namely, all figures are composed out of pyramids. The reference 
to Speusippus is identified on the basis of the verbatim fragment in ps-Iamblichus’ 
Theologumena [FR. 122 IP1] where, according to Isnardi Parente, the pyramid is granted a 
great prominence. This assumption is, in the first place, disputable. It is true that a long part 
of the quotation in [FR. 122 IP1], is devoted to the construction of pyramids (considered as 
the first solids), but not only do pyramids play a role in Plato’s Timaeus as well – the text 
which is quoted the most in the De Caelo –,14 but they occur again in another passage of the 
De Caelo,15 where both Democritus’ and Plato’s elements are the target. More strikingly, 
Isnardi Parente does not mention the context where the passage of the De Caelo is preserved, 
namely within a longer criticism addressed precisely against Democritus and Leucippus. It 
is true that, in the course of his criticism, Aristotle had compared Democritus’ and 
Leucippus’ theory to that of those people who say that everything that exists is numbers, or 
(originates) out of number (τρόπον γάρ τινα καὶ οὗτοι πάντα τὰ ὄντα ποιοῦσιν ἀριθμοὺς καὶ 
ἐξ ἀριθμῶν).16 However, the comparison cannot substantiate the reference to Speusippus: 
one the one hand, people described as those who believe that all things are numbers can most 
likely be identified with the Pythagoreans; on the other hand, the only items called ‘elements’ 
in Speusippus’ system appear to be primary principles, and we have no clue what the details 
of Speusippus’ interpretation of the elements in the Timaeus were. Moreover, no extant 
fragment concerning Speusippus bears witness to an infinity of elements in his system, an 
attack which seems to be more comprehensible if directed against the atomists (or Plato and, 
possibly, Xenocrates). Accordingly, although a theory of pyramids is attested by the 
fragment in ps-Iamblichus, the comparison with the fragment in the De Caelo cannot be 
 
12 Fr. 122 IP1. 
13 Although the quotation preserved by ps-Iamblichus (fr. 122 IP1) can be interpreted within a cosmological 
framework, nothing in the quotation refers explicitly to the soul, and the only reference to cosmic bodies (viz. 
not to the soul) appears in the brief resumé preceding the citation, which clearly preserves material re-
elaborated in a Neoplatonic context.  
14 See Johansen (2009: 9, n.1). For a more wide-ranging comparison of the De Caelo with the Timaeus see 
Solmsen (1960). 
15 De Caelo, 3.8. 
16 De Caelo, 3.4, 303a8-10. 
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considered as conclusive, especially insofar as it is part of a broader criticism against 
Democritus and Leucippus.17 Although Isnardi Parente does not insist on specifically 
identifying Speusippus in the passage, her interpretation of it strongly influences her reading 
of Speusippus’ soul, which is presented as less problematic.18  
 
It is true that such methodological issues and interpretative decisions are probably 
congenital to any edition of fragmentary material19 and this should not lead us to 
immediately suppose the need for a novel account. However, what the collections have 
mostly failed to provide is an influential picture of the first two scholars of the Academy and 
of their essential tenets. Although the three collections are, in different ways, invaluable 
from the perspective of highlighting specific concerns related to specific issues and 
fragments, nonetheless they do not fulfil the aim of providing an account of Speusippus’ and 
Xenocrates’ theories which gives insight about the development of their philosophical 
commitments. On the one hand, the collections by Isnardi Parente keep the synoptic 
treatment of Speusippus and Xenocrates extremely compact.20 On the other hand, although 
Tarán’s21 introduction to the fragments is fairly long, his presentation of Speusippus’ tenets 
often suffers for his critical approach to Aristotle, who, as Bodéüs rightly underscores in his 
review,22 is usually taken to misunderstand Speusippus’ views. In summary, despite the 
depiction of Speusippus and Xenocrates as original philosophers holding distinctive claims, 
the stress on their originality makes them ultimately extraneous to the Platonic tradition or 
makes their Platonic inheritance difficult to understand, unless one is ready to dig into the 
commentary on specific passages. It is not an accident, then, that the most influential 
interpretations of Speusippus and Xenocrates, not only in the 50s and 60s (in particular, 
Merlan’s in 1953, Krämer’s in 1964) but also in the early 21st century, when Dillon published 
 
17 Similar examples can be adduced with respect to Tarán’s collection of Speusippus’ fragments (e.g. Tarán’s 
identification of Speusippus’ primary principles with number one and number two, the first definite plurality 
(although this explicitly contradicts Aristotle’s text; see fr. 83 IP1 = Metaph., 1085b5–12, 21-27, where 
Speusippus plurality is said to be τὸ κατηγορούμενος καθόλου πλήθος) on the basis of a problematic 
interpretation of fr. 122 IP1 (= Ps-Iamblichus, Theologoumena 61ff), or with respect to Isnardi Parente and 
Dorandi’s (2012) edition of Xenocrates’ fragments (see, e.g. the treatment of Aristotle’s passages in Topics 
and Posterior Analytics (frr. 86-89 IP2) related to Xenocrates’ definition of the soul. The discussion is minimal, 
and the context of the passages is never analysed in detail so to highlight what Aristotle formally considers 
wrong of Xenocrates’ definition; for other examples, see Gottschalk 1986).  
18 Compare Isnardi Parente (2005: Introduzione, 8) ‘Torniamo, dopo questo, ai principi dell’anima, e 
chiediamoci quali essi debbano essere. É chiaro, anzitutto, che Speusippo si riferisce qui all’anima come 
totalità, e solo secondariamente ad anime individuali. La τετράς è, in essa, il primo principio, per cui il mondo 
appare come un universo tetradicamente ordinato; ma tale tetrade informa di sé il διαστατόν, il corpo 
generalmente esteso dell’universo stesso; sì che διάστασις può dirsi il principio per mezzo del quale esso è a 
sua volta ordinato’. 
19 Whatever the nature of this fragmentarity is.  
20 Isnardi Parente (1980: 51-63); Isnardi Parente (2012: 3-40), but the doctrinal section goes from p.12 to 33 
only. 
21 Tarán (1981: 3-113). 
22 Bodéüs (1984: 118). 
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his ground-breaking monograph The Heirs of Plato (2003), have acknowledged in 
Speusippus’ and Xenocrates’ theories proto-Neoplatonic or proto-Middle Platonic accounts. 
As Dillon’s preface perfectly summarises: ‘Speusippus and Xenocrates set the agenda for 
what was to become, over the succeeding centuries, the intellectual tradition which we call 
Platonism (Xenocrates initiating the mainstream of ‘Middle Platonism’, Speusippus, with 
some of his more daring speculations, stimulating certain developments in 
‘Neopythagoreanism’)’. Dillon’s account, much less rooted in a detailed analysis of the 
evidence, but more committed to a philosophical consideration of the significance of 
Speusippus and Xenocrates’ tenets, is better at locating their doctrines in the philosophical 
and cultural atmosphere of the Academy and presenting their theories as the product of past 
(and crucial for future) streams of Platonism.  
 
The status quaestionis: the need for a different methodological approach 
There is one crucial methodological assumption which has been shared, at different levels, 
by all scholars who worked on Speusippus and Xenocrates until very recently: Aristotle is 
not an accurate witness. The lesson taught by Cherniss’ revolutionary works23 has been 
inherited by scholars to such an extent that sometimes information provided by Aristotle is 
dismissed without further justification on the assumption that either it cannot fit a Platonic 
framework or that it must be the result of Aristotle’s own criticism. A very fruitful example 
of this practice is the dismissal of Aristotle’s charge of episodicity, whose significance, 
although testified by Theophrastus, is usually minimised by scholars.24 Aristotle’s charge 
will be dealt with in the course of Section I. However, what is interesting to note here is that 
the assumption of Aristotle’s unreliability ultimately generated a series of scholarly methods 
for the interpretation of Speusippus and Xenocrates. I will attempt to outline the main 
methodological approaches scholars produced and give examples of them by presenting their 
reactions to Aristotle’s charge of episodicity.25  
 
 
23 Most of all Cherniss (1935) and Cherniss (1945). 
24 Trabattoni (2017) is a notable exception. 
25 For a more detailed analysis of Speusippus’ and Xenocrates’ collections previous to 1980, see Isnardi Parente 
(1980: 51-56), Isnardi Parente (2005: 12-18), Isnardi Parente and Dorandi (2012: 33-40) and Isnardi Parente 
(1986). One aspect which is missing from my outline is the consideration of Speusippus and Xenocrates as 
Pythagoreans. I have excluded this aspect from my thesis, but my opinion on the topic is generally in line with 
Burkert’s (1972: 53-82): although Speusippus and Xenocrates probably conceived the roots of their doctrines 
to be in accordance with or arising out of Pythagorean theories, their doctrines need to be considered as 
primarily Platonic. So Zhmud (2016). Some of the methodological approaches I will sketch out in the following 
pages are directed specifically to Speusippus. However, I believe the methodology to be extensible, in line of 
principle, also with respect to Xenocrates. Lastly, my limited knowledge of German does not allow a detailed 
treatment of two important studies on Speusippus and Xenocrates, namely, Metry (2002) and Thiel (2006), 
whose in depth discussion I set as the objective for future studies. 
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(i) Given the assumption that Aristotle often distorts the view of the philosophers he 
presents, material preserved in later authors is considered more reliable than that 
preserved by Aristotle. This approach, however, does not straightforwardly dismiss 
the information Aristotle preserves. On the contrary, later texts are usually used in 
order to shed light on compatible material found in Aristotle so to balance the 
bitterness of Aristotle’s polemic. This approach was originally set out by Merlan26 
who, for the first time, identified the material preserved in Chapter 4 of Iamblichus’ 
De Communi Mathematica Scientia as referring to Speusippus. The compatibility of 
Iamblichus’ report with claims paralleled by Aristotle’s text led Merlan to suppose 
that Iamblichus probably had Speusippus’ material in his library and that, 
accordingly, he could complement the information Aristotle did not preserve. The 
same path has been followed by Krämer27 and the Tübingen school28 and, more 
recently, by Thiel,29 Gerson,30 and Dillon. For Dillon, Iamblichus’ testimony (fr. 88 
and 72 IP1) would completely disprove Aristotle’s. Speusippus’ ontological levels 
are in fact to be understood as connected on the basis of the similarity (ὁμοιότης) 
they show with respect to one another. Although Dillon admits the ‘embarrassment 
about the lack of evidence for the mode of connection between levels’, nonetheless, 
he believes that ‘a truly episodic universe would be anathema to a Platonist’.31 
Granted that this approach privileges information (or, at least, interpretations) 
provided by Middle Platonists or Neoplatonists, the outcome of this method is a 
proto- Middle Platonic or Neoplatonic depiction of Speusippus and Xenocrates. 
Their systems have been read as unitarian generative systems produced by primary 
principles, to be understood as principles of all things. This approach has the 
invaluable merit of placing both Speusippus and Xenocrates within the Platonic 
tradition, and to tracing the development of later streams of Platonism as intimately 
connected to the internal evolution of the Academy. However, the main flaw is that 
some portion of Aristotle’s evidence, which is the closest chronologically to the 
Academy (and sometimes the most synoptic)32 does not receive an accurate treatment 
 
26 Merlan (1953) 
27 Krämer (1964). Think, for example, about his interpretation of the One as super essential (Krämer 1961). 
28 See e.g. Gaiser (1998); Reale (2008). 
29 Thiel (2006). 
30 Gerson (2013) and (2018). 
31 Dillon (2003: 46, footnote 40).’ 
32 This is particularly true for Speusippus. In the latest online collection, Isnardi Parente identifies 36 fragments 
referring to Speusippus from Aristotle’s corpus, and 2 from Theophrastus’ Metaphysics. With respect to 
Aristotle, Tarán’s collection is even more conspicuous: it lists 38 passages from the Aristotelian corpus (and 
not all of them coincide with those listed by Isnardi Parente). Even by considering non-Aristotelian fragments 
only, both collections are mainly constituted by fragments related to Aristotle’s passages: 41 of the passages 
included come from commentaries on Aristotle’s texts, and if we exclude the 25 fragments preserved by 
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and is not interpreted in its own sake. It is not an accident, then, that Speusippus’ 
biological fragments preserved by Athenaeus works are not given their due credit, 
while metaphysics remains the main focus both for Speusippus and Xenocrates.  
(ii) An opposed methodological approach was proposed by Tarán. Tarán’s collection is 
philologically attentive. It deals thoroughly with Aristotle’s text and, most of all, it 
handles the context in which the fragments are preserved. The assumption that 
Aristotle’s testimony is unreliable, ultimately inherited from his teacher Cherniss, is 
elaborated as a need to get rid of Aristotle’s influence when interpreting material 
concerning Speusippus. Thus, data obtained by the analysis of Aristotle passages is 
not rejected on the basis of later texts,33 but it is insted dismissed if it is considered 
as the result of Aristotle’s own criticism. It is not by accident, then, that the charge 
of episodicity is rejected by Tarán on completely different grounds than method (i) 
namely, on the basis of an internal analysis of Aristotelian fragments. Accordingly, 
the critique ‘of making the whole of nature ‘episodic’, is’, for Tarán, merely ‘directed 
against the plurality of ‘material principles’’.34 Besides the absence of any translation 
for the texts included, Tarán’s collection suffers from his commitment to eliminate 
Aristotle’s influence from the evidence. The most evident example is that 
Speusippus’ theory of primary principles – attested by Aristotle in various places of 
his corpus – is ultimately reduced to an invention of Aristotle himself, so that the 
One and the Plurality should instead be interpreted as merely number one and two.  
(iii) A middle ground between these two opposed approaches, both of which arise out of 
the assumption that Aristotle is unreliable, can be found in Isnardi Parente’s 
collections.35 Although Aristotle is considered the primary witness for the 
 
Athenaeus on Speusippus’ Similars and the Latin transmission of Speusippus’ ethical theories (7 fragments in 
total) operated by Cicero mainly, we are left with very few ‘other’ fragments (10 in total). 
33 Paragraph 4 of Iamblichus’ DCSM is excluded from the collection, although reasons for the rejection are 
explained in a specific section of Tarán’s introduction (1981: 86-107). But this approach to Iamblichus’ 
evidence shows the same flaw exposed above: in order to dismiss Iamblichus’ account, Tarán wants to 
demonstrate that his report in incompatible with Aristotle’s. But the two reports do have in common, at least, 
the following points: (i) that the One and the Plurality are principles of mathematical numbers; (ii) that the 
point is similar to the One, and that a material principle different from plurality but presumably similar to it is 
the principle of geometrical magnitudes; (iii) the existence of a plurality of principles, each pair peculiar to 
their ontological level; (iv) the absence of beauty and goodness in the principle; (v) the material principle is 
not connoted as bad. Moreover, we could also add that, according to a puzzling testimony of Theophrastus, 
(vi) the good is said by Speusippus to be in the middle (and this may or may not account for the fact that 
although not specified, good seems to arise at the third level in Iamblichus’ testimony).  
34 Tarán (1981: 305). Similarly, Isnardi Parente (2005: Introduzione, 7) ‘le diverse entità o ‘sostanze’ sono 
legate fra di loro da un rapporto di analogia; e ciò non piace ad Aristotele, che trova venirsi a formare in tal 
modo una realtà discontinua’. In a recent paper (2012: 4-5) Dillon aligns with this position: ‘If Speusippus had 
some mechanism or process up his sleeve for linking these levels together, Aristotle is not going to tell us; that 
would spoil his rhetorical point, which is to ridicule what he elsewhere (N3, 1090b19ff.) terms Speusippus’ 
‘episodic universe’’.  
35 This is well summarised by Gottschalk’s review of Isnardi Parente’s first collection of Xenocrates’ and 
Hermodorus’ fragments (1986: 81): ‘I.P. tried to hold the balance between what one may call, loosely, the 
Tübingen and American schools of interpretation, with a slight inclination towards the American’. 
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reconstruction of Speusippus’ and Xenocrates’ doctrines, the information is counter-
balanced or combined with that obtained by other sources. In general, Isnardi 
Parente’s collections prove to be extremely helpful in the analysis of individual 
fragments; the commentaries of the collections provide accurate accounts of previous 
interpretations, as well as Isnardi Parente’s position on particular issues. However, 
her collections are much less helpful when it comes to providing a unitarian picture 
of Speusippus and Xenocrates. This is, on the one hand, motivated by the extensive 
work Isnardi Parente conducted on both scholarchs, which is often referred to in her 
collections but not accurately included in the discussion of the material. On the other 
hand, her collections do not provide sufficient accounts of the contexts where 
fragments are preserved, nor of the methodological assumptions used for their 
interpretations, which, as highlighted in the previous section, are not always clear or 
coherent throughout the collections. Moreover, by attempting to obtain a general 
account of the figures of Speusippus and Xenocrates by extrapolating information 
through a comparison of different comments on similar topics, the picture one obtains 
is far from coherent. A good example is Isnardi Parente’s description of Speusippus’ 
mathematical number, which fluctuates between her acknowledgement that it does 
not work a cause,36 and her description of it as a transcendent model.37  
 
Given the methodological flaws of all these three approaches and the unsatisfactory 
outcomes, scholars working on Speusippus and Xenocrates more recently have also 
acknowledged the need for a new methodology. Newer proposed methodological practices 
are, in general, more charitable with respect to Aristotle’s testimony, and do not start by 
assuming his essential unreliability. In this respect, they are usually more receptive of Isnardi 
Parente’s middle-ground approach (iii), although they are also responsive to the need for a 
philosophical consideration of the significance of Speusippus’ and Xenocrates’ doctrines 
within the Platonic tradition. There are at least three approaches which deserve to be 
sketched out:  
 
(iv) An option which has been advanced by Bénatouïl is to approach the material 
concerning Speusippus and Xenocrates without aiming for systematicity. Given 
that the material at our disposal does not allow more than the reconstruction of 
isolated doctrines, Bénatouïl proposes a topic-related approach,38 which 
 
36 Isnardi Parente (2005: 34) 
37 See, e.g. Isnardi Parente (2005: 15). 
38 See, e.g. Bénatouïl and El Murr (2010) and Bénatouïl (2017). 
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concentrates on reports related to specific issues, with a general bottom-up 
procedure. Rather than reconstructing the details of singular doctrines, the attention 
is shifted to the philosophical reasons for such postulations and the strategies for 
their justification.39 As this approach favours a reconstruction of Speusippus’ and 
Xenocrates’ doctrines by appeal to parallel texts and sources, the advantage is that 
such a reconstruction does not perform a progressive detachment from anchor-texts 
(as the chain of inference does), but always maintaines a primary reference to early 
sources.  
(v) Alternatively, Horky40 takes a different methodological path. The evaluation of 
Speusippus’ and Xenocrates’ theses is grounded in the consideration of their 
metaphysics, with a generally top-down directed approach. Given this method, 
Speusippus and Xenocrates’ doctrines are contextualised within the larger 
framework of their metaphysical commitments. As to the primary texts for his 
analysis, Horky shares the need to ground his interpretations in sources which are 
chronologically close to Speusippus and Xenocrates – evidence preserved by 
Speusippus’ and Xenocrates’ contemporaries in the Lyceum (Eudemus, 
Theophrastus) is privileged against later sources, which, when used in order to 
complement the picture, are never taken as authoritative over the Early Peripatetic 
material.  
(vi) Lastly, Bechtle proposes a positive interpretation of Neoplatonic evidence, 
accepting the authenticity of the information preserved by these texts. For, he 
believes, the parallels these texts shows with respect to Aristotle’s testimony are 
easiest to explain if we assume that they all go back to one author.41 This approach 
is more receptive of that of Dillon and the Tübingen school (i), in accounting for 
the sketches of the theses presented by Aristotle by making constructive use of later 
interpretations.  
 
In principle, I tend to be more sympathetic to methods (ii), (iv) and (v). I believe that 
Aristotle’s intellectual dishonesty needs to be set aside, and this is why the general 
methodological assumption for this thesis will be that Aristotle does indeed report genuine 
traces of Speusippus’ and Xenocrates’ doctrines. In particular, I share with Tarán (ii) the 
need to analyse each passage within its context, in the attempt to evaluate separately each 
 
39 E.g., Bénatouïl (2017: 21): ‘C’est la raison pour laquelle je vais m’intéresser […] à la manière dont Speusippe 
et Xénocrate semblent avoir élaboré et justifié les fondements de leur cosmologie, en particulier à partir de 
celle de Platon. Autrement dit, je vais me demander ce que doivent être les principes du monde de leur point 
de vue, plutôt que quels sont les principes cosmologiques qu’ils ont adoptés’. 
40 See, e.g. Horky (2018), where Speusippus’ definitional dialectic is explained on the basis of his rejection of 
the Forms and Horky (2013b).  
41 See, e.g. Bechtle (2010). 
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piece of information provided by Aristotle and the weight it carries within his arguments. I 
will also, sometimes, conclude that Aristotle cannot be trusted fully in his conclusions. This, 
however, will be the result of analyses of Aristotle’s terminology and interpretative 
strategies in other sections of his corpus, with a methodology which may loosely recall the 
Platonem ex Platone exegetical method adopted by Middle Platonists. I will try not to 
assume that Aristotle does not understand or intentionally misinterprets Speusippus and 
Xenocrates’ theses, but, rather, to show that he combines information related to their 
doctrines with his own, so as to highlight their internal difficulties. I am also generally 
sympathetic to method (iv) and (v). I agree that a sufficient account of Speusippus’ and 
Xenocrates’ doctrine will face the need to leave some aspects of their theories undetermined 
and should always aim at an explanation of the philosophical reasons for the postulation of 
their theses. However, I cannot share the confidence and charitability these approaches 
concede to later testimonia, and this is the reason why I decided to offer a novel 
reconstruction of Speusippus’ and Xenocrates’ theses rooted in an (almost) exclusive 
consideration of Aristotle’s testimony.42 The reasons for my scepticism towards information 
concerning Speusippus and Xenocrates provided by later authors is related to my difficulty 
to assess their testimonia conclusively. In particular, I believe that any assessment of these 
texts will be excessively dependent on initial interpretative assumptions. In order to give an 
example of why, I will provide a brief analysis of the scholarly reception of: 
- a fragment preserving William of Moerbeke’s translation of Proclus’ Commentary 
on Plato’s Parmenides [FR. 62 IP1]; 
-  a passage from Damascius’ Problems and Solutions regarding First Principles, 
where Speusippus is cited and criticised for having held that the One is a minimum, 
or ἐλάχιστον [FR. 61 IP1];  
and 
- a passage to be found in an anonymous Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides, extant 
in a palimpsest published by Kroll,43 where the same criticism Damascius levels 
against Speusippus is further related to the smallness (σμικρότητα) and indivisibility 
(μὴ δ<ιαιρετὸν εἶ>ναι) of τὸ ἕν [FR. 60 IP1]. 
 
First, I will highlight a brief resumé of the content of the fragments. Proclus’ Latin fragment 
[FR. 62 IP1] preserves words of Speusippus related to the One and the Indefinite Dyad. On 
a maximalist reading, the doctrine preserved is Speusippus’ interpretation of Plato’s first and 
 
42 Throughout the thesis, the fragments I will make use of are (almost exclusively) those recognised by Isnardi 
Parente (and Tarán, for Speusippus) as authentic. When doing otherwise, I will make use of other passages 
only to illuminate the discussion, and not to draw direct conclusions. 
43 Kroll (1892). 
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second hypothesis of Plato’s Parmenides and accounts for an interpretation of the One as 
super-essential; on a minimalist reading, it contains Speusippus’ reasons for positing the 
Infinite Dyad.  
 
As to Damascius’ fragment and the related criticism of Speusippus in the Anonymous 
Palimpsest, [FRR. 61 and 60 IP1], they offer a different version of Speusippus’ One, 
according to which the One is a minimum, an ἐλάχιστον. 
 
The three texts have been approached differently by scholars, and the reason why I group 
them together here is directly related to their scholarly reception. As for the Latin fragment, 
[FR. 62 IP1] the scholarly approach it received can be sketched out as follows: on the one 
hand, scholars like Dillon,44 Halfwassen,45 and, more recently Gerson,46 building on the 
results of a famous article published by Dodds in 1928,47 offer a positivistic reading of the 
fragment, read as reporting Speusippus’ interpretation of the first and second hypotheses of 
Plato’s Parmenides. With minor differences, on this account Speusippus is the propounder 
of a metaphysical/ontological interpretation of the first two hypotheses of Plato’s 
Parmenides, which antedates Moderatus’ interpretation: the absolute One is in itself and it 
is above being, while the Dyad, in its interaction with the One, is primarily responsible for 
the production of beings. On the other hand, in both collections of Speusippus’ fragments as 
well as in Klibansky and Labowsky’s edition where the fragment was first presented,48 the 
text receives a very sceptical treatment and it is considered either as a Neopythagorean or 
Neoplatonic reading of Speusippus’ doctrine. Although converging on this conclusion, 
Tarán and Isnardi Parente diverge conspicuously as to the translation and reading of the 
Latin text. Indeed, Tarán argues that it is the function of principle which is denied to the 
(first) One, which is then followed by a Dyad of principles. Differently, Isnardi Parente 
argues that the One is freed from being, more in line with Neoplatonic readings of Plato’s 
text. Speusippus, then, would be invoked by Proclus in order to legitimise the origin of his 
Platonic interpretation of the Parmenides. After the publication of the collections, the text 
was the focus of an influential article by Steel, who, in 2002, provided a new Greek 
retroversion of the text and pointed out the closeness that the retroverted Greek entertains 
with the formulation of Plato’s second hypothesis in the Parmenides.49 This led Steel to 
reinforce the sceptical approach to fragment [FR. 62 IP1], as the author concludes that such 
 
44 Dillon (2010). 
45 Halfwassen (1993). 
46 Gerson (2016). 
47 Dodds (1928: 138). 
48 Klibansky and Labowsky (1953). 
49 Plato, Parmenides, 143a6-8. 
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a reading reveals a Neopythagorean nuance in Speusippus’ theory and is therefore to be 
dismissed for the reconstruction of Speusippus’ original doctrine. 
 
A similar dichotomous interpretation has been reserved to Damascius’ passage [FR. 61 IP1] 
and to the related criticism found in the Anonymous Commentary to Plato’s Parmenides, 
[FR. 61 IP1], although its scholarly reception has been more univocal. Among scholars with 
a positivistic attitude toward these texts, we can list Bechtle, who argued that the reading of 
the One as a minimum (ἐλάχιστον) is revealing of Speusippus’ positive characterisation of 
the One as not-being.50 On this account, Speusippus’ interpretation of the One is clearly 
compatible with the Latin fragment, which would indeed preserve Speusippus’ interpretation 
of the Parmenides. Although the positive use of the evidence, Bechtle’s interpretation 
substantially agrees with that of Tarán’s and Isnardi Parente’s in taking the fragments, as 
well as the claim of inferiority and deficiency of Speusippus’ smallest One, to be a 
Neoplatonic elaboration of the criticism Aristotle himself addresses against Speusippus.51 
On this account, Damascius and the anonymous author of the Commentary would either be 
misunderstanding or building on Aristotelian criticism of Speusippus, and complain about 
Speusippus’ One (understood as an elemental or physical minimum). Given this second 
assumption, the fragment is clearly not compatible with the Latin fragment, [FR. 62 IP1] 
describing a One which is over-being. Accordingly, Tarán and Isnardi Parente conceive the 
two testimonia as incompatible, and trace them back, respectively, to a misinterpretation of 
Aristotelian passages (Damascius and the Anonymous) and to a 
Neopythagorean/Neoplatonic mediation (Proclus’ Latin fragment) of an allegedly 
Speusippean doctrine. 
 
A third option has recently been provided by Brisson,52 who, abstaining from interpretation 
of the gravely damaged lines related to Speusippus in the Palimpsest [FR. 61 IP1], attempted 
a reconstruction of the doctrine by making use of the three texts (and contexts) together. His 
analysis concludes that the origin for the criticism related to the smallness of the One is to 
be found originally in Plotinus.53 Plotinus, in turn, would formulate a critique against an 
interpretation of the Parmenides possibly preserved in an apocryphon, and allegedly 
ascribed to Speusippus. Accordingly, Plotinus’ critique against the One conceived as a 
 
50 Bechtle (2010a: 55) ‘That the nature of the One is only “one,” but not “being” in any sense (since this would 
be in conflict with the One’s oneness and utter simplicity), implies that “not-being” may be taken to express 
the same characteristic as “one.” Thus “not-being” does not attribute anything second to the One, like “being,” 
but is identical to the utter simplicity that the One of the first deduction is supposed to have’. 
51 See, e.g. Arist. Metaph. M7 1084b23-28. 
52 Brisson (2010). 
53 In particular: Plotinus, Enneads VI.9 [6], 1-8 
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minimum on arithmetical, geometrical and even physical level and directed against a 
negative interpretation of the One, is then taken up by some other Platonist, possibly Amelius 
of Porphyry, author of the text preserved in the palimpsest, as well as by Damascius, who 
criticises it in turn.  
 
What I hope to have shown from this very compact outline is that interpretative decisions to 
be made on late testimonia concerning Speusippus and Xenocrates are many and multi-
layered. However, what I find particularly problematic is (a) that they are also inter-
dependent and (b) that their compatibility ultimately depends on strong initial interpretative 
assumptions.  
 
Indeed, the main issue of disagreement, that, in turn, causes a ramification of different 
interpretations, can ultimately be acknowledged in what kind of content we think we can get 
out of Proclus’ fragment [FR. 62 IP1]. Scholars have identified at least four possible 
readings: 
 
- A sceptical reading: Speusippus is describing an absolute One, which is not even a 
principle strictly speaking, and which is followed by a pair of opposed principles (the 
Dyad). This account is preferred by people who believe the information to reach 
Proclus via a Neopythagorean channel54 (and possibly argue for a successive 
Neoplatonic reading of the information) and who deny any information to be 
ascribable to the historical Speusippus.  
- A minimalistic reading: Speusippus is saying nothing more than the One, taken in 
itself and without a second co-ordinated principle, cannot generate anything. This 
reading can be: 
o Positively maximised: Speusippus is offering the first interpretation of 
Plato’s Parmenides, according to which the first One is absolute and over-
being, and which is later taken up by other Neoplatonists. On this account, 
we need to antedate the first ‘Neoplatonic’ interpretations of the Parmenides 
to the Early Academy, long before Moderatus. 
o Or, it can be sceptically maximised: the interpretation is clearly transmitting 
Neoplatonic material,55 and, once again, its content cannot be projected onto 
Speusippus.  
 
 
54 E.g., Tarán (2001), who believes Proclus’ immediate source to be a Neoplatonist. 
55 E.g., Isnardi Parente (1984), who argues for a Neopythagorean transmission. 
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As a consequence of what reading we will pick, we will determine whether Proclus’ passage 
is compatible or incompatible with the criticism formulated by Damascius and the 
anonymous Palimpsest. If we choose a compatible option, then we may say that Damascius 
offers a negative reading of the positive one proposed by Proclus (i.e. the One is read as an 
ἐλάχιστον because it is not yet being, but that out of which being arises). Differently, if we 
opt for an incompatible reading, then we may read Damascius’ and the Anonymous 
Palimpsest’s critiques as arising out of Aristotle’s own criticism against Speusippus. Still, if 
we opt for incompatible readings of the fragments, we would probably need to justify why 
such incompatible readings all come from texts related to the interpretation of Plato’s 
Parmenides and quote Speusippus by name.  
 
Given the number of interpretative assumptions to be made on these texts, I believe that, 
at least as a first stage of analysis, an interpretation of Speusippus’ and Xenocrates’ doctrines 
which relies exclusively on Aristotle’s testimony is required. This decision is related not 
only to the chronological proximity of Aristotle to the first scholars of the Academy. Indeed, 
it is also fundamental in view of a contextualisation of Speusippus’ and Xenocrates’ theories 
which roots their understanding in the discussions taking place within and outside the 
Academy, and which feature Aristotle as the crucial interlocutor. 
 
Thus, the main projected outcome of this thesis will be to show a) that a fil rouge of such 
discussions can be identified through the lines of Aristotle’s criticism against Speusippus 
and Xenocrates; and b) that such a criticism exposes, specifically, Speusippus’ and 
Xenocrates’ philosophical reasons for their tenets. In order to accomplish this purpose, it 
will be impossible to discuss each fragment by comparing it to each and every singular 
scholarly position which has been offered. This is for a very simple reason. As I hope to 
have underlined, each and every one of the accounts discussed has been advanced according 
to different methodological choices as well as purposes. In this respect, every discussion of 
individual fragments is incapsulated within a broader framework of references and justified 
or grounded into previously established assumptions which influence the arrangement of the 
fragments themselves. To question one of these claims, usually implies questioning the 
methodology as a whole, as well as peculiar assumptions it is based on.  
 
Given this framework, through the application of a new methodology, this thesis aims to 
provide a novel picture of the Academy under Speusippus’ and Xenocrates’ direction, and 
of the significance of the critical impulse Aristotle provided for the development of their 
systems. If an appeal to later authors might be considered necessary in order to complement 
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topics Aristotle makes no mention of (as, e.g. the soul for Speusippus), we must be aware 
that such an appeal is potentially very misleading at the same time, precisely because it offers 
no stable ground for their assessment. 
 
A novel understanding of Speusippus’ and Xenocrates’ Platonic inheritance  
 
And after Plato Speusippus, the son of Plato’s sister Potone, 
succeeded to the School, then Xenocrates, and afterwards Polemon. 
And these, it is said, began from his own hearth at once 
 to undo the teaching of Plato, 
distorting what had been clear to the master 
by introducing foreign doctrines,  
so that you might expect the power of those marvellous dialogues 
 to be extinguished at no distant time, 
and the transmission of the doctrines 
 to come to an end at once on the founder’s death.56 
 
Before approaching the analysis of Speusippus’ and Xenocrates’ fragments, one last 
aspect stands in need of justification: why is a new consideration of Speusippus’ and 
Xenocrates’ Platonic inheritance needed? 
The reason can be exemplified by Eusebius’ harsh judgement about the successors of 
Plato, here reported in esergo. For what motivates Eusebius’ comment is precisely an 
evaluation of Speusippus and Xenocrates which is based on their doctrinal continuity or 
discontinuity with respect to Plato. What is more striking is that Eusebius’ judgement about 
the first successors of Plato in the school still reflects the attitude embraced by most modern 
scholars.57 Indeed, the modern reception of Speusippus’ and Xenocrates’ theories is mainly 
through two opposed approaches:  
 
a) By maximising the notion of continuity between the doctrines of Plato, those 
of his successors and of later streams of Platonism. This approach has been brought 
forward in different ways. On the one hand, Platonism has been identified in a set of 
positions which are shared among all Platonists (see, e.g. Gerson 2013);58 on the 
other hand, the continuity between Plato and the Platonic tradition has been 
 
56 Euseb., Pr. ev., XIV, 13-14, transl. Gifford (1903). 
57 See, e.g. Tarán’s (1981: 21) comment about Speusippus’ conception of mathematical objects: ‘To begin 
with, it appears that he remained enough of a Platonist to think that the objects of knowledge must be eternal 
and unchangeable entities’, or the comment expressed by Field and Hornblower (2016) in the Oxford Classical 
Dictionary entry on Xenocrates: ‘His philosophical contributions, so far as we can reconstruct them from the 
scanty evidence, were less impressive. He seems, in general, to have attempted to reproduce Plato’s thought 
in a stereotyped and formalized system, though on one or two points he probably preserved the correct tradition 
of interpretation as against Aristotle’ (my emphasis). 
58 Gerson (2013: 10): ‘The elements of UP according to my hypothesis are antimaterialism, antimechanism, 
antinominalism, antirelativism, and antiskepticism’. 
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considered rooted originally in Plato’s unwritten doctrines (see, e.g. the Tübingen 
school). 
b) By maximising the notion of discontinuity between the doctrines of Plato 
and those of his successors. On this account, Speusippus’ and Xenocrates’ Platonic 
inheritance has been intertwined with that of later streams of Platonism. Speusippus’ 
doctrines have been interpreted as anticipating Neo-Platonism (see e.g. Krämer 1964; 
Bechtle 2010; Dillon 2010) and Xenocrates’ as foreshadowing Middle Platonism 
(see, e.g. Dillon 2003). This way, their Platonic inheritance has been projected into 
the future rather than in the past.  
 
Both of these interpretative approaches are unsatisfactory because they are reductive. This 
reductiveness does not account for (i) the historical originality of Early Academic doctrines 
in their context of origin; (ii) the dialectical relationship they entertain with other thinkers 
(first of all, Aristotle); (iii) how the doctrinal filiation with Plato should be understood; and 
(iv) the specific and individual philosophical reasons which determined a doctrinal 
discontinuity but do not imply a rejection of Plato’s legacy. 
 
Within the framework I provide for this thesis, I hope to show that Speusippus’ and 
Xenocrates’ doctrines did not sever their intimate connection with Plato at all. On the 
contrary: their doctrinal derailments or recoveries can be better understood as the attempt, 
from genuine Platonists, to defend at all costs their Platonic inheritance from Aristotle’s 
attacks. 
Note of clarification 
 
Exclusion of other early witnesses 
Given the methodological warnings expressed with respect to the evidence preserved by 
late authors, one question yet remains to be answered: what motivates the exclusion of other 
early and contemporary witnesses, most notably Theophrastus? 
The exclusion59 can be motivated by at least two reasons. 
 
One reason is directly related to the content and weight that Theophrastus’ passages 
preserve for the reconstruction of Speusippus’ and Xenocrates’ philosophy. First of all, 
Theophrastus’ evidence concerning Speusippus and Xenocrates is extremely scant and 
amounts to two passages only: frr. 71 and 87 IP. 60   
 
59 Theophrastus’ passages are referred to in footnotes, but not directly analysed in the text.  
60 = frr. 59 and 83 Tarán. Fr. 87 IP Speusippus corresponds to fr. 20 IP Xenocrates. 
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As for fr. 87 IP, it preserves content which can arguably fit either an ethical or 
cosmological theory.61 Given that both Tarán and Isnardi Parente adopt an ethical 
interpretation of the passage, I left aside the fragment as not relevant to the focus of this 
thesis.  
 
The second mention, fr. 71 IP Speusippus (= fr. 20 Xenocrates), features Speusippus and 
Xenocrates together and is included both in the collection of Speusippus’ fragments and in 
that of Xenocrates’. Ιn the introductory lines, Theophrastus makes a general consideration 
addressed to a large group of people.62 After having described the generation of numbers, 
solids and bodies, these people left aside a detailed treatment of everything else and did not 
explain how these processes took place precisely. Then, Theophrastus comments that so did 
Speusippus, but not Xenocrates, who is said to have placed everything around the cosmos. 
Lastly, Theophrastus provides a list of items populating Xenocrates’ world. 
The passage has been the object of a lively dispute among scholars. In particular: it has 
been discussed (i) whether the introductory lines can be read as a misinterpretation of Plato’s 
doctrine;63 (ii) whether the second portion of text, which presents textual problems, is to be 
included in the text or not; and (iii) if the list of items populating Xenocrates’ world can be 
reconciled with other testimonia.64 As to Speusippus, the core information we are preserved 
with is that he appeared not to have explained generative processes in detail.65 This 
complaint is replicated by Aristotle, especially with respect to the production of numbers, 
and this aspect is accounted for throughout the thesis. Accordingly, I did not consider the 
analysis of Theophrastus’ fragment as adding much information.  
 
As to the content related to Xenocrates and specifically addressing the items populating 
his world, the passage preserves information which are at odds with Aristotle’s claim that 
Xenocrates posited one nature for Forms and Numbers. This leads to a second reason for the 
exclusion of the evidence preserved by Theophrastus, namely Theophrastus’ complex 
doctrinal relationship with Aristotle. Although, fr. 71 IP appears to replicate the same 
 
61 See Tarán (1981: 444-449) and Isnardi Parente (1980: 294-297). 
62 Theophrasus speaks of ‘many’ (οἱ πολλοί) as well as of ‘those who posited the One and the Indefinite Dyad’ 
(καθάπερ καὶ οἱ τὸ ἓν καὶ τὴν ἀόριστον δυάδα ποῖοθντες). 
63 As Cherniss, among others, concludes (1945: 25-59). Taràn is more careful about the identification (1981: 
381-382). 
64 In particular, with Aristotle’s claim that Forms and Numbers are merged together (Frr. 26-28 IP Xenocrates) 
and Sextus Empiricus’ tripartite division of the items populating Xenocrates’ world (F2 IP). On this issue, see 
Horky (2013b), who provides an analysis of the above-mentioned passages in parallel and offers an explanation 
for their correspondence.  
65 See Tarán (1981: 382): ‘The comparison between him and the philosophers of 6a23-b5 is limited then to the 
fact that also he failed to discuss in detail the derivation of things from the principles’. 
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theoretical framework employed by Aristotle in his criticism of Speusippus’ episodic 
system, Theophrastus’ doctrinal relationship with Aristotle cannot be reduced to a simple 
repetition of Aristotle’s doctrines. Accordingly, an accurate analysis of the passage would 
have required a thorough study of the relationship that Theophrastus’ Metaphysics entertain 
with Aristotle’s, of its peculiar agenda and objectives, an analysis which would have let me 
astray from the present purpose.  
 
Similar considerations can be extended to the evidence preserved by the commentators 
of Aristotle’s text and other middle authors (for which the sources and the processes of 
transmission of the material are often not easily determinable conclusively), which, 
accordingly, have been excluded from the present analysis.  
 
Inclusion of other authors: Athenaeus and Proclus 
Section 4.1 provides an analysis of the fragments preserved by Athenaeus and related to 
Speusippus’ inquiry into the Similars. Although this decision may appear to conflict with 
my methodological assumptions, the inclusion of the material can be motivated by the 
following reasons. Aristotle’s testimonia concerning Speusippus’ inquiry into the sensibles 
is limited to one passage only,66 analysed at the beginning of Chapter 4. As the material at 
our disposal is extremely limited and compact, I believed it was necessary, in order to 
strengthen the validity of the results obtained, to take into account additional material. And 
since Athenaeus is the author preserving most of the information on the topic, I included his 
fragments as part of my analysis. However, the aim of section 4.1 is not to obtain new 
information about Speusippus’ enquiry into the sensibles, but, differently, to show that (i) 
an analysis of Athenaeus’ fragments does not work against my hypothesis of an episodic 
system for Speusippus; and that (ii) the fragments preserved by Athenaeus do not support 
consistently the hypothesis of a link between Speusippus’ ontological levels, usually 
individuated by scholars in the notion of ὁμοιότης. 
 
A similar comment can be extended to sections 4.2 to 4.2.4, entirely dedicated to an 
analysis of a fragment preserved by Proclus. Such sections are meant as a test of the results 
obtained in the previous chapters against a source which appears to be independent of 
Aristotle.67 Accordingly, the aim of the sections is not to obtain new information about 
Speusippus, but to show that Proclus’s passage is compatible with the conclusions obtained. 
 
66 Fr 80 IP. 
67 At least insofar as the material appears to go back either to Phillip of Opus via Posidonius and Geminus, or 
to Heraclides Ponticus. 
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Aristotelian testimonia excluded from consideration 
The thesis examines Aristotelian fragments which are identified as authentic by the two 
collections of Isnardi Parente and Tarán.68 Given the focus on Aristotelian testimonia 
concerning epistemological and metaphysical theories, ethical fragments,69 fragments listed 
as belonging to authentic works,70 and fragments dealing with Speusippus’ and Xenocrates’ 
exegesis of the Timaeus,71 have been excluded from consideration. This thesis is not a critical 
edition of Aristotle’s fragments concerning Speusippus and Xenocrates’ theories and does 
not set completeness as its aim. A sufficient account of all Aristotelian passages preserving 
information about Speusippus’ and Xenocrates’ epistemology and metaphysics, in fact, 
would have required a more generous treatment than what is generally allowed for a Ph.D. 
thesis. However, specific justification for having left aside potentially relevant testimonia is 
provided below:  
 
Speusippus 
- Fr. 38 IP (=Arist. A.Po, II13, 97a6ff; = fr. 63a Tarán) preserves polemical evidence 
related to a thesis which claims that a thing can be known only if its relationships to 
all other things are known (the information that the thesis is Speusippean is supplied 
by commentators of the passage (see ffr. 39-47 IP), who unanimously point at 
Speusippus as the author). The content of the passage is arguably related to 
epistemology, and, given the focus of my thesis, may be taken to require specific 
attention. However, the passage has been object of a lively dispute among scholars,72 
who seriously disagree as to how the argument presented by Aristotle should be 
understood. More specifically, the disagreement includes (i) the order of the claims 
and their reciprocal philosophical cogency; and (ii) what claims are actually endorsed 
by Speusippus and what are to be understood as Aristotle’s counterarguments. Given 
the conspicuous dose of controversies at stake and the impossibility to supply other 
 
68 Accordingly, dubious references (as frr. *68 IP (=Arist. Metaph. I3, 1054a20ff), *81 (= Arist. Metaph. N3, 
1090b5ff = fr. 50 Tarán), and *98 IP (=Arist. De an. I2, 404b 18ff) and *146a IP (=Arist. De part. Anim. I2, 
624b4-20 = fr. 67 Tarán)), and/or Speusippean fragments which are not acknowledged as authentic by both 
Isnardi Parente and Tarán (frr. 68 IP and 110 IP) will be excluded from consideration.  
69 Speusippus: frr. 108 (=Arist. EN, VII 13, 1153b1ff = fr. 80a Tarán); 109 (=Arist. EN, X 2, 1173aff = fr. 81a 
Tarán); 110 IP (=Arist. Metaph. I 6, 1056a30ff). Xenocrates: frr. 154 (Aris. Top. II6, 112a32-37) and 158 
(Arist. Top. VII1, 152a 5-12; 25-30) IP1. I considered also frr. 3 IP1 (=Arist. Top. VI3, 141a), dealing with 
Xenocrates’ definition of wisdom, and 13 IP1 (=Arist. EE I8, 1218a 24-8), where Aristotle reports that for 
Xenocrates the One is considered to be (the) Good because numbers yield to it, to belong to the ethical section. 
70 Speusippus: frr. 118-122 (= frr. 3, 4, 5a, 5b, 28 Tarán); 147-159 IP (= frr. 1a, 1b, 2, 83, 87b, 86 Tarán; frr. 
149, 150, 153, 156-159 IP are discussed but not included as fragments by Tarán); Xenocrates: frr. 177-186 IP. 
71 Fr. 94 IP (=Arist. De cael. I 10, 279b32-290a 3, 280a 7-8 = Xenocrates fr. 73 IP). 
72 Just to mention some: Barnes (1994: 245-247); Falcon (2000); Dillon (2003: 79-80), Burnyeat (1990 ad loc). 
For more detailed information about the scholarly dispute, see, infra, footnotes 361 and 363. 
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Aristotelian material on the topic, an appropriate assessment of the passage would 
have required inclusion of passages preserved by other witnesses (the Anonymous 
commentator of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, Iohannes Philoponus; Eustratius; 
Simplicius). However, this practice would have contravened the methodological 
principles of this thesis and, accordingly, I decided to postpone the discussion to a 
different context.  
- Fr. 85 IP (=Arist. Top., I 18, 108b23ff = fr. 65 Tarán) also discusses issues related to 
definition and specifically mentions a theory of similarity which both Isnardi Parente 
and Tarán accept as a reference to Speusippus. However, the passage is also 
mentioned in Huffman’s collection of Archytas’ fragments,73 where it is analysed in 
close connection with fr. A22 Huffman and acknowledged as a reference to Archytas. 
In both fr. 22A Huffmann, where Archytas is explicitly mentioned, and fr. 85 IP, the 
example of stillness in the air (νηνεμία) occurs. Although Huffmann realises the 
difference between the two contexts, he nonetheless takes both passages to refer to 
Archytas. Accordingly, as the attribution is not confirmed conclusively, I decided to 
consider the fragment as dubious and excluded the passage from the present analysis.  
- Fr. 63 IP (=Arist. EN 1 4, 1096b5ff) states that Speusippus followed the Pythagoreans 
in placing the One in the series of the goods. I excluded the passage from those 
considered because I believe the discussion to belong to an ethical context. If 
otherwise, the passage would be incompatible with other (well attested) metaphysical 
fragments preserved by Aristotle, where it is said that Speusippus refused to 
characterise the One as (the) good. A similar consideration can be extended to fr. 67 
IP (=Arist. A.Po II6, 92a20ff = fr. 82 Tarán) which has been identified as Speusippean 
and related to ethical doctrines by Cherniss.74 
- Frr. 64 (=Arist. Metaph. N4, 1091b30ff = fr. 45a Tarán), 66 (=Arist. Metaph. Λ 10, 
1075a31ff = fr. 46a Tarán), 82 (=Arist. Metaph. N5, 1092a35ff = fr. 38 Tarán), 82a 
(=Arist. Metaph. M1, 1087b6 = fr. 39 Tarán) IP, preserve information related to the 
names Academic authors attributed to primary principles, and to some of their 
characteristics, e.g. divisibility/indivisibility, etc. (frr. 64 and 66 – dealing with the 
thesis that if the One were to be characterised as ‘good’, the second principle would 
consequently be characterised as ‘bad’ – are briefly referred to in the thesis but do not 
receive separate consideration). The reason for excluding this group of passages from 
the thesis is related to the context they are preserved in. In the passages Platonists are 
grouped together and an adequate distinction and attribution of their theses is not 
 
73 Huffmann (2005: 499-503). 
74 Cherniss (1945: 36-38). 
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always achievable. To give an example, passages where Speusippus is identified by 
scholars provide at least two different formulations of his second principle (πλῆθος 
in frr. 64, 82 and 82a IP (which is less than one line and only reports the alleged 
Speusippean formulation); τὰ πολλά in fr. 66), which appear to depend on the contexts 
of Aristotle’s refutations. 
- Fr. 92 IP (=Arist. Metaph. N5, 1092a17ff = fr. 53 Tarán), where Aristotle charges 
Speusippus for having generated place together with mathematical objects. The 
fragment is the only passage where Aristotle makes a reference to place with respect 
to Speusippus’ doctrine. Considering that an adequate assessment of the passage 
would have required consideration of Aristotle’s criticism of Plato’s receptacle (as, 
e.g. in Phys. 209b16-17; 212a1-2), where Aristotle accuses Plato of having confused 
matter with space, I postponed the analysis of the fragment to a different context.  
 
Xenocrates 
- Fr. 25 IP (=Arist. Metaph. Z11, 1036b 12-7) preserves two different positions 
concerning the line, which have been attributed by scholars to Plato and Xenocrates 
respectively. However, scholars strongly disagree as to (i) the right grammatical 
construction of the sentence; (ii) its translation; (iii) the web of references that, in turn, 
justify the identification of Plato or Xenocrates behind the Aristotelian sentences.75 
Given the many decisive elements that an appropriate evaluation of the text would 
have required for the assessment, the passage is not fully discussed in the text, but 
only referred to in the footnotes.  
- Fr. 41 IP (=Arist. Metaph. B 3, 998b30- 999a14) addresses the issue of the relationship 
between genus and species in Xenocrates’ system. Whether the reference in the text 
addresses Xenocrates or not, and what portion of text should be understood as actually 
reporting his thesis is a hotly debated issue.76 Accordingly, I considered the reference 
as dubious, and postponed its discussion to a different context.  
- Fr. 44 (Arist. Phys. VI2, 233b 15-7) preserves a general comment Aristotle makes 
about the impossibility for indivisible magnitudes of any kind to exist; fr. 46 IP (Arist. 
Phys. I3 187a1-3) reports of an argument ‘ἐκ τῆς διχοτομίας’ according to which there 
are indivisible magnitudes. I excluded these passages from my analysis because the 
 
75 See, e.g. Ross (1924: 201-202), Cherniss (1945: 567ff), Saffrey (1971: 32ff), Cherniss (1971: 44 ff), Isnardi 
Parente (2012: 263-264). 
76 More information on scholarly disagreements can be found in Berti (2009: 128-129). 
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former only reports a very general claim which is not further qualified by Aristotle, 
while the latter is not clearly referred to Xenocrates.77 
 
All other fragments, if not fully discussed in the text are at least referred to in the footnotes.  
 
Outline of the thesis  
My thesis will be divided into two sections: the first section (Chapters 1-5) will focus on 
Speusippus, and the second section (Chapters 6-7) will focus on Xenocrates.  
The overall goal of the first section is to expose Speusippus’ rationale for an episodic 
system. To this aim, Chapter 1 will analyse the fragments which provide general information 
about the structure of Speusippus’ world and the items populating it. Such an analysis will 
provide (a) the general framework for my interpretation of Speusippus; and (b) a justification 
for the thematic arrangement of the following chapters. Chapter 2 will be dedicated to an 
investigation of Speusippus’ claim about the absence of Good in the principles. I will argue 
that the claim can be understood as a direct response to the Platonic problem of participation, 
and as an attempt to fix Plato’s difficulties by means of a first intervention in the system; 
sensibles will not need to rely onto causal or paradigmatic causes for their understanding, 
but will require a different and separate kind of enquiry. Chapter 3 will be dedicated to the 
analysis of mathematical objects, so as to show that the mathematical realm presents a 
second intervention into the system. I will argue that Speusippus’ decision to avoid 
characterising mathematical objects as paradigmatic and efficient causes aims to preserve 
the possibility that mathematical and geometrical practices can be differentiated and are 
independent from other kinds of enquiry. Chapter 4 will take into account Speusippus’ 
inquiry into the sensibles. In order to offer a broader perspective of Speusippus’ 
epistemology, the last section of Chapter 4 will examine a passage of Proclus’ Commentary 
on the First Book of Euclid Elements. This last section is meant to test the depiction of 
Speusippus I have provided in the previous chapters against a source which appears to be 
independent from Aristotle. Lastly, Chapter 5 will attempt to summarise the information 
about primary principles obtained throughout the thesis to explain why they are conceived 
of as unqualified. 
 Section II, on Xenocrates, will show that Aristotle’s criticism of the episodicity of 
Speusippus’ world is well understood by Xenocrates. I will argue that Xenocrates accounts 
for the ontological continuity of his system by means of structural similarities between the 
 
77 See Isnardi Parente (2012: 275-276). In the revised collection of Xenocrates’ fragments, no asterisks are 
used in order to mark dubious references. However, where Isnardi Parente is not sure about the attribution is 
made clear in the commentary.  
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items populating it. To this purpose, the section will be organised into two chapters: Chapter 
6 will investigate the significance and meaning of the formula μία φύσις employed by 
Aristotle when explaining Xenocrates’ conflation of numbers with Forms. An analysis of 
Aristotle’s formula will reveal that a) it can be understood as including not only numbers, 
but geometrical objects as well; and b) that the μία φύσις of mathematical and geometrical 
objects with Forms can be further illuminated by Xenocrates’ claim that parts are prior to 
their wholes. Indeed, Form-Numbers and what I will call ‘Ideal-Geometricals’ do share a 
similar ontological structure, aimed at accounting for their continuity as well as for a gradual 
deployment of reality. Within the perspective of a continuous consideration of the world, 
Chapter 7 will investigate Xenocrates’ definition of the soul as a ‘self-moving number’. 
Through an analysis of Aristotle’s references to Xenocrates’ definition, I will argue that in 
order for sensible objects to be explained in continuity with the rest of the system, a third 
condition is needed: movement. Additionally, I shall claim that the appeal to the notion of 
number rather than to geometry in the definition of the soul is meant to avoid a physical 
consideration of the soul. The overall goal of the section is to show that Xenocrates’ main 
purpose is to maintain an ontological continuity in his system. For the gradual deployment 
of his reality is explained by adding specific conditions at each ontological level. In this 
respect, Xenocrates (i) shows a profound understanding of Aristotle’s criticism against 
Speusippus’ world and (ii) works with shared assumptions of Aristotle himself, as the 
differentiation of wholes into πᾶν and ὅλον highlights. The overall picture of the two sections 
is that of a continuous and fruitful discussion taking place inside the Academy, with 
Speusippus and Xenocrates effectively engaging with Aristotle’s critiques in the attempt to 
preserve Platonist doctrines which show coherence at a broader level. The central difference 
between Speusippus and Xenocrates’ approaches is to be identified in their respective 
interests, which determine the arrangement of their worlds. On the one hand, Speusippus’ 
doctrines expose the worry of ensuring and maintaining independent inquiries, and, 
therefore, are oriented predominantly by epistemological concerns; on the other hand, 
Xenocrates’ system is governed by an ontological commitment. Indeed, the possibility for 
the soul to know seems to be granted on the basis of an ontologically justified deployment 
of his ontology, which accounts for the continuity (and differences) of each ontological level 
on the basis of their similar ontological structures. 
 
 
 
  
 
Section I: Speusippus 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  1 
CHAPTER ONE: 
SPEUSIPPUS’ PHILOSOPHY: A GENERAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
 
In order to begin our investigation of the Aristotelian testimonia on Speusippus, it is 
important, as a first step, to cover some basic issues. Indeed, in any assessment of 
fragmentary material, the choice of the first fragments to be analysed is obviously crucial, 
as it works as a predisposition of the following analyses. This chapter is meant to be an 
analysis of those fragments which preserve an overall presentation of Speusippus’ structure 
of reality and of his philosophical commitments (namely, frr. 48, 86, 52, 77 IP1) and can 
therefore provide us with the general coordinates to begin our inquiry. In particular, section 
1.1 will deal with Speusippus’ structure of the world as described by Aristotle in Metaphysics 
Z2, in the attempt to identify the layers composing Speusippus’ structure of reality; section 
1.2 will concentrate on how these layers relate to one another and section 1.3 will focus on 
Speusippus’ rejection of the Forms. The choice for this arrangement is motivated by three 
reasons: first of all, the fragments under analysis in these sections can be considered as 
somehow isolated and do not require an appeal to other fragments for their understanding. 
In this respect, dealing with these fragments at the beginning of my inquiry has a clear 
methodological advantage; they can more easily work as the basis to support an 
interpretation of Speusippus’ theories which does not rely on a circular method, or on strong 
initial hermeneutical assumptions. Secondly, these fragments preserve crucial information 
about Speusippus’ philosophical commitments in general. The arrangement of a 
discontinuous system, together with the choice to reject the Forms, provides us with 
compelling evidence about Speusippus’ philosophical assumptions and about the overall 
framework of his theories. Lastly, the selection of these introductory fragments has the 
advantage of including one of the two extant Aristotelian fragments which actually addresses 
Speusippus by name.78 Accordingly, these assumptions will constitute the foundational 
points for my enquiry and will serve as general frame for the analysis of more particular 
issues.  
 
1.1 Aristotle’s list of οὐσίαι (fr. 48) 
The first requirement for an understanding of Speusippus’ theories is to grasp his overall 
conception of reality. Accordingly, this section is conceived as an introduction to 
 
78 My analysis of the second fragment, fr. 53 IP1, will represent the core of the next Chapter. 
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Speusippus’ ontological commitments, through an analysis of the description Aristotle gives 
of them in Metaphysics Z2. Given this purpose, book Z of the Metaphysics, where Aristotle 
conducts his enquiry about substance,79 obviously represents a crucial text. It is in Chapter 
2,80 in fact, that the first direct mention of Speusippus occurs. The context is that of the 
introductory chapters of book Z (1-3), where Aristotle reviews the opinions of his 
predecessors and outlines the fundamental questions about οὐσία which will guide his 
analysis further. Accordingly, the passage reads as follows:  
 
[FR. 48] ἔτι παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητὰ οἱ μὲν οὐκ οἴονται εἶναι οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον, οἱ δὲ πλείω καὶ μᾶλλον 
ὄντα ἀΐδια, ὥσπερ Πλάτων τά τε εἴδη καὶ τὰ μαθηματικὰ δύο οὐσίας, τρίτην δὲ τὴν τῶν 
αἰσθητῶν σωμάτων οὐσίαν, Σπεύσιππος δὲ καὶ πλείους οὐσίας ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἀρξάμενος, καὶ 
ἀρχὰς ἑκάστης οὐσίας, ἄλλην μὲν ἀριθμῶν ἄλλην δὲ μεγεθῶν, ἔπειτα ψυχῆς· καὶ τοῦτον δὴ 
τὸν τρόπον ἐπεκτείνει τὰς οὐσίας. 
 
Further, some do not think there is anything such as this (viz. substance) beyond sensible 
things, while some others think there are eternal substances which are more in number and 
more real, e.g., Plato posited two kinds of substance – the Forms and the objects of 
mathematics – as well as a third kind, i.e. the substance of sensible bodies. And Speusippus 
posited still more kinds of substances, beginning with the One, and principles for each kind of 
substance, one for numbers, another for spatial magnitudes, and then another for soul; and in 
this way, he multiplies the kinds of substances.81 
 
This fragment preserves crucial evidence related to Speusippus’ ontological 
commitments. As is customary, before arranging his own discussion of the topic, Aristotle 
starts the enquiry by examining the various opinions of his predecessors: it is in this context 
that Plato and Speusippus are mentioned. Leaving aside for a moment the obvious 
difficulties that the subject of Aristotle’s enquiry itself raises, not to mention the terminology 
of substance used by Aristotle throughout the text, the passage preserves important 
information about Speusippus’ structure and organization of reality: Speusippus appears to 
have posited even more οὐσίαι than Plato did and to have established different kinds of 
principles for each of them. If the content appears to be fairly clear at a first glance, it is 
worth examining the broader context of Z2 in which it is placed, so to be sure to understand 
Speusippus’ position as in relation to those of Plato and Aristotle.  
 
79 As to the aim of book Z specifically, interpreters disagree. In particular, Menn (2011) has recently questioned 
the answer provided by both Burnyeat (2001) and Frede and Patzig’s commentary (1988), which relied on the 
assumption that the discussion of Z is arranged according to an investigation of the criteria and candidates for 
substances. By contrast, Menn argues that Z offers a critical investigation περὶ ἀρχῶν. As he explains elsewhere 
(unpublished, IIα: 9): ‘Z is looking for ἀρχαί and it is looking for the ἀρχαί as one particular kind of cause, 
namely as a cause of being in one particular sense’.  
80 It is obviously impossible, in this context, to cover extensively the scholarly debate related to Aristotle’s 
conception of οὐσία in book Z of Metaphysics and how it relates to other Aristotelian texts. For a general 
overview of book Z, see Frede and Patzig (1988), Bostock (1994), Burnyeat (2001) and Lewis (2013). For a 
critical overview of scholarly positions on the arrangement of book Z of the Metaphysics, see Menn (2011).  
81 Arist., Metaph. Z2, 1028b18-24, transl. Ross modified. 
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At the beginning of Z2,82 Aristotle says that ‘substance is thought to belong most 
obviously to bodies’.83 Accordingly, he lists candidates generally thought to be substances: 
animals, plants and their parts; natural elements and things that are composed by these; the 
heaven and its parts. Nonetheless, a comprehensive analysis still needs to address whether 
these things alone are substances; if all of them are, or only some; and if there are more 
things that need to be added to the list.84 Indeed, some philosophers are said to believe that 
the ‘limits of body, i.e. surface, line, point and unit’85 are substances as well, and more so 
than the body or the solid. It is at this point that the passage begins, and that problems arise. 
Aristotle states: 
 
ἔτι παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητὰ οἱ μὲν οὐκ οἴονται εἶναι οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον, οἱ δὲ πλείω καὶ μᾶλλον 
ὄντα ἀΐδια […]. 
 
Further, some do not think there is anything substantial beyond sensible things, but 
others think there are eternal substances which are more in number and are more real.86 
 
This first sentence presents two groups of people: (a) οἱ μέν and (b) οἱ δέ. The first group 
(a) seems to be clearly defined: those people who believe that, beyond the sensibles, no 
substances can be found. On the contrary, the second group (b), which includes Plato and 
Speusippus, is not as clearly delineated, as there are some grammatical ambiguities related 
to μᾶλλον, placed in an equivocal position. Indeed, the comparative adverb can be either 
taken to refer to ὄντα (μᾶλλον ὄντα) or considered together with πλείω (πλείω καὶ μᾶλλον, 
ὄντα ἀΐδια). Accordingly, Aristotle might be saying that:  
 
 (b.1): ‘but some others (believe that there are) eternal substances which are greater in 
number and are more real’.87  
 
82 Although the scholarly debate about book Z is very lively, chapter 2 of book Z is usually overlooked by 
scholars, who often treat the chapter as a mere report of previous views on substance, aimed at introducing the 
possibility of the existence of non-sensible substances. Indeed, references to Z2 in scholarly debates are almost 
restricted to pointing out the two different questions asked by sections Z1-3, namely, with Menn’s words 
(unpublished, IIα: 9): (a) ‘what οὐσίαι are there?’, (b) ‘what is the οὐσία of a given thing’. Moreover, as it is 
Z3 that mainly sets the agenda for the rest of book Z, scholarly accounts generally overpass Z2 quickly. As an 
example, except for Frede and Patzig’s commentary (1988: 26-32) and Menn’s chapters (unpublished, IIα), 
which fairly discuss the section, Burnyeat (2001: 13-14) and Bostock (1994: 69-70) dedicate to it only two 
pages of their books, while Lewis only a few lines (2013: 16). 
83 Arist., Metaph. Z2 1028b8-9 ‘δοκεῖ δ᾽ ἡ οὐσία ὑπάρχειν φανερώτατα μὲν τοῖς σώμασιν᾽, transl. Ross. 
84 Ivi, 1028b13-14. 
85 Ivi, 1028b16-17, transl. Ross. 
86 Ivi, 1028b18-19, transl. Ross slightly modified. 
87 Following Ross’ translation. Ross (1924: 164) offers another option for the translation which is closer to b.2 
(‘entities more in number and more truly substances, being eternal’) but concludes this one is preferable. 
Tricot’s French translation of the Metaphysics (1953: 351) goes in the same direction, as well as Isnardi 
Parente’s (1980: 153-154) and Reale’s (1993: 291), although Reale alone clarifies the second term of 
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(b.2): ‘while others think that there are several [kinds of οὐσία beyond the sensibles], 
and that they are more so [i.e. are οὐσίαι to a higher degree than the sensibles], since 
they are eternal’.88 
 
These options present two main interpretive approaches to be discussed here. On the one 
hand, translation (b.1) relies on a substantivation of the adjective ἀΐδια. However, the 
adjective is not preceded by an article in the text. On the other hand, translation (b.2) 
implicitly supplies a τοιαῦτα in order for the reading to be possible. As a result, in translation 
(b.1) μᾶλλον determines ὄντα: others believe that there are eternal substances, which are 
beings to a higher degree; by contrast, in translation (b.2) μᾶλλον, together with πλείω, 
qualify the implicit τοιαῦτα: others believe that there are several (viz. things of this sort) and 
that they are more so (viz. of this sort), because they are eternal. 
 
I tend to prefer option (b.2) for the following interpretative reasons. 
 
The meaning of (b.1) seems to suggest a strong contrast with group (a). The first group 
of people believes that no substances can be found beyond sensible bodies, while the second 
group believes in the existence of non-sensible substances, which are more in number and 
more real. Therefore, the two groups seem to be mutually exclusive: the first group believes 
that only sensibles can be substances (as there is nothing of such a sort, τοιοῦτον, beyond 
them), while the second group holds that only non-sensible things can be considered 
substances. Indeed, even though the two comparatives do not necessarily entail mutual 
exclusiveness, they nonetheless establish the superiority of eternal substances over sensible 
ones in terms of being and number, thus making the contrast tenable anyway.  
 
comparison of πλείω. Accordingly, in Reale’s translation eternal substances are more numerous ‘delle (sc. 
sostanze) sensibili’, i.e. than sensible substances. In a later volume dedicated to the Metaphysics and the first 
philosophy of Aristotle, Reale (2008: 183) quotes the passage and gives a translation very close to (b.2). 
Nevertheless, as the volume is not intended as systematic translation of Metaphysics, I will refer to his earlier 
translation as the standard one.  
88 Following Menn’s translation (unpublished, IIα: 24). Bostock (2001: 2) follows the same interpretive 
direction, as do Frede and Patzig (1988: 63). For the sake of completeness, I should mention that, in their 
commentary, Frede and Patzig, (1988: 31-32) distinguish as many as three possible translations of the sentence. 
Indeed, they propose two different options of punctuation that open to three interpretive directions. Transl. 1 
and 2 are derived by inserting a comma after ὄντα (i.e. οἱ δὲ πλείω καὶ μᾶλλον ὄντα, ἀΐδια); transl. 3 is obtained 
by inserting a comma after μᾶλλον (i.e. οἱ δὲ πλείω καὶ μᾶλλον, ὄντα ἀΐδια); While transl. 3, which is preferred 
over the others, coincides with (b.2), the two others deserve a quick comment. Transl. 1 corresponds to Ross’ 
translation (b.1), even though I do not see the need of a comma after ὄντα in order to make the reading possible. 
The translation is rejected on the basis of Metaph. 1028b17 and 21, which suggest that what is stake in the 
passage is a degree in terms of substantiality, and not in terms of being. Also, transl. 2, derived from the same 
punctuation, differs from transl. 3 (that is the same as b.2) only in the punctuation chosen for the Greek. Both 
translations are refused because the reading of ἀΐδια alone, isolated by the punctuation they proposed, creates 
problems. Accordingly, I don’t see the need for a third interpretive option as they do.  
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This interpretation, however, may face an initial complication: a comparison in terms of 
degree of being (i.e. eternal substances are more real than sensible ones) would not make 
much sense in a Platonic context, where a strong polarity between sensibles and Forms can 
be detected. Indeed, a comparison presented in terms of degree of being would dissolve the 
antithesis between Forms, essences in the full sense, and sensibles, which ontologically 
depend on the latter, establishing some sort of ontological hierarchy that is not explicitly 
exhibited in the Platonic dialogues.89 Yet, the comparison does indicate a controversial point 
in Plato’s ontology, as the relationship between sensibles and Forms never receives an 
exhaustive account and, from an Aristotelian perspective, might be subject to this 
interpretation. Despite this option, bringing in the discussion elements which are extraneous 
to the context of Z2 and to Aristotle’s own interpretation may not be legitimate from a 
methodological point of view. In the end, in Z2 Aristotle maintains that Plato established 
three kinds of οὐσία: the Forms, the objects of mathematics and the substance of sensible 
bodies. Given this framework, a comparison in terms of being would still hold.  
 
But the appropriateness of the comparison in terms of degrees of being can also be 
questioned with respect to the internal coherence of Z2. As Frede and Patzig observe in their 
commentary,90 also the lines immediately preceding our passage91 suggest that what is at 
stake here is not a degree of being but, rather, a degree of substantiality. Indeed, in 1028b 
16-17 Aristotle says that, for some people, ‘τὰ τοῦ σώματος πέρατα, [...], εἶναι οὐσίαι, καὶ 
μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὸ στερεόν’, namely, that the limits of the body are οὐσίαι, and even 
more so than the body and the solid. Therefore, it would be more reasonable that the same 
comparison is here at stake: it is not that non-sensible οὐσίαι are considered to be more real 
than sensibles, but, rather, they are considered to be οὐσίαι qua substance to a higher degree. 
In this respect, I agree with Menn92 that lines 1028b 18-19 also refer back to the fifth aporia 
of book B;93 in that circumstance, the question raised was ‘whether we should say that there 
are only the sensible οὐσίαι, or also others besides these, and whether [these others] are all 
of the same kind or are several genera of οὐσίαι, [as claimed by] those who say that there 
 
89 For a recent study of the notion of οὐσία in the Platonic dialogues (and, in particular, in the Theaetetus, 
Republic and Parmenides), see Ferrari (2017). Ferrari argues that οὐσία in the dialogues expresses two different 
notions of separation: (a) ‘simple separation’ of the Form qua Form, peculiar to every Form as distinguished 
from particulars; and (b) ‘peculiar separation’ of each Form from other Forms, which constitutes its peculiar 
essence. For a comprehensive discussion of the term until Aristotle’s technical use, see Motte-Somerville 
(2008). 
90 Frede-Patzig (1988: 31). 
91 Arist., Metaph. Z2 1028b 17. 
92 Menn (unpublished, IΙα: 18) and Reale (2008: 183-184).  
93 See Arist., Metaph. B 997a 34-b3. 
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are the Forms and also the intermediates, which they say the mathematical sciences are 
about’.94  
 
Accordingly, I take the meaning of (b.2) to be closer to Aristotle’s intentions in Z2 and 
to face fewer interpretative problems. If (b.1) somehow established two mutually exclusive 
groups or a comparison played by degrees of being, I believe that (b.2) opens the path to a 
more continuous understanding of the two groups. While the first group (a) denies the 
possibility of finding οὐσίαι beyond sensible bodies, the second group (b) would believe in 
the existence of many kinds of οὐσίαι beyond sensible bodies. This way, the second group: 
believes in the existence of different kinds of οὐσίαι beyond sensible bodies; establishes 
degrees of substantiality among those οὐσίαι; and considers substances beyond bodies to be 
οὐσίαι to a higher degree than the sensibles due to their eternity. Also, this interpretation 
does not exclude the possibility that the second group considers sensibles to be οὐσίαι as 
well. Indeed, the examples given by Aristotle seem to suggest exactly this: Plato is said to 
have established two kinds of οὐσίαι (i.e. Forms and mathematicals), together with a third 
kind, that of sensible bodies; and Speusippus believed in the existence of even more 
substances. Provided that the Aristotelian description might not give a fair description of 
Plato’s commitments,95 the account seems to be much more generous in relation to 
Speusippus: apparently, for him, sensibles were to be considered substances96 as well.97  
 
94 Menn (unpublished, IIα: 18). And, in fact, Menn takes the πλείω in Z2 to also mean several [genera], 
unpublished, IIα: 18 n. 29). Also Ross (1924b: 163) acknowledges that πλείω can be taken to mean both (i) 
‘more numerous than sensible substances’and (ii) ‘more than one kind’, but he prefers option (i). 
95 For sure with respect to sensible bodies, while the question about mathematicals as intermediates can be left 
open. See, e.g., the critique Reale addresses against Annas in Annas (1992: 14-15). For Reale, Annas is too 
reluctant to attribute Plato the theory of intermediates; Annas denies that such a theory can be found in the 
dialogues, but she is open to the possibility that it was part of Plato’s exoteric teaching. On a more general 
level, this aspect may consistute a problem for my interpretation: if Aristotle’s depiction of Plato’s οὐσίαι can 
be considered unfair, the same can be said of Speusippus’. However, Aristotle’s interpretation of Plato’s οὐσίαι 
can be defended via a reference to Plato’s dialogues, where the term is not used with technical nuance. See, 
e.g., Delcomminette’s conclusion (2008a: 111) about the usage of the term in the Republic: ‘Nous avons essayé 
de montrer qu’«être» était toujours à prendre dans ce dialogue (viz. the Republic) au sens d’être quelque chose, 
c’est-à-dire d’être déterminé d’une certaine façon. Cette détermination peut être ou non parfaite (my 
emphasis); mais l’οὐσία par excellence est ce qui est parfaittement déterminé […]. Prise dans sa totalité, elle 
constitue donc l’objet propre du désir du philosophe, en ce qu’elle correspond au mode d’être qui seul peut 
procurer à celui-ci la connaissance à laquelle il tend. Mais οὐσία peut également désigner l’être d’une chose 
particulière (my emphasis), auquel cas ce terme renvoie plutôt au contenu de la détermination de la chose, 
c’est-à-dire à ce qu’elle est son essence’. For similar conclusions on the Theaetetus, see Delcomminette (2008b: 
142); on the Sophist, Collette-Dučić (2008: 158); on the Statesman, Delcomminette (2008c: 163); on the 
Philebus, where the term is taken to be close to Aristotle’s employment, Van Riel (2008: 173-174).  
96 At least in Aristotle’s perspective.  
97 Regardless of whether this nuance can be correctly attributed to Aristotle’s passage or not, a parenthesis 
related to the meaning and usage of the term οὐσία is required. Indeed, a precise definition of the term, together 
with a discussion of its meaning, significance, and reference, can only be found in Aristotle and cannot be 
attested with certainty for Speusippus. Moreover, as the term appears precisely in book Z of the Metaphysics, 
dedicated to an enquiry about substance, it is safer to consider it as a properly Aristotelian framework in which 
Speusippus’ system is presented, rather than Speusippus’ own terminology. Conversely, what we can conclude 
from our analysis is that, if Speusippus did indeed employ this term, his conception of οὐσία would likely be 
closer to the Aristotelian than to the Platonic notion, or, at least, of wider application than that of his master. 
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Accordingly, Aristotle’s description of previous philosophers’ ontology in [FR. 48] refers 
to two groups of people: the first group (a) believes that substances can be found only among 
sensible bodies; the second group (b) which includes Speusippus, believes in the existence 
of different kinds of οὐσίαι, including the sensibles, as arranged according to different 
degrees of substantiality.98 To put it in another way, Speusippus belongs to that group whose 
arrangement of the world features different ontological levels. With this in mind, we can 
examine the following lines of Aristotle’s report more thoroughly. 
 
Σπεύσιππος δὲ καὶ πλείους οὐσίας ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἀρξάμενος, καὶ ἀρχὰς ἑκάστης οὐσίας 
ἄλλην μὲν ἀριθμῶν, ἄλλην δὲ μεγεθῶν, ἔπειτα ψυχῆς. 
 
Speusippus posited still more kinds of substances, beginning with the One, and positing 
principles for each kind of substance, one for numbers, another for spatial magnitudes, 
and then another for soul. 
 
Aristotle adds that, beside the sensibles (παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητά), Speusippus established the 
existence of many oὐσίαι – and, along with these, of correspondent principles – among which 
he lists numbers first, next magnitudes, and then soul. Moreover, as Speusippus is credited 
with establishing even more substances than Plato, who is already ascribed three different 
kinds of οὐσίαι, namely Forms, mathematicals and sensibles, we might think that we should 
include those substances in the list as well.  
Accordingly:  
 Aristotle’s list of οὐσίαι: 
Plato τὰ εἴδη τὰ μαθηματικά ἡ οὐσὶα τῶν αἰσθητῶν 
σωμάτον 
Speusippus  
(τὸ ἕν)99 
ἡ οὐσὶα 
τῶν 
ἡ οὐσὶα τῶν 
μεγεθῶν 
ἡ οὐσὶα 
τῆς ψυχῆς 
 
 
(Contra, see Cattanei 1996: 152-153, who argues that Speusippus’ theory increases Plato’s theory ‘della 
sostanza soprasensibile’ in terms of principles, while reducing it in terms of genera). Indeed, an inclusive 
conception of substances that encompasses sensible bodies within its definition squares both with the rejection 
of Plato’s Forms and with the fact that the inquiry into the sensibles constituted a considerable part of 
Speusippus’ research. However, a second option is also possible. Mansfeld and others (1990: esp. 52-61) have 
shown that previous to Aristotle there was a tradition of classifying philosophers’ views on the basis of the 
ὄντα they established, a tradition that both Plato and Aristotle used in order to make their classifications (on 
this, see also Menn 2012: 206-207). Accordingly, another possibility would be to consider the term οὐσία 
Aristotle uses here as a superimposition of his terminology onto a classification of ὄντα Speusippus did actually 
establish. 
98 As highlighted in the previous footnote (n. 78), we must keep in mind that the language of substantiality may 
or may not represent a helpful tool when thinking about Speusippus, who might have thought of his 
arrangements of the components of the world otherwise. In order to facilitate the reading, however, I will keep 
using this formulation throughout this section. Indeed, on the one hand, the framework for Speusippus’ theories 
is provided by Aristotle, and, in this regard, the formulation is faithful; on the other hand, the formulation is 
still helpful for thinking of an internal order of the arrangement, which, although phrased by Aristotle in terms 
of substantiality, might reveal a different but compatible rationale for it. 
99 It is unclear whether τὸ ἕν needs to be included or excluded from Aristotle’s list of oὐσίαι. The reasons for 
such doubts will be clarified in the next paragraph. 
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ἀριθμῶν (τὰ αἰσθητά)100 
 
From a comparison of Aristotle’s lists of Plato’s and Speusippus’ οὐσίαι, one more aspect 
emerges: Aristotle seems to intend Speusippus’ multiplication of the oὐσίαι as a 
multiplication of the kinds of oὐσία. It is not that, in comparison with Plato, Speusippus takes 
into account more of the world. Rather, Speusippus posited even more oὐσίαι because he 
further subdivided in kinds some of the οὐσίαι Plato established.101 And such a reading 
seems to be confirmed by parallels with other Aristotelian passages in book B.102 Thus, a 
gradual structure of reality starts to be delineated; at the top we find primary principles,103 
followed by numbers, magnitudes, soul, and probably, as we have just seen, sensibles at last. 
And for each οὐσία, specific principles. Therefore, Aristotle’s testimony provides us with 
considerable information about the elements composing the various levels of Speusippus’ 
world. Despite the apparent clarity of the content, though, a second glance reveals more 
challenges.  
 
Primary principles 
First of all, the passage raises an obvious question about principles in general, and, more 
specifically, about primary ones: the One (τὸ ἕν) and Plurality (τὸ πλῆθος). Are primary 
principles to be considered in the same manner as the other substances listed or not? The 
Greek formulation, ‘Σπεύσιππος δὲ καὶ πλείους οὐσίας ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἀρξάμενος’ seems to 
 
100 Aristotle appears to now take for granted that there are sensible oὐσίαι. On this aspect, see Menn 
(unpublished, IIα: 18). 
101 My chart converges completely with Gaiser’s scheme (1998: 227). For a different interpretation of the kinds 
in Speusippus’ system and a discussion of previous scholarly hypotheses, see Tarrant (1974: 144 specifically). 
In particular, Tarrant discusses the positions of Merlan and Krämer and offers his own interpretative solution 
on the basis of a comparison of Speusippus’ oὐσίαι with the hypotheses of Plato’s Parmenides. On the basis 
of Aristotle’s passage, Krämer identifies four kinds (as I do in the scheme) + the primary principle (which, 
however, he lists among the oὐσίαι). Differently, Merlan recognises five different kinds (the chart diverges 
from mine only insofar as two kinds of bodily οὐσίαι are accounted for), with the soul in the middle. The reason 
for the postulation of two bodily oὐσίαι (i.e., body-inferior bodily entities) responds to the need to account for 
a puzzling passage of Theophrastus (fr. 71 IP1), in which τὸ τίμιον is said to be at ‘centre of being’ (περὶ τὴν 
τοῦ μέσου χώραν) with the extremes on either side τὰ δ᾽ἄκρα ἑκατέρωθεν)’ Tarrant (1974: 133). Tarrant’s own 
scheme is very close to Merlan’s, although it is more detailed in providing material principles for each kind, 
as well as attributes. Although both Merlan and Tarrant rely heavily on Iamblichus’ DCMS (fr. 72 IP1) for their 
identification, it is noteworthy that none of them include the One among the oὐσίαι. 
102 See, e.g., aporia 5, Arist., Metaph., B2 997a34-b3, transl. Menn (ivi): ‘whether we should say that there are 
only the sensible oὐσίαι, or also others besides these, and whether [these others] are all of the same kind (my 
emphasis) or are several genera of oὐσίαι, [as claimed by] those who say that there are the forms and also the 
intermediates, which they say the mathematical sciences are about’. Menn takes Aristotle in Z2 to be speaking 
about kinds of oὐσίαι just as he does in aporia 5, book B. This reading is justified also by reference to Plato, 
Sophist, 245a-246c, where the discussion, evoked by Aristotle, relates to whether oὐσίαι are bodies, 
incorporeals or both. 
103 As previously emphasised, the context does not allow a full and detailed examination of each aspect related 
to Speusippus’ philosophy. Accordingly, for some controversial issues, here as well as in other circumstances, 
I will rely on the two extensive analyses conducted by Isnardi Parente (1980) and Tarán (1981: 33). In this 
particular case, I take for granted that Speusippus theorised the existence of a second principle, Plurality (τὸ 
πλῆθος), that is absent in the fragment under analysis, but is nonetheless attested by frr. 64, 66, 75, 82, 82a, 83, 
84 IP1.  
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suggest that, at least for Aristotle, we should consider the One as included in the list: first 
principles are οὐσίαι just as much as numbers, spatial magnitudes and the soul. However, 
the sentence, constructed with ἀρξάμενος in the nominative connected to Σπεύσιππος and 
followed by ἀπὸ plus the genitive, keeps an intrinsic ambiguity in Greek just as it does in 
English. ‘Starting from the One’ might suggest both an inclusive104 as well as an exclusive105 
consideration of the One among the list of οὐσίαι. It must be said that a parallel examination 
of the grammatical construction in Aristotle reveals that its usage quite often bears an 
inclusive meaning.106 Nevertheless, grammatical parallels cannot be considered as 
conclusive here.107 Indeed, if we consider the passage as a whole, and we examine its 
implications in terms of meaning, other problems arise. For instance, Aristotle says that 
Speusippus posited principles for each kind of οὐσία, starting from the One. Then, in the list, 
numbers, magnitudes and the soul appear. Accordingly, if, as Aristotle said, Speusippus 
posited principles for each οὐσία, and if, as we assumed before, the One is an οὐσία as well, 
the One itself would also require a principle rather than being a principle itself.  
 
One possible way to solve the difficulty would be to consider the One to which Aristotle 
 
104 For instance, this is ps.-Alexander of Aphrodisias’ reading of the text (In Arist. Metaph., 462, 34ff Hayduck 
= fr. 49 IP1); thus, the commentator lists the One as the first οὐσία (πρώτην μὲν τὸ αὐτοέν). The clearest 
examples of an inclusive reading of the middle voice of the verb ἄρχω in constructions such as: ‘ἀρξάμενος 
ἀπό + gen’ occur in Euclid. E.g., ‘ἀρξάμενον ἀπὸ τοῦ Θ τὴν ΘΜΒ διαπορεύεται’, Eucl., Phaenom., 9.37. Tarán 
contends that the One should be considered the first οὐσία (and the first number) precisely by means of an 
inclusive reading of the construction. In his response to Mueller (1986), Tarán (1991: 228-230) makes it clear 
that he considers the construction to be necessarily inclusive. For a longer discussion of the topic, see Tarán 
(1981: 32-41).  
105 If not exclusive, at least not clearly inclusive. And this seems the way in which Asclepius understands the 
sentence in his Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics (fr. 50-51 IP1). For in both passages (Ascl., In Arist. 
Metaph., 379 12ff and 377 34ff Hayduck) the One does not appear in the list of Speusippus’ substances (cf. 
especially 377 34ff: καὶ ὁ μὲν Σπεύσιππος πολλὰς ἕλεγεν εἶναι οὐσίας· ἄλλην γὰρ οὐσίαν ἔλεγεν εἶναι μεγεθῶν 
καὶ ἄλλην ἀριθμῶν […]). Although the passage offers a reinterpretation of Aristotle’s lines in which the kinds 
Aristotle identified are multiplied in even further species, the One does not appear nevertheless. It is true, 
however, that Asclepius is not well-known for his originality (see e.g. Tarán 1969: 8 and Cardullo’s (2002: 
507-513) partially rehabilitative comments) and might be relying on Syrianus’ own exegesis of book Z (Luna 
2001: 142-174) which he simplified. For Aristotelian cases in which the construction does not seem to be 
clearly inclusive, see e.g. Arist., HΑ, ΙΙ 17, 507a 36-507b 1, ‘ὁ μὲν στόμαχος ἀπὸ τοῦ στόματος ἀρξάμενος ἐπὶ 
τὰ κάτω παρὰ τὸν πλεύμονα᾽. In this case, the mouth is where the oesophagus originates, but is not part of the 
oesophagus itself. The construction is similarly difficult to determine when it refers to time-periods. See, e.g. 
Arist., ΗΑ, 564a 19, where Aristotle says female pigdgeons sit on their egs ‘starting from the afternoon’ (ἀπὸ 
δείλη ἀρξαμένη) or HA, 633a 13-14, where Aristotle says the cuckoo becomes visible ‘starting from spring’ 
(ἀρξάμενος ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔαρος). Here as well, not only the seasons (which might be considered ambiguous in 
principle) but also the risings of the stars seem to rather determine an origin, or limit, for the event to happen. 
In fact, the migration of birds (or hibernation, as Aristotle believed) as well as the sitting-times on their eggs 
are regular insofar as periods are concerned, not days. On the determination of time according to the risings 
and settings of the stars, see Peck (1970: 383-408). This reading of the One as the origin of the series (but not 
as part of it, see Smyth (1956, 1348 b) on the usage of ἀπό or ἐξ + genitive with verbs of beginning), also 
squares with Aristotle’s own conception of a series. See Kirwan (1998: 153): ‘According to Aristotle every 
series must have an ‘origin’, which is either its first member or something outside the series (as a parent is the 
origin of the developing stages of his child)’, my emphasis. 
106 See, e.g. in constructions such as ‘ἀρξάμενοι πρῶτον ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων’ in Arist., EE 1217a 18; PA, 646a 3, 
655b 28, Poet., 1447a 12; similarly, also in A.Po, 81b 38; 81b 40. 
107 Especially since both forms are attested in Aristotle’s corpus. See infra footnotes 104 and 105 above. 
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refers as the first number, and not as a principle. At the same time, though, it would not really 
make sense to consider the One Aristotle refers to as the first number, since numbers appear 
immediately afterwards in the list. As the One is listed as the first item, and numbers come 
right after it, I see no reason for repetition on Aristotle’s part.108 Accordingly, it seems more 
plausible to consider the One here referred to as a principle, and to consider it as principle of 
numbers.109 This squares with the fact that, in Aristotle’s formulation, the sentence 
highlightingt principles for each kind of οὐσία follows the sentence regarding the One:  
 
Speusippus posited still more kinds of substances, beginning with the One, and positing 
principles for each kind of substance. 
 
But if we take the One to be the principle of numbers, we need to conclude that the One, as 
primary principle, cannot be an οὐσία even for Aristotle, or at least not properly speaking, 
since it is a principle itself and it does not require another principle.110  
 
A second solution, which seems more plausible to me, might be found in considering the 
difficulties of Aristotle’s passage as a reflection of a difficulty Aristotle himself had in 
translating Speusippus’ system into his own theoretical language and framework. Indeed, what 
if Speusippus’ principles had an ontological status that was thought to be ambiguous by 
Aristotle? In the end, first principles could not be the same as Platonic Forms, since Speusippus 
 
108 Moreover, to suppose that Speusippus did not consider the One as a number would also be preferable on 
the basis of the cultural background of his time (cf. Arist., Metaph., N 1088a6ff). On the One not being regarded 
as a number, see Heath 1921: 69-70 andff.). For an identification of the One with number 1 in this passage, see 
Tarán (1981: 35ff). Contra, Dillon (2003: 44ff), who differentiates different dimentions for the One as principle 
of all things, principle of numbers and a number itself. For a discussion of the consideration of One as an 
element and principle of numbers in Theon of Smyrna, see Petrucci (317-320 and 329-330) who traces the 
roots of such a discussion back to Academic theories. On Aristotle’s discussion of the one as a unit of measure 
(in Metaph. I), see Centrone (2005: 49-64). On Aristotle’s own conception of the One, more specifically, see 
Castelli (2010). On Aristotle’s testimony of the principles as related to Pythagoreans, see Horky (2013a: 22-
27). Tarán, who interprets the One as number one, relies mainly on ps- Iamblichus (fr. 122 IP1). However, the 
consideration of the One as a principle does not exclude its arithmetical employment (see Acerbi 2010: 236ff). 
109 I agree with Isnardi Parente (2005, Commento (a): 14) on this point. In order to support her interpretation, 
Isnardi Parente quotes Arist. Metaph. M10, 1087a3: the One is not the first of a series (πρῶτον), but rather it 
is its foundation (πρότερον). The whole Aristotelian passage is very interesting as it addresses the problem of 
whether the principles-elements are substances or not. Contra, see Tarán (1981: 300-302), who takes the One 
listed here as the first number. Differently, Dillon (2003: 51) opts for a triple multiplication of the One, and 
argues that Speusippus postulated ‘three distinct entities: a supreme ‘One’, or Unity, the first principle of all 
things, a secondary ‘One’, or Unit, which is the immediate product of the primal One and Plurality, and serves 
in turn as the first principle of Number—and thirdly, the purely mathematical ‘one’[…]’.  
110 For an overview of scholarly interpretations of the passage, see Isnardi Parente (2005, Commento (b): 12-
14). Isnardi Parente identifies two different and equally misleading interpretations of the passage: on the one 
hand, to take Aristotle too literally and establish a lack of connection between the realities Aristotle lists, e.g. 
Stenzel (1929), Rabinowitz (1957: 87ff), Tarán (1981: 300-302); on the other hand, to establish a derivative 
connection between them and colour Speusippus’ interpretation of a Neoplatonic nuance, e.g. Ravaisson (1838: 
36ff); Dodds (1928: 129-142); Merlan (1953: 96-140), Krämer (1964: 31-32; 208; 214-215). Isnardi Parente 
takes a middle position: she acknowledges Speusippus’ realities as independent from one another, but she 
connects them by means of their analogy. As to my interpretation, Isnardi Parente would certainly list it among 
those which take Aristotle too much literally. 
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refused to admit their existence, and they were not even comparable with Aristotelian 
substance, i.e. with individual objects and their species.111 At the same time, Aristotle reports 
that the Academics referred to their principles as στοιχεῖα,112 thus creating confusion regarding 
their ontological status. Accordingly, for the moment our analysis will conclude that at least 
in Aristotle’s mind, Speusippus’ principles possibly bear a peculiar ontological status, which 
might not be precisely the same of other οὐσίαι. 
 
Other principles?  
The consideration of the One rasises an obvious and related question: are primary 
principles different than other kinds of principles? And how do other principles work? Not 
to fall short of expectations, it must be said that the material preserved does not allow a clear 
reconstruction of each stage of reality together with its principles.113 Similarly, it is 
extremely difficult to be more precise about what distinctive features principles other than 
primary feature. In order to solve these puzzles and defend Speusippus’ system from the 
charge of disconnection,114 scholars often established an analogical relationship between the 
pair of first principles (One-Plurality) and principles of different stages of reality.115 The 
 
111 See Arist., Categ., 5.11-17: ‘A substance—that which is called a substance most strictly, primarily, and 
most of all—is that which is neither said of a subject nor in a subject, e.g. the individual man or the individual 
horse. The species in which the things primarily called substances are, are called secondary substances, as also 
are the genera of these species. For example, the individual man belongs in a species, man, and animal is a 
genus of the species; so these—both man and animal—are called secondary substances’, transl. Ackrill. Once 
more, the passage quoted above (Arist. Metaph. M10, 1087a1-1087b 8) reveals telling: ‘if the first principles 
are universal (καθόλου αἱ ἀρχαί) either the substances composed of them will be universal too, or there will be 
a non-substance prior to the substance (ἔσται μὴ οὐσία πρότερον οὐσίας); because the universal is not substance 
and the element or first principle is prior to that of which it is an element or first principle (πρότερον δὲ τὸ 
στοιχεῖον καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ ὧν ἀρχὴ καὶ στοιχεῖόν ἐστιν)’. The problem arises because of the Academics’ 
consideration of the principles as elements.  
112 See, e.g., among many passages, fr. 58 IP1. 
113 It is generally accepted that Speusippus identified the principles of magnitudes with point (ἡ στιγμή) and 
place (ὁ τόπος), although Aristotle is not consistent in the attribution and other times speaks of extension 
(διάστημα), see, e.g., Arist., Metaph. N, 1092a17-20 and M, 1085b31. As for the soul, things become even 
more complicated. It is only through Posidonius that we receive a definition of the soul as ‘the form of the 
omni-dimensionally extended’ (ἰδέα τοῦ πάντη διαστατοῦ), a definition Posidonius advocates for himself 
(Plut., De anim. Proc., 22, 1023b). Isnardi Parente (2005, Introduzione: 8) suggests as principles of the soul 
τέτρας and διάστασις, but she needs to rely on ps-Iamblichus (Theolog. Aritm., 61-62) and on a dubious 
attribution of a passage in De Caelo for textual evidence (III, 307a29-307b3 = Supplementum Academicum 
122a). Lastly, she identifies in the couple ταὐτον-θάτερον (inspired by Plato’s Sophist; Isnardi Parente 1979: 
63) the principles of sensible things. Tarrant (1974: 135) offers a different interpretation for the identification 
of principles by giving priority to the One: ‘He begins only with the formal principle, which is always the One 
in some particular guise […] and gradually builds up larger structures until the receptacle as a whole is finally 
revealed’; accordingly, for Tarrant the material principle of numbers is πλῆθος, of geometricals τόπος, of 
psychicals κίνησις, of bodies κενόν and of φαυλότατα, ἄπειρον. However, in order to provide such details, 
Tarrant relies heavily on ps-Iamblichus’ Theolog. Arithm. (=fr. 122 IP1), whose content on such topics is not 
paralleled elsewhere. Pesce (1961: 56) offers an interpretation similar to Tarrant’s. 
114 Aristotle’s charge of disconnection against Speusippus’ system will be analysed in the next section (1.2). 
115 See Stenzel (1929) who equates the concept of ὁμοιότης and that of ἀναλογία. Accordingly, ὅμοιον 
ultimately means ‘proportionally analogous’ and bears a mathematical meaning. Isnardi Parente (2005) 
disagrees on the mathematical reference, especially when applied to the sensibles; rather, she carachterises the 
ὁμοιότης as a functional analogy. However, as Napolitano-Valditara rightly emphasises (1988: 249, n. 69), it 
is not clear how the analogy works precisely. In particular, Napolitano-Valditara highlights that it is difficult 
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resulting picture is that of a system in which, coherently with Aristotle’s testimony in Z2, 
different realities have indeed their peculiar principles; however, principles at different 
levels are nevertheless related by means of similarity to one another. All of these issues will 
be addressed in more detail later on.116 For our purposes, it is important to underline that 
apart from scattered Aristotelian comments about principles, the only fragment preserving 
information about principles in general is preserved by Proclus,117 and its content seems to 
play a specific role in Proclus’ own formulations. Accordingly, questions regarding the 
functioning of primary principles will be addressed at the conclusion of our analysis, in order 
to gather all the information at our disposal first.  
 
With regard to the realities populating Speusippus’ world, Aristotle’s passage does point 
to (at least some of) them: numbers, spatial magnitudes, the soul and the sensibles. As each 
component will be analysed in detail in the following chapters, I will limit myself to a brief 
introductory outline of each item and of the general framework we can get from the fragment 
under consideration.  
 
The mathematical realm 
From Diogenes Laertius’ catalogue,118 we learn that Speusippus wrote a book entitled 
Μαθηματικός, the Scientist.119 If the title’s reference to mathematical and geometrical 
practices cannot be established conclusively,120 it is probable Speusippus recognised 
 
to understand how the στιγμή can work as the formal principle for magnitudes, and how the ταὐτον can perform 
the minimalistic functions that the ἕν and the στιγμή perform at different levels. Moreover, as Isnardi Parente 
understands first principles as the condition of possibility of numbers, it is unclear how the ταὐτον can perform 
a similar function at the level of the sensibles.  
116 For my position on the relationship between different ontological levels, see next section (1.2). For the 
analogical relationship between different levels of the system established by scholars, see Chapter 4. For the 
functioning of first principles, see Chapter 6. 
117 Fr. 35 IP1 (= Procl., In Eucl. p. 179, 12-22 Freidlein).  
118 Diog. Laert., IV 1-5. On the lives of Speusippus and Xenocrates, see Dorandi (2008). On book IV more 
generally, see Dorandi (1999) and (1992). 
119 Possibly a dialogue. Zeller (Zeller, Mondolfo 1974: 1006, n. 3) believes the book to be the first part of On 
Pythagorean Numbers. Contra, Lang (1911:30) thinks the title of the book clearly indicates it was a dialogue. 
On this basis, he arbitrarily corrects the list of books reported by Diogenes and moves it to the first part of the 
catalogue (see Dorandi 1992: 37-66). See also Isnardi Parente (1980: 212-213 and 216) and Tarán (1981: 188-
199).  
120 If Isnardi Parente is cautios in acknowledging a mathematical reference in the title of the treatise, which she 
translates as ‘Lo Scienziato’ (Isnardi Parente 1981: 36. And similarly, Dorandi (1999: 493) who translates ‘Le 
Savant’), Bénatouïl and El Murr (2010: 57) more confidently suggest as Speusippus’ background the reference 
to Plato’s Republic (527aff.). Bénatouïl and El Murr (2010: 61) also note that besides the Μαθηματικός, 
Diogenes reports of another book entitled Φιλόσοφος. They contrast the two books on the basis of two different 
practices, one peculiar to the geometer, another to the philosopher. On the conception of ancient Greek 
μαθήματα, and the usage of the term with reference to arithmetics, geometry, astronomy and harmonics, see 
Vitrac (2005), Zhmud (2006: 122-124) and (2018: 451-452): ‘From him (viz. Archytas) this idea passed onto 
Plato and Aristotle and became firmly established in Greek culture. In the mid fourth century B.C.E. this group 
of sciences, in which the application of mathematical methods was common (my emphasis), was joined by 
mechanics and optics. This canonical set of mathēmata survived with very minor variations until the end of 
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mathematics and geometry as theoretical sciences nevertheless.121 Indeed, in line with 
Plato’s requirements for stable objects of knowledge, mathematical objects are eternal, 
immobile and not subject to change. In this respect, it is important to stress that Aristotle’s 
terminology is usually inconsistent and fluctuates mainly between τὰ μαθηματικά and ὁ 
μαθηματικὸς ἀριθμός. However, it seems reasonable to say that both numbers and 
geometrical items fall under the mathematical realm and that both are in question when 
Aristotle speaks generically of τὰ μαθηματικά.122 What Aristotle consistently says is: 
 
-  Speusippus rejected ideal number and postulated mathematical number only;123 
-  mathematical number (or mathematical objects) is the first of beings (τὸν πρῶτον τῶν 
ὄντων).124  
- mathematical number is a reality in itself125 and is not conceived as a cause.126 
 
Aristotle’s insistence in characterising mathematical number as the first ‘being’127 might 
support the doubts we raised concerning his interpretation of Speusippus’ principles. On the 
one hand, the characterisation of the principles as στοιχεῖα suggests him a physical 
consideration of them; on the other hand, as numbers (or mathematical objects) are said to 
be the first ὄντα, Speusippus’ principles cannot be considered ‘beings’, or at least not 
fully.128 By considering mathematical number as the first of beings, primary principles at 
least, but possibly also other kinds of principles, are left out. If primary principles are not 
ὄντα, how should we conceive of them? Fortunately, as the relationship between first 
 
antiquity. […] Those engaged in these disciplines called themselves, and were called by others, hoi peri 
mathēmata or hoi mathēmatikoi’. 
121 See Tarán (1981: 424-425). The identification of arithmetics and geometry as the objects of theoretical 
sciences will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.  
122 The possibility of a unitarian consideration of the mathematical realm will be tested at various stages of my 
analysis. However, it must be said from now that extant Aristotelian fragments on Speusippus never discuss 
magnitudes (μεγέθη) at length. Indeed, except for fr. 84 IP1 which examines the principles of μεγέθη, magnitues 
are usually mentioned at the end of the argument, with formulations such as: ‘ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ μεγέθη᾽ (see, 
e.g. fr. 75 and 80 IP1). This may be a consequence of the fact that most of the Aristotelian fragments concerning 
Speusippus are to be found in books M and N of the Metaphysics, where Aristotle has the Academics’ 
conceptions of numbers as the first target. In this respect, contradictions about magnitudes would already 
follow from those Aristotle draws about numbers.  
123 See, e.g. frr. 52, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77 IP1 
124 See, e.g. frr. 52, 74, 75 IP1. 
125 καθ᾽αὑτὴν φύσιν, Arist., Metaph., N2, 1090a 12-13 (=fr. 80 IP1).  
126 Arist., Metaph., N2, 1090a10-12 (=fr. 80 IP1); N3, 1090b16-19 (=fr. 86 IP1)  
127 As well as mathematical substance as the only ούσία ‘παρὰ τὰς αἰσθητὰς οὐσία’ (Arist. Metaph., M1, 
1076a11), as in fr. 74 IP1: ἕτεροι δέ τινες τὰς μαθηματικὰς μόνον οὐσίας εἶναι φασι. 
128 See infra, fotnote 97. Before Aristotle, the doxographic tradition classified philosophers according to the 
number and character of ὄντα they established. See Mansfeld (1990) and Menn (2012: 207): ‘the pre-Platonic 
doxographic classification of the philosophers based on what ὄντα they posited was really a classification of 
what things they posited as having existed from the beginning’. In this respect, the list of Speusippus’ items, 
despite Aristotle’s language of substantiality may also be understood as a list of the ὄντα he posited; and 
Aristotle’s consistency in speaking of number as the first of beings (τῶν ὄντων) may be taken as a confirmation 
of such a supposition.  
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principles and numbers is the best attested, we can attempt an investigation of the relation 
between principles and corresponding kind of οὐσία, by analysing the relation between 
primary principles and mathematical number/objects.129 Lastly, it is important to emphasise 
Aristotle never attributes to Speusippus’ mathematical objects any kind of causal activity. As 
it will be clear from the next two sections (1.2 and 1.3), the exemption from causal activities 
granted to mathematical objects will have a significant impact on Speusippus’ system; indeed, 
this aspect provides evidence to understand both Speusippus’ rejection of Forms as well as the 
charge of episodicity Aristotle addresses against his system. 
 
The soul 
Concerning the soul, the situation becomes even more difficult: indeed, among extant 
Aristotelian testimonies concerning Speusippus, only one passage mentions the soul. 
Moreover, the passage does not help at all any understanding about the soul itself, as it only 
tells us that the statements of mathematics (τὰ λεγόμενα)130 please the soul (σαίνει τὴν 
ψυχήν).131 
For this reason, in the present context the soul will not receive a separate and specific 
account. In order to compensate the absence of such aspect, which would be important for a 
clearer understanding of Speusippus’ epistemological theories but is absent in Aristotle’s 
testimonia, Chapter 5 will take into account an epistemological fragment preserved by 
Proclus in the Commentary on the First Book of Euclid’s Elements. Although the fragment 
refers generally to the hunt for knowledge performed by διάνοια and does not provide 
additional information about Speusippus’ conception of the faculty/faculties responsible for 
our knowledge, nevertheless it represents unique evidence for Speusippus’ conception of the 
process of knowledge.  
 
The sensibles 
Lastly, even though not explicitly listed in Aristotle’s list, Speusippus’ world probably 
features sensible objects. That this is the case is hinted by the fact (i) that in Aristotle’s list 
of Plato’s οὐσίαι sensibles occur explicitly,132 and (ii) that in other contexts Aristotle more 
explicitly opposes mathematical objects to sensibles.133 However, the fact that sensibles are 
 
129 See Chapter 3.  
130 As Tarán shows, (1981: 318-319) the reference to mathematics is ensured by the context. 
131 Arist., Metaph. N3, 1090a35 -1090b1 (=fr. 80 IP1). 
132 In general, it seems that in Z2 Aristotle takes for granted that sensibles οὐσίαι exist. See Menn (unpublished, 
IIα: 18): ‘While he here treats it as formally open whether there are sensible οὐσίαι (and it is genuinely open 
whether all alleged sensible οὐσίαι have the same status), he still says that ‘οὐσία seems to belong most 
manifestly to bodies’, and all of the views he cites (including Plato’s, 1028b19-21) do concede that there are 
sensible οὐσίαι, even if perhaps these are not οὐσίαι in as high a degree as the eternal things’. 
133 See, e.g., Arist., Metaph. N3, 1090a35-1090b1 (=fr. 80 IP1). 
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not explicitly included in Aristotle’s list may raise other doubts: do sensibles (qua sensibles) 
have their principles as well? Or are they absent from Aristotle’s list of οὐσίαι and 
correspondent principles because they don’t? 
Moreover, a consideration of the sensible world is usually neglected or incidental in 
scholarly accounts, which have paid more attention to reconstructing metaphysical theories 
preserved in later sources, than in giving Speusippus’ focus on scientific research the right 
credit. Besides the biological fragments preserved by Athenaeus, Diogenes Laertius bears 
witness of not one, but ten volumes of a book of (Dialogues) On the science of Similars, of 
a book entitled Divisions and Hypotheses on the Similars and of a book on Examples of 
Genuses and Species. Given this background, although not extensively discussed by 
Aristotle in his testimonia, sensible objects seem to constitute a conspicuous part of 
Speusippus’ world. With this in mind, section 4.1 will provide, in parallel with Aristotle’s 
testimony, a discussion of the fragments preserved by Athenaeus, in an attempt to do justice 
to the weight conceded to the sensible world by Speusippus’ own research.  
 
1.2 The episodicity of the world (frr. 86; 52) 
Once the items composing Speusippus’ world have been identified, it is reasonable to ask 
the following question: how are these related to one another? Part of the answer can be found 
in one of the most famous critiques addressed by Aristotle to Speusippus: the charge of the 
episodicity of the world. Indeed, in Metaphysics N,134 Aristotle accuses Speusippus of 
having condemned the world to a badly constructed tragedy. For Aristotle, if we judge ἐκ 
τῶν φαινόμενων, nature does not appear to be episodic at all. Likewise, at the beginning of 
his Metaphysics, Theophrastus addresses the same charge to Speusippus.135 In the study of 
nature, the starting point is to understand ‘whether there is some connection (συναφή)136 and 
something like a mutual association (οἷον κοινωνία) between intelligibles and the things of 
nature’.137 His conclusion is, straightaway, that it is more reasonable (εὐλογώτερον) to 
suppose that there is some connection and to suppose that the whole is not episodic. But 
what does this disconnection amount to? In order to answer this question, let us analyse 
 
134 Arist., Metaph. N3, 1090b13-20 = fr. 86 IP1. 
135 Theophr., Metaph., 4a 9-17 in Gutas (2010: 110-113). On this passage, cf. Petrucci (2018: 106) ‘To put it 
briefly, μὴ ἐπεισοδιῶδες τὸ πᾶν (Metaph. 4a14): the world is a consistent whole, encompassing a perfect realm, 
whose very structure ensures its own qualified permanence, and a lower one, whose permanence and regularity 
is determined by the former. All this leads to a qualitatively determined conception of the world’s dynamics: 
after all, Theophrastus seems willing to regard the world’s order as good, to the point of stating that providence 
rules over the heavenly realm’. For an organicistic reading of Theophrastus’ doctrine, see van Raalte (1988). 
136 It is probably relevant the difference Aristotle draws between ἁφή and σύμφυσις in Metaph. Δ 4, 1014b22–
26, here evoked by Theophrastus’ employment of the word συναφή ‘i.e. (viz. the difference) between mere 
contact and organic unity […]; in the latter case apart from contact there is in both parts something which makes 
them one relatively to continuity and quantity’ (Alexandru 2014: 122, my emphasis). 
137 Gutas (2010: 111). 
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Aristotle’s fragment directly:  
 
[FR. 86] ἔτι δὲ ἐπιζητήσειεν ἄν τις μὴ λίαν εὐχερὴς ὢν περὶ μὲν τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ παντὸς 
καὶ τῶν μαθηματικῶν τὸ μηθὲν συμβάλλεσθαι ἀλλήλοις τὰ πρότερα τοῖς ὕστερον (μὴ 
ὄντος γὰρ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ οὐθὲν ἧττον τὰ μεγέθη ἔσται τοῖς τὰ μαθηματικὰ μόνον εἶναι 
φαμένοις, καὶ τούτων μὴ ὄντων ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὰ σώματα τὰ αἰσθητά· οὐκ ἔοικε δ’ ἡ φύσις 
ἐπεισοδιώδης οὖσα ἐκ τῶν φαινομένων, ὥσπερ μοχθηρὰ τραγῳδία). 
 
Again, if one is not too easily satisfied, one might inquire further with regard to all 
number and the objects of mathematics, that they contribute nothing to one another, the 
prior to the posterior; for if number did not exist, none the less magnitudes would exist 
for those who maintain the existence of the objects of mathematics only, and if 
magnitudes did not exist, soul and sensible bodies would exist. But the phenomena show 
that nature is not a series of episodes, like a bad tragedy.138 
 
In this passage, Aristotle points out at something which constitutes, in his view, a general 
problem of Speusippus’ system: if one were to press him further on number and 
mathematical objects in general, she would realise that these do not contribute anything to 
one another. Crucial here is the verb συμβάλλω, which establishes the relationship at stake. 
As Crubellier emphasises in his commentary,139 the verb is used in the same way it is 
employed by Aristotle in M5 (1079b 12-13),140 namely to express the role that objects 
presented as ontologically prior play in the explanation of those which come after them.141 
The connection with this second passage, in which Aristotle famously asks: τί ποτε 
συμβάλλονται τὰ εἴδη ἢ τοῖς ἀϊδίοις τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἢ τοῖς γιγνομένοις καὶ φθειρομένοις, is 
 
138 Arist., Metaph. N3, 1090b13-20 = fr. 86 IP1, Transl. Ross, slightly modified.  
139 Crubellier (1994: 496). Accordingly, the verb is not used with the technical meaning of ‘to compare, or to 
be comparable’ (see, Ross 1924b: 427, but also Mulgan 1974: 67). So concludes Riesbeck (2016: 263-265) in 
the context of book 3 of the Politics, where he translates the verb as ‘to contribute’. For a similar use of the 
verb in Aristotle, with the sense of ‘to contribute’, see Arist., De An., 1, 1, 402a5: ‘The knowledge of the soul 
admittedly contributes (συμβάλλεσθαι) greatly to the advance of truth in general’, transl. Smith; Ivi, 2, 3, 
414b10-11: ‘Sounds, colours, and odours contribute (συμβάλλεται) nothing to nutriment’, transl. Smith; EE 3, 
7, 1234a30: ‘Therefore envy contributes (συμβάλλεται) to injustice (for the actions that spring from it affect 
another person)’, transl. Rackham; EN, 7, 14, 1154a 22-23: ‘Since we should state not only the truth, but also 
the cause of error—for this contributes (συμβάλλεται) towards producing conviction’, transl. Ross; GA, 1, 20, 
727b 3: It is clear then that the female contributes (συμβάλλεται) the material for generation, and that this is in 
the substance of the menstrual discharges’, transl. Platt. 1; GA, 1, 21, 730a 25-26: ‘the contribution 
(συμβάλλεται) of the female to the generative product is not the same as that of the male’, transl. Platt; Poet., 
1458b1-2: ‘A major contribution (οὐκ ἐλάχιστον συμβάλλεται) to clarity and unusualness of diction is made by 
lengthenings, shortenings, and modifications of words’, transl. Halliwell (note that Bywater translates directly 
‘what helps most’). 
140 Arist. Metaph. M5, 1079b 12-13: Πάντων δὲ μάλιστα διαπορήσειεν ἄν τις τί ποτε συμβάλλονται τὰ εἴδη ἢ 
τοῖς ἀϊδίοις τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἢ τοῖς γιγνομένοις καὶ [τοῖς] φθειρομένοις· οὔτε γὰρ κινήσεώς ἐστιν οὔτε μεταβολῆς 
οὐδεμιᾶς αἴτια αὐτοῖς. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὔτε πρὸς τὴν ἐπιστήμην οὐθὲν βοηθεῖ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων (οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐσία ἐκεῖνα 
τούτων·ἐν τούτοις γὰρ ἂν ἦν), οὔτ’ εἰς τὸ εἶναι, μὴ ἐνυπάρχοντά γε τοῖς μετέχουσιν· The criticism Aristotle 
expresses against Plato’s theory of Forms in chapters 4 and 5 of book M of the Metaphysics, repeats almost 
literally (with the exception of the presence of Speusippus’ and Xenocrates’ doctrines) that of chapters 6 and 
9 of book A (on the minor differences between the books see Annas 1976: 131-132).  
141 That ontological priority is in question appears to be confirmed by the middle, which ‘lays stress on the 
conscious activity, bodily or mental participation, of the agent’ Smyth (1956: 392) 1728. Accordingly, it is the 
role, or, better, the contribution that τὰ πρότερα make to τοῖς ὕστερον which is absent. See Bonitz (1870), 
which translates the middle συμβάλλεσθαι as ‘conferre’, to bring together or to contribute. 
  17 
essential. With respect to Plato’s Forms, Aristotle emphasises that they do not offer any 
contribution to the sensibles because they do not seem to bear any causal function for their 
understanding.142 More specifically, Forms do not seem to be the cause of their movement,143 
of their knowledge,144 of their essence,145 nor their material cause (lit. the cause ἐξ οὗ).146 
Hence, as Forms do not contribute anything to the sensibles, there is no need to suppose their 
existence. Accordingly, in Aristotle’s report of Plato’s account, the (ontological) priority of 
Forms over the sensibles is explained by the causal role the former exert on the latter.147 
Aristotle challenges precisely this point by pointing out that such inferential procedure from 
simple entities we perceive with our senses to more complex entities is unjustified because 
the supposed causal activity performed by Forms on sensibles cannot be acknowledged.148 
This works fine as far as Plato is concerned. But what about the objects populating 
Speusippus’ world? As previously highlighted, Aristotle denies that Speusippus’ 
mathematical objects perform causal activities.149 This is important because it means that the 
major critique Aristotle addresses to Plato in M5, and related to the causal activities of 
Forms, cannot be at stake in the passage under analysis. Moreover, unlike Plato, Speusippus 
did not posit the existence of Forms, or, more generally, of items whose existence Aristotle 
would not recognise. Accordingly, the issue cannot be limited to a complaint about a false 
inferential procedure:150 for Aristotle would easily agree on the existence of all items present 
in Speusippus’ ontology. Hence, Speusippus’ mistake must be acknowledged on different 
grounds.  
 
One thing to note is that items referred to in Aristotle’s examples coincide precisely with 
 
142 For a positive account of causal activities exerted by Forms beyond formal and paradigmatic causality, see 
Fronterotta (2008) and the studies listed at pp. 16-17. For a broader view on Plato’s theory of Forms, see the 
papers collected in Fronterotta and Leszl (2011). 
143 Arist., Metaph., 1079b14-15. 
144 Ivi, 15-17.  
145 Ivi, 17-23. 
146 Ivi, 23-24. In the following lines (1079b25-1080a11), Aristotle will also criticise the role Forms play as 
paradigmatic (or final) causes, as οὐσίαι of sensible things, and the theory of causality exposed in the Phaedo 
(99e-105c), possibly considering Forms as efficient causes. For a more recent analyses of the issues related to 
universals and, more specifically, to the problems created by Plato’s postulation of Forms see the papers 
collected in Charadonna and Galluzzo (2013: 139), most of which address specific problems arising by Plato’s 
Forms and Aristotle’s related criticism. 
147 As well as their separability (χωρίς), but the issue will be touched upon shortly, as separation and priority 
are strictly related in Aristotle’s account. For an analysis of Plato’s ontological hierarchy as arranged according 
to the rule of ‘prior-posterior’ and grounded in the principle of συναιρεῖν καὶ μὴ συναιρεῖσθαι, see Ferrari 
(2015) and (2016).  
148 As Castelli (2013) synthetically resumes: ‘Aristotle’s criticism of Platonic Forms is mainly directed against 
two precise points: the ambiguous ontological status of Forms and their role as causes’.  
149 This aspect will be investigated in more detail in Chapter 3. 
150 Or it can, but only to a certain extent, namely as it represents the starting point of Aristotle’s criticism. Cf. 
Crubellier (1994: 495): ‘ce que nous percevons de la nature nous donne l’exemple de liaisons causales 
ordonnées et intelligibles, et l’on peut donc s’attendre qu’il en soit ainsi pour le réel dans sa totalité (y compris 
les êtres qui échappent à notre expérience)’ (my emphasis). 
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those listed in Aristotle’s list of Speusippus’ οὐσίαι; except for the One, we find, in the same 
order: number, magnitudes, the soul, and explicitly listed here, sensible bodies. The 
correspondence and coherence between the two lists can thus confirm a) that the items 
populating Speusippus’ world (sensibles included) are indeed those identified in the Z2 
passage; b) that the One, unless considered as the first number, should be excluded by the 
list of Aristotle’s οὐσίαι. Accordingly, a clearer picture starts to emerge: Aristotle is here 
acknowledging an ontological hierarchy between the items populating Speusippus’ world 
but does not find reasons for such a cardinal ordering. Indeed, Aristotle’s reference to an 
order of priority and posterioriy and the correspondence of the items listed with those 
mentioned in Speusippus’ list of οὐσίαι confirm that what is at stake here is an ontological 
hierarchy. The supposition is substantiated by Aristotle’ example: Aristotle explains that 
even if number would not exist, magnitudes would not cease to exist. The same example is 
deployed further: even if magnitudes would not exist, soul and sensible bodies would still 
exist. The example is crucial because it recalls that used by Aristotle in his explanation of 
prior and posterior in Δ11, where Aristotle defines things which are prior in nature and 
substance (κατὰ φύσιν καὶ οὐσίαν) according to the possibility to be without (εἶναι ἄνευ): 
 
Τὰ μὲν δὴ οὕτω λέγεται πρότερα καὶ ὕστερα, τὰ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ οὐσίαν, ὅσα 
ἐνδέχεται εἶναι ἄνευ ἄλλων, ἐκεῖνα δὲ ἄνευ ἐκείνων μή·ᾗ διαιρέσει ἐρήσατο Πλάτων. 
 
Some things, then, are called prior and posterior in this sense; others in respect of nature 
and substance, i.e. those which can be without other things, while the others cannot be 
without them — a distinction which Plato used.151 
 
In the passage, Aristotle establishes a connection between priority in nature, or in substance, 
and ontological independence, or the capacity to be without.152 As Aristotle phrases the 
connection in this context, in order for A to be ontologically prior to B, (i) A can be without 
B, while (ii) B cannot be without A. Scholars disagree as to how this ‘capacity to be without’ 
should be interpreted153 and as to whether the premises are both necessary in order to cause 
 
151 Arist. Metaph. Δ11, 1019a1-4, transl. Ross. 
152 The scholarly discussion on the topic of ontological priority and how it should be related to ontological 
separation is extremely lively. As the topic would require a more detailed analysis, in the present context it 
will be impossible to cover the bibliography exhaustively. In a recent paper, before advancing her own view, 
Katz (2017: 26-40) does a very good job in enabling a clear understanding of the main points of discussion and 
highlighting the reasons for scholarly disagreements. Accordingly, my analysis will largely rely on Katz (2017) 
and Katz (2013) for the main points of clarification on the issue. 
153 As Katz (2017) clearly explains, the two main interpretative decisions amount to establishing (a) the 
meaning of the verb εἶναι in ‘the capacity to be without’; and (b) the independence relation expressed by ‘the 
capacity to be without’. On the standard view (a) εἶναι is taken to have an existential meaning (see, e.g. Fine 
1984; Witt 2003 and Makin 2003); and (b) the relation of independence is taken to be modal (as implication 
of being. i.e., for B to be ontologically dependent on A is for A to be a necessary condition for B). However, 
these are not the only possible interpretations; for example, the meaning of the verb εἶναι can be taken as 
essential (i.e. ‘being what something is’, see, e.g. Peramatzis 2011: 13), and (b) the relation of independence 
can be taken to be ‘cause of being’. 
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ontological separation.154 However, what scholars generally agree on is that for ontological 
priority to obtain both conditions are individually necessary and jointly sufficient: namely 
(i) A’s ontological independence from B, and (ii) B’s ontological dependence on A. But in 
[FR. 86], Aristotle’s example establishes that in Speusippus’ world, the various ontological 
levels do not even satisfy the necessary (and hence, neither the sufficient) conditions for 
ontological priority to obtain. Let us take the first part of the example. Aristotle says: μὴ 
ὄντος γὰρ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ οὐθὲν ἧττον τὰ μεγέθη ἔσται.155 Indeed, the individually necessary 
condition for A (i.e. mathematical number) to be prior to B (i.e. magnitudes), is (i) A’s 
ontological independence from B and (ii) B’s ontological dependence on A. But Aristotle 
states precisely the opposite: if number ceased to exist, none the less magnitudes would exist. 
Accordingly, the individual necessary condition for B to be ontologically dependent on A is 
not satisfied, because B is not ontologically dependent on A. But if one of the two necessary 
conditions for ontological priority is not satisfied, it is impossible to meet the sufficient 
condition for ontological priority at all. Accordingly, mathematical number does not satisfy 
the conditions to be ontologically prior to magnitudes. Nevertheless, items listed in the 
passage do satisfy the condition for weak ontological separation: namely, the ontological 
independence of B (i.e. magnitudes) from A (i.e. mathematical number). For Aristotle says 
magnitudes would still exist even if number did not. However, weak ontological separation 
does not imply ontological priority, as the two items can still be simultaneous. And I believe 
this is precisely Aristotle’s point in the present passage: Speusippus’ substances are 
ontologically isolated.156 Hence, they cannot be arranged in order of ontological priority 
because their independence is not asymmetrical and fails to ground the things from which 
they are independent. Contra Plato, in Speusippus’ system, causality does not grant the 
priority of one ontological level over the other. As Speusippus’ substances are ontologically 
 
154 Either weak or strong ontological separation, (henceforth OS). In general, we can say both premises are 
individually necessary and jointly sufficient for strong OS, which implies ontological priority, but that for weak 
OS to obtain only (i) is sufficient. For a discussion of the topic with respect to Plato (and principles), see Menn 
(unpublished, Iβ4). 
155 I take Aristotle’s formulation to be existential. For this reason, I believe the passage can be considered akin 
to that in Δ11, although the language of annihilation is not explicit. For similar passages with a clearer 
vocabulary of physical annihilation (therefore with an existential meaning), see e.g. Arist., EE Α8, 1217b 8-16 
with Trabattoni’s (2003: 290-293) comments; Iambl., Protr. 38, 11-14 Pistelli = Arist., Fr. 5 Ross. 
156 I owe Katz (2017: 64) the terminology of isolation. In her paper, Katz argues further that strong ontological 
separation (mutually entailing with ontological priority as both have the same jointly sufficient conditions but 
are not conceptually identical) allows Aristotle to deny that ontologically isolated substances as those posited 
by Speusippus fulfil the separation criterion for substancehood: ‘Speusippus’ candidate substances are 
independent from but not strongly OS from sensible substance (viz. for otherwise sensibles would be dependent 
on them). This allows Aristotle to rule them out from the start, since they fail to ground the kind (or kinds) 
from which they are independent, and so fail to fulfil the separation criterion of substancehood’. In the end, 
Aristotle does not question the existence of mathematical number or magnitudes, but their consideration as 
separate substances. In effect, if weak OS were a sufficient criterion for strong separation, Aristotle would be 
forced to admit that not only the soul and the sensibles are substances, but mathematical objects as well.  
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isolated, nothing accounts for their ontological arrangement.157 This seems to be confirmed 
by the metaphor Aristotle employes, and which I will take into account briefly. Ontological 
levels are arranged like the episodes of a poor tragedy, and the elimination of one does not 
involve consequences for the rest of the system. But Aristotle’s critique can be further 
unpacked:  
 
a) First of all, the lack of connection Aristotle is here pointing at does not seem to be 
random. Aristotle provides us with a precise order of elimination, which follows the same 
order provided when presenting the components of Speusippus’ world in the list of 
οὐσίαι: numbers, magnitudes, soul and sensible bodies. As this structure seems to imply 
a precise internal order, it is plausible to conclude Aristotle takes Speusippus’ components 
to be organised according to different degrees of substantiality, as I had suggested in the 
previous section. Accordingly, in Speusippus’ world, at least in the way Aristotle 
describes it, numbers are οὐσίαι to the highest degree (due to their eternity, apparently), 
and then, according to a gradual descent, magnitudes, soul and sensible bodies. But 
Aristotle denies Speusippus’ levels can be arranged according to ontological priority-
posteriority, because the independence of each level does not ground the levels it is 
independent from. Thus, Aristotle is telling Speusippus that although he established 
degrees of substantiality within his system, and although, according to this arrangement, 
some components are ontologically prior to others, he failed to recognise that to establish 
an order of priority implies some degree of dependence as well.158 Now, the question of 
what sort of independence is here intended, and whether it can be fleshed out as an 
existential independence159 of prior levels, or as the capacity not to depend on something 
else for their status as distinct kinds of οὐσίαι,160 does not present an issue for the present 
analysis. For whatever interpretation of the notion of dependence we are working with 
here, 161 the conditions are not satisfied by the items of Speusippus’ world.  
 
157 Isnardi Parente, on the contrary, holds that Aristotle is scarcely reliable on this point (1960: 274 and 322) 
and she argues that Speusippus’ system relies on an internal relation of analogy. However, establishing a 
relation of analogy between different ontological levels, does not imply as a consequence also a necessary 
connection between them. Differently, Dillon (2003: 44-46) argues in favour of a generative connection of the 
levels for which, he admits, there is no evidence. Moreover, as he relies extensively on Neoplatonic material 
(Iamblichus’ DCMS and and ps-Iamblichus’ Theologumena Arithmeticae) in order to advance his views, it is 
hard to challenge his interpretation on the basis of the extant Aristotelian evidence. In Chapter 2 I will argue 
that Aristotle needs to be taken seriously in his criticism, which is revealing of Speusippus’ epistemological 
claims.  
158 In fact, the notion of dependence is, for Aristotle, crucial in order for things ‘to be classified as kinds of 
beings; […] it is in virtue of standing in one of these ties (viz. to be said-of and to be present-in) that non-
substances and universal substances are in fact classified᾽. Corkum (2008: 76-77).  
159 As, for example, in G. Fine (1993). 
160 As for example, in Corkum (2008) and, to a certain extent, Peramatzis (2011). 
161 By defining it in opposition to ontological independence, it can mean, e.g. (i) the incapacity for independent 
existence (G. Fine 1984, Witt 1989; Makin 2003); (ii) the incapacity to be what it is independently of A being 
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b) Moreover, the isolation of Speusippus’ ontological levels is explicitly evoked by the 
metaphor used by Aristotle: to say that the world does not resemble the episodes of a bad 
tragedy, amounts to saying that the world is not constituted by a series of disconnected 
events.162 In Poetics 6, when giving a first definition of what tragedy is, Aristotle mantains 
that tragedy ‘as having magnitude’ should be ‘complete in itself’. And the stress on unity 
and completeness is constant throughout the whole book.163 Within this unitarian 
conception of the tragedy and, more specifically, of its structure,164 an episodic plot is 
defined as that where ‘there is neither probability nor necessity in the sequence of its 
episodes’.165 But that the absence of probability and necessity in the sequence of the 
episodes amounts to their isolateness is explained by Aristotle while clarifying what he 
means by ‘the plot is one’.166 It is here that we find the best explanation of his metaphor:  
 
The truth is that, just as in the other imitative arts one imitation is always of one 
thing, so in poetry the story, as an imitation of action, must represent one action, a 
complete whole (μιᾶς τε εἶναι καὶ ταύτης ὅλης), with its several incidents so closely 
connected (καὶ τὰ μέρη συνεστάναι τῶν πραγμάτων) that the transposition or 
withdrawal of any one of them will disjoin and dislocate the whole (μετατιθεμένου 
τινὸς μέρους ἢ ἀφαιρουμένου διαφέρεσθαι καὶ κινεῖσθαι τὸ ὅλον). For that which 
makes no perceptible difference by its presence or absence is no real part of the 
whole (ὃ γὰρ προσὸν ἢ μὴ προσὸν μηδὲν ποιεῖ ἐπίδηλον, οὐδὲν μόριον τοῦ ὅλου 
ἐστίν).167 
 
 
what it is (Peramatzis 2011: 189); (iii) not having claim to the ontological status of a being idependently of 
being either (or both) said-of or present-in another thing (as subject), (Corkum 2008: 77); the necessity that ‘it 
be an essential property of x (viz. B) that it exist only if y (viz. A) does’ (essentialist/existential account of 
dependence; K. Fine 1995: 272-273). 
162 On this point, see also Katz (2017: 62), to whose reading of the metaphor I am indebted. See, as a parallel 
of the metaphor, also Arist., Metaph., Λ10 1975b 37-1076a 2: ‘those who say mathematical number is first and 
go on to generate one kind of substance after another and give different principles for each, make the substance 
of the universe a series of episodes (ἐπεισοδιώδης) (for one substance has no influence on another 
(συμβάλλεται), by its existence or non existence)’, transl. Ross.  
163 Just as it is a crucial issue with respect to the world. See, e.g. Arist., Poet. 7, 1450b24-25: ‘a tragedy is an 
imitation of an action that is complete in itself, as a whole of some magnitude’ (my emphasis); or 23, 17-20: 
‘the construction of its plots should clearly be like that in a tragedy; they should be based on a single action, 
one that is a complete whole in itself, with a beginning, middle, and end, so as to enable the work to produce 
its own proper pleasure with all the organic unity of a living creature’, (my emphasis). Note, also, that 
beginning, middle and end are defined by Aristotle by what comes before and after and, hence, according to a 
logical order of priority and posteriority (see, Poet., 7, 1450b21-31). This arrangement in terms of beginning, 
middle and end recalls the arrangement of a series (Arist., Metaph., Δ11, 1018b12-14): ‘In respect of place, 
for instance, [things are prior] from being nearer to some place defined either by their nature (as for instance 
the middle or the end)᾽, transl. Kirwan (1998: 44).Throughout the section, all translations of the Poetics are by 
Bywater. 
164 Arist., Poet., 1450a38-39: the ‘the first essential, the life and soul, so to speak, of tragedy is the plot’. 
165 Arist., Poet., 1451b34-35, τῶν δὲ ἁπλῶν μύθων καὶ πράξεων αἱ ἐπεισοδιώδεις εἰσὶν χείρισται· λέγω δ᾿ 
ἐπεισοδιώδη μῦθον ἐν ᾧ τὰ ἐπεισόδια μετ᾿ ἄλληλα οὔτ᾿ εἰκὸς οὔτ᾿ ἀνάγκη εἶναι. As Finkelberg (2006: 62) 
puts it: ‘in Aristotle’s unflattering characterization, the episodic plot in one in which the unity of action is 
diluted, as it were, in a succession of single episodes which do not follow the strict logic of cause-and-effect 
relationship’; also, Garrett (2014: 1): episodic plots are those which ‘violate the strict formal economy of 
tragedy’.  
166 Arist., Poet., 8, 1051a16: μῦθος δ’ ἐστὶν εἷς. 
167 Arist., Poet., 8, 1451a30-35. 
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It is clear that, even in this context, Aristotle’s criticism evokes the two aspects we have 
encountered in [FR. 86]: independence (or isolation), and an arrangement according to 
an order of priority and posteriority. A tragedy which accomplishes the condition of a 
complete whole has a structure whose parts are closely connected; they are so closely 
connected that not only the removal, but also the transposition of one, would affect the 
whole system. On the contrary, parts which can be removed from the plot without 
affecting the whole, are isolated, or disconnected episodes. Once again, Aristotle 
confirms that the independence or dependence of an item can be established on the basis 
of the consequences arising from its suppression. If the whole is not affected, it means 
that the items removed are isolated, and not related to the rest. For otherwise, even the 
transposition of an item from one place of the plot would affect the whole. Accordingly, 
the isolation of Speusippus’ levels implies disconnection between them, and such a 
disconnection cannot account for a precise order of the structure, let alone account for an 
order established in terms of degrees of substantiality.  
 
c) Lastly, it must be highlighted that, at the beginning of the fragment, Aristotle 
addresses the criticism to some components in particular, namely, to all number and 
mathematical objects (ὁ ἀριθμὸς πὰς καὶ τὰ μαθηματικά). For Aristotle says that, if we 
press Speusippus further on all number and mathematical objects, we realise that they do 
contribute nothing the one to the other. Initially, Aristotle’s criticism appears to be 
expressed specifically with reference to numbers and mathematical objects. But in the 
latter part of the testimony, the objects under attack seem to be much less clearly 
identifiable. And in fact, the terminology does not help to clarify the issue. Aristotle first 
identifies the problematic topic as related to ‘all number and the objects of mathematics’. 
Then, when extending his criticism by appeal of an example, Aristotle speaks of ‘number’ 
and ‘magnitudes’; and, lastly, when he refers back to Speusippus’ position in general, he 
says ‘τοῖς τὰ μαθηματικὰ μόνον εἶναι φαμένοις’, i.e. those who say that mathematical 
objects alone exist. Accordingly, Aristotle’s terminology fluctuates between: 1) ὁ ἀριθμὸς 
πὰς καὶ τὰ μαθηματικά, all number and mathematical objects (in general); 168 2) ὁ ἀριθμός 
and τὰ μεγέθη, number and magnitudes; 3) τὰ μαθηματικά, mathematical objects.169 As 
already emphasised, Aristotle’s terminology is rarely consistent when related to 
 
168 See Hussey (1991: 107): ‘Aristotle takes it for granted throughout M 1-3 that there are such things as 
‘mathematical objects’ (in particular, numbers and geometrical figures), and that they are not straightforwardly 
identical with any entities of a more ordinary kind’, and Mueller (1970: 157). 
169 This seems to be confirmed by the language Aristotle employs in books M and N. See Crubellier (1994: 
334) ‘Les objets géométriques sont appelés ‘genres postérieurs au nombre’ (viz. τῶν ὕστερον γενῶν τοῦ 
ἀριθμοῦ) par référence au programme platonicien (Même type de désignation dans A9, 992b13: τὰ μετὰ τοὺς 
ἀριθμούς)᾽. 
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Speusippus’ mathematical ontology and, because of this, it is hard to find a conclusive 
explanation. In particular it is difficult to understand what τὰ πρότερα τοῖς ὕστερον refers 
to, given that they are expressed in a neuter plural. For they could equally refer to (1) τὰ 
μαθηματικά, or to both (2) ὁ ἀριθμὸς πὰς καὶ τὰ μαθηματικά. Does Aristotle refer to (1) 
the relation that mathematical objects in general entertain with non-mathematical levels, 
or is he pointing at (2) an internal relation of mathematical objects to one another? 
Although a definitive answer to this question cannot be provided at this stage of the 
analysis, I believe that an explanation which points to a separation of the mathematical 
level intended as a whole in relation to that of sensible bodies, rather than at an internal 
relation which mathematical objects entertain to one another, is more attractive.170 Indeed, 
it is also worth noting that the soul and sensible bodies are referred to together. This, on 
the one hand, might be easily explained by reference to a principle of economy in the 
explanation provided by Aristotle. As Aristotle has already provided a full example, 
although he needs to show the consequent implications, he does not need to reiterate the 
full description of how the elimination works at every level. On the other hand, though, 
matching together the soul with sensible bodies, and distinguishing them from the 
mathematical realm, maintains a certain attractiveness from a philosophical point of view. 
For, even in Aristotle’s own hylomorphic system, it would be much less intuitive to say 
that, by eliminating the soul, sensible bodies would still exist. Indeed, if mathematical 
objects maintain a certain degree of separability even in Aristotle’s own conception, 
although being inseparable from the objects themselves, the same cannot be said for 
(almost all) sensible bodies.171 Indeed, the claim that by eliminating the soul, sensible 
bodies would still exist, is a much easier claim to counter, if this was really Speusippus’ 
formulation. In any case, I will leave this question open, for the moment.172  
 
Hence, according to our analysis, Aristotle’s passage conveys the following information 
about Speusippus’ system: 
 
170 For a more detailed treatment of Aristotle’s criticism of Platonists’ geometrical objects (and potential 
criticism involved here), see Crubellier (1994: 338-343). 
171 This consideration obviously does not take into account soulless bodies such as rocks and pebbles, which, 
anyway, receive a marginal treatment in Aristotle’s own corpus and respond to a different reason for their 
unity. 
172 Also Crubellier, in his commentary (1994: 496), raises the question of how the thesis of mathematical 
number alone would lead to an episodic conception of the whole reality. His answer touches very closely my 
suggestion: ‘On le conçoit facilement pour ce qui est de la connexion entre les nombres et les phénomènes 
naturels, puisque cette these a précisément été adopté en rupture avec la doctrine primitive des idées, qui pensait 
trouver dans les objects idéaux des causes pour les objets naturels’. In this respect, Annas’ comments on the 
passage are, on the contrary, not very helpful, as she limits herself to the general claim that Aristotle’s criticism 
suggests that ‘the Academy had not in fact said anything very definite’, and to the observation that ‘one theory 
is criticized on the grounds that all the mathematical objects are produced disconnectedly, i.e. there is no 
rational way in which the earlier contribute to the later’ (1974: 209).  
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a) Speusippus’ components of the world appear to be arranged according to 
different degrees of substantiality (or, at least, this is how Aristotle spells out the 
arrangement). Within this arrangement, Aristotle identifies, in order of degree of 
substantiality, the following components: numbers, magnitudes, soul and sensible 
bodies.  
b) Aristotle’s criticism specifically addresses two aspects of Speusippus’ system 
that are connected: priority in substance and ontological isolation of the levels. As 
the components of the world are arranged according to different degrees of 
substantiality, they should also be connected to one another for the order to subsist. 
But this is precisely what is absent in Speusippus’ conception, which by contrast, 
features distinct levels which are separated. For Aristotle the two things, taken 
together, are contradictory: the isolation and disconnection of the levels do not allow 
a consideration of the objects according to an order of substantiality. For, for A to be 
prior to B, B must somehow be dependent on A. 
 
In order to verify the results just obtained, we can test our outcomes against another 
Aristotelian version of the same charge, preserved in book Λ of the Metaphysics. 
 
[FR. 52] οἱ δὲ λέγοντες τὸν ἀριθμὸν πρῶτον τὸν μαθηματικὸν καὶ οὕτως ἀεὶ ἄλλην 
ἐχομένην οὐσίαν καὶ ἀρχὰς ἑκάστης ἄλλας, ἐπεισοδιώδη τὴν τοῦ παντὸς οὐσίαν ποιοῦσιν 
(οὐδὲν γὰρ ἡ ἑτέρα τῇ ἑτέρᾳ συμβάλλεται οὖσα ἢ μὴ οὖσα) καὶ ἀρχὰς πολλάς· τὰ δὲ ὄντα 
οὐ βούλεται πολιτεύεσθαι κακῶς. οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκοιρανίη· εἷς κοίρανος ἔστω. 
 
Those who maintain that mathematical number is primary, and that, in like manner, [there 
is] always another substance which follows and that [there are] different principles for 
each [substance], make the substance of the universe episodic (for one substance in no 
way affects another by existing or non-existing) and establish many principles. But beings 
don’t want to be governed badly: ‘the rule of many is not good; let one be the ruler’.173 
 
As it is immediately evident, the passage does not preserve information on the components 
of the world themselves. Indeed, with the exception of mathematical number, defined as 
primary, other components are not spoken of explicitly. On the contrary, Aristotle speaks of 
the substance of the universe (τὴν τοῦ παντὸς οὐσίαν), and of another οὐσία always following 
mathematical number with its respective principle (ἀεὶ ἄλλην ἐχομένην οὐσίαν καὶ ἀρχὰς 
ἑκάστης ἄλλας).174 From the vocabulary used, which repeatedly insists on the aspect of 
 
173 Arist., Metaph., Λ10, 1075b37-1076a5. The last sentence is a quotation of Hom., Il. II, 204. The earliest 
manuscripts omit ἔστω from the quotation (see Berti 2017: 549). 
174 Note that the insistence on the continuity of the οὐσίαι occurs also in Z2 with respect to Xenocrates (ἔνιοι 
δὲ τὰ μὲν εἴδη καὶ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχειν φαςὶ φύσιν, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἐχόμενα). I take the accent on the 
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substantiality, we can conclude that, as suggested before, mathematical number and the items 
following it should be considered as the οὐσίαι populating Speusippus’ ontology. Moreover, 
the hint of a continuous succession of οὐσίαι following mathematical number seems to confirm 
that the components of Speusippus’ world are in fact arranged according to an order, and that 
the order should be understood in terms of degrees of substantiality. Once again, the 
mathematical level is the focus of Aristotle’s criticism. However, from the passage under 
examination it seems clearer that Aristotle’s charge does not concern internal relations within 
the mathematical level only, but, on the contrary, the relation each level entertains with others. 
Indeed, both Homer’s quotation at the end of the fragment, as well as the general context of 
the discussion of Λ,175 point to the absence of a unique governing principle of the whole. And 
this is specifically evident for Speusippus’ conception, which features principles for each level. 
By contrast with the previous passage, the criticism here does not address specifically the 
question of the relation of the components in terms of priority and posteriority, but, instead, it 
concentrates on their reciprocal disconnection, justified by reference to the peculiar principles 
each level features. However, the criticism is formulated almost in the same way: just as 
Aristotle had said: ‘τὸ μηθὲν συμβάλλεσθαι ἀλλήλοις τὰ πρότερα τοῖς ὕστερον’, in the 
present passage he says ‘οὐδὲν γὰρ ἡ ἑτέρα τῇ ἑτέρᾳ συμβάλλεται οὖσα ἢ μὴ οὖσα’. In this 
respect, one may also note that the relation that Aristotle would want to establish between the 
components, and that he stresses as absent in Speusippus’ conception, is here spelled out by 
appeal to the same verb εἰμί: in nothing one thing affects another by being or not being. 
Accordingly, the fragment confirms our main points: a) Speusippus’ world is populated by a 
variety of components, among which mathematical number is the first, and which, in 
Aristotle’s perspective, are arranged according to an order of substantiality; b) the different 
levels are neither connected to one another, nor ordered according to a unique governing 
principle, but each of them has specific principles. Moreover, c) the fragment also helps us 
clarify Aristotle’s criticism further. It is the way Speusippus accounts for the independence of 
each ontological level, namely, by establishing specific principles ruling over each level, that 
makes Aristotle conclude that his levels are independent and his system episodic. Given that 
 
continuity expressed here by ‘ἀεὶ ἄλλην ἐχομένην οὐσίαν’ to pick up the reference to ‘τὴν τοῦ παντὸς οὐσίαν’. 
Accordingly, the οὐσίαι Aristotle speaks of are considered ontologically consequent to one another and, so to say, 
they do not interrupt the substance of the universe. In this sense, ontological continuity does not imply connection, 
but only the existence of an order. This insistence on continuity is shared also by Theophrastus (see infra, 
footnotes 135-136).  
175 Cf. Zingano (2010: 141-142) ‘Book Lambda endeavours to establish that there is sunaphē tis kai hoion 
koinōnia pros allēla tois te noētois kai toīs tēs phuseōs, “a sort of connection and as it were a common ground 
between objects of reason and the things of nature”, so that they are not disconnected hōsper hekatera 
kechōrismena, “as if each was separated”, to quote twice from Theophrastus’ Metaphysics (2, 4a9–12; see also 
Lambda 10, 1075a16 panta de suntetaktai pōs, “all things are ordered together somehow”), a treatise which 
seems to be very close to Lambda’. On the context of book Λ, see, among alia, the papers collected in Frede 
and Charles (2000) and the collection of Horn (2010a). On Λ10 more specifically and the unity of the world-
order, see Horn (2010b). 
  26 
the mathematical level originates out of different principles than those established for the 
geometrical one, the suppression of the mathematical level would have no effect for 
geometrical objects; for magnitudes would still originate out of their principles even if all 
numbers were to be destroyed. This aspect leads Aristotle to describe Speusippus’ system as a 
series of disconnected episodes. Accordingly, Aristotle’s criticism is directed at every level 
and does not regard the mathematical realm internally only; on the contrary, he points at the 
absence of a unique relation ordering the levels between each other. By establishing peculiar 
and unrelated principles for each ontological level, Speusippus gave away the possibility of an 
ordering continuity in the system.  
 
1.3 The rejection of Forms (fr. 77) 
In order to conclude our sketch of a general framework of Speusippus’ ontology, one final 
aspect stands in need of our attention: the rejection of Plato’s theory of Forms. Indeed, in 
books M and N of the Metaphysics, but also often elsewhere in the corpus, Aristotle presents 
the positions of Plato, Speusippus and Xenocrates together. Each of the three positions is 
characterised by a peculiar feature: beyond the sensibles, Plato posited the existence of 
Forms (and numbers); Speusippus posited the existence of mathematical number alone; and 
Xenocrates brought together Forms and numbers. But in at least one passage, Aristotle gives 
an explicit rationale for Speusippus’ position and for his decision to posit mathematical 
objects only: 
 
[FR. 77] οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὰ μαθηματικὰ μόνον ποιοῦντες παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητά, ὁρῶντες τὴν περὶ 
τὰ εἴδη δυσχέρειαν καὶ πλάσιν, ἀπέστησαν ἀπὸ τοῦ εἰδητικοῦ ἀριθμοῦ καὶ τὸν 
μαθηματικὸν ἐποίησαν·176 
 
Those who posit the objects of mathematics only besides sensible things, because they 
saw the difficulty and artificiality regarding the Forms, abandoned Ideal number and 
posited mathematical number. 
 
In the passage, Aristotle suggests that Speusippus’ decision to establish the existence of 
mathematical number only, beside sensible things, is motivated by the difficulty and 
artificiality he observed in Plato’s theory of Forms. Unfortunately, Aristotle does not explain 
what Speusippus’ specific problems in relation to Plato’s theory were, and the vocabulary used 
here is the only tool at our disposal to grasp the philosophical difficulties. Accordingly, we 
 
176 Arist., Metaph. M9, 1086a2-5. It is worth noting, here, that the expression ‘παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητά’, present in fr. 
48 IP1 as well, here occurs again. In the present fragment, however, it seems that Speusippus concedes the 
existence of mathematical objects only, beyond that of sensible bodies. This conclusion strengthens the 
suggestion, raised in section 1.2 that the main intervention in Speusippus’ system is that between the mathematical 
realm and the sensible one. 
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will investigate the terms δυσχέρεια and πλάσις. 
 
The word δυσχέρεια is commonly used by Aristotle to refer to logical difficulties.177 From 
this perspective, it is not absurd to think that part of Speusippus’ problem with Plato’s theory 
of Forms was related to those discussions taking place already within the Academy, and 
which Aristotle himself raised;178 it certainly did not come as a surprise to Speusippus that 
specific contradictions could be raised against the Forms, especially concerning their relation 
to sensible objects. But if the word δυσχέρεια is quite common in Aristotle’s prose, things 
get more interesting once we address the term πλάσις. Indeed, the substantive πλάσις is not 
common at all in Aristotle’s corpus, where it occurs only once, in the biological context of 
the Generation of Animals.179 In that context, Aristotle is speaking about the production of 
milk in women and its usefulness. The passage explains that although, in the months 
preceding the seventh month, milk is used for the formation of the embryo, when the embryo 
is approaching completion, the residue of secretion is more in quantity because it is not used 
for the moulding of the embryo (εἰς πλάσιν τοῦ ἐμβρύου) anymore, but, rather, for its small 
growth (εἰς μικρὰν αὔξησιν). In this respect, the term points specifically to the conformation 
and shaping that the embryo is undergoing until the seventh month. In absence of other 
occurrences of the substantive, we can broaden our scope with a brief survey of the usage of 
the corresponding verb. Indeed, the general use of the verb πλάσσω, employed by Aristotle 
especially in his biological works, confirms that the usual meaning refers to the moulding of 
 
177 On Aristotle’s use of the term as ‘theoretical difficulty’ in philosophical contexts, see Bonitz (1870: 210), 
who records 15 uses of the word  as ‘philosophical difficulty’ (idem quod ἀπορία and ἀτοπία) and Cheng 
(2018), who provides a survery of δυσχερ-word in both Plato and Aristotle and offers an explanation of the 
process of objectification of the word. As Cheng argues (2018: 99-100): ‘δυσχερ-words are suitable for 
expressing the embarrassing and uncomfortable state of someone who is puzzled by sophistic arguments in 
which semantic polysemy and ambiguity play a considerable role’. Then, Plato and Aristotle seem ‘to “purify” 
the sophistic δυσχέρεια bringing it from the field of antilogia to the Socratic elenchus and the Aristotelian 
dialectic’. For a parallel analysis of the semantic development of the term ἀπορία, see Politis (2006). Cheng’s 
analysis also aims at questioning the results obtained by Schofield (1971), who closely associated the word 
δυσχέρεια with Speusippus. See below, n. 178. 
178 As, for instance, Arist. Metaph., A9; B2; An. Post. I, 22. In a very influential article, Schofield (1971) argued 
that Aristotle’s frequency (especially in books M and N of the Metaphysics) in using the word δυσχέρεια in 
the sense of ‘ἀπορία raised by Speusippus in the Academic debates on first principles’ (ivi: 14) suggests that 
the word can be claimed as Speusippean. The paper has been very well received by scholars and opened the 
path for a lively discussion on the identification of οἱ δυσχερεῖς in Plato’s Philebus. Despite the challenges 
raised by Tarán (1981: 79-80) and D. Frede (1992: 51; 1993: 461), Schofield’s identification of οἱ δυσχερεῖς 
has been defended by Dillon (2003: 67-76 and 1999: 104-105); Tarrant (2010: 111-112) and (2008), where 
Tarrant argues for an analogous identification of οἱ δυσχερεῖς in the Magna Moralia; more recently, Murgier 
(2016: 74-78). For different positions, see Bringmann (1972), who suggests Heraclides lies behind the 
reference (this identification, however, has been strongly questioned by Brancacci 1999) and Warren (2009) 
who shows how Aristotle in NE drew on a previous discussion between Speusippus and Eudoxus, probably 
lying in the background of Plato’s Philebus. For a recent attempt to reconstruct the debate, see Fronterotta 
(2018). 
179 Arist., De gen. anim., 776a34. 
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material objects or matter in general, which leads to the acquisition of a determinate shape.180 
By transposing the results of this brief survey to the context of our analysis, it seems fair to 
conclude that the second part of Speusippus’ problem with the theory of Forms is related to 
the way the theory is conceived and shaped by Plato. But this result seems to be 
unsatisfactory, given that Speusippus abandons the Forms completely and refuses the 
existence of ideal number as well, instead of re-shaping the doctrine. For Speusippus does 
not construct a different theoretical framework for the Forms, as, for instance, Xenocrates 
does. What does it mean, then, that he had observed the πλάσις of Plato’s theory? 
 
In order to obtain a better understanding of the meaning of πλάσις, here two examples of 
the Aristotelian usage of the verb πλάσσω in polemical contexts come to our aid. Let us 
examine them more closely. The first occurs in the De gen. et corr.,181 where Aristotle 
criticizes Leucippus for having constructed a hypothesis according to which reality is partly 
divisible and partly isn’t. He says: 
 
Εἰ μὲν γὰρ πάντῃ διαιρετόν, οὐδὲν εἶναι ἕν, ὥστε οὐδὲ πολλά, ἀλλὰ κενὸν τὸ ὅλον· εἰ 
δὲ τῇ μὲν τῇ δὲ μή, πεπλασμένῳ τινὶ τοῦτ’ ἐοικέναι· 
 
For, if it is divisible through and through, there is no one, and no many either, but the 
whole is void; while to maintain that is divisible at some points but not at others, looks 
like an arbitrary fiction.182  
 
The reasons for Aristotle to say that Leucippus’ hypothesis resembles an arbitrary fiction 
are explained in the following lines: ‘Arguing in this way, they were led to transcend 
(ὑπερβάντες) sense-perception, and to disregard (παριδόντες) it on the ground that one ought 
to follow reason’.183 And again: ‘Moreover, although these opinions appear to follow logically, 
yet to believe them seems next door to madness when one considers the facts’.184 Therefore, 
Leucippus’ theory is arbitrary because it is constructed in such a way that it goes beyond sense 
perception and does not work in accordance with the facts. In the passage, the reasons for 
Aristotle’s criticism are rooted in a strong empiricism: Leucippus’ hypothesis is artificial, 
 
180 See, e.g., De gen. anim. 764a15, where Aristotle considers two animals already moulded in embryo, one of 
which has all the parts of the female, while the other of the male; 730b30, where nature is depicted as a modeller 
who works the material with her own hands. De Hist. An. 623b32; 624a1; 624a2; 624a19, all related to the 
construction of cells by bees or similar insects; 628a 12; 628b 11 where wasps mould their combs; De part. 
Anim. 654b29, 657a20, 676b10 where the verb refers, respectively, to the moulding of an animal out of a clay; 
to the material needed for the formation of ears; to the elements moulded in snakes into a certain form. For a 
complete account of the references, see Bonitz (1870: 597), who translates: formare, fingere (and, accordingly, 
when abstract: confingere, comminisceri). 
181 Arist., De gen. et corr. 325a8-10, transl. Joachim. 
182 Translation by Joachim. Italian translations of the De gen. et corr. also go in the same direction: Giardina 
(2008: 162) translates πεπλασμένῳ with ‘artificioso’, while Migliori (2013: 75) ‘arbitrario’.  
183 Arist., De gen. et corr. 325a13-15, transl. Joachim. 
184 Arist., De gen. et corr. 325a17-19, transl. Joachim. 
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because, according to Aristotle, it completely overlooks reality. The same can be said for the 
second example, taken from the De motu animalium. For, when Aristotle is speaking about 
the joints of the animals, he observes that they work differently than in geometrical 
illustrations:  
 
καὶ γὰρ τὸ κινεῖσθαι, ὡς φασί, πλάττουσιν ἐπ’ αὐτῶν· οὐ γὰρ κινεῖσθαι τῶν 
μαθηματικῶν οὐδέν. 
 
For movement, too, in such figures is a figment, so they say, since in mathematics nothing 
actually moves.185  
 
Once again, Aristotle contrasts what we can observe in accordance with our senses and 
what, by contrast, we cannot. Indeed, when we speak of movement in a mathematical or 
geometrical context, we are not describing a real pattern detectable in nature, but, rather, a 
fictitious one. If we take the two examples to be relevant, we have a much clearer view of 
Speusippus’ concerns: on the one hand, the theory of Forms was problematic because of 
logical difficulties, well attested by various passages of Aristotle’s corpus and possibly 
discussed already by Plato within the Academy; on the other hand, the theory of Forms also 
had an empirical disadvantage: the existence of Forms is not easily discernable by empirical 
analysis and necessitates a stronger metaphysical claim. With the elimination of Forms and 
of ideal number, Speusippus claimed the advantage of dealing with ontological levels that 
were unanimously acknowledged in their existence by reducing the metaphysical dimension 
drastically.  
 
1.4 Speusippus’ ontology: preliminary conclusions 
This preliminary examination of the general features of Speusippus’ system gives us some 
starting points for the following investigation. According to the Aristotelian passages 
analysed so far, we can conclude that:  
 
a) Speusippus belongs to that group of philosophers who established the 
existence of many substances beyond sensible bodies and, according to Aristotle, 
arranged them according to different degrees of substantiality.  
b) The list of Speusippus’ oὐσίαι includes: mathematical number, magnitudes 
(the two are possibly joined together as τὰ μαθηματικά), soul and sensible bodies. 
According to what Aristotle says, each oὐσία presents specific principles. Although 
it is difficult to establish precisely to what extent Speusippus actually shares 
 
185 Arist., De motu animalium, 698a25-26, transl. Peck.  
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Aristotle’s conception of oὐσία, the existence of different principles for each level 
suggests that each level has specific characteristics which distinguishes it from the 
others. Moreover, as mathematical number appears first in the list because it is 
considered the first among beings, the list implies an order in terms of priority and 
posteriority. However, it may well be that the order implied in Speusippus’ 
arrangement follows a different rationale than Aristotle’s, as, for example, a 
difference in terms of ontological progression.186 Nonetheless, there is some way in 
which mathematical number, or mathematical objects, are prior to other components. 
c) The arrangement according to degrees of substantiality or, better, the relation 
in terms of priority and posteriority, implies, for Aristotle, that the different 
ontological levels should be connected to one another. Despite an arrangement which 
features an internal relation of priority and posteriority, for Aristotle, the isolation of 
the levels that fails to account for an order among them.  
d) The fact that Speusippus’ establishes different principles for each ontological 
level makes Aristotle conclude that Speusippus’ levels not only fail to account for 
their arrangement and order but are also disconnected.  
e) Lastly, Speusippus seems to identify two kinds of problems in Plato’s theory 
of Forms: on the one hand, a problem related to logical difficulties involved in Plato’s 
account; on the other hand, an empirical disadvantage that leads Speusippus to reject 
ideals in his system (ideal number included) in favour of a more empirical realism. 
 
 
186 This is the suggestion of Isnardi Parente (1980: 268ff), which seems quite plausible to me. As mathematical 
number is conceived of as the first among beings, the following levels might be explained as a ‘progression in 
terms of being’. This, however, should not be understood as a scale of reality. On the contrary, it is quite clear 
that the Academics considered numbers as real entities, existing by themselves, and not as abstracted ones (see 
also Crubellier (1994: 353-354), who argues that this is the overall theory which Aristotle is trying to 
invalidate). Accordingly, the ‘progression in terms of being’ should be understood as a progressive (and not 
derivative) deployment of reality, which is also, to a certain extent, empirically comparable.  
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CHAPTER TWO: 
THE ABSENCE OF GOOD IN THE PRINCIPLES:  
SPEUSIPPUS’ RE-THINKING OF PLATO’S THEORY OF FORMS 
 
 
 
As we discussed in the previous chapter, in Metaphysics M (9, 1086a 2-5) Aristotle 
reports that Speusippus, having seen the ‘δυσχέρειαν καὶ πλάσιν’ of Platonic Forms, 
abstained from positing ideal number and posited mathematical number alone. In the same 
book (M 8, 1083a 21-22), Speusippus is said neither to believe in Forms absolutely nor as 
certain numbers. Accordingly, as argued, it is plausible to say Speusippus raised at least two 
different types of problems to Plato’s Forms: on the one hand, logical difficulties concerning 
the account of Forms; on the other hand, possibly, a difficulty justified by, or rooted in, a 
more empirical approach. But how do these problems relate to one another? And what 
precisely, were the philosophical reasons for Speusippus to abandon the theory of Forms? 
 
In this chapter, I shall argue that Speusippus’ postulation and conception of first principles 
works as a direct response to the Platonic problem of participation to the Forms. Indeed, 
Speusippus’ analytical conception of principles, conceived as causes but released from 
ontological grounding in the sensibles, allows an inquiry and taxonomical arrangement of 
sensible objects that does not require any appeal to Forms. To this purpose, the chapter will 
be organised as follows. As a starting point, I will take into account Aristotle’s criticism of 
Speusippus’ conception of principles. I will show that a specific aspect of this criticism, i.e., 
that directed towards the absence of Good in the principles, allows us to better understand 
Speusippus’ conception of the principles within its relation to the Platonic problem of 
participation. Against traditional readings of the passage, I will argue that the biological 
analogy of the principle with the seed, often thought to originate with Speusippus, rather 
reflects an Aristotelian critique against Speusippus’ theory, originally conceived with 
reference to first principles only.187 Accordingly, I will show that if we take participation to 
 
187 Ravaisson (1838: 75). Merlan (1953: 97 and 105-106) takes the seed to be, for Speusippus, both a simile 
and a metaphor of the principles. In the first edition of the fragments (1980: 275), Isnardi Parente is unclear on 
the attribution of the comparison. She writes that Zeller follows Aristotle’s text closer than other scholars, by 
attributing to Speusippus the argument based on the seed, but she also writes that the fragment, better than 
biological and organic comparisons, gives us the idea of how Speusippus conceived the progressive 
mathematical-geometrical development of reality fulfilled in the tetraktys. In the second edition (2005: 16), 
she comments that the argument based on the seed is typically Aristotelian, but she does not expand her analysis 
further. Tarán (1981: 335-336) says that the analogy between seed and ἀρχή is typically Speusippean; Dillon 
(2003: 42-43) allows the possibility that Aristotle may be tendentious here but seems to agree that the 
comparison with the seed was indeed Speusippean; Bonazzi (2015: 16) and Trabattoni (2017: 150) agree that 
the analogy with the seed is Speusippean.  
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have represented for Speusippus at least one of the problems of Plato’s doctrine of the Forms, 
we are provided with a coherent explanation for his decision to separate different levels of 
reality. Under these circumstances, the discontinuity of the system works as an attempt to 
guarantee different kinds of inquiries, and, therefore, of different kinds of knowledge related 
to different kinds of objects. If this reading is right, the usual charge of episodicity, unfairly 
dismissed by scholars,188 would expose Speusippus’ aim to fix Plato’s metaphysical 
doctrine. The ‘truly episodic universe’, labelled by Dillon as an ‘anathema to a Platonist’,189 
might constitute, on the contrary, a genuine attempt by a leading Platonist to restore Platonic 
theories by defending them from inconsistencies and contradictions.  
 
2.1 What is most beautiful and noble does not exist ἐν ἀρχῇ (fr. 53) 
In many passages of Metaphysics N (see, e.g. N4 1091a30ff; 1091b13ff), Aristotle 
explains that Speusippus chose not to characterise the first principle, τὸ ἕν, as (the) good. On 
some occasions, Speusippus’ justification is associated with his worry about ascribing 
‘badness’ to the second principle.190 Technically, this operates on the assumption that 
‘badness’ is opposite to ‘goodness’ and that the first two principles must be opposed to one 
another; if one principle is to be good, the second (τὸ πλῆθος) must necessarily be 
characterised as bad. But on at least two occasions, Aristotle reports seem to hint at a more 
general theory. Indeed, the first example occurs in Λ:  
 
[FR. 53] ὅσοι δὲ ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, ὥσπερ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι καὶ Σπεύσιππος τὸ κάλλιστον 
καὶ ἄριστον μὴ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἶναι, διὰ τὸ καὶ τῶν φυτῶν καὶ τῶν ζῴων τὰς ἀρχὰς αἴτια μὲν 
εἶναι τὸ δὲ καλὸν καὶ τέλειον ἐν τοῖς ἐκ τούτων, οὐκ ὀρθῶς οἴονται. τὸ γὰρ σπέρμα ἐξ 
ἑτέρων ἐστὶ προτέρων τελείων, καὶ τὸ πρῶτον οὐ σπέρμα ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ τὸ τέλειον. οἷον 
πρότερον ἄνθρωπον ἂν φαίη τις εἶναι τοῦ σπέρματος, οὐ τὸν ἐκ τούτου γενόμενον, ἀλλ᾿ 
ἕτερον ἐξ οὗ τὸ σπέρμα. 
 
Those who hold, as the Pythagoreans and Speusippus, that what is most beautiful and 
noble does not exist ἐν ἀρχῇ — for although the principles of plants and animals are 
causes, beauty and completeness are in the things arising out of them — don’t think 
correctly. In fact, the seed arises out of other prior and complete things, and what is 
primary is not the seed but completeness. e.g. we must say that before the seed there 
is a man — not the man arisen out of the seed, but another from whom the seed arises 
out of.191  
 
188 Dillon (2003: 44-45) suggests a generative system, but, as already mentioned, he admits the absence of 
sufficient textual evidence for his interpretation. However, in a footnote (n. 40, p. 44) Dillon mentions Malcom 
Schofield’s suggestion that Speusippus ‘may in fact have left his universe episodic’. Isnardi Parente (1980: 59) 
recurs to the notions of ὁμοιότης and analogy, in order to account for some continuity in Speusippus’ system, 
as does Tarán (1981: 26). 
189 Dillon (2003: 46). 
190 See, e.g. Arist., Metaph. N4, 1091b30-35.  
191 Fr. 53 IP1 (=Arist., Metaph. Λ7, 1072b30-1073a3). The translation is mine, but it is worth mentioning that 
both Tredennick (1935: 150-151) and Ross (1984: 176-177) translate ‘ἐν ἀρχῇ’ with ‘in the beginning’ and 
‘τὰς ἀρχάς᾽ with ‘beginnings’.  
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Aristotle here exposes a compact, general theory attributed to Speusippus and the 
Pythagoreans, according to which: ‘what is most beautiful and noble does not exist in the 
beginning’. Already an initial glance at the Greek reveals an ambiguity: the thesis here 
reported is unclear. Indeed, the sentence can be understood as: 
a) ‘what is most beautiful and noble does not exist in the beginning’, i.e., beauty 
and nobility are posterior in time; 
b) ‘what is most beautiful and noble does not exist in the principle’, i.e., beauty 
and nobility are posterior ontologically.192 
 
As the two readings are grammatically equivalent,193 in order to understand what meaning 
we should assume to be operative, we need to look at the rest of Aristotle’s testimony. 
Indeed, Aristotle adds an expansion and explanation of the thesis: ‘although the principles 
of plants and animals are causes, beauty and completeness are in the things arising out of 
them (ἐν τοῖς ἐκ τούτων)’. The expansion of the thesis focuses on specific kinds of principles, 
those of animals and plants, connoted as causes. Even though these principles are causes, 
however, beauty and completeness can be found only in the things arising out of them, i.e., 
in their consequents, or products: plants and animals. The sentence states once again the 
posteriority in appearance of qualities such as beauty and, now, also completeness, but does 
not help to clarify in what sense this posteriority should be understood. In fact, the bearing 
of qualities such as beauty, nobility, and completeness is expressed only with the verb εἶναι 
and an indirect complement, constructed with ἐν plus the dative, expressing the presence of 
qualities in an object, i.e., in the things arising out of the principles of plants and animals (ἐν 
τοῖς ἐκ τούτων). Up to this point, we are still dealing with both theses: the posteriority of 
beauty and completeness can be either ontological or temporal. It is here that Aristotle 
presents his refutation, consisting in a counterexample showing that Speusippus’ thesis is 
 
192 The possibility of both readings is confirmed as well by commentators of the passage, who take the sentence 
either way. Accordingly, pseudo-Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Arist. Metaph., p. 699, 28-33 Hayduck = fr. 49 
IP, understands that it is not possible to say that the principle is good, while the Latin translation of Themistius’ 
paraphrase of Metaphysics Λ (In Metaph. Libr. L Paraphrasis, p. 24, 24-32 = fr. 42c Tarán) reports ‘initio rei’, 
giving a temporal reading to ‘ἐν ἀρχῇ’. Even by objecting that the Latin version of the text is a translation from 
the Hebrew and, as such, cannot be used as conclusive evidence, the temporal reading can also be detected 
from the meaning of the passage. Indeed, the noun ‘res’ implies that the object in question is a generated 
ontological being (identified, in fact, with the seed), while the formulation ‘tempore perfectionis’ alludes to its 
temporal development. 
193 It has been noted by other scholars that Aristotle sometimes accommodates both ontological and temporal 
priority in some passages of his corpus see, e.g. Crubellier (1994: 539), with respect to Arist., Metaph., N5 
1092a9ff; Corkum (2008: 69) with respect to Arist., Phys., 260b17-19, where Aristotle, in relation to motion 
(κίνησις), says there is also temporal priority in addition to priority in substance; more relevant is the case of 
Metaph. Θ8 where Aristotle, with the focus on the three relations falling under the potential–actual scheme, 
proves the logical, ontological and temporal priority of the act. 
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not correct. The counterexample reads that the seed arises out of other prior things, and, 
therefore, that the seed is not prior, but completeness is. Aristotle goes on to add that, in fact, 
before the seed there is a man — not the man arisen out of the seed, but, rather, another man 
from whom the seed arises out of. The counterexample provided indicates the ontological 
priority of completeness:194 the seed, considered in relation to its final end, man, is in 
potency. But, as we know, actuality is prior to potentiality ontologically. Therefore, it is man, 
a complete substance195 in its actual form, that comes first. But is Aristotle’s refutation 
legitimate? In order to establish this, we need to look at Aristotle’s report more carefully, 
evaluating the reliability of the thesis attributed to Speusippus, and providing possible hidden 
premises assumed by Aristotle in his confutation. 
Accordingly, the thesis attributed to Speusippus consists of three different premises: 
(i) What is most beautiful and noble does not exist in the principle/in the 
beginning. 
 
194 One might object that temporal priority is sufficient to explain the counterexample, without any need to 
recur to ontological priority as well. In the end, Aristotle himself, in Metaph. Θ8, when demonstrating the 
priority of actuality over potentiality, says that actuality is, in time, ‘sometimes prior and sometimes not’ 
(Metaph. Θ8, 1049b11-12). Nevertheless, this objection fails to underline two important points of Aristotle’s 
counterexample which show that both ontological and temporal priority are at play here. On the one hand, in 
Metaph. Θ8 Aristotle goes on explaining that: ‘the matter and the seed and the thing which is capable of seeing, 
which are potentially a man and corn and seeing, but are not yet so actually, are prior in time to the individual 
man and corn and seeing subject which already exist in actuality’, (Arist., Metaph. Θ8, 1049b19-23, transl. 
Tredennick). Accordingly, if the completeness at stake is that of the individual man, or the individual corn, 
completeness, and therefore actuality, is posterior in time, while the seed is prior. And this seems exactly the 
mistake Aristotle is pointing out at by saying that: ‘before the seed there is a man’, but ‘not the man arisen out 
of the seed’. On the other hand, one might object that in the same example, Aristotle specifies that ‘prior in 
time to these potential entities are other actual entities from which the former are generated; for the actually 
existent is always generated from the potentially existent by something which is actually existent—e.g., man 
by man, cultured by cultured—there is always some prime mover; and that which initiates motion exists already 
in actuality’, (Arist., Metaph. Θ8, 1049b24-27). However, the reasons for this meaning of temporal priority 
seem be to at least compatible with Aristotle’s explanation of ontological priority. Indeed, Aristotle says that 
actuality is prior in substantiality ‘(a) because things which are posterior in generation are prior in form and 
substantiality; e.g., adult is prior to child, and man to semen, because the one already possesses the form, but 
the other does not; and (b) because everything which is generated moves towards a principle, i.e. its end’ 
(Arist., Metaph. Θ8, 1050a4-10). For this reason, I believe it is appropriate to take into consideration both kinds 
of priority. Moreover, to consider both ontological and temporal priority seems to be particularly appropriate 
in relation to the passage under examination. Indeed, even if temporal priority were to be sufficient, from an 
Aristotelian perspective, to demonstrate Speusippus’ theory is wrong, we must not forget that the thematisation 
of a distinction between different kinds of priorities is specifically Aristotelian and does not apply to Platonists 
in general, nor to Speusippus in particular.  
195 The example has been accounted for in many ways by scholars, who have interpreted the ‘man’ Aristotle 
refers to very differently. Most commentators understand the claim with an existential meaning, and I tend to 
agree with such interpretations (i.e. the man spoken of is an individual existing man) because, in similar 
accounts ‘Form or actuality is the end toward which natural processes are directed. Actuality is therefore a 
cause in more than one sense of a thing’s realizing its potential’ (Cohen 2006). Makin (2006: 193-194) goes in 
a similar direction and (2003: 226-227) argues that such examples of ontological priority are to be understood 
in view of teleological considerations. Accordingly (2006: 195): ‘Fs are prior in substance to Gs so long as 
there is some process which in normal conditions results in Fs rather than Gs; whereas the way to get Gs rather 
than Fs is to interfere with, interrupt, or hinder that process’. Similarly, Witt (1994: 222ff). Peramatzis (2011: 
284) rejects the existential construal as problematic and offers an explanation based on Physics, 2.9, 200a7-10; 
19-20, aimed at explaining the example by appeal to a parallel with the existential dependence of matter upon 
form: ‘if an adult, a human or a form exist or are going to exist at later or completion stages of certain types of 
generation process, the relevant types of child, seed or matter must exist or will have to exist (respectively) at 
earlier stages of these processes’.  
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(ii) Principles (of plants and animals) are causes. 
(iii) Beauty and completeness are in the things arising out of the principles. 
 
2.2 Premise (i): what is most beautiful and noble does not exist in the principle/in 
the beginning (τὸ κάλλιστον καὶ ἄριστον μὴ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἶναι) 
Similar versions of premise (i) recur quite often in other passages of Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics, and more precisely, in Metaphysics N4 1091a29ff; N4 1091a36-b3; N5 
1092a9-17. As the discussion of N4 and N5 will be taken into account specifically in section 
2.6, for the sake of the present discussion, it is not necessary to analyse in detail each 
testimonium within its context. It is worth saying, though, that in all the other contexts the 
thesis is expressed more specifically with reference to first principles in general, or to the 
One in particular. Indeed, in N4 1091a31-32, Aristotle takes into account an aporia related 
to how the elements196 and first principles are related to the Good and the Beautiful (‘πῶς 
ἔχει πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ καλὸν τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ αἱ ἀρχαί’) in order to understand whether 
‘any of the these (viz. the elements and the principles) is such as we mean when we speak of 
the Good or the Supreme Good, or whether, on the contrary, these are later in generation 
than the elements (ὑστερογενῆ)’.197 In N 4 1091a36-b3, following on the same topic, 
Aristotle speaks of an agreement between the mythologists and other thinkers of his time, 
‘who deny that there is such an element (viz. conceived as the Good or as the Supreme Good), 
and say that it was only after some evolution in the natural order of things, that both the 
Good and the Beautiful appeared (προελθούσης τῆς τῶν ὄντων φύσεως καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ 
τὸ καλὸν ἐμφαίνεσθαι)’; in the same respect, Aristotle comments that, in his opinion, ‘the 
difficulty arises not from ascribing goodness as belonging to the first principle (ἡ δυσχέρεια 
οὐ διὰ τὸ τῇ ἀρχῇ τὸ εὖ ἀποδιδόναι ὡς ὑπάρχον)’, suggesting that, indeed, this was the 
difficulty experienced by Speusippus.198 Lastly, in N5 1092a9-17 Aristotle says that 
Speusippus is not right in his assumption when he likens the principles of the universe to the 
principle of animals and plants (τὰς τοῦ ὅλου ἀρχὰς τῇ τῶν ζῴων καὶ φυτών), on the grounds 
that out of indeterminate and incomplete things always arise things that are more complete 
(ἐξ ἀορίστων ἀτελῶν τε ἀεὶ τὰ τελειότερα).199 It is in this context that the example of the 
 
196 Relevant here, is also that Speusippus characterised his principles as elements (see, e.g. fr. 58 IP1). 
197 Arist., Metaph. N4 1091a33-35, transl. Tredennick (1933: 285), slightly modified. 
198 Arist., Metaph. N4 1091b2-3, transl. Tredennick (1933: 287). I am not alone in taking the good as a 
qualitative attribution. Indeed Crubellier’s translation (1994: 520) goes precisely in the direction of explicitly 
characterising the attribution of the good to the One as the attribution of a quality: ‘Mais à vrai dire la difficulté 
ne vient pas de ce que l’on attribue le Bien, comme une qualité, au principe, mais de ce que l’on fait de l’Un 
un principe – et un principe au sens d’«élément»‘, (my emphasis).  
199 (=fr. 57 IP1) This last passage requires closer inspection, especially in its connections to the fragment here 
examined. Such an examination will be dealt with in section 2.6. For the moment, I will limit my comments to 
a brief observation about the terminology, which strongly emphasises the vocabulary of the τέλος. Indeed, the 
vocabulary of the τέλος is extremely relevant with respect to the seed example, as it will become clearer in the 
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seed appears once again; indeed, Aristotle concludes: ‘for even in the natural world the 
principles from which these things are derived are perfect and complete — for it is man that 
begets man; the seed does not come first’.200 
 
This brief comparison of different versions of premise (i) already provides us with crucial 
information for our enquiry.  
 
First of all, premise (i), asserting the absence of qualities such as beauty and goodness, 
seems to have a specific target: it does not concern any kind of principles, but primary ones. 
However, Aristotle does not specify this in [FR. 53] and, for the moment, we cannot exclude 
that the premise equally applies to other kinds of principles. Secondly, the reference to two 
qualities, beauty and goodness, is consistent across all testimonies, while the reference to 
completeness appears only twice, and always concurrently with the counterexample of the 
seed. Lastly, Aristotle hints at one reason for providing such premise. Indeed, by stating that 
the difficulty (ἡ δυσχέρεια) ‘arises not from granting that goodness [τὸ εὖ] belongs to the 
ἀρχή’,201 Aristotle provides us with crucial information: the reason for Speusippus’ thesis 
lies precisely in the problematic assumption of qualities as belonging to the principles. If we 
cannot still opt for an ontological or temporal reading of the thesis, we are at least provided 
with some evidence in favour of the former.  
 
2.3  Premise (ii): principles (of plants and animals) are causes (τῶν φυτῶν καὶ τῶν 
ζῴων τὰς ἀρχὰς αἴτια μὲν εἶναι) 
Premise (ii): ‘principles of plants and animals are causes’, is generally considered by 
scholars to be genuinely Speusippean.202 However, although the biological analogy can be 
considered coherent given both the importance granted by the philosopher to inquiry into the 
sensibles203 and Aristotle’s testimony about the postulation of many οὐσίαι and of 
correspondent principles, I think there are reasons to doubt the attribution and suspect an 
Aristotelian intervention.204  
 
next stage of my analysis.  
200 For the sake of completeness, I here report the Greek: ‘εἰσὶ γὰρ καὶ ἐνταῦθα τέλειαι αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐξ ὧν ταῦτα· 
ἄνθρωπος γὰρ ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ, καὶ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ σπέρμα πρῶτον’, Arist., Metaph. N5 1092a15-17, transl. 
Treddenick (1933: 291). 
201 Transl. Menn (unpublished, Iγ3: 40). 
202 See, e.g. Tarán’s discussion of frr. 42a and 43 (1981: 334-339, Tarán’s numeration), but also Ravaisson 
(1838:72) Dancy (1991: 85-86); Bonazzi (2015: 16); Trabattoni (2016: 150-151). 
203 See frr. 123-146 IP1 on the ὅμοια.  
204 At the conference Metaphysics and Epistemology in Plato’s Academy (Durham, 21-22 February 2018) 
Thomás Bénatouïl suggested that the biological analogies and the example of the seed could receive a separate 
treatment. Accordingly, one could still doubt premise (ii) is genuinely Speusippean, but nonetheless consider 
the example as employed by Speusippus. I thank Thomás Bénatouïl for the suggestion, as it had never occurred 
to me the possibility to consider the two separately. However, as we realised, by accepting the seed-example 
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First of all, also in Z2, where Aristotle had introduced Speusippus’ system, he states that: 
‘Speusippus posited still more kinds of substances, beginning with the One, and principles 
for each kind of substance, one for numbers, another for spatial magnitudes, and then another 
for soul’.205 Although Aristotle is here taking into consideration people who believed that there 
are several kinds of οὐσίαι beyond the sensibles (παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητά), sensibles recur explicitly 
in Aristotle’s list of Plato’s οὐσίαι, but not in Speusippus’. It is also true that Aristotle 
introduces Speusippus’ list by saying that he posited still more kinds of substances, but when 
it comes to saying that he also established principles for each kind of οὐσία, sensibles do not 
appear anymore. Moreover, the correlative set ἄλλην μέν - ἄλλην δέ,206 followed by the ἔπειτα 
(which suggests a sense of conclusion), seems to indicate that the list of principles is 
exhausted.207 Thus, even if we accept that Speusippus’ considered sensible bodies to be 
included among the οὐσίαι,208 we have no evidence suggesting he actually posited principles 
for them as well, nor that he posited principles of plants and animals specifically.209 Indeed, if 
this was a genuine Speusippean formulation, I see no reason for Aristotle not to include it in 
his list. Secondly, the expression occurs in a very similar way ([ἀρχή] τῶν ζῴων καὶ φυτῶν) 
in another context, namely, in the above quoted testimony (N5 1092a 9-17) in which it appears 
 
as Speusippean we are provided with a generative model for the production of consequents from principles. 
But this does not square with other Aristotelian evidence, where Aristotle insists Speusippus did not account 
for the production of items out of principles. 
205 FR. 48 IP1 (=Arist., Metaph. Z2, 1028b21-23). For a more detailed analysis of this fragment, see, supra, 
section 1.1. 
206 See, for a parallel example of two options that exhaust the list, Arist., De gen. et corr., 326b2-6: εἰ δ᾿ αὐτὸ 
αὑτὸ ἕκαστον, ἢ διαιρετὸν ἔσται, κατ᾿ ἄλλο μὲν κινοῦν κατ᾿ ἄλλο δὲ κινούμενον: ‘but, if each is its own mover 
either it will be divisible, in part causing motion and in part being mover’, transl. Forster and Furley. 
207 The grammatical evidence is not meant to be conclusive, but only to work as a suggestion. Indeed, although 
it is possible to read the ἔπειτα as indicating conclusion, it may well be that it is the topic that is concluded, and 
not the list (as in Bonitz (1870: 266): ἔπειτα ‘in enumerandis argumentis’ or ‘fort complectitur quae antea dicta 
sunt’). Also, parallel versions of ἄλλος μέν - ἄλλος δέ followed by ἔπειτα are hard to find. A working parallel 
could perhaps be [ps-Xen.], Ath. Const. Indeed, in enumerating the various ‘leaders of the people’ in a longer 
list, [ps-Xen.] seems to arrange the order internally according to shorter chronological periods (introduced by 
μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα, εἶτα and others). At Ath. Const. 28.2.7-10, [ps-Xen] says: ‘μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τοῦ μὲν δήμου 
προειστήκει Ξάνθιππος, τῶν δὲ γνωρίμων Μιλτιάδης, ἔπειτα Θεμιστοκλῆς καὶ Ἀριστείδης· μετὰ δὲ τούτους 
Ἐφιάλτης μὲν τοῦ δήμου, Κίμων δ’ ὁ Μιλτιάδου τῶν εὐπόρων’. However, the same construction at 62.2.1-3, 
where [ps-Xen.] is listing the pay for different services, shows that the sense of conclusion is not necessary, as 
the list continues (μισθοφοροῦσι δὲ πρῶτον ὁ δῆμος ταῖς μὲν ἄλλαις ἐκκλησίαις δραχμήν, τῇ δὲ κυρίᾳ ἐννέα 
<ὀβολούς>· ἔπειτα τὰ δικαστήρια τρεῖς ὀβολούς· εἶθ’ ἡ βουλὴ πέντε ὀβολούς). A closer working parallel could 
perhaps be Procl., In Parm., 1, 707, 40 - 708, 7, where exactly same construction with ἄλλος is used. ‘Δεῖ τοίνυν 
ἐπὶ πάσης τάξεως τῶν πραγμάτων νοεῖν ἑνάδα μὲν ἐξῃρημένην ἄλλην, ἑνάδα μετὰ τοῦ πλήθους ἄλλην, ἔπειτα 
οὕτω τὸ πλῆθος καθ᾽αὑτὸ μηδὲ μετέχον τῆς οἰκείας ἑνάδος, οὐχ ὅτι ἐστί τι τοιοῦτον ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν, ἀλλ᾽ὅτι καὶ 
τοῦτο πρὸς τὸ παρὸν εἰς νοῦν βαλέσθαι διὰ τὴν τοῦ Ζήνωνος δόξαν ἀναγκαῖον’  
208 An interpretation that, as I emphasised in section 1.1, I am inclined to accept.  
209 In general, evidence regarding principles other than primary is extremely scanty. For the present purpose, 
it is important to note that in the fragments preserved by Athenaeus, namely those bearing witness of 
Speusippus’ enquiry into the sensibles, there is no mention of principles at all. Also relevant is Theophrastus’ 
testimony (Metaph., 6b 4-6): ‘of the heavens and the rest they make no further mention whatsoever. And 
likewise, neither do those around Speusippus’, transl. Gutas (2010: 126-127). Quoting Gutas’ commentary 
(2010: 311): ‘The reference to Speusippus is incontestably negative: what Theophrastus means is precisely that 
those about Speusippus […] do not explain how ‘the lower entities can be derived from the principles assumed’ 
(van Raalte 264). This is the theme of this entire Aporia, that some philosophers posit the principles and then 
stop without explaining the derivation of everything else from them’.  
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concurrently with the counterexample of the seed. The consistency in speaking of principles 
of plants and animals in polemical contexts in which the counterexample of the seed is 
introduced as a counterdemonstration, makes me suspicious. Accordingly, I think we should 
keep open as a possibility that such principles are introduced precisely in order to refute 
Speusippus’ claims. In the end, parallels with other evidence have shown that the thesis: ‘what 
is most beautiful and noble does not exist in the principle/in the beginning’, usually addresses 
primary principles, and not those of animals and plants. Indeed, I think that the example of 
principles of plants and animals is functional for Aristotle to introduce his counterexample 
of the seed and point out a flaw in Speusippus’ system. Lastly, the example of the seed is 
widely used by Aristotle in many passages of his corpus, where it is not unusual that Aristotle 
speaks of seeds of plants and animals210 and considers them to be principles.211 What is even 
more relevant is that the seed is the exemplum princeps in Aristotle’s demonstration of the 
ontological priority of actuality over potentiality, a topic that is particularly connected to the 
fragment under analysis [FR. 53], as will be clear from the following considerations. To 
conclude, what I consider to be genuinely Speusippean of premise (ii) is only the claim that 
principles are causes. 
 
2.4 Premise (iii): Beauty and Completeness are in the things that arise out the 
principles (τὸ δὲ καλὸν καὶ τέλειον ἐν τοῖς ἐκ τούτων) 
Lastly, thesis (iii) seems to me the natural continuation of premise (i). As beauty and 
completeness are not in the principle/in the beginning, they will be shown in the things 
arising out of the principles. If, from this perspective, premise (iii) can be considered 
genuinely Speusippean, I believe the change in terminology would be significant. Indeed, as 
we noted above, given that the cluster of properties such as beauty, nobility and goodness is 
constant in similar versions of premise (i),212 completeness always appears in the testimonies 
in second place, and before the introduction of the seed example.213 In this respect, the shift 
 
210 See, e.g. Arist., Phys., I 7 190b1-190b4; II, 8 199b8-199b9; De an. I, 2 405b2-405b4, with reference to 
Hippo: ‘they seem to have argued from the fact that the seed of all animals is fluid’ (italics is mine), transl. 
Smith. In a different context, but similarly about Aristotle speaking of σπέρμα of plants, see Abraham (2010: 
278-279). One issue here is obviously related to the ambivalence of the Greek term σπέρμα, translatable both 
with ‘seed’ and ‘semen’ according to the contexts. Indeed, when we are speaking of σπέρμα as semen, it is 
even more common for Aristotle to speak about it as the male principle as opposed to the female principle, 
sometimes referred to as σπέρμα as well. On this, see Lefebvre (2016), whose discussion of Bolton (2010) and 
of the significance of ἐξ οὗ in this specific biological context is also relevant.  
211 One passage of Magna Moralia is particularly relevant here. Even though the authenticity of the text is 
widely debated, it can be taken at least as a plausible position that derives from Aristotle’s though: ‘Every 
natural kind is given to begetting a being like itself, i.e. plants and animals; for both are apt to beget. And they 
are given to beget from their first principles— for instance, the tree from the seed; for this is a kind of principle’, 
Arist., Mag. mor. 1 10, 187032-34, transl. Stock.  
212 Arist., Metaph. N4, 109130ff; N4 1091b13ff; N5, 1092a9-17. 
213 Arist., Metaph. N4, 1091a30ff. 
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from goodness and beauty to completeness214 would indicate the imposition of Aristotelian 
teleology. Indeed, these two qualities do occur in Platonic dialogues as paradigmatic 
examples of Forms,215 and it is not unusual for Aristotle, when criticising Plato’s Theory of 
Forms, to take into account the Form of Good.216 If Aristotle seems to be less interested in 
arguing against the Form of Beauty,217 there are at least two passages, respectively in the 
Eudemian Ethics and in Metaphysics M in which Aristotle mentions the two qualities 
together, apparently referring to the Platonists.218 Although not conclusive, I take the 
evidence to allow the possibility that the passage shifts from an Academic discussion of (the) 
Good and (the) Beauty to Aristotle’s own notion of the τέλος.219 
 
2.5 The counterexample of the seed 
As noted above,220 the possibility of both readings of [FR. 53] is confirmed by ancient 
commentators of the text who read Aristotle’s ‘ἐν ἀρχῇ’ in two ways. But apart from 
allowing different interpretations of Speusippus’ theory, I believe that the effectiveness of 
Aristotle’s confutation lies precisely in the ambiguity of the text. In order to test this 
supposition, it is worth examining Aristotle’s argument. Aristotle’s argument consists in a 
simple counterexample: a) The seed arises out of other prior and complete things; b) What 
is prior is not the seed, but completeness. Ultimately, the refutation drops its reference to the 
principles and concentrates on the ontological priority of completeness. But as it is 
immediately clear, the argument lacks certain premises. Accordingly, in order to advance 
 
214 I take ἄριστον, as the superlative of ἀγαθός, to belong to the same discussion of the latter. Tarán notes 
(1981: 335) that the two superlatives are here also related to the context, as Aristotle himself ascribes them to 
the unmoved mover. I leave aside the question of the moral connotation of such qualities, that would require a 
separate and detailed analysis of Speusippus’ ethical doctrines. This aspect is rightly noticed by Trabattoni 
(2016: 148-155) who underlines that these qualities are, in a Platonic context, also ethically connoted, and 
explains possible advantages of Speusippus’ thesis.  
215 The most important examples are, for the Form of Good, Republic VI, 508e1ff; for that of Beauty, Symp., 
210eff.; Phaed. 78d-e. Both Forms occur, within different discussions, in the Republic. 
216 For Aristotle’s criticism of the Form of Good, see, e.g. Arist., EN, 1096a34-b 5, Metaph. N 4, 1091b25ff. 
217 Although there are some scholars working in this direction, trying to show Aristotle’s engagement with 
Plato’s discussions in the Symposium. See, e.g. Sheffield (2010). 
218 In EE, Aristotle criticises the Platonists for having built an argument that is, so to say, upside down. Indeed, 
they demonstrate the goodness of things that are agreed to be good, on the basis of arguments that would 
themselves need further justification. Aristotle comments that ‘they ought to start with agreed [goods], such as 
health, strength, and temperance, [in order to show] that the beautiful (τὸ καλόν) is present even more in 
unchanging things’. Arist., EE, 1, 1218, 21-22, transl. Woods (1992: 10), slightly modified. In Metaphysics M 
(3, 1078a 30- 1078b 7), Aristotle draws a distinction between goodness and beauty and concludes that 
‘inasmuch as it is evident that these (I mean, e.g. orderly arrangement and definiteness) are causes of many 
things, obviously they must also to some extent treat of the cause in this sense, i.e., the cause in the sense of 
the Beautiful.’, transl. Tredennick. Although Aristotle will never return on the topic, Annas highlights that ‘an 
early marginal comment refers us to his discussion and transcription of Plato’s On the Good’, Annas (1976: 
151). 
219 It must be highlighted, here, that in Metaph. N5 1092a 9-17, where the thesis occurs again together with the 
example of the seed, the formulation seems to be completely reframed within the language of the τέλος. Under 
these circumstances, the thesis: ‘ἐξ ἀορίστων ἀτελῶν τε ἀεὶ τὰ τελειότερα’ could be read as a paraphrase of 
Speusippus’ thesis under Aristotelian conceptualisation. This will be examined in more detail in section 2.6.  
220 See, infra, footnotes 192 and 193. 
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his counterexample, Aristotle would appear to be assuming that, for Speusippus: 
 
I. The principle of plants and animals is the seed. 
II. Plants and animals are the τέλος of the seed.  
 
These two premises effect a conceptual shift from Aristotle’s original presentation of 
Speusippus’ thesis to the introduction of the counterexample. Aristotle’s objective is, indeed, 
to show that Speusippus wrongly supposed that: 
 
III. The seed is a principle.221 
 
But in order to state that the seed is a principle (III.), Aristotle needs to accommodate a 
possible temporal reading of thesis (i), stating that: ‘what is more beautiful and noble does 
not occur in the beginning’. In the end, Aristotle would probably agree with Speusippus that 
substances are complete and show their completeness at their stage of actuality and, thus, 
completeness is posterior in time.222 But what Aristotle is trying to show is that Speusippus 
naively assumed that what is prior in time is also ontologically so. Moreover, the conceptual 
shift is well hidden: empirical comparisons make it easy to accept that the principle of plants 
and animals is the seed (I.), and that, accordingly, the seed’s fulfilment will precisely be 
individual plants and animals (II.). Furthermore, to consider individual plants and animals 
as the fulfilment (or τέλος) of the seed, allows a consideration of the seed as the potential 
state of animals and plants. Even if Aristotle himself would somehow agree with this 
conclusion, the counterexample shows that this is true only if we think of the actual state as 
posterior to the potential state in time. This points out at another (supposed) problem with 
Speusippus’ ontology: in Aristotle’s eyes, Speusippus’ principles look deficient. Indeed, the 
biological example points out that even though principles are characterised as causes, they 
lack the formal requirements in relation to the objects they cause.223 In Aristotle’s biology, 
the τέλος works as an intrinsic cause:224 the seed can be considered as the cause of a specific 
 
221 Or, better, that Speusippus’ principle is wrongly conceived as a seed.  
222 At least in one sense. See infra, n. 195-195. 
223 This critique closely recalls that addressed by Aristotle to Plato as well, regarding the impossibility for the 
Forms to exert (various kinds of) causal activities into this world. The bibliography on the topic is extremely 
rich and it is obviously impossible to be covered here appropriately.  
224 I am aware of the complications implied in the ontological consideration of the τέλος, or final cause. For a 
thorough analysis of such difficulties and a critical discussion of the main interpretations of Aristotelian 
teleology, see Quarantotto (2001: 329-365) and Johnson (2005: 15-39). For an account of the final cause within 
biological processes, see Gotthelf and Lennox (1987: 199-286), Quarantotto (2005), Johnson (2005: pp. 131- 
294 specifically, on Teleological explanations in natural science) and Leunissen (2010). Leunissen 
distinguishes two types of teleological causation; the primary type amounts to the ‘realization of a preexisting, 
internal potential (or perhaps “potentials”) for form through stages shaped by conditional necessity’ (4) and is 
‘responsible for the coming to be and presence of those features that can be exhibited to be the necessary 
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kind of οὐσία, but it will not become that man (or that animal, or that plant) because of 
extrinsic agents acting on it.225 But it is precisely the decision to take into account principles 
of plants and animals and not other kinds of principles that facilitates the introduction of the 
counterexample. Aristotle voluntarily juxtaposes different kinds of principles in order to 
render his claim more effective: Aristotle treats the thesis functionally, as equally applicable 
to all principles, while Speusippus has a referential term, first principles. Since the example 
takes into account plants and animals, the manoeuvre implies either the exclusion of primary 
principles from the discourse, or the equation of them with other sorts of principles.226 Both 
of these options entail the contradiction that Aristotle wants to draw: if Aristotle is here 
taking Speusippus’ view to be universal,227 a simple and particular counterexample would is 
sufficient to deny it.228 
 
Aristotle’s criticism can be summarised as follows: on the one hand, Speusippus is 
responsible for an ingenious conception of the principles, which, in Aristotle’s view, 
accounts for their temporal priority, but not for their ontological priority. In this respect, 
Speusippus’ principles can be compared to a seed, which is apparently prior (and actually 
so, in time), but it is not when considered from an ontological perspective. Speusippus’ 
conception of principles is therefore wrong because it takes temporal priority to be 
ontological as well. On the other hand, a second critique is closely related to this first: 
understood in this way, Speusippus’ principles are deficient; for, although characterised as 
causes, they lack something that accounts for the qualities shown in their consequents. 
Aristotle’s biological analogy shows that Speusippus’ principles are unaccomplished causes, 
failed principles that are such only nominally. If, for Aristotle, the formal cause and his 
conception of natural teleology229 account for the perpetuation of patterns in the same 
species, the same cannot be said for Speusippus’ principles. On the contrary, nothing 
guarantees that specific clusters of qualities can arise out of a completely unqualified 
 
prerequisites for the performance of vital and essential functions’ (209); the second involves ‘a formal nature 
of a natural being using materials that happen to be available (usually residues that have come to be of material 
necessity and that are not conditionally necessitated) for the production of parts that serve the animal’s well-
being’ (4) an is responsible for the ‘presence and sometimes also for the shaping of subsidiary and luxury 
features that increase the well-being of living beings’ (209).  
225 Unless we want to consider external causes not allowing the seed to fulfil its actual state. 
226 Indeed, Aristotle might point out a real flaw of Speusippus’ system, if the latter was negligent in accurately 
distinguishing principles of different kinds. In that case, the Aristotelian polemics would appear to be fairly 
right.  
227 With ‘universal’ I mean that the view holds good for all kinds of principles.  
228 More simply, if Aristotle takes Speusippus’ view to be valid for all kinds of principles, a particular 
counterexample is sufficient to contradict the view and reject it. Indeed, in order to deny that, e.g., ‘(all) 
principles are red’, I just need to demonstrate that: ‘one principle (or some of them) is not red’. Avoiding 
clarifying that Speusippus’ view is qualified, makes it easier for Aristotle to contradict it and refuse it.  
229 If the two can be considered separately, Arist., GA I.1, 715a6: ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὡς ἔν τι σχεδόν. See, among 
others, Lennox (2001: 182-194) and Leunissen (2010: 12-16). 
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principle nor that a principle can originate qualities at all.  
 
2.6 Another discussion on the good (frr. 58; 57) 
Before concluding my analysis, it is worth testing my results once more. As mentioned, 
the Aristotelian passage just examined [FR. 53], finds a close counterpart in another 
Aristotelian testimony about Speusippus [FR. 57], located at the beginning of N5, but 
integrated into a longer discussion starting in N4 about the Good and the principles. As the 
aim of the present section is a close analysis of [FR. 53] and [FR. 57], I will touch onto the 
beginning of the discussion [FR. 58] only briefly.230  
 
At the beginning of N4, Aristotle says: 
 
[FR. 58] Ἔχει δ᾽ἀπορίαν καὶ εὐπορήσαντι ἐπιτίμησιν πῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ 
καλὸν τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ αἱ ἀρχαί· ἀπορίαν μὲν ταύτην, πότερόν ἐστί τι ἐκείνων οἷον 
βουλόμεθα λέγειν αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον, ἢ οὔ, ἀλλ᾽ὑστερογενῆ. παρὰ μὲν γὰρ 
τῶν θεολόγων ἔοικεν ὁμολογεῖσθαι τῶν νῦν τισίν, οἳ οὔ φασιν, ἀλλὰ προελθούσης τῆς 
τῶν ὄντων φύσεως καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἐμφαίνεσθαι (τοῦτο δὲ ποιοῦσιν 
εὐλαβούμενοι ἀληθινὴν δυσχέρειαν ἣ συμβαίνει τοῖς λέγουσιν, ὥσπερ ἔνιοι, τὸ ἓν 
ἀρχήν· ἔστι δ᾽ἡ δυσχέρεια οὐ διὰ τὸ τῇ ἀρχῇ τὸ εὖ ἀποδιδόναι ὡς ὑπάρχον, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ 
τὸ ἓν ἀρχὴν καὶ ἀρχὴν ὡς στοιχεῖον καὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἐκ τοῦ ἑνός). 
 
Now, there is a difficulty, and a reproach to anyone who finds it no difficulty, about how 
the elements and the principles are related to the good and the beautiful. The difficulty is 
this: whether any of these is such as we mean when we speak of the good or the supreme 
good, or whether, on the contrary, these are posterior in generation. For it would seem that 
there is an agreement between the mythologists and present-day thinkers, who deny that 
there is such an element, and say that it was only after some evolution in the natural order 
of things that both the good and the beautiful appeared. They do this to avoid a real 
difficulty which confronts those who hold, as some do, that the One is a first principle. 
This difficulty arises not from ascribing goodness to the first principle as an attribute, but 
from treating the One as a principle, and a principle in the sense of an element, and then 
deriving number from the One.231 
 
Aristotle presents the aporia as regarding the relation entertained between τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ 
τὸ καλὸν and τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ αἱ ἀρχαί. As underlined in the first sections of this chapter,232 
the aporia is expressed explicitly as a relation that the principles, and, specifically, primary 
principles,233 entertain with the good and the beautiful. And the question, more specifically, 
addresses whether any of these principles or elements is such as we mean when we speak of 
 
230 I am aware that the whole discussion of N4, together with a detailed analysis of the objections raised by 
Aristotle between the two passages under analysis, would deserve a separate treatment. As this discussion, 
however, would represent a long digression within my analysis of Speusippus, it needs to be postponed to a 
different context.  
231 (=Arist., Metaph. N4 1090a31-1091b4). Transl. Tredennick and Ross, slightly modified. 
232 See, infra, sections 2.1-2.4. 
233 As characterised as elements by the Academics. This aspect will be examined in more details in Chapter 6. 
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the good, or the supreme good, or, rather, if these are to be considered later in origin. If it 
seems like the focus of the discussion is narrowed down to the good only, Aristotle then 
takes beauty into consideration again. Indeed, it seems that there is an agreement between 
the theologists and other present thinkers of his time, viz. Speusippus, who deny that there is 
such an element and say that it is only when the nature of beings has progressed that both the 
good and the beautiful appeared. In this regard, I would like to highlight a few aspects of this 
passage which confirm some suppositions of the previous analysis and which may be of use 
for the next section.234 
 
First, Aristotle speaks of an agreement between the mythologists and the thinkers of his 
time, who denied that there is such a principle, or element, conceived as (the) good, and 
established that beauty and good only appear once the nature of things has advanced. This 
thesis, although expressed in a different way, is still compatible with what we have identified 
as Speusippus’ premise (i), namely: that what is most beautiful and noble does not exist in 
the principle. Moreover, by following Crubellier’s translation of the previous sentence we 
read: ‘est-ce que quelque chose comme ce que nous appelons le bien lui-même, ou le 
meilleur, fait partie des principes, ou bien, au contraire, <ces termes> ont-ils été produits 
plus tardivement’ the thesis seems indeed even more familiar.235 Qualities such as good and 
beautiful do not exist in the principle, but they are to be found at a different stage of nature. 
Indeed, if we distance ourselves from the immediately generative meaning that the adjective 
ὑστερογενής suggests, the claim seems to be still compatible with what we have concluded 
until now. Qualities such as beautiful and good appear (ἐμφαίνεσθαι)236 when the nature of 
beings has progressed (προελθούσης τῆς τῶν ὄντων φύσεως): namely, at a different stage of 
nature.237 As we have already seen, Aristotle stresses insistently both the absence of an 
internal coherence of Speusippus’ system, and the inconsistency caused by the separation of 
each level. In this respect, it would be at least contradictory to say that nature progresses, or, 
better, perfects. Accordingly, Speusippus’ thesis can be enriched as follows:238 he abdicates 
the attribution of the qualities ‘good’ and ‘beautiful’ to the principles and conceives the good 
 
234 I do not take my argument to be conclusive. My intention, as it will be clear from the second observation, 
is, rather, to highlight that the reference to qualities, to participation, and to predication is indeed at stake even 
in the continuation of the discussion. 
235 Crubellier (1994: 518).  
236 Note here that the verb does not carry any generative meaning, but only a consideration of what happens in 
nature. 
237 Crubellier (1994: 521) also highlights that this way of quoting introduced by the παρά implies that we are 
dealing with a thesis which is not expressedly professed. Accordingly, we are dealing only with the possibility 
of finding among the theologians a support. 
238 See Crubellier’ summary of Speusippus’ thesis (1994: 516-517): ‘ils renoncent purement et simplement à 
attribuer au principe la qualité de «bon», et conçoivent le bien comme une propriété qui s’applique à certains 
êtres en raison des formes particulières qu’ils prennent au cours de leur développement’ (my emphasis). 
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as a property which applies to beings at a different stage of nature. 
 
Secondly, I would like to discuss the adjective ὑστερογενής further. Scholars239 tend to 
consider the reference to the theologians as genuinely Speusippean. However, I agree with 
Crubellier that such a supposition is not necessary, as the passage: ‘obéit quand même aux 
règles ordinaires de la méthode diaporématique’.240 In the end, the reference to theologians 
and poets is not something extraneous to Aristotle’s own doxographical practice which is quite 
generous in acknowledging the indebtment philosophy has towards myths241 as well as the 
inaccuracies of the ancient sages. In Brisson’s words, Aristotle’s practice is based on two 
postulates: ‘(i) there is continuity between the tradition concerning the gods and what 
philosophy has to say about them; (ii) nonetheless, the philosopher must distinguish the 
narrative from its initial basis’.242 In this respect, I believe it is more natural to interpret the 
reference to theologians and poets as part of Aristotle’s own practice,243 rather than necessarily 
finding an attribution for it. But even if we want to attribute the reference to Speusippus 
himself, a consideration of the adjective is relevant: Aristotle might be here exploiting the 
reference so as to focus the attention on a generative function of the principles, which is indeed 
absent244 in other Aristotelian accounts of Speusippus, but relevant in the context of the seed-
counterexample. The evocation of theogonic genealogies and the familial relationship between 
previous and posterior gods, in fact, promotes a vision of a principle(s) which entertains a 
genetic link with its consequents. It is not a case, then, that the adjective used by Aristotle, 
ὑστερογενής, strengthens such an idea: the beauty and the good are produced or generated 
secondly in time. Indeed, the genetic link established between the principles and their 
consequents facilitates the same critiques that Aristotle already addressed against Speusippus’ 
principles. It highlights 1) the impossibility that consequents can show qualities which are 
absent in the principles by which they are caused.245 And 2) it encourages a temporal reading 
of Speusippus’ thesis so to show that, from an ontological point of view, the claim does not 
make sense. 
 
With this in mind, we can now turn to a more detailed analysis of [FR. 57] in its direct 
connection with [FR. 53], as analysed in the previous section. The direct relevance that the 
 
239 Annas (1976: 213-214), Tarán (1981: n.145 p. 340). 
240 Crubellier (1994: 521). 
241 Cf., for instance, the famous passage in Arist., Metaph. A, 982b11-19: ‘φιλόμυθος φιλόσοφός πώς ἐστιν᾽. 
242 Brisson (2004: 38). 
243 And so does Isnardi Parente (1980: 279) 
244 Or even denied. 
245 See, for example, Phys. II 7, 198a26-27; III 2, 202a9-12; Metaph. Λ3, 1070a6-9, where the same example 
of the seed/man is used to show the necessary identity of type between a cause and its effect. 
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fragment has for our discussion is justified by three features that the two passages share: 1) 
a critique of Speusippus’ (primary) principles; 2) the reference to principles of animals and 
plants; 3) the model of the seed used as a counterexample against Speusippus’ theory. 
Indeed, the first two lines represent the conclusion of the precedent discussion opened in N4: 
Aristotle suggested we cannot refuse to consider the first principle as good, but he didn’t 
argue positively for it. On the contrary, the previous discussion was limited to presenting 
such a position as intuitively true. It is in this context that Aristotle decides that it is now 
worth examining again the opposite thesis, namely, Speusippus’, in order to actually deal 
with it directly.246  
 
[FR. 57] Εἰ οὖν καὶ τὸ μὴ τιθέναι τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς καὶ τὸ τιθέναι οὕτως 
ἀδύνατον, δῆλον ὅτι αἱ ἀρχαὶ οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἀποδίδονται οὐδὲ αἱ πρῶται οὐσίαι. οὐκ ὀρθῶς 
δ᾿ ὑπολαμβάνει οὐδ᾿ εἴ τις παρεικάζει τὰς τοῦ ὅλου ἀρχὰς τῇ τῶν ζῴων καὶ φυτῶν, ὅτι 
ἐξ ἀορίστων ἀτελῶν τε ἀεὶ τὰ τελειότερα, διὸ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πρώτων οὕτως ἔχειν φησίν, 
ὥστε μηδὲ ὄν τι εἶναι τὸ ἓν αὐτό. εἰσὶ γὰρ καὶ ἐνταῦθα τέλειαι αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐξ ὧν ταῦτα· 
ἄνθρωπος γὰρ ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ, καὶ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ σπέρμα πρῶτον.  
 
If, then, it is impossible both not to place the good among the principles, and to place it 
in this way, it is clear that the principles are neither being rightly rendered, nor are the 
first beings.247 Nor does someone suppose correctly if he compares the principles of the 
whole to that of animals and plants, on the ground that the more perfect things always 
come from those which are indeterminate and imperfect, and is led by this to assert that 
this holds for the first principles; so that not even the One itself is a real thing; for even 
in the natural world the principles from which these things come from are perfect—for 
it is man that begets man; the seed does not come first.248 
 
Now, some preliminary general comments related to the discussion are required. First of 
all, diverse from [FR. 53], where Aristotle referred generally to an ‘ἀρχή’, Aristotle speaks 
here in [FR. 57] of τὰς τοῦ ὅλου ἀρχάς. The formulation is at least bizarre, considering the 
critiques addressed to Speusippus and related to the disconnection of his system. Indeed, as 
already underlined in the previous chapter,249 the charge of episodicity insisted precisely on 
a) a hierarchical order of priority and posteriority between the various levels granted by the 
system and, for Aristotle, inconsistent with b) the separation of such levels. If there isn’t a 
principle accounting for such an order, how can Aristotle speak of the principles of the whole? 
 
246 See Crubellier (1994: 538-539). 
247 I follow Annas (1976: 126) and Crubellier (1994: 538), who translate αἱ πρῶται οὐσίαι with ‘primary real 
objects’ or ‘les premiers êtres’. Indeed, Crubellier notes that the distinction between primary and secondary 
substances is not pertinent in the context and that, rather, Aristotle means ‘les premiers êtres, ceux qui 
apparaissent les premiers au cours de la derivation, c’est-à-dire les nombres et les objets géométriques […]. La 
phrase est intéressante parce qu’elle indique que l’objet de cette section n’est pas la conception des principes 
considerés en eux-mêmes, mais bien l’organisation de la série descendante entre les principes et le monde 
phénoménal’. Moreover, it should be highlighted that the claim that ‘the principles are neither being rightly 
rendered, nor are they the first beings’ confirms once more the supposition that the principles at stake here are 
primary ones and not others.  
248 Arist. Metaph. N4, 1092a 11-17, Transl. Tredennick (1933: 290-291) modified.  
249 See, infra, sections 1.2 and 1.3. 
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Moreover, how can he speak of principles of the whole, if each of Speusippus’ levels presents 
its own principles? One solution is to understand that Aristotle is speaking of primary 
principles by using his own schemes. Insofar as primary, the principles would somehow need 
to account for the whole system. If we grant this as an explanation, we also need to bear in 
mind that Aristotle’s presentation is, from the very beginning, transposing Speusippus’ world 
in a different, and possibly incompatible, philosophical framework.  
 
A second thing to highlight is the fluctuation from the plural to the singular with reference 
to the principles. Aristotle speaks first of ‘the principles of the whole’ and then of ‘the 
principle of plants and animals’. Besides being inconsistent with the previous formulation of 
[FR. 53], where principles of plants and animals were indeed plural, Aristotle seems here to 
be pointing also at something else; as Crubellier notes,250 in the shift from a plural, τὰς τοῦ 
ὅλου ἀρχάς, the principles of the whole, to a singular, τῇ τῶν ζῴων καὶ φυτῶν, the singular 
τῇ [ἀρχῄ] has to be understood in the empirical sense of ‘beginning’. Therefore, the whole 
passage should be understood as criticising an inference about the nature of something we 
cannot see (the principles of the whole) starting from something we can actually see (the 
beginning of animals and plants).251 Although I take Crubellier’s suggestion to be essential 
here, I believe that this aspect can be better determined and understood, if we take a look at 
the verb παρεικάζω, which occurs only 7 times in the Aristotelian corpus, and often in very 
biological and detailed passages of the Parva Naturalia.252 An analysis of the occurrences 
shows that the verb, commonly translated as ‘to compare’ or ‘to liken’, refers to a specific 
kind of comparison, or analogy, which is neither explicative nor inferential, but only 
illustrative. Let us try to make this clearer. In two of the occurrences253 the verb appears as 
part of a comment in a parenthetical statement which says: ὡς μεγάλῳ παρεικάζοντα μικρόν, 
‘to compare small things with great (ones)’. The context, is, in both cases, that of an 
explanation of physical phenomena (as, for example, the production of fluxes, phlegm and 
serum in the brain, or the explanation of the sound of thunder). In both cases the phenomenon 
under analysis is so ‘small’ that it cannot be observed directly, and Aristotle finds a parallel 
explanation by reference to a second (‘larger’) phenomenon already accounted for. Thus, the 
explanation is provided by reference to something we can actually observe, and then it is 
transposed onto the microscopic or imperceptible circumstance. Accordingly, the verb 
 
250 Crubellier (1994: 539). 
251 Ivi, ‘il s’agirait d’inférer la nature de ce qu’on ne voit pas (les principes du tout) à partir de ce qu’on voit (le 
commencement des animaux et des plantes)’. 
252 Arist., De insomniis, 461b20; Metaph. N4, 1092a12 (i.e., the passage under analysis); Meterologica 369a30, 
370a12; PA, 653a3; De respiratione 473b8; De sensu et sensibilibus 445a13. 
253 Arist., De partibus animalium 653a3, or, as in the Meterologica ‘ὡς παρεικάσαι μείζονι μικρὸν πάθος’. 
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παρεικάζω, at least in such parenthetical statements, seems a) to be used by Aristotle in his 
own practice in order to provide an explanation for something which is not visible, on the 
basis of an inductive reasoning; b) to imply a comparison between two different kinds of 
objects, one of which we can account for on the basis of its observability, while the same 
cannot be said for the second. Therefore, Aristotle can conclude that by comparing ‘small 
things with big ones’ we can find an account for something which is unaccountable on the 
basis of empirical observation. So far, things seem to be pretty clear. However, the 
explanation for the unobservable phenomenon is always provided before what we took to be 
the support for an analogical and inductive explanation. 254 Aristotle first explains the detailed 
functioning of the blood vessels and how the blood reaches the brain and cools down, and 
then he offers a similar account on the basis of what happens with vapor carried by the heat 
to the upper regions where it condenses into water and falls back in the form of showers. In 
this respect, the analogy seems to be much more illustrative rather than explicative. It is not 
by reference to the showers that the phenomenon of the blood reaching the brain is explained, 
but, on the contrary, showers are used just as an illustrative example of what is taken to 
happen inside the brain. The same can be said for the other occurrences of the verb in the 
Aristotelian corpus, which can be resumed as follows: 
 
1. One occurrence of παρεικάζω, where the verb seems to simply mean ‘to 
resemble’.255  
 
254 It may be helpful, here, to compare this uses of ‘images’ with Aristotle’s criticism of ‘example’ in Posterior 
Analytics. An example (παράδειγμα) ‘stands neither as part to whole, nor as whole to part, but rather as part to 
part (ὡς μέρος πρὸς μέρος), when both are subordinate to the same term, and one of them is familiar. It differs 
from induction, because induction starting from all the particular cases proves (as we saw) that the extreme 
belongs to the middle, and does not connect the deduction to the extreme, whereas argument by example does 
make this connexion and does not draw its proof from all the particular cases’, APo., 69a14-18. As Lloyd notes 
(1966: 404-409), ‘in the Rhetorics, he (viz. Aristotle) treats the paradigm as a persuasive, rather than 
demonstrative, argument (my emphasis). […] He also points out that if no ‘rethorical syllogisms’ are available, 
then we must try to prove our points with paradigms; but if we have enthymemes (i.e. rethorical syllogisms), 
then paradigms should be used as supporting evidence. But then the paradigm should not be put before the 
enthymemes (for in that position they would reesemble an induction, and induction is usually inappropriate in 
rethorical speeches), but after them, in the role of evidence’ (ivi: 406). In this respect, Lloyd’s analysis of the 
use of paradigm in Plato is also relevant: ‘In general, analogies are used as an effective technique of persuasion 
(my emphasis), particularly in recommending various political and ethical doctrines, although it is true that 
Plato sometimes allows Socrates to claim to have demonstrated his conclusions by this means.’ Indeed, Plato 
seems not to be as methodologically consistent as he himself would require. However, apart from (i) a heuristic 
usefulness of analogies in the process of recollection, Lloyd stresses as valuable methodological points (i) the 
emphasis on how likenesses are often deceptive (see, e.g. Phaed. 262a-c; Soph. 231a); (ii) how specific 
analogies are challenged in various early dialogues (e.g. Charm. 165bff; Meno, 72d-f); (iii) the didactic and 
persuasive function of likenesses (Polit. 278a8ff). 
255 Arist., De insomniis, 461b20. I provide the context for a better understanding: ‘For whenever a man sleeps, 
with most of his blood going down to his heart, the motions within the blood—some of which are potential, 
some actual—go down together with it. And the motions are such that in any motion of the blood this motion 
emerges from it, and if this motion perishes, that one emerges. In fact, they relate to one another just like the 
artificial frogs which float up in the water as the salt dissolves—in the same way the motions are present 
potentially, and with their restraint removed, they actualize, and having been set free they move around in the 
little bit of blood remaining in the sense-organs, having a likeness as figures in the clouds which people 
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2. A difficult Aristotelian example asserting that that which can be smelled 
(ὀσφραναντός) can be reasonably (εὐλόγως) likened or compared (παρεικάσται) to 
‘an immersion or washing of dryness in the moist and fluid’, whose understanding is 
quite unintelligible.256 
3. Two occurrences related, respectively, to examples provided by Empedocles 
and Clidemus, in their accounts of physical phenomena. In the case of Empedocles, 
before introducing his verses explaining the functioning of the processes of 
inhalation and exhalation, Aristotle says that the philosopher had illustrated the 
process by reference to the clepsydras (παρεικάζων τὸ συμβαῖνον ταῖς κλεψύδραις). 
Once again, even in Empedocles’ verses, the description of the process of inhaling 
and exhaling is first described in all its specific facets, and then related to the example 
of a girl playing with a clepsydra, which seem to play the role of an illustrative 
metaphor. In the case of Clidemus, Aristotle’s report is much shorter and, in this 
respect, more difficult to assess. He witnesses that, for some people, including 
Clidemus, lightening was to be considered as appearing, rather than existing, and that 
they ‘compared’ (παρεικάζοντες) it to what happens when you strike the sea with a 
rod by night and the water is seen to shine’.257  
 
The use of the verb elsewhere in Aristotle to criticise other philosopher’s analogies would 
appear to suggest a comparison provided by Speusippus himself. However, what seems 
common to all occurrences is that the comparisons provided function as a support for claims 
provided on another basis and not as demonstrations themselves. In other words, the 
parallels are provided as illustrative metaphors to visually explain and support philosophical 
claims which would otherwise be difficult to support by means of empirical observation. 
Possibly, Speusippus, either being pressed on the absence of good in his principles, or in 
order to support with a more intelligible example his claims, could have indeed referred to 
biological parallels. But this should not lead us to think that his conclusions were based on 
these. On the contrary, under these circumstances it seems more likely that they were used 
 
compare (παρεικάζουσιν) now to men, then to centaurs as they quickly transform’, tranls. McDavid and 
Ouranou, (Summer Workshop in Ancient Philosophy, Aristotle On Dreams, Rethymno 11-17 July), available 
at http://www.fks.uoc.gr/english/cvs/karamanolis/OnDreamstransl.pdf. 
256 Arist., De sensu et sensibilibus, 445a13; I take Carbone’s translation to be the most understandable in terms 
of content: ‘Pertanto l’essere dotato di odore è qualcosa di comune a entrambi e appartiene al tattile, all’udibile 
e al diafano. Perciò lo si accosta ragionevolmente all’immersione o al lavaggio di qualcosa di secco in un 
liquido o in un fluido’ (2002: 107, my emphasis), although the example remains quite obscure to me. Moreover, 
the translation keeps the reference to an illustrative metaphor; for it says: ‘for this reason (διό) it is reasonably 
(εὐλόγως) associated to […].’ 
257 Transl. Webster. The context seems to be that of defyining lightening. In this respect, cf. Lloyd (1966: 404): 
‘we may note that he (viz. Aristotle) condemns the use of metaphor in reasoning and particularly in giving 
definitions’.  
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only to provide an illustration and support for his claim that qualities such as beauty and 
goodness are shown at a different stage of nature. For although Aristotle seems to imply that 
the conclusion was transposed from a biological to a metaphysical claim, in all the other 
polemical occurrences of the verb, what represents the first term being compared (or brought 
closer to a second image) is expressed with the accusative, while the illustrative and 
supportive metaphor with the dative. If this analysis is right, Speusippus had his own reasons 
to hold that beauty and goodness did not exist in the principle, and, in need of an illustrative 
example, he might have referred to biological examples. Given this background, if we read 
[FR. 57] again, the thesis ‘ἐξ ἀορίστων ἀτελῶν τε ἀεὶ τὰ τελειότερα’ should be understood 
as the logical reason provided for why first principles do not to have qualities such as good 
and beautiful and not, as Aristotle is trying to show, as a reason justified by empirical 
comparisons.  
 
But let us take a closer look at Speusippus’ thesis as offered in [FR. 53] in parallel to the 
general principle provided in [FR. 57]. In the previous sections (2.2-2.4), we associated the 
following three premises with Speusippus: (i). What is most beautiful and noble does not exist 
in the principle; (ii). Principles are causes; (iii). Beauty and completeness are in the things 
arising out of the principles. We concluded our analysis by supposing that the premises 
expressed by Speusippus were formulated mainly with reference to first principles. The main 
difference between the information provided by Aristotle in [FR. 57] is that the notion of 
causality is, in this last passage, not emphasised.258 But if we supply this claim, and we 
observe the three premises more closely, there is space to doubt that the general claim ‘ἐξ 
ἀορίστων ἀτελῶν τε ἀεὶ τὰ τελειότερα’ might be a result of Aristotle’s own reading of 
Speusippus’ thesis. Indeed, if what is most beautiful and noble does not exist in the principle, 
although the principle is a cause, it is clear that, in Aristotle’s view, the principle is ἀτελής, 
incomplete, in comparison to what it causes.259 On the contrary, if beauty and completeness 
appear in the things arising out of the principle, those things will be, in comparison with the 
principle, τελειότερα, more complete. In fact, the general thesis ‘ἐξ ἀορίστων ἀτελῶν τε ἀεὶ 
τὰ τελειότερα’ expresses a comparison in terms of degree between the first and the last term. 
Things arising out of the principles are not said to be complete, but more complete. And if 
they are more complete, they must be more complete in comparison with something else: 
i.e. they more complete than the seed, and, therefore, than their principle. Unfortunately, as 
the evidence is limited, the solution to the problems just examined necessarily requires some 
 
258 However, it can be reasonably considered as implicit in γεννᾷ. 
259 See, Arist. Metaph. Λ3 1070a6-9; Phys. 2.7 198a26-27; 3.2 202a9-12 where we can find relevant 
discussions on the necessary homogeneity of the cause and its effect. 
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dose of speculation. Nevertheless, as already pointed out, the teleological terminology 
provides Aristotle with an easier framework to refuse Speusippus’ claims, and always occurs 
later in the accounts, preceding the counterexample of the seed. Even in the present context, 
the introduction of the discussion relates to the presence or absence of good in the principles, 
and it is only as an afterthought that Aristotle focuses his attention on completion. Aristotle’s 
vocabulary operates a gradual climax in the range of adjectives used from a) ἀορίστων 
ἀτελῶν τε; to b) τὰ τελειότερα; and, finally, c) τέλειαι. At first, things arising out of the 
principles are presented as more complete (τελειότερα). This comparison, as an implication, 
entails that principles are, at least in comparison with them, incomplete (ἀτελῆ). Once 
Aristotle has established the consequence of the comparison, the counter-example becomes 
relevant: for even plants and animals come out of something which is complete (τέλεια), and 
not from something which is incomplete. Accordingly, Aristotle is here supplying the same 
deficient premises provided in the previous fragment, but with a different phrasing. Namely, 
the general claim ‘ἐξ ἀορίστων ἀτελῶν τε ἀεὶ τὰ τελειότερα’ establishes that, if, for 
Speusippus: 
 
I. The principle of plants and animals is incomplete.  
II. Plants and animals are more complete than the seed.  
 
Then: 
III. The seed is a principle.  
Once again, as Crubellier also notes, Aristotle had accommodated a temporal reading of 
τῇ [ἀρχή] τῶν ζῴων καὶ φυτῶν. As highlighted in [FR. 53], Aristotle would once again agree 
that, in time, plants and animals are brought to completion from something which is not 
complete. But he cannot agree on what is ontologically prior, which is (a) man, and not the 
seed.260 Accordingly, as the same considerations drew in relation to [FR. 53] can be 
expanded to this fragment as well [FR. 57], the plausibility of our conclusions is 
confirmed.261 
 
260 Note the closeness of the formulation of the counter-example in both fragments: τὸ πρῶτον οὐ σπέρμα ἐστὶν 
- καὶ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ σπέρμα πρῶτον. 
261 I am aware that my analysis completely overlooked two aspects: a) the second term used by Aristotle, i.e. 
the adjective ἀόριστος, which might be taken as providing information on the characterisation of Speusippus’ 
principles; b) the reference to the annihilation of the One. As the discussion of Speusippus’ principles will be 
addressed in Chapter 5, for the moment I will limit myself only to brief considerations. Indeed, we would 
expect the adjective ἀόριστος to be associated to the second principle only, τὸ πλήθος, as the term is commonly 
used by Aristotle to refer to the Dyad and to matter (see, for instance, Arist., Metaph. Z 1029b20-21: λέγω δ᾿ 
ὕλην ἣ καθ᾿αὑτὴν μήτε τὶ μήτε ποσὸν μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν λέγεται οἷς ὥρισται τὸ ὄν, ‘By matter I mean that which 
in itself is neither a particular thing nor a quantity nor designated by any of the categories which define Being’, 
transl. Tredennick). On the contrary, in the fragment under analysis the consequences drawn lead to the 
annihilation of One only. One possible way to avoid the difficulty would be to suppose that Aristotle has here 
in mind the two principles, and that he is conflating features suitable not only to the One, but to Plurality as 
well. The obvious difficulty for such a reading is that the text does not provide any hint in this direction except 
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2.7 Why participation?  
Aristotle’s criticism in [FR. 53] and [FR. 57] can be summarised as follows: (i) 
Speusippus wrongly conceived of his principles as of a seed; (iii) accordingly, Speusippus’ 
principles cannot be (ontologically) prior and exercise their function of principles. Indeed, 
both theses Aristotle attributes to Speusippus (τὸ δὲ καλὸν καὶ τέλειον ἐν τοῖς ἐκ τούτων; ἐξ 
ἀορίστων ἀτελῶν τε ἀεὶ τὰ τελειότερα) focus the attention on a process of development or 
engendering, and on a process with brings forth completion. In such a process, the seed is 
wrongly taken to be the origin. By employing Aristotle’s own theoretical framework of 
potency and actuality, we could say that the dynamis principles embody in Speusippus’ 
system is, from Aristotle’s perspective, a deficient one, specifically for it is a dynamis; 
because although Aristotle makes clear that actuality is prior, and not potency, the 
relationship between the principles and their offspring is connoted in terms of indefiniteness, 
incompleteness or absence of qualities’.262 
 
So much for what concerns the textual analysis of the passages. However, I believe there 
are elements which may allow us to push the conclusions a bit further.  
 
Premise (i), as reported by Aristotle, appears to imply the ontological posteriority of what 
is qualified over what is unqualified. In other words, the thesis entails that what is 
ontologically prior, cannot yet be qualified in terms of properties. Indeed, qualities such as 
beauty and goodness are posterior ontologically, with respect to what is unqualified. As we 
have shown, parallel versions of the thesis suggest that it had a specific designatum, primary 
principles; moreover, qualities that are often taken into account are beauty and goodness, 
possibly related to emblematic Platonic examples. If this analysis is plausible, we may read 
the thesis, in its ontological nuance, as a response to the Platonic theory of the Forms and as 
an attempt to fix it. Indeed, if premise (i) requires the ontological priority of what is 
unqualified over what is qualified, Forms cannot be taken to meet this requirement. In fact, 
qualities such as beauty, nobility and goodness are exemplified absolutely in the Forms. But 
if Forms cannot meet the requirement of being unqualified, they cannot be postulated as 
ontologically prior. On the contrary, principles, analytically conceived, do meet the 
 
for the plural: ἐπὶ τῶν πρώτων. In general, I take ἀόριστος to play a role in Speusippus’ conception of both 
principles, and to be related to the difficulty Aristotle seems to usually have concerning the ontological status 
of Speusippus’ first principles.  
262 One may note, however, that Aristotle also denies that the seed is actually a human being in potency. (see 
Arist. Metaph. Θ8, 1049a14–18). It would be interesting to compare the criticism Aristotle raises in [FR. 53] 
and [FR. 57] and that addressed in Metaph., N5. 1092a 21-1092a 24; 1092a 29- 1092b5 (where the seed 
analogy appears once again) with Aristotle’s own embryological theories (in particular GA I, 18.724b6-11). 
As such an investigation would lead me astray from the present purpose, I postoponed the discussion to a 
different context. 
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requirements of premise (i), i.e., being unqualified. Thanks to Aristotle we know that 
Speusippus, having seen the ‘δυσχέρειαν καὶ πλάσιν’ of Platonic Forms, rejected ideal 
number and posited mathematical number alone.263 And it is Aristotle again who suggests 
that, for Speusippus, the δυσχέρεια also derived from ‘granting goodness [τὸ εὖ] as 
belonging (ὡς ὑπάρχον) to the ἀρχή’.264 If principles, in Speusippus’ system, were to 
embody the paradigmatic role265 Forms played in Plato’s doctrine, they would be liable to 
the same criticism. For, as Aristotle points out elsewhere, if the One, insofar as principle of 
numbers, were to be good, its offspring would also result to be good.266 The results would 
then be an overabundance of goods. However, Aristotle never addresses such charges to 
Speusippus.267 Hence, his principles are constructed according to different hypotheses. 
 
By generalising Speusippus’ reasons to reject that the One is (the) good, it seems possible 
to relate such a rejection with (a) Speusippus’ refusal of Plato’s theory of Forms and (b) the 
difficulties that these intrinsically held in their relation to sensible objects.268 Platonic 
participation, indeed, obtained a precarious balance between the fact that Forms needed to 
be close enough to sensibles in order to share their properties and characteristics and, at the 
same time, distant enough not to be confused with them; to some extent, they needed to be 
separated and independent from them.269 This ontological account, as Aristotle emphasises 
many times, and as Plato possibly realised himself,270 brought inherent contradictions 
especially with reference to the sensibles, which shared different properties and 
characteristics of Forms (as dialectic shows at a logical-epistemological level) with these 
latter remaining unique. Accordingly, in Speusippus’ system principles would be conceived 
as causes, as premise (ii) suggests, but they would lose their ontological grounding in their 
consequents, being characterised as completely unqualified. 271 Indeed, I believe that 
although the phrasing of premise (i) more explicitly addresses some qualities that Forms 
exemplified, the problem it calls attention to has a broader significance: the sharing of 
 
263 Arist., Metaph. M9, 1086a2-5. 
264 Transl. Menn (unpublished, Iγ3: 40). 
265 Or anly causal activity which Aristotle attributes to the Forms. 
266 See Arist. Metaph. N4, 1091b27-28. 
267 Instead, Aristotle appears to present this result as a reason for Speusippus to deny that the One is good. See 
Arist., Metaph. N4, 1091b21ff.  
268 As previously highlighted, also the word δυσχέρεια points at logical difficulties.  
269 See, among others, Fronterotta (2001), the essays collected in Fronterotta (2010) and Fronterotta and Leszl 
(2011). 
270 As, for instance, in the Parmenides, in the Theaetetus, or in the Sophist where the greatest kinds (μέγιστα 
γένη) are introduced. 
271 Another possible solution would be to consider principles of each level as minimally qualified (e.g. those 
of numbers as qualified only quantitatively; those of magnitudes dimentionally (or, possibly, numerically and 
dmentionally), etc.). On these reading, primary principles would still be the least qualified, or completely 
unqualified. 
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qualities between Forms and sensible in general, or, in other words, participation. Hence, if 
what Speusippus considered to be problematic of the Platonic view is precisely the sharing 
of qualities among Forms and sensibles, it is appropriate to consider Speusippus’ principles 
as totally unqualified and not just in relation to those qualities here taken into account.272  
 
Broadening the scope of Speusippus’ conception of principles by considering participation 
as a problem he was actually targeting would be consistent with: 
 
a) Fragments related to Speusippus’ inquiry into the sensibles, which bear no 
reference to qualities the objects enquired (which are all sensible objects, mainly plants 
and animals) share but only provide a sketch of their relation in terms of similarities and 
differences. 273 Sensible objects are indeed compared by means of reciprocal similarities 
and differences, and vertical relationships are difficoult to identify.  
 
b) The absence of criticism related to regress implied in the Third Man 
argument. Indeed, if anything else in Speusippus’ system was expected to take on 
paradigmatic activities274 in place of the Forms, Speusippus’ system would suffer from 
the same problem of Plato’s. But this does not emerge from Aristotelian critiques, which 
never address the argument of the Third Man explicitly to Speusippus.  
 
c) The continuous reference to qualities, participation275 and predication which 
emerges out of Aristotle’s considerations following [FR. 58]. In the following portions of 
text, the reference to qualities, and to qualities shared by different kinds of beings, are 
issues which are central. Indeed, the reference to beauty and good is often formulated, 
 
272 Indeed, the numerical characterisation of first principles (One and Plurality) does not explicitly contradict 
my thesis.  
273 See, e.g. frr. 38-47 IP1. 
274 I am not sure what Isnardi Parente’s position on this point is. Although she seems to argue in favour of an 
analogical relation between different kinds of principles, she sometimes seems to hint at a paradigmatic activity 
performed by numbers, e.g. when she calls them ‘models’. See, for example (1980: 278), where numbers are 
said to be: ‘modelli transcendenti (viz. del reale)’; (1977: 1024), where Speusippus is defined ‘il teorizzatore 
precipuo del numero, il sostitutore dei modelli numerici ai modelli eidetici’; (2005: 6): ‘Aristotele non ci dice 
mai chiaramente che Speusippo ritenesse che i numeri debbano svolgere la funzione che hanno, nel sistema di 
Platone, le idee. E’ però integrazione necessaria, dal momento che egli ci dice che i numeri sono il primo e 
fondamentale tipo di essere, e che sono separati dai sensibili, il che significa che ne costituiscono il tratto 
trascendente di unificazione’. 
275 Participation becomes a more explicit target once we turn to the difficulties Aristotle lists at 1091b22-
1092a5 (from line 1091b22 to 1092a5 the verb μετέχω occurs four times) and addressed to those who make 
the Good a principle (see also Crubellier 1994: 522 and 533-534). On several occasions, when listing the 
difficulties Aristotle differentiates Speusippus’ position and claims he wanted to avoid them. One mention is 
particularly significant, as it is connected to Speusippus’ refusal to connote primary principles as contraries. 
For, by making primary principles opposites, and connoting them as Good and Evil, respectively: ‘συμβαίνει 
δὴ πάντα τὰ ὄντα μετέχειν τοῦ κακοῦ ἔξω ἑνὸς αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἑνός᾽ (and the same remark is repeated in Λ10, 
1075a34-36). 
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also when addressed more generally to those Platonists who kept the identity between the 
good and the principle(s), as a relation of predication of specific attributes.276 As 
Crubellier notes, Aristotle highlights quite insistently, as he does in [FR. 58], that 
Speusippus’ postulation of the existence of mathematical number alone, arose precisely 
‘d’une prise de conscience des conséquences intenables de l’identification entre l’Un et 
le Bien’.277 And these consequences, in the way they are spelled out in the critiques 
addressed to the Platonists, point precisely to relationships of predication and 
participation.  
 
Moreover, I believe that such a response would provide explanatory advantages both in 
accounting for aspects of Speusippus’ system that have been neglected by scholars, and in 
view of a coherent reconstruction of Speusippus’ doctrines.   
 
a) If Speusippus’ postulation of unqualified principles is prompted in response 
to the charge of metaphysical separation, and thus releases the sensibles from an 
ontological/epistemological dependence and grounding in the Forms, this would 
perfectly match with the weight conceded by Speusippus in his surviving testimonia to 
inquiry into the sensibles.278 This aspect is usually neglected or incidental in scholarly 
accounts, which focus more on reconstructing supposedly metaphysical theories 
preserved in later sources, rather than give Speusippus’ focus on scientific research the 
right credit. Besides the biological fragments preserved by Athenaeus, Diogenes 
Laertius279 bears witness of not one, but ten volumes of a book of (Dialogues) On the 
Science of Similars, of a book entitled Divisions and Hypotheses on the Similars and of 
a book on Examples of Genuses and Species. Although Speusippus is also credited with 
the view that it is impossible to define anything without knowing all other objects 
 
276 See, for example (Arist. Metaph. N4 1091b 16ff.) the discussion on the attributes of self-sufficiency and 
eternity. These, for Aristotle, belong to the first principle and are good because the principle itself is good 
substantially (note here that the discussion is not addressed to Speusippus, who, supposedly, would encounter 
the same difficulty if he had conceived of his principles as self-sufficient and eternal. Once again, we can 
therefore suppose that these ‘qualities’ were not claimed by Speusippus as features of his principles); or, also, 
the discussion on units becoming specimen of good themselves, if they participate in the One, which is good 
(Arist. Metaph. N4, 1091b25-26). In this case, the relationship between the One and the units is expressed by 
the formula ‘B is ὅπερ Α’ or ‘ὅπερ Α τι’, which, as Crubellier (1994: 529) notes, means that A is a genus to 
which B belongs, when this attribution is made on the ground of its essence (once more, Aristotle says here 
that Speusippus, in order to avoid this difficulty, abstained from positing ideal number and posited 
mathematical number alone. From this, it seems clear that at least some of the problems were indeed related to 
the relation of participation). The same for the discussion of evil, to which everything in the world would 
participate in with the exception of the One, if the two principles are conceived of as opposed contraries (Arist. 
Metaph. N4 1091b35ff).  
277 See, e.g. 1091a36-b3; b32-35 Crubellier (1994: 519). 
278 This will be analysed in more detail in Chapter 4.  
279 Diog. Laert., IV, 1, 4-5.  
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differing from that first (indeed, one needs to know the object which he is defining, plus 
all of those that differ from the object in question), this does not imply that he considered 
knowledge of such sensible realities as totally impossible.280 If, as Aristotle testifies, the 
axioms of mathematics cannot be applied to the sensibles, maybe we should take this 
claim as confirming that these latter deserve a different kind of inquiry that results in a 
different kind of knowledge.281  
 
b) Secondly, this reading also accommodates the difficulties experienced by 
Speusippus in relation to the diairetic method, and recognised by some scholars as the 
difficulty that led him to refuse the Platonic theory of Forms.282 Indeed, for both Cherniss 
and Isnardi Parente,283 Speusippus’ problem was related to a short-circuit in Plato’s 
system, noticeable when one wants to understand the diairetic partitioning method 
within an ontological perspective.284 As I believe that, for Speusippus, it was precisely 
the relation of Forms and sensibles that was considered problematic, an intervention in 
the system constituted of unbinding the sensibles both from mathematical number and 
from the principles, also avoid the problems related to an ontological grasping of the 
qualities they bear. 
 
c) Lastly, if this reading is correct, it would expose Speusippus’ primary 
concern: to solve a problem in Plato’s doctrine by allowing the possibility of ensuring 
different epistemological practices, addressed to different kinds of objects. By 
characterising first principles as unqualified, Speusippus is trying to ensure the 
possibility of different kinds of enquiries related to different objects and to preserve the 
internal structure at each level of being. Moreover, this interpretation would be 
consistent with Speusippus’ conception of mathematical number, the first of beings285 
(πρῶτον τῶν ὄντων) and a reality by itself (καθ᾽αὐτὴν φύσιν).286 According to these 
premises, mathematical number would drop its role of being intermediate: it does not 
 
280 And so argues Horky (2018: 36-37), who claims Speusippus ‘is not to be credited […] with any sort of 
proto-sceptical argument that a regress implies that no essence can be known whatsoever’. By contrast, he 
suggests the argument may be used in order to show ‘that prenatal knowledge of all the essences is required 
for knowledge of any single essence, which can only, in fact, be obtained via discursive dialectic’. 
281 As Sextus’ testimony seems to confirm (=fr. 34 IP1) when distinguishing between ‘ὁ ἐπιστεμονικός λόγος’, 
the criterion for noetic objects, and ‘ἡ ἐπιστημονική αἴσθεσις’, the criterion for sensible objects. On Sextus 
report, see Isnardi Parente (1969) and (1992), Cambiano (2011), Kaklamanou (2012) and Dillon (2018). 
282 My reading obviously cannot accommodate the position of Dillon (2003), who interprets Speusippus’ 
system as a generative reality originating in the One. 
283 Isnardi Parente (1980: 58-59), Cherniss (1962: 38ff). 
284 I leave aside the question of whether it is legitimate or not to actually consider the diairetic method as 
exposing interrelated ontological reality in such way. 
285 Arist., Metaph. M6 1080b14-16. 
286 Arist., Metaph. N2 1090a4. 
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work as a paradigmatic cause and, in virtue of its independence from sensible objects, it 
guarantees, owing to its eternity, immutability and unchangeability,287 a different and 
secure kind of knowledge. This manoeuvre secures at the same time the possibility and 
independence of mathematical and geometrical practices288 and the stability of their 
conclusions. Indeed, as the independence of both levels is symmetrical, objects may 
differ in their ontological consistency and stability, but precisely because of their 
difference, they also allow enquiries that are differentiated and suitable to each of them.  
 
While an episodic structure of the world results from this picture, at the same time the 
reasons for its episodicity become clearer. If Aristotle accuses Speusippus of having 
condemned the world to a badly constructed tragedy, he does not recognise the advantage of 
Speusippus’ commitment: self-sustainability at each level of being implies independence not 
only of their objects, but also of the different kinds of knowledge for their pursuit. 289  
 
287 On the status of the objects of theoretical sciences as not allowing any kind of γένεσις, see Procl., In Eucl. 
77,7ff Friedlein (=fr. 36 IP1). This aspect will be dealt with in section 3.4. 
288 The claim that mathematical and geometrical practices are rendered impossible is indeed addressed against 
Xenocrates. See, e.g., Arist. Metaph., M8, 1083a 31-b 8 (=fr. 29 IP).  
289 On Speusippus’ and Xenocrates’ theory and practice of philosophical education, see Horky (2018). In a 
very recent paper, Dillon (2018) also argues that Early Academic philosophers accounted for a form of 
knowledge (different from and inferior to that of the intelligible world) also at the level of sensibles. His 
account relies mainly on Sextus’ report (=fr. 34 IP1). For a different reconstruction of Speusippus’ account of 
sensible knowledge, see Kaklamanou (2012). 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
MATHEMATICAL NUMBER 
 
 
 
As we have seen in the last chapter, Speusippus’ refusal of Plato’s theory of Forms seems 
to be connected to the complications this held in relation to the sharing of qualities between 
sensible particulars and the Forms themselves, insofar as these were functioning as their 
ontological and epistemological grounding. Speusippus’ solution to these complications 
relied on a separation between ontological levels, which granted to each level independence 
both in terms of ontological subsistence and epistemological autonomy. It is on this ground 
that the philosopher holds ‘that mathematical number alone exists, the first of beings and 
separate from sensible things’.290 As argued there, Aristotle’s testimonies are not consistent 
terminologically when speaking of the mathematical realm, as they refer to numbers, 
mathematical objects and, sometimes, even mathematical propositions. What seems to be 
consistent across Aristotle’s reports, though, is the insistence that numbers are the first ὄντα, 
the first beings, and the claim that Speusippus refused to postulate ideal numbers as, for 
instance, Xenocrates did. Moreover, the reference to numbers as the first ὄντα also squares 
with some later testimonies, Proclus’ in particular, in which the objects of theoretical 
sciences are described as eternal, immutable and ingenerated. Given this background, the 
aim of the present chapter is to analyse the role mathematical number plays in Speusippus’ 
system, through a comparison of Aristotelian testimonia and a passage preserved by Proclus 
and related to the same topic. To this purpose, section 3.1 will offer an overview of 
Aristotle’s texts, in order to gather consistent information about mathematical objects in 
Speusippus’ thought. Sections 3.2 and 3.3 will concentrate on the relationship mathematical 
number is said to entertain with primary principles (the One in particular), and especially on 
Aristotle’s attempts to explain the generation of number(s) out of them. Lastly, section 3.4 
will concentrate on a passage preserved in Proclus’ Commentary on the First Book of 
Euclid’s Elements that attests to a dispute within the Academy on the right appellative for 
mathematical propositions. Indeed, as Aristotle’s information is sketchy and incomplete, the 
comparison with Proclus’ evidence will be crucial for testing the results and acquiring a 
synoptic view of the subject.  
 
 
 
290 Arist., Metaph. N6, 1080b 15-16. 
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3.1 The mathematical realm in Aristotle’s testimony (frr. 73; 74; 75; 76; 77) 
Accordingly, let us turn to what Aristotle has to say specifically about Speusippus’ 
mathematical theories which, unfortunately, is not much. Hence, our strategy will consist in 
providing a broad view of the main texts, in the attempt to reconstruct a coherent view 
concerning the mathematical realm. 
 
[FR. 73] Now there are three kinds of substance. One is sensible […]. Another is 
immutable, which certain thinkers hold to exist separately; some dividing it into two 
classes, others combining the Forms and the objects mathematics into a single class, and 
others (recognizing) only the objects of mathematics as of this nature (οἱ δὲ τὰ 
μαθηματικὰ μόνον τούτων).291 
 
[FR. 74] There are two views on this subject. Some say that mathematical objects, i.e. 
numbers and lines, etc., are substances; and others again that the Forms are substances. 
Now since some recognize these as two classes—the Ideas and the mathematical 
numbers—and others regard both as having one nature, and yet others hold that only 
the mathematical (substances) are substances (ἕτεροι δέ τινες τὰς μαθηματικὰς μόνον 
οὐσίας εἶναί φασι), we must first consider the mathematical objects, without imputing 
to them any other characteristic […].292 
 
[FR. 75] Some hold that both kinds of number exist, that which involves priority and 
posteriority being identical with the Forms, and mathematical number being distinct 
from Forms and sensible things, and both kinds being separable from sensible things; 
others hold that mathematical number alone exists, being the primary reality and 
separate from sensible things (οἱ δὲ τὸν μαθηματικὸν μόνον ἀριθμὸν εἶναι τὸν πρῶτον 
τῶν ὄντων κεχωρισμένον τῶν αἰσθητῶν). […] Some distinguish mathematical objects 
from those which “come after the Ideas”; and of those who treat the subject in a different 
manner some speak of the mathematical objects and in a mathematical way—viz. those 
who do not regard the Forms as numbers, nor indeed hold that the Forms exist—and 
others speak of the mathematical objects, but not in a mathematical way (τῶν δ᾿ ἄλλως 
λεγόντων οἱ μὲν τὰ μαθηματικὰ καὶ μαθηματικῶς λέγουσιν, ὅσοι μὴ ποιοῦσι τὰς ἰδέας 
ἀριθμοὺς μηδὲ εἶναί φασιν ἰδέας, οἱ δὲ τὰ μαθηματικά, οὐ μαθηματικῶς δέ).293 
 
[FR. 76] Nor again is the theory sound which certain other thinkers hold concerning 
numbers. These are those who do not believe in Forms, neither absolutely nor as being 
certain numbers, but believe that the objects of mathematics exist, and that the numbers 
are the first of existing things, and that their principle is the One itself (εἰσὶ δ᾿ οὗτοι 
ὅσοι ἰδέας μὲν οὐκ οἴονται εἶναι οὔτε ἁπλῶς οὔτε ὡς ἀριθμούς τινας οὔσας, τὰ δὲ 
μαθηματικὰ εἶναι καὶ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς πρώτους τῶν ὄντων, καὶ ἀρχὴν αὐτῶν εἶναι αὐτὸ 
τὸ ἕν).294 
 
[FR. 77] Those who posit the objects of mathematics only besides sensible things, 
because they saw the difficulty and artificiality regarding the Forms, abandoned Ideal 
number and posited mathematical number (οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὰ μαθηματικὰ μόνον ποιοῦντες 
παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητά, ὁρῶντες τὴν περὶ τὰ εἴδη δυσχέρειαν καὶ πλάσιν, ἀπέστησαν ἀπὸ τοῦ 
εἰδητικοῦ ἀριθμοῦ καὶ τὸν μαθηματικὸν ἐποίησαν).295 
 
291 Arist. Metaph. Z 1069a33ff, transl. Tredennick. In all passages, the italics is mine. 
292 Arist. Metaph. M 1076a18-24, transl. Tredennick modified.  
293 Arist. Metaph. M 1080b1-6; 24-30, transl. Tredennick. 
294 Arist. Metaph. M 1083a22-26, transl. Tredennick. 
295 Arist. Metaph. M 10836a3-6 transl. Tredennick. 
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As mentioned previously, Aristotle’s terminology is not consistent and fluctuates 
between: τὰ μαθηματικά, τὰς μαθηματικὰς οὐσίας, τὸν μαθηματικὸν ἀριθμόν, τοὺς 
ἀριθμούς. In this respect, as the phrasing of Speusippus’ theory is also dependent on the 
context it is presented in by Aristotle, it is hard to infer what its original formulation might 
have been, and whether it was related to mathematical number only, or whether it could be 
extended to comprise the mathematical realm more broadly. Nevertheless, we may observe 
that such fluctuation between ‘number(s)’ and ‘mathematical objects’ more broadly might 
hint at some sort of unitarian conception of the mathematical realm as such, of which number 
is to be considered the first component. Indeed, Aristotle is relatively consistent in referring 
to mathematical number specifically as the first of beings, rather than to mathematical objects 
more generally. If this is right, it would confirm the provisional obtained in Chapter 1:296 
Speusippus had a unitarian conception of the mathematical realm, which comprised 
mathematical number(s) as well as geometricals. 
 
A unitarian conception of the mathematical realm is also suggested by the repeated 
mention of alone, or only next to ‘mathematical number(s)’ or ‘mathematical objects’. In 
some passages, this specification is clearly meant to distinguish Speusippus’ position from 
those of Plato and Xenocrates, who, according to Aristotle, had postulated the existence of 
either both Forms and mathematical number, or had merged the two into a single nature. In 
this respect, the ‘only’ serves as a clarification that Speusippus did something different, and, 
by refusing the existence of ideal number and Forms he posited mathematical number only. 
However, the specification occurs also in another context, where Speusippus is referred to 
as: ‘οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὰ μαθηματικὰ μόνον ποιοῦντες παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητά’. The formulation ‘παρὰ 
τὰ αἰσθητά’ is precisely that of Z2, where Aristotle was referring to those people who 
believed that there were several kinds of οὐσίαι beyond sensible bodies. In that circumstance, 
Aristotle had listed, besides number(s), magnitudes and soul. In this context Aristotle seems 
to imply that, besides sensible bodies, Speusippus had postulated the existence of 
mathematical objects only. Leaving aside the question of soul (about which information 
provided by Aristotle is so poor that it does not allow any consideration of the topic), it seems 
plausible to conclude that numbers and magnitudes (at least) are referred to together here as 
τὰ μαθηματικά. Indeed, also the formulation: ‘τὰ δὲ μαθηματικὰ εἶναι καὶ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς 
πρώτους τῶν ὄντων’ suggests as much: Speusippus believes that mathematical objects exist, 
and that numbers are the first of beings. Indeed, the sentence seems to convey a 
 
296 See, infra, section 1.2. 
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comprehensive conception of mathematical objects, of which numbers constitute a part. In 
this respect, as Aristotle’s terminology is not consistent, but numbers usually are the subject 
of his criticism when he complains about Plato and the Academics (as a group), we might 
reasonably suppose that Aristotle sometimes refers to mathematical number in order to 
exemplify features that, in Speusippus’ mind, might have belonged to the mathematical 
realm as such. In this respect, the idea of a unitarian conception of the mathematical realm 
(as opposed to the sensible realm) starts to acquire some consistency. And this supposition 
seems to be even more reasonable when we observe that the counterpart for mathematical 
number (or mathematical objects), is usually the sensibles. Aristotle says that mathematical 
number is separated from the sensibles and that Speusippus conceived mathematical number 
as some sort of ‘καθ᾽αὐτὴν φύσις᾽,297 an entity by itself, and he justifies its separateness by 
stating that: ‘those who treat number as separable assume that is exists and is separable 
because the axioms will not apply to sensible objects’.298  
 
Moreover, as already underlined in Chapter 2, these passages confirm that the reason for 
postulating mathematical objects only, and therefore for refusing too the existence of ideal 
number, is related to the rejection of the Forms. Although they do not take on paradigmatic 
or causal functions, mathematical objects preserve two important features Plato granted to 
the Forms: separability and self-subsistence. Mathematical number is separated from the 
sensibles, and is an entity in itself. The insistence on characterizing mathematical number as 
separated and in denying any causal effect onto the sensibles seems to be justified, once 
again, by appeal to epistemological reasons. For Aristotle testifies that the separateness of 
mathematical number is motivated by the fact that the axioms of mathematics are not true of 
sensible bodies. Just as we observed in the previous chapters, granting ontological 
independence to the mathematical realm consequently grants its gnoseological independence 
as well. The separation of mathematical number seems to fulfil specifically this aim: 
allowing for different epistemological practices at different ontological levels. In this 
respect, the postulation of mathematical number would account for the preservation of 
mathematical and geometrical practices and, possibly, for the truth of their objects. By 
 
297 Arist., Metaph. N2, 1090a1-13, οὐθενὸς γὰρ οὔτε φησὶν ὁ λέγων αὐτὸν εἶναι, ἀλλ᾿ ὡς αὐτήν τινα λέγει 
καθ᾿αὑτὴν φύσιν οὖσαν, οὔτε φαίνεται ὢν αἴτιος·, ‘He who maintains its existence does not claim that it is the 
cause of anything, but regards it as an independent entity; nor can we observe it to be the cause of anything’, 
transl. Tredennick. 
298 Arist., Metaph. N3, 1090a35-1090b1, οἱ δὲ χωριστὸν ποιοῦντες, ὅτι ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν οὐκ ἔσται τὰ 
ἀξιόματα, ἀληθῆ δὲ τὰ λεγόμενα καὶ σαίνει τὴν ψυχήν, εἶναί τε ὑπολαμβάνουσι καὶ χωριστὰ εἶναι, ‘But those 
who treat number as separate assume that it exists and is separate because the axioms will not apply to sensible 
objects; whereas the statements of mathematics are true and appeal to the soul’, transl. Tredennick. Note here, 
that the passage addresses numbers only, but takes its counterpart to be sensible objects only, and not sensibles 
and magnitudes combined. 
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addressing a stable and independent kind of object, mathematical and geometrical 
discussions proliferating inside and outside the Academy could rely on a secure kind of 
knowledge. Moreover, the rejection of ideal number serves a second purpose: it allows 
independent inquiry into the sensibles. By denying the existence of ideal number, 
Speusippus exempts numbers from fulfilling causal requirements as well as sensibles from 
ontological and causal dependence on them. Not only are mathematical axioms not true of 
sensible objects; sensible objects do not need them: their study will indeed require a different 
kind of understanding.  
 
To wrap up our observations briefly, what seems to be consistent in Aristotle’s testimonia, 
and can therefore be taken as fairly reliable can be summarised as follows: 
 
a) Speusippus postulated the existence of mathematical number and refused the 
existence of both ideal number and the Forms. Aristotle is not consistent in speaking 
about Speusippus’ mathematical theories, and his wording oscillates between ‘numbers’ 
and ‘mathematical objects’. Nevertheless, this oscillation suggests a unitarian 
conception of the mathematical realm as such.  
b) Aristotle constantly specifies that Speusippus’ postulated mathematical objects (or 
number(s)) only. The specification can to be explained both in view of a differentiation 
of Speusippus’ position from those of Plato and Xenocrates, and as another indication 
that the mathematical level can be conceived of as unitary. 
c) Mathematical number is separated from the sensibles and is the first of beings 
(πρῶτον τῶν ὄντων). In Aristotelian accounts, sensibles often represent the counterpart 
of the mathematical realm.  
d) The principle and element of mathematical number is the One.  
 
Besides the aspects just listed, the specific features of the theory remain very obscure. 
Moreover, the synthesis of all of these aspects does not really say much about the details of 
Speusippus’ mathematical theories, nor about how numbers are to be connected to the 
principles, and how we should understand the construction ἐκ + genitive in passages 
connecting principles with their consequents. It is especially in regard to the latter point that 
Aristotle preserves other crucial information. Accordingly, the next section will try to 
understand how mathematical number is related to the principles and how Speusippus 
conceived of this relationship.  
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3.2 The generation of numbers: Aristotelian candidates (fr. 83) 
As observed, Aristotle does not provide us with detail concerning the role of the 
mathematical realm in Speusippus’ philosophy. Moreover, what remains completely obscure 
is the crucial transition from first principles to numbers. In this regard, even if we are not 
provided with any detail, Aristotle does at least refer to the generation of numbers in two 
occasions. The first occurs in Metaph. M: 
 
[FR. 83] Ἔτι πῶς μὲν ἐνδέχεται εἶναι ἐκ τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ πλήθους τὸν ἀριθμὸν οὐθὲν 
ἐπιχειρεῖται· ὅπως δ᾿ οὖν λέγουσι ταὐτὰ συμβαίνει δυσχερῆ ἅπερ καὶ τοῖς ἐκ τοῦ ἑνὸς 
καὶ ἐκ τῆς δυάδος τῆς ἀορίστου. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ κατηγορουμένου καθόλου γεννᾷ τὸν 
ἀριθμὸν καὶ οὐ τινὸς πλήθους, ὁ δ᾿ ἔκ τινος πλήθους, τοῦ πρώτου δέ (τὴν γὰρ δυάδα 
πρῶτόν τι εἶναι πλῆθος), ὥστε διαφέρει οὐθὲν ὡς εἰπεῖν, ἀλλ᾿αἱ ἀπορίαι αἱ αὐταὶ 
ἀκολουθήσουσι, μῖξις ἢ θέσις ἢ κρᾶσις ἢ γένεσις καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα. 
 
Further, no attempt is made to explain how it is possible for number to originate out of 
the One and Plurality; but howsoever they account for this, the same difficulties follow 
for those who (originate)299 number out of the One and the indeterminate Dyad. For one 
generates number from that which is universally predicated and not from a particular 
plurality; the other from a particular plurality, viz. the first; for they hold that the Dyad 
is the first particular (τι) plurality. Thus, there is practically no difference between the 
two views; the same difficulties will be involved with regard to mixture, position, 
blending, generation and the other similar modes of combination.300 
 
In the first line of the testimony, Aristotle experiences the same frustration modern 
scholars do when they try to understand how the generation of numbers works in Speusippus’ 
account. For Aristotle affirms Speusippus made no attempt at all (οὐθὲν ἐπιχειρεῖται) to 
explain how it is possible for number to arise301 out of the One and Plurality, the two primary 
principles postulated by Speusippus. Although we could still question Aristotle’s honesty, 
(and suppose that Speusippus actually had an account for such a generation, or production) 
the fact that Aristotle equates Speusippus’ principles with those of Xenocrates in order to 
reject any option for the generation of numbers seems to indicate that Speusippus neither 
provided any specific explanation for the generation of number(s) out of primary principles, 
nor yet did he consider it as a crucial transition in need of justification.302  
 
299 As in Crubellier (1994: 347), I supply εἶναι ἐκ + gen from the previous sentence.  
300 Arist., Metaph. M9 1085b5–12, 21-27, transl. Tredennick modified. 
301 Although I am using different terminology, the relation of number with first principles is usually expressed 
with ἐκ + the genitive (see, e.g. frr. 53 and 57 in Chapter 2, sections 2.1 and 2.6), and no verb of production is 
provided. 
302 I agree with Annas (1976 :186) that Speusippus probably didn’t say ‘anything definite on this topic’; because 
if otherwise, ‘Aristotle would hardly produce a priori arguments to show that it must be impossible’. However, 
I disagree as to how she understands the argument: ‘The argument plays on the difficulty in seeing how 
plurality contribute anything towards the formation of a unit, since a unit is precisely what cannot be pluralized; 
so, it seems that plurality cannot be a factor in the production of units’. As it will be clear in the next pages, I 
believe Aristotle’s argument to raise a difficulty related specifically to the impossibility for pluralities of units 
to actually result in unified compounds. In this respect, both the One and Plurality are seen as problematic 
principles.  
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Aristotle’s strategy has three steps. First (i), he highlights the problem: Speusippus did 
not explain how number can originate out of the One and Plurality (εἶναι ἐκ τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ 
πλήθους τὸν ἀριθμόν). Secondly (ii) he conflates Speusippus and Xenocrates by equating 
their second principles; as both philosophers generate numbers out of the One and a second 
principle of plurality, Aristotle concludes there is practically no difference between the two 
accounts. However, this second step is crucial, for both Speusippus’ universally predicated 
πλῆθος and Xenocrates’ δυάς are in fact equated to a particular plurality (τι πλῆθος). Lastly, 
(iii) on the basis of the equation of the two principles of plurality with the ‘particular 
pluralities’, he raises difficulties to both accounts by exploiting the elision of the former 
formulations in favour of the latter. Let us an analyse the testimony more carefully.  
 
a. First of all, what is immediately odd in Aristotle’s strategy, is that although the focus of 
Aristotle’s criticism is number (i.e. he asks how it is possible for number to originate 
out of the principles), no attention is drawn to the fact that Speusippus and Xenocrates 
had very different accounts of number. The distinction is not trivial at all: Speusippus’ 
mathematical number is constituted by units that are combinable, whereas the units of 
Xenocrates’ ideal numbers are not combinable nor comparable to one another 
(ἀσύμβλητοι303). Aristotle is well aware of the difference. For Xenocrates is usually 
criticised with respect to this aspect of his doctrine specifically, which, according to 
Aristotle, renders mathematical practices impossible.304  
 
b. The lack of distinction between the different kinds of number postulated by Xenocrates 
and Speusippus is, I believe, strictly related to step (ii) of Aristotle’s strategy. For the 
equation is meant to establish that number arises out of the One and a second principle 
of plurality. More specifically, the equation makes number the product of the 
combination of the One with a particular plurality. And Aristotle’s ‘equivocation’ here 
is crucial to his dialectic: all the options for the production of numbers, in fact, amount 
to modes of combination, and, more specifically, to atomistic modes of combination.  
 
c. This strategy is, however, at least weirdly intricate: Aristotle presented Speusippus’ 
primary principles (or, at least the One) as elements. If the connotation of ‘element’ is 
 
303 Οn the theory of the ‘ἀσύμβλητοι ἀριθμοί’ as already held by Plato see Wilson (1904). Such a debated 
theory arises out of a statement of Aristotle (Metaph. N8 1083a32). Ross (1924b: 427) suggests that συμβληταί 
in the context of books N means to be ‘capable of entering into arithmetical relations with one another of being 
added and subtracted, multiplied and divided’. 
304 See, for instance, Arist., Metaph. M6 1080a15–b4. The composition of Xenocrates’ number will be dealt 
with more specifically in Section II of the thesis. See, infra Chapter 7. 
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to be intended in the Aristotelian way, namely, as basic structural constituent, it is at 
least bizarre that Aristotle does not mention it in this context. For, if principles are to be 
conceived as elemental constituents, Aristotle could easily show that, once numbers are 
produced, they do not fulfil adequate forms of compounds. However, this seems 
precisely where Aristotle wants to go. Indeed, the equation of Speusippus’ Plurality with 
Xenocrates’ Dyad intended as the first particular plurality (i.e. number two) amounts to 
an equation of ‘Plurality’ with ‘number two’, and, namely, with two units. 
 
d. Although the modes of production listed by Aristotle point to combinability, perhaps a 
different focus for the discussion is required. In the end, the distinction between 
mathematical and ideal number seems not to represent a compelling difference in this 
context, at least to the extent that Aristotle does not mention it at all. If this is the case, 
we should probably think of the way in which mathematical and ideal numbers can be 
considered as akin. Namely, that both can be conceived as unitarian, or homogeneous 
compounds of units. In this respect, the equation of a ‘universally predicated plurality’ 
with a ‘particular plurality’ might serve a different purpose in Aristotle’s strategy. In 
other words, Aristotle might be pointing out that the One, although considered as 
principle of numbers, does not accomplish the result of rendering unitarian the 
compounds originating out of it: plurality, especially when determined, is irreducible to 
unity.305  
 
Almost all the processes listed by Aristotle involve precisely some sort of combination 
out of elements. Mixture (μῖξις), listed as the first process, receives a long treatment in the 
context of chapter 1.10 of the De generatione and corruptione, where it is distinguished from 
aggregation, and, in general, from all other sorts of combination which do not result in 
homogeneous products.306 Indeed, in order to accomplish μῖξις the elements involved in the 
combination should be opposed but balanced, share the same matter and be able to act and 
be acted upon reciprocally, thus implying a homogeneous result.307 In the context of the De 
 
305 Note that if my interpretation is right, Aristotle is here playing with two different conception of ‘element’. 
On the one hand, element as a basic constituent of number (i.e. units). And this seems the way plurality is 
conceived of in the passage. On the other hand, the One is an element insofar as it is immanent to the things 
deriving out of it, and, in this respect, its results should accomplish an organic form of unity. 
306 See, D. Frede (2004: 294); Giardina (2008: 57-61). 
307 Giardina (2008: 61-62). Giardina (2008: 63) summarises the conditions for μῖξις to be present as follows: 
‘In conclusione: l ) la mescolanza esiste e non è solo apparenza come sostenevano Empedocle, gli Atomisti e 
Platone; essa è combinazione di elementi che si alterano e che quindi sono diversi in atto ma uguali in potenza 
a ciò che erano prima della mescolanza; 2) la mescolanza avviene quando gli elementi che si mescolano hanno 
una materia comune, condizione del loro reciproco agire e patire; 3) la mescolanza riguarda soprattutto i corpi 
facilmente divisibili, in primo luogo i liquidi non vischiosi’. 
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gen. et corr., Aristotle’s targets can be identified as the atomists and Empedocles,308 who, 
according to Aristotle, had confused mixture with aggregation. Indeed, in atomic 
compounds, the compositional elements, even when aggregated, remain unvaried, and only 
deceive our sense-perception. For sense-perception, unable to distinguish the elements 
involved in the aggregation because of their smallness, perceives them as a unitarian 
compound. The same consideration seems to extensible to the units, which do not seem to 
undergo any sort of real mixture in numerical compounds, but only to compose an 
aggregated whole. If this is the case, Aristotle’s argumentative strategy grounds its 
justification in the assimilation of atoms and units.309 Strictly speaking, numbers are not 
generated, for generation would involve some change in the original elements implicated in 
the process, which do not happen in an aggregated compound. 
 
The second option listed is position (θέσις). Once again, the term reflects the technical 
language used by Aristotle to describe the differential factors in Democritus’ atomic 
theory.310 According to Aristotle’s testimony, Leucippus and Democritus explained the 
differentiation of the objects populating our world by appealing to atoms’ differences in 
shape, order and position.311 The example given by Aristotle explains the differences quite 
clearly: A and N differ in shape; AN and NA differ in order; Z differs from H in their 
positional orientation. If we can take this latter as an example to understand what Aristotle 
means by θέσις, once again it seems understandable why this model cannot work for 
Xenocrates’ and Speusippus’ units to explain the generation of different numbers. We might 
guess that since units are identical, their composition cannot differ according to their 
position.312 The third term used by Aristotle is κρᾶσις, blending. The term recurs often in 
Aristotle’s corpus313 but, among the occurrences, it appears in a very interesting passage of 
De gen. et corr.314 In this passage, Aristotle’s targets are the atomists. Aristotle explains that: 
 
so long as the constituents are preserved in small particles (κατὰ μικρά), we must not 
speak of them as combined. For this will be a composition instead of a blending or 
 
308 Isnardi Parente notes that the reference to μῖξις seems to be addressed to Eudoxus of Cnidus as well, and to 
go beyond a critique addressed to Speusippus only (IP2: 39). However, she believes Aristotle is here accusing 
Speusippus of not having distinguished adequately an absolute and a determinate plurality. 
309 This hypothesis may be substantiated by the fact that the corresponding terminology belongs to Aristotle’s 
criticism, and not to the atomists’ language. The differences identified by Aristotle as: σχήμα, τάξις, θέσις 
should in fact correspond to Democritus’: ῤυσμός, διαθιγή and τροπή. Οn this aspect, see Von Fritz (1938: 26).  
310 See Arist. Metaph. A4 985b15-17 and H2, 1042b14. 
311 Arist. Metaph. A4 985b16-22. 
312 However, in Xenocrates’ perspective units are not qualitatively identical. Or this is at least what Aristotle 
seems to imply by commenting that not any two units make number 2 (Arist., Metaph. M6 1080b28–30).  
313 Some of the occurrences are very interesting for our context as well. As an example, the term is used with 
reference to the harmonic theory of the soul: Arist., De an., 407-408. 
314 Arist., De gen. et corr., 328a7-11. See also Annas’ commentary (1976: 259-260, passages quoted and 
comment on mixture and juxtaposition).  
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combination (σύνθεσις γὰρ ἔσται καὶ οὐ κρᾶσις οὐδὲ μίξις); nor will the part exhibit the 
same ratio between its constituents as the whole. But we maintain that, if combination 
has taken place, the compound must be uniform—any part of such a compound being 
the same as the whole, just as any part of water is water.315 
 
Ιn this case, it is the comparison of units with atoms that grounds Aristotle’s rationale. 
Moreover, here we find the two terms κρᾶσις and μῖξις together. If we take atoms (or units) 
to be Aristotle’s target when he mentions τὰ μικρά, it is clear that, for Aristotle, there cannot 
be any kind of uniform compound out of them. Blending or combination cannot occur, since 
atoms and units can combine, but cannot uniformly mix together. For, insofar as the One is 
considered as one of their principles, numbers should fulfil uniform compounds: an outcome 
they do not accomplish. In the end, just as much as Speusippus did not want to describe his 
principle as good because if otherwise, this would result in a multiplication of goods, so too 
the same comment can be extended to the carachterisation of the principle as One. Why, 
then, although they result out of the One, do units not accomplish unity? As a consequence, 
μῖξις, θέσις and κρᾶσις cannot provide a coherent explanation for the generation of numbers. 
Surely, they cannot explain the generation of ideal numbers, because the units composing 
each number cannot be subtracted or added to others.316 But what is odd is that Aristotle 
does not use this explanation to reject the generation of mathematical number. On the 
contrary, in [FR. 83] Aristotle couples Speusippus’ account with that of Xenocrates, in order 
to reject it. As previously highlighted, Speusippus’ and Xenocrates’ conceptions of primary 
principles are furthermore criticised by Aristotle with respect to their characterisation as 
elements of numbers. Also, we have seen that the options for generation listed by Aristotle 
in the passage often find revealing parallels in Aristotle’s criticism of the atomic theory. 
Accordingly, if we consider an element to be the minimum constituent of a compound, all 
of these critiques would follow quite straightforwardly. Why, then, Aristotle does not choose 
 
315 Id., tranls. Joachim.  
316 At Arist., Metaph. N5, 1092a24-29, Aristotle wonders what is the way in which numbers are derived, and the 
options listed in the previous text occur once again: ‘Is it by mixture? But (a) not everything admits of mixture; 
(b) the result of mixture is something different; and unity will not be separable, nor will it be a distinct entity, as 
they intend it to be. Is it by composition, as we hold of the syllable? But (a) this necessarily implies position; (b) 
in thinking of unity and plurality we shall think of them separately. This, then, is what number will be—a unit 
plus plurality, or unity plus the Unequal’, transl. Tredennick. The passage, whose context will be dealt with in 
the following section, clearly evokes the same discussion of M9 here under analysis. However, the focus of 
the discussion is shifted from the necessity of unity within compounds to the characterisation of the principles 
as elements. For a unitarian interpretation of books M and N of the Metaphysics, consisting in Aristotle’s 
rejection of the Platonists’ ‘generalising’ and ‘elementarising’ methods, see Cattanei (1989, 1990a and 1990b). 
Cattanei argues that Aristotle’s arguments in books M and N amount to a rejection of the Platonists’ (i) ‘metodo 
generalizzante’ (according to which Platonists acknowledged, in general ‘di porre ciò che è più universale 
come ontologicamente anteriore rispetto a ciò che è meno universale’, 1990a: 192-193) and (ii) ‘metodo 
elementarizzante’ (i.e. that determining ‘la sostanzialità intellegibile degli elementi costitutivi di un composto, 
sia esso empirico o sostanza intellegibile non semplicissima, e la trascendenza dell’elemento più semplice 
rispetto a quello meno semplice’ 1990a: 184). The rejection of such methods allows to identify Aristotle’s pars 
construens of the analysis (Cattanei 1990b), consisting in his theory of abstraction.  
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this path? The reason most likely lies in the different conception that Speusippus has of an 
element, and in the way his principle of plurality is described in [FR 83]. For, all the different 
options for combination here listed by Aristotle, as well as the comparison with atomic units, 
seem to point at one and same direction: the lack of unity in the compounds. How can 
numbers, qua unitarian compounds of units, arise out the principles? 
 
3.3 The generation of numbers: γένεσις 
In the previous section, I deliberately avoided the reference to one of the terms listed by 
Aristotle: γένεσις. My reasons for this avoidance are many; first, the term γένεσις does not 
appear in specific theoretical frameworks like the others, which all occur in parallel 
polemical contexts connected to atomistic theories. In this respect, the term requires a 
separate analysis. Secondly, the topic has been indirectly touched upon in the Aristotelian 
critique against Speusippus’ first principles. As the analysis of Chapter 2 concluded, 
Speusippus’ first principles are, in Aristotle’s eyes, deprived, insofar as their consequents 
show qualities that they do not hold. In this perspective, the critique indirectly addressed a 
wrong conception of γένεσις as well: indeed, how can principles, with their absence of 
qualification, be causes of such qualified consequents? Some of these questions occur again 
in another passage of N5, which is neither included by Isnardi Parente nor by Tarán as a 
genuine Speusippean fragment.317 As a matter of fact, the passage deals more generally with 
the Platonists’ conception of elements and does not address Speusippus specifically. 
However, as the passage retains references to many of the questions raised so far, I believe 
that a few observations are necessary and can be helpful in clarifying the issues under 
discussion.  
 
Ἔδει δὲ τοὺς λέγοντας ἐκ στοιχείων εἶναι τὰ ὄντα καὶ τῶν ὄντων τὰ πρῶτα τοὺς ἀριθμούς, 
διελομένους πῶς ἄλλο ἐξ ἄλλου ἐστίν, οὕτω λέγειν τίνα τρόπον ὁ ἀριθμός ἐστιν ἐκ τῶν 
ἀρχῶν. […] Καὶ ἐπεὶ τὸ ἐκ τινῶν εἶναι ἔστι μὲν ὡς ἐνυπαρχόντων ἔστι δὲ ὡς οὔ, ποτέρως 
ὁ ἀριθμός; οὕτως γὰρ ὡς ἐνυπαρχόντων οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλλ᾿ ἢ ὧν γένεσις ἔστιν. ἀλλ᾿ ὡς ἀπὸ 
σπέρματος; ἀλλ᾿ οὐχ οἷόν τε τοῦ ἀδιαιρέτου τι ἀπελθεῖν. ἀλλ᾿ ὡς ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου μὴ 
ὑπομένοντος; ἀλλ᾿ ὅσα οὕτως ἔστι, καὶ ἐξ ἄλλου τινός ἐστιν ὑπομένοντος. ἐπεὶ τοίνυν τὸ 
ἓν ὁ μὲν τῷ πλήθει ὡς ἐναντίον τίθησιν, ὁ δὲ τῷ ἀνίσῳ, ὡς ἴσῳ τῷ ἑνὶ χρώμενος, ὡς ἐξ 
ἐναντίων εἴη ἂν ὁ ἀριθμός· ἔστιν ἄρα τι ἕτερον ἐξ οὗ ὑπομένοντος καὶ θατέρου ἐστὶν ἢ 
γέγονεν. Ἔτι τί δή ποτε τὰ μὲν ἄλλ᾿ ὅσα ἐξ ἐναντίων ἢ οἷς ἔστιν ἐναντία φθείρεται, κἂν 
ἐκ παντὸς ᾖ, ὁ δὲ ἀριθμὸς οὔ; περὶ τούτου γὰρ οὐθὲν λέγεται. 
Those who assert that beings [arise] out of elements, and that the primary realities of 
things are numbers, ought to have first distinguished the senses in which one thing is 
derived from another, and then explained in what way number is derived from the first 
principles. […]. And since being [derived] from certain things is, as it were, [being 
derived] from things that are inherent or not, in which way is number so derived? 
 
317 My analysis of the passage is strongly indebted to Crubellier’s commentary (1994: 544-559), to which I 
refer for a more detailed analysis of the passage. 
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Derivation from inherent elements is only possible for things which admit of generation. 
Is it derived as from seed? But nothing can be emitted from that which is indivisible. Is it 
derived from a contrary which does not persist? But all things which derive their being in 
this way derive it also from something else which does persist. Since, therefore, one 
thinker regards the One as contrary to plurality, and another (treating it as the Equal) as 
contrary to the Unequal, number would have to be derived as from contraries. Hence there 
is something else which persists from which, together with one contrary, number is or has 
been derived. Further, why on earth is it that whereas all other things which are derived 
from contraries or have contraries perish, even if they are [derived] out of the whole 
[contrary], number does not perish? Of this no explanation is given.318 
Aristotle points out, from the very first line, a difficulty presenting the core of his 
critiques. In saying that beings (τὰ ὄντα) and numbers (as the first of them) arise from the 
elements (ἐκ στοιχείων) Speusippus is not clear about: πῶς ἄλλο ἐξ ἄλλου ἐστίν. The absence 
of a clear verb to connote the generation, constructed only by the verb εἶναι and ἐκ plus the 
genitive, is constant in Aristotle’s account of Speusippus. Indeed, either Speusippus himself 
accounted for the origination of number in such an undetermined way,319 or, following 
Aristotle’s usual criticism, he did not provide an account for it at all. In order to shed some 
light on the issue, Aristotle offers his own options for thinking about generation. What seems 
different than the previous discussion, however, is that if in [FR. 83] Aristotle’s challenge was 
related to the unity and homogeneity that numerical compounds cannot accomplish, here the 
attention is shifted onto the relation principles entertain with their consequents. In particular, 
what is at stake here is how principles can combine in order to produce something other than 
themselves. For, in this section, Aristotle’s aim is to show that it is impossible to conceive the 
principles as elements.320 We can adapt Crubellier’s insight here: ‘the element is defined in 
book Δ as ἐξ οὗ σύγκειται πρώτου ἐνυπάρχοντος (i.e. ‘the primary immanent thing of which 
something is composed’, transl. Tredennick) — starting from this definition (which applies 
to the simplest models of generation, i.e. mixture and composition), the critique of N5 
encompasses more complex or rare forms of synthesis, in which the cause ἐξ οὗ is not 
preserved in the final product, namely, the transmission of the peculiar form by means of the 
seed, and the action of a contrary which is destroyed in the process’.321 Without wishing to 
address all the details of the debate, which relates to the Academics’ as a group,322 there are a 
few aspects I would like to highlight and which will be useful in view of the whole discussion.  
 
 
318 Arist., Metaph., N5. 1092a 21-1092a 24; 1092a 29- 1092b5, transl. Tredennick.  
319 An option that I am inclined to accept, although Aristotle’s criticism is obviously not limited to pointing 
out the obscurity of a linguistic expression.  
320 Or, as Crubellier (1994: 553) phrases it: ‘étant admis que les principes sont des éléments, quel type de 
dérivation peut-on envisager pour les autres êtres, à commencer par les nombres?’. 
321 Crubellier (1994: 545), my translation. 
322 See, for example, that the two principles are considered by Aristotle as opposite, as it does not seem to be 
the case for Speusippus. For a detailed analysis of the whole section, see Crubellier (1994: 544-558). 
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Aristotle’s previous criticism addressed atomistic conceptions of compounds with the 
purpose of showing that, ultimately, such conceptions of atomic compounds could never be 
taken as models, since they do not accomplish unity in numbers; in the present context, it 
seems that it is the eternity of number particularly at stake. For all the options for numerical 
generation listed by Aristotle reflect ways in which sensible things are generated, and, 
accordingly, cannot be applied to objects that are eternal and immutable.323 But this provides 
us with some important information: numbers do not perish and do not undergo generation. 
Accordingly, if we take the mathematical realm to be somehow opposed or distinguished from 
that of the sensibles, we might have discovered one reason to distinguish the two realms by 
appeal to ontological features of their diverse objects: numbers (or mathematical objects) are 
eternal and unchangeable, while sensibles aren’t. Forasmuch as this consideration might seem 
intuitive, this tells us that Speusippus embraced at least some of the features postulated by 
Plato for real objects of knowledge, i.e. eternity and immutability, by characterising numbers 
(or the mathematical realm) as eternal and immutable. Also, this explains the reason for 
Aristotle to disagree with Speusippus’ (and the Platonists’ more in general) position, according 
to which in order to grant numbers with immutability and unchangeability, numbers must be 
considered to arise out of the principles rather than, as in M2 and N1, being conceived as 
‘quasi-objects’ constructed out of collections of empirical objects.324 
Secondly, if the notion that numbers arise out of the principles is established in order to 
guarantee their eternity and unchangeability, this might well be the explanation for other levels 
to be granted with different principles, and for them to be ultimately independent of the same 
set of principles. For, although the information about other ontological levels is not well 
preserved, such an explanation would account for ontological differences between different 
objects. In this regard, sensible objects, being freed from their causal dependence on numbers, 
would finally be discharged from the need to share features with other ontological levels, and, 
accordingly, could acquire epistemological independence as well.  
Lastly, the overall criticism, as highlighted by Crubellier, is directed against those kinds of 
generative processes in which principles are not preserved in the products. Although it is easy 
to understand the immediate difficulty in imagining a material part “detaching” from 
something indivisible, I believe that what is significant here is, more in general, the reference 
to forms of processes whose elements, or principles, are not preserved in their results. In the 
end, number specifically is described as eternal, and unchangeable, aspects which are 
reaffirmed at the end of the passage. Given these premises, despite Aristotle’s attempt to offer 
precise meanings for the derivation of number out of the principles, it would probably be more 
 
323 As also Szlezák observes (1987: 49-51). 
324 Crubellier (1994: 544). 
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natural to assume that this generation should not be accounted for in principle. For, if 
otherwise, the status of number itself as eternal and unchangeable would be denied. 
Accordingly, what the passage should help bring to mind is not the generation of numbers as 
such, but the need of a different way to conceive the relationship between principles and 
products, which does not account for their generation, but, rather, for something else. 
 
3.4 A brief digression: Speusippus’ and Menaechmus on the right appellative for 
mathematical prepositions (fr. 36) 
In order to conclude our analysis of Speusippus’ conception of the mathematical realm, 
it is necessary to digress briefly from our treatment of Aristotle and turn to a relevant 
discussion preserved in Proclus’ Commentary on the First Book of Euclid’s Elements. As 
already highlighted, Aristotelian passages do not preserve much information about the 
mathematical level, nor about how this is related to first principles, which solocits scholarly 
speculation. More information, however, can be found in Proclus. Proclus, indeed, is the 
only source who testifies to a dispute internal to the Academy that finds Speusippus and 
Menaechmus contending on the right appellative for mathematical propositions. The 
controversy, which is not simply a terminological discussion, reveals important details of 
Speusippus’ ontological and epistemological conception of the principles. Given my 
methodological premises, and due to some complications which will be highlighted in the 
following analysis, my use of Proclus’ testimony will be limited to a test of the results just 
obtained, rather than being employed as a source for new data.325  
 
The dispute between Menaechmus and Speusippus is introduced by Proclus to present 
two different processes, according to which consequents can be deduced from principles. 
Even though the context of the excerpt is predominantly mathematical, featuring an 
exhibition of Euclid’s notions of the common principles of geometry, an attempt to unravel 
philosophical and metaphysical elements is nevertheless worth undertaking. After all, even 
Aristotle had described Speusippus as speaking of mathematical objects in a mathematical 
way (οἱ μὲν τὰ μαθηματικὰ καὶ μαθηματικῶς λέγουσιν).326 According to Euclid, Proclus 
 
325 For a detailed and accurate analysis of the passage, and of the conception of geometry according to Plato 
and his successors see Bénatouil-El Murr (2010: 57-80). Through an analysis of the passages preserved by 
Proclus, they conclude that far from making geometry a model for rigor and accuracy, Speusippus and 
Xenocrates considered it: ‘un paradigme des contraintes propres à la connaissance humaine - du fait de sa 
distance à ses objets éternels - et des stratégies (hypothèses, figurations, constructions) qu’elle peut mettre en 
œuvre afin de les saisir, à condition de ne pas oublier les limites de leur objectivité’ (2010: 77). I will treat their 
interpretation in greater detail in the next chapter, where the second passage of Proclus will be part of my 
analysis. In general, I believe our readings to be compatible, although they differ on some interpretative issues. 
Differently, Lasserre (1964, ad loc.) takes the discussion to exemplify the paradigmatic roles of a philosopher 
(Speusippus), a mathematician (Menaechmus) and a logician (Anphinomous).  
326 Arist., Metaph., M6 1080b1-6; 24-30 (=fr. 75 IP). 
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claims, the common principles of geometry can be divided into hypotheses (ὑποθέσεις), 
postulates (αἰτήματα) and axioms (ἀξιώματα). The difference between the three kinds of 
principles, then, is explained according to Aristotle’s definitions. An axiom is a proposition 
that is evident and credible in itself, as, for example, ‘that things equal to the same thing, are 
equal to each other’.327 A hypothesis is, instead, something that, although it is no self-
evident, is presumably accepted by the learner, e.g. ‘the circle is a figure of such-and-such a 
sort’. Lastly, something that is asserted but not known and that does not receive the assent 
of the learner, is called a postulate, as, for example, the assertion that ‘all the right angles are 
equal’.328 It is clear from this framework that Proclus wants to ground his discussion in a 
mathematical context. Indeed, the principles here taken into account are those of geometry, 
and the procedures analysed seem to involve, in the broader sense, mathematical deduction. 
The discussion then moves from the principles (αἱ ἀρχαί) to the things ‘(deriving) from the 
principles’329 (τὰ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν). It is at this level that things are divided into problems and 
theorems, and this is where the testimony on Speusippus finds its place. 
 
[FR. 36] ἤδη δὲ τῶν παλαιῶν οἱ μὲν πάντα θεωρήματα καλεῖν ἠξίωσαν, ὡς οἱ περὶ 
Σπεύσιππον καὶ Ἀμφίνομον, ἡγούμενοι ταῖς θεωρητικαῖς ἐπιστήμαις οἰκειοτέραν εἶναι 
τὴν τῶν θεωρημάτων προσηγορίαν ἢ τὴν τῶν προβλημάτων, ἄλλως τε καὶ περὶ ἀϊδίων 
ποιουμέναις τοὺς λόγους. οὐ γάρ ἐστι γένεσις ἐν τοῖς ἀϊδίοις, ὥστε οὐδὲ τὸ πρόβλημα 
χώραν ἐπὶ τούτων ἂν ἔχοι, γένεσιν ἐπαγγελλόμενον καὶ ποίησιν τοῦ μήπω πρότερον 
ὄντος […]. ἄμεινον οὖν φασι λέγειν, ὅτι πάντα ταῦτα ἐστι, τὰς δὲ γενέσεις αὐτῶν οὐ 
ποιητικῶς ἀλλὰ γνωστικῶς ὁρῶμεν ὡσανεὶ γιγνόμενα λαμβάνοντες τὰ ἀεὶ ὄντα […]. οἱ 
δὲ ἀνάπαλιν πάντα προβλήματα λέγειν ἐδικαίουν ὡς οἱ περὶ Μέναιχμον μαθηματικοί 
[…]. 
 
Already among the ancients, some, such as the followers of Speusippus and 
Amphinomus, thought it right to call all of them [sc. things that follow from the 
principles]330 ‘theorems’ (θεωρήματα); they thought that the appellation ‘theorem’ is 
more proper for theoretical sciences than the appellative ‘problems’, especially since 
these sciences deal with eternal objects. For there is no generation in eternal objects, so 
that there would not be any place for the ‘problem’ among them, since this indicates 
generation and production of what did not yet exist before. […] Thus, it is better, 
according to them, to say that all these things exist and that we look on their generation 
not in a productive sense (ποιητικῶς), but in a cognitive sense (γνωστικῶς), assuming 
eternal things (λαμβάνοντες τὰ αεὶ ὄντα) as if they were in the process of coming to be 
(ὡσανεὶ γιγνόμενα) […]. Others, on the contrary, such as the mathematicians of the 
school of Menaechmus, thought it correct to say that all things are ‘problems’ 
(προβλήματα).331 
 
The extract touches upon issues that are crucial for our inquiry but raises many questions 
 
327 Procl., In Eucl., p. 76, 11-12 Friedlein, transl. Morrow. 
328 Ibid., p. 76, 15 Friedlein, transl. Morrow. 
329 Ibid., p. 76, 20-21 Friedlein, transl. Morrow. 
330 The reference for πάντα is supplied by Proclus in the sentence preceding the passage under examination 
(77, 7 Friedlein) 
331 Ibid., p. 77,7ff Friedlein, transl. Kidd (257-258) complemented. 
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as well. First of all, a brief contextualization: the passage is to be found in the second 
prologue of Proclus’ Commentary on the First Book of Euclid’s Elements where Proclus, in 
order to provide an appropriate presentation of the topic, distinguishes the principles of the 
science (τὰς ἀρχὰς τῆς ἐπιστήμης viz. geometry) from things that follow from the principles 
(τὰ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν). Then, after having presented the former as hypotheses, postulates and 
axioms, and the latter as theorems and problems, Proclus introduces the debate between 
Speusippus and Menaechmus. Although Proclus passage is embedded in a geometrical 
context, however, nothing guarantees that Speusippus’ background for such a discussion was 
of mathematical nature exclusively. Actually, if we isolate the passage from its context, it is 
not clear what Speusippus’ context was; on the contrary, the first information about the topic 
discussed is provided by a generic neuter plural, πάντα, referred to an initial τὰ ἀπὸ τῶν 
ἀρχῶν (i.e. things (deriving) from the principles) that Proclus had distinguished into 
problems and theorems. Next, it is said that the appellative theorem is the most fitting for 
theoretical sciences. Although the assumption may be questioned, the reference to theoretical 
sciences is the main evidence for connecting Speusippus’ and Menaechmus’ dispute to the 
mathematical realm, by assuming that mathematical and geometrical objects are the objects 
of theoretical sciences. In this respect, if geometrical objects (at least) are also to be 
considered the objects of theoretical sciences, this allows once more for the possibility of a 
unitarian conception of the mathematical realm in general. Indeed, as geometrical objects 
are, in the present context, presented as unngenerated and immutable (just as Aristotle had 
said number(s) to be), this means that they would be granted the same ontological status of 
numbers. In any case, Speusippus believed that the appellative theorem was the most 
appropriate for the objects of theoretical sciences. The reason provided by Speusippus for 
the appropriateness of the appellative, namely, that objects of theoretical sciences are eternal 
and unchangeable, may be used to confirm that it is the mathematical realm which is here at 
stake. Indeed, this takes us back to Aristotle’s description of numbers (or mathematical 
objects in general, as I supposed), as eternal.332 In this respect, the testimony is consistent in 
attesting that Speusippus maintained that (real) objects of knowledge are eternal and adds as 
a second feature: they are also immutable. Precisely because of this, as the name problem 
denotes a constructive and productive process, it obviously cannot be applied to eternal and 
immutable objects, without implying a contradiction of their status. Accordingly, we are 
given two possible appellatives for procedures of a mathematical kind: theorems and 
problems. The distinction between the two nouns seems to be played essentially by the 
presence or absence of an action of productive nature. While the name problem implies a 
 
332 See, infra, section 3.3, Ἔτι τί δή ποτε τὰ μὲν ἄλλ᾿ ὅσα ἐξ ἐναντίων ἢ οἷς ἔστιν ἐναντία φθείρεται, κἂν ἐκ 
παντὸς ᾖ, ὁ δὲ ἀριθμὸς οὔ; 
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generation of something new or, at least, a modification, the name theorem does not. 
Therefore, for Speusippus, the pertinence of the two appellatives is played out in the 
appropriateness to the processes/absence of process they describe.  
 
To return to the passage, Proclus goes on explaining Speusippus’ argument, and adds, 
with reference to the eternal objects of theoretical sciences, that the generations we observe 
are only apparent. We observe things that in reality always are but see them as if they were 
in the process of coming-to-be (ὡσανεὶ γιγνόμενα).333 In this circumstance, Proclus shifts 
from the singular, γένεσις, used to the state the general condition of the absence of generation 
in eternals, to the plural, γενέσεις, which suggests that the topic has changed: from the eternal 
condition of the objects of theoretical sciences we are now considering their (apparent) 
productive processes. By apparent, I mean that those objects, being eternal and 
unchangeable, are not obviously undergoing a productive process. Indeed, in the following 
sentence Proclus shifts once again the attention from the derivative process itself to the 
human comprehension of it. Even if our human condition entails that we look at the process 
as if the consequences are actually generated and produced (and, possibly, our human 
practices do involve processes in apprehension of such objects), in reality the process never 
happens within mathematicals and geometrical themselves, discovered and seen through our 
human practices. Once again, in fact, the contrast expressed by Proclus and explicated by 
the two different adverbs, ποιετικῶς and γνωστικῶς, exhibits a distinction between a 
constructive and productive process and an intellectual and deductive vision334 or 
comprehension.335  
 
Accordingly, Proclus’ passage confirms some of the information gathered trough the 
analysis of Aristotle’s passages. In particular:  
a) The plausibility of a unitarian conception of the mathematical realm, according 
Speusippus. Indeed, mathematical as well as geometrical objects are described as 
ungenerated and this time, also unchangeable, thus confirming Aristotle’s account of their 
 
333 This whole discussion about geometry, and, in particular, about the human process of ‘discovering’ and 
‘understanding’ mathematical objects that, in reality, always are, is relevant for another passage of Aristotle 
(De Caelo, I, 10, 279 b32-280a 2). In the passage, Speusippus and Xenocrates (for the identification, see 
Simplicius, In De caelo, 303, 32-33 and an anonymous scholion = Tarán fr. 61B) are said to appeal to the 
construction of geometrical figures in the attempt to explain the generation of the world in the Timaeus. For a 
convincing discussion of the passage, as well as cosmological discussions within the Academy, see Bénatouil 
(2017). 
334 Taking up the reference to the verb ὁράω. 
335 Echoing the reference to the roots shared with the verb γιγνώσκω. On this aspect specifically, see Bénatouïl-
El Murr (2010: 58), who link the two aspects to a distinction between the discourses made πράξεως ἕνεκα 
(Plato, Resp. VII 527 a7) and those γνώσεως ἕνεκα (527 b1) in the Republic. 
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ontological status.336  
 
and 
 
b) Implicitly, the incongruity of thinking of mathematical and geometrical objects as 
‘generated’. Indeed, the insistence on the need of an accurate terminology to describe the 
objects of mathematics which does not share reference with the processes of generation 
and change, confirms that we must think of the relationship between first principles and 
numbers in a way that does not imply these processes and grants the mathematical realm 
with its eminent ontological status.  
 
336 I am here considering the eternity of mathematical objects as also implying the absence of their generation. 
Although this may not be taken for granted, I take this outcome to be the result of the analysis undertaken in 
section 3.3 related to the relationship between primary principles and numbers. Accordingly, although Aristotle 
explicitly states only that numbers (and, as I supposed, mathematical objects in general) do not perish, 
according to the analysis we can also establish the fact that they are not generated as well.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
            THE SENSIBLES 
 
 
 
The only evidence Aristotle preserves with respect to Speusippus’ treatment of the 
sensibles is summarised in the following lines:  
 
[FR. 80] τοῖς δὲ τὸν μαθηματικὸν μόνον λέγουσιν εἶναι ἀριθμὸν οὐθὲν τοιοῦτον 
ἐνδέχεται λέγειν κατὰ τὰς ὑποθέσεις, ἀλλ’ ὅτι οὐκ ἔσονται αὐτῶν αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι ἐλέγετο. 
ἡμεῖς δέ φαμεν εἶναι, καθάπερ εἴπομεν πρότερον. καὶ δῆλον ὅτι οὐ κεχώρισται τὰ 
μαθηματικά· […] οἱ δὲ χωριστὸν ποιοῦντες, ὅτι ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν οὐκ ἔσται τὰ 
ἀξιώματα, ἀληθῆ δὲ τὰ λεγόμενα καὶ σαίνει337 τὴν ψυχήν, εἶναί τε ὑπολαμβάνουσι καὶ 
χωριστὰ εἶναι· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ μεγέθη τὰ μαθηματικά. 
 
As for those who hold that mathematical number alone exists, they cannot allege 
anything of this kind consistently with their hypotheses; what they did say was that the 
sciences could not have sensible things as their objects. But we maintain that they can; as 
we have said before. And clearly the objects of mathematics do not exist in separation 
[…]. But those who treat number as separable assume that it exists and is separable 
because the axioms will not apply to sensible objects; whereas the statements of 
mathematics are true and appeal to the soul. The same applies to mathematical extended 
magnitudes.338 
 
In the preceding portion of text, Aristotle presented the reasons adduced by on the one 
hand Plato and Xenocrates,339 and, on the other hand, by the Pythagoreans, for justifying the 
existence of number. According to Aristotle, the justification of ‘those who posit the 
existence of Forms and identify them with numbers’340 is based on the existence of Forms, 
and, in particular, on the process of abstraction from concrete examples.341 In general, 
Aristotle acknowledges that those who posit the Forms, insofar as they grant Forms with 
causal functions to be exerted onto the sensibles, provide a similar justification for the 
existence of numbers, also explained via a reference to causality. Differently, the 
Pythagoreans justify the existence of numbers by means of similarities between attributes of 
numbers and sensible bodies, consequently concluding that real things are made of numbers. 
Given this background, Speusippus is, according to Aristotle, left with no reasons to justify 
the existence and separation of number from sensible things consistently. As Crubellier 
 
337 As to the use and meaning of the verb σαίνω, see infra pp. 99-100, and footnote 431. 
338 Arist. Metaph. N3, 1090a25-29; 1090a35-1090b2 (= fr. 80 IP), transl. Tredennick. 
339 With Tarán (1981: 329), contra Ross (1924: 478), who refers the lines to Plato only (although Tarán takes 
the whole passage as a confutation of Speusippus), and Annas (1976: 208), who says that a ‘serious 
identification of Forms and numbers cannot be in mind here’. 
340 Arist. Metaph. N3, 109017-18, Οἱ μὲν οὖν τιθέμενοι τὰς ἰδέας εἶναι καὶ ἀριθμοὺς αὐτὰς εἶναι.  
341 The preceding lines of the text are particularly difficult to read. Both Ross (1924: 480-481) and Crubellier 
(1994:477-478) discuss various options for understanding the passage. For our purposes, it is not necessary to 
determine the precise meaning of Plato’s procedure, which appears to be a version of the ἕν ἐπὶ πολλῶν 
argument (or Platonic ἔκθεσις) but just to understand the different a priori rationale that it provides compared 
to that of Speusippus. 
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highlights,342 it is interesting to note that Speusippus’ position is here singled out from those 
of Plato and Xenocrates, despite the existence and separation of number is a claim to which 
the three of them are committed.343 The distinction is important for it provides us with crucial 
elements: 
a) As Platonists appear to be grouped together in lines 1090a35-36 with the 
forumla ‘οἱ δὲ χωριστὸν ποιοῦντες’, line 28 provides us with the peculiar justification 
advanced by Speusippus (namely ὅτι οὐκ ἔσονται αὐτῶν αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι ἐλέγετο), or, 
at least, the only he could appeal to. 
b) The distinction allows us to identify two different rationales for maintaining 
the existence of number. Both explanations are advocated for epistemological 
reasons. However, that provided by Plato and Xenocrates rests on a a priori basis, 
while Speusippus’ appears to be more empirically justified.344 Indeed, just as Forms 
are provided, according to Aristotle, in order to explain sensible appearances, a 
similar causal function is assigned to numbers.345 But as Aristotle underscores, 
Speusippus cannot rely on the causal function of Forms/numbers (and thus he cannot 
allege anything of this kind consistently with his hypotheses) in order to maintain that 
mathematical number exists. Thus, the existence of numbers is guaranteed on the 
following basis: if numbers were not to exist, neither would mathematical 
sciences;346 for the exactness, necessity and universality of mathematical sciences is 
incompatible with sensible objects.347  
 
Granted these considerations, the following two crucial considerations about Speusippus’ 
system are thus confirmed: (i) mathematical number does not take on any causal function in 
Speusippus’ system; and (ii) the separation of mathematical number from the sensibles is 
justified by means of strong epistemological reasons; namely, the acknowledgement that 
 
342 Crubellier (1994: 482). 
343 And in fact, in lines 1090a 35ff Aristotle appears to group the three of them together.  
344 See Crubellier (1994: 482): ‘Il est possible aussi que, pour Aristote, l’argument de l’accord avec 
l’expérience ait plus de valeur que celui de la vérité a priori, de sorte qu'il serait enclin à présenter celui-ci 
comme un pis-aller’. 
345 Although Aristotle does not consider this step to be granted. Cf. Crubellier (1994: 480): ‘a fortiori ils ne 
permettent pas d'établir l'existence des nombres, puisque cela supposerait une étape supplémentaire (la 
détermination des idées comme des nombres) qui est loin d'être acquise’.  
346 See the translation of the passage by Crubellier, who understands the future ἔσονται as a reductio ad 
absurdum (‘mais on dit que <si ces nombres n'existaient pas>, les sciences qui portent sur eux n’existeraient 
pas’) and takes the shift from the present (ἐνδέχεται) to the impersonal and passive imperfect (ἐλέγετο) to 
indicate an older and more general argument to which Speusippus resorts. 
347 With Ross (1924: 481) ‘the objects of the sciences could not be sensible things […] and must therefore be 
immaterial but substantial numbers’. For the reference of αὐτῶν, see Ross (ibid.) ‘αὐτῶν 1. 27 refers to τὰ 
αἰσθητά σώματα l. 22, ἀρμονία, οὐρανός, and πολλλὰ ἄλλα ll. 24, 25’. 
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sensible bodies and mathematical objects pertain to different domains and, accordingly, are 
to be granted with different and –given (i)– independent practices for their investigation.  
 
Claim (ii) appears to be confirmed also by the end of the passage, where Aristotle groups 
the Platonists together and reiterates a similar consideration about the distinction between 
sensible bodies and mathematical objects more generally (including geometrical 
magnitudes). The reasons for positing the separation of mathematical number (besides its 
existence) is in fact provided by the claim that there are no axioms which apply to sensible 
objects (ὅτι ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν οὐκ ἔσται τὰ ἀξιώματα)348, since axioms are true and please 
the soul. The implication, then, is that the ontological difference between sensible and 
mathematical objects requires them to be separated, and to be investigated by different 
practices. It is the ontological difference existing between sensibles bodies from mathematical 
objects that, in turn, motivates a difference of the epistemological practices required for their 
examination. But as the justification for establishing the existence of numbers provided by 
Speusippus and that offered by Plato and Xenocrates differed, the consequence is that, for 
Speusippus, the existence and separation of numbers are both justified by their different 
ontological characteristics, and, consequently, require different epistemological practices 
numbers and sensible for their investigation. 
 
4.1 The inquiry into the sensibles: the collection of the ὅμοια (frr. 84; 123-146) 
As highlighted in the previous sections, the sensibles play a role within Speusippus’ 
system at least to the extent that they are inclusively considered by Aristotle in his list of 
Speusippus’ οὐσίαι, and insofar as they are often depicted as a counterpart for the 
mathematical realm. As emphasised, Aristotelian passages also suggest that Speusippus’ 
reason for mathematical number to exist and be separated is rooted into a different 
ontological conception of mathematical and sensible objects.  
However, trying to determine precisely what the content of Speusippus’ enquiry into the 
sensibles was, is a much harder task. Xenocrates and Aristotle are also credited with books 
on Divisions, and, in general, scholars agree on recognising the diairetic method as a 
fundamental procedure of classifications within the Academy. As for Speusippus, the 
taxonomic organisation of reality seems to be arranged according to the criteria of similarity, 
or ὁμοιότης. Hence, sensible objects are organised in groups according to the similarities 
they entertain and (possibly) arranged in groups according to species and genera, as the title 
Examples of Genera and Species seems to confirm. Given these premises, it would be at 
 
348 Note the similarity in formulation of (i) ὅτι οὐκ ἔσονται αὐτῶν αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι ἐλέγετο at line 28, and (ii) ὅτι 
ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν οὐκ ἔσται τὰ ἀξιώματα at lines 36-37. 
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least incautious to dismiss the sensible realm quickly. Attempts to make justice of the 
fragments, mostly preserved in Athenaeus’ Deiphnosophistae and belonging to Book II of 
Speusippus’ Ὅμοια, the Similars, have been done in the past; in particular, Lang349 attempted 
a reconstruction of the whole system of Speusippus’ arrangement of the sensibles into genera 
and species, and Tarán350 thoroughly analysed the material in order to mitigate Lang’s 
tendency to collapse with excessive confidence the Aristotelian divisions onto Speusippus’ 
material. I generally agree with Tarán’s conclusion about the material preserved, and with 
his caution in projecting, or making excessive use of, Aristotle’s methods and divisions for 
the understanding of Speusippus’ taxonomy. Building from Tarán’s main conclusions, I 
would like to emphasise some aspects that can be helpful for our purposes. Indeed, what I 
believe to be missing from scholarly accounts of the sensible realm, for however detailed 
they may be, is precisely a philosophical consideration of the sensibles within Speusippus’ 
system as a whole. For I believe Speusippus’ philosophical choices, andhis decision to 
operate interventions in his system can be properly appreciated only when understood in 
light of his epistemological commitments. If a (mainly) dualistic ontology was already part 
of the Platonic legacy Speusippus inherited, it is the symmetrical separation of the sensible 
and mathematical realms in view of a distinction of their diverse epistemological practices 
that should be appreciated as a unique Speusippean contribution.  
 
Given this background, this section will analyse the biological fragments preserved by 
Athenaeus, so to complement the information obtained from Aristotle’s passage. The aim is 
not to provide new information about Speusippus’ biology, but, rather, to show that the 
conclusions reached so far cannot be disproved by them. 
 
As for Speusippus’ Ὅμοια, all the fragments preserved have as their subjects either 
animals or plants, since this was probably the focus of (at least) book II of the Similars. 
Essentially, the fragments can be subdivided in the following groups:351 
 
i. Group (i): Fragments establishing the similarity between a group of sensibles 
(frr. 8; 12a; 12b; 18; 20; 22; 23; 24 Tarán). 
i. Group (ii): Fragments establishing that a single item is similar, or akin, to 
others (frr. 10; 15 Tarán). 
ii. Group (iii): Fragments which establish the similarity of the objects by 
 
349 P. Lang (1965: 7-20). 
350 L. Tarán (1981: 244-257). 
351 Leaving aside those fragments only attesting to Speusippus’ terminology. 
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referring to a bigger group (sometimes called εἶδος. See frr. 9 (μαλακόστρακα); 11 
(κώνωπος εἶδος); 17 (πολύποδα) Tarán). 
iii. Group (iv): Fragments establishing the similarity between two specific 
objects (frr. 6; (12c); 14; 16; 21 Tarán). 
 
The terminology used to establish the ‘similarity’ between sensible objects varies 
between ἐοικός (1) παραπλήσιον (7), ὅμοιον (6), ἐμφερής (2), and it may or may not belong 
to Speusippus. Whether we can take all the vocabulary to belong to Speusippus or not, what 
is important is that the terminology used, in general, calls attention to a reciprocal relation 
between the objects in questions. Obviously, Speusippus must have had criteria which 
justified the similarity between the objects and which, ultimately, could be appealed to in 
order to arrange the classifications; however, from the fragments preserved it is hard to 
establish what these criteria were: fragments preserved analyse an item, or, more often, a 
group of items, which are said to be similar to one another; there is any reference to a 
unifying factor. This may suggest, for Speusippus’ practice, an empirical and collective 
process of classification of the objects in question, rather than a theoretically organised and 
fixed taxonomy. Indeed, both the vocabulary used to establish the similarity between the 
objects under analysis and the suggestion of a reciprocal relation between the objects 
(sometimes in not immediately intuitive groupings) suggest that the classes were constructed 
through an empirically-based classificatory process. The problem here is that the information 
at our disposal is so meagre that it is hard to propose conclusive suggestions at all about how 
the classes were constructed. To give an example, Tarán argues that one of the criteria used 
by Speusippus was the reference to the habitat, a criterion Aristotle strongly criticised in 
Parts of Animals (642b10-13). According to Tarán, this criterion encourages us to identify 
Speusippus as the target of Aristotle’s criticism and to add information about his method: a 
rigid dichotomic method of diairesis. However, the fragment taken by Tarán352 as testifying 
that habitat was indeed considered a criterion for classification, reads as follows:  
 
Σία. Σπεύσιππος ἐν δευτέρῳ Ὁμοίων φησὶ ἐν ὕδατι γίνεσθαι, σελίνῳ ἑλείῳ τὸ 
φύλλον ἐοικός. 
 
352 Tarán, fr. 6 (= 123 IP1), (1981: 246ff). Also Cherniss (1944: 57) refers to the importance of the habitat for 
Speusippus. For Cherniss, the connection with Aristotle’s system of classification is granted by a class of items 
which appears in both authors, i.e. that of the polypides, in relation to which Aristotle raises difficulties 
regarding their natural habitat. However, such connections cannot be considered as conclusive, given the scarce 
material attesting to Speusippus’ criteria for classifying sensible objects, and given that we have no hints about 
what these criteria actually were. Moreover, in Cherniss’ analysis, it is Aristotle’s comment on the habitat of 
the polypides that makes the reference to the habitat significant for Speusippus as well. But the mention of the 
same class, and the reference to the habitat in the present context do not attest, separately, that the habitat was 
indeed a criterion for Speusippus’ classifications. 
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Literally, the fragment reads: ‘Marshwort. Speusippus, in the second book of the Similars 
says that (it) grows in water, and that the leaf resembles to marsh-celery’. The most natural 
way to read the sentence is to take the two infinitive clauses (γίνεσθαι; ἐοικός [εἶναι]) 
dependent on the φημί as coordinate clauses. But if the two clauses are coordinate, there is 
no way to read the former as explaining the latter; namely, there is no way to read the fact 
that marshwort grows in water as a justification for its similarity with marsh-celery. Indeed, 
even in Athenaeus’ text,353 the appeal to the habitat as an explanation is connected to Ptolemy 
Euergetes the Second, king of Egypt, who is told to propose a correction in Homer’s text by 
substituting ‘violet and celery’ with ‘marshwort and celery’; for both marshwort and celery 
grow in water, while violet does not. Therefore, in Speusippus’ fragment the similarity is 
established by appeal to the likeness the leaves of the two plants share, a factor that may 
weigh in favour of an observational and empirical practice. It is the similarity between the 
two leaves, and, in general, the web of relationships an object entertains with others, that 
helps us to understand the object itself and the class it belongs to. However, this is the only 
fragment in which any description of the sensible object under investigation appears, and in 
absence of more testimonia, we must be cautious in advancing answers.  
 
Another interesting aspect is that the reciprocity in the relationship of similarity can also 
be detected in most cases in the way objects are listed in the Greek. Indeed, although the 
sample is quite limited, we should nevertheless try to work with what we have. In group (i), 
where groups of items are listed, all items share the same grammatical case.354 In group (ii) 
the situation is slightly different, since the relation of similarity established is of the type: 2 
items - 1 item; accordingly, the two terms of the relation are obviously distinguished and 
one is expressed with the dative. Interestingly enough, however, the two fragments preserved 
for group (ii) establish such relation indifferently: the relation of similarity is not only 
expressed with the formula: 2 items ≅ 1 item (dative), but also with the formula: 1 item 
(nominative) ≅ 2 items (dative).355 Hence, even here, there is no reference to a third item 
which establishes the similarity, but, rather, this seems to be played by a horizontal relation 
that the items share as a group. Group (iii) organises the items into larger groups and, 
accordingly, the macro-class is usually expressed with a genitive, while the items that fall 
 
353 See, Athen. Deipnsoph. 61c, where the reference to marshwort interrupts the discussion on mushrooms, 
continued after.  
354 E.g., fr. 22 Tarán (= Athen. II, p. 214, 24-26): Σπεύσιππος δ᾽ἐμφερῆ φησιν εἶναι κόκκυγα, χελιδόνα, 
τρίγλαν. 
355 See, e.g. fr. 15 Tarán: Σπεύσιππος δ᾽ἐν δευτέρῳ Ὁμοίων ὅμοιά φησιν εἶναι τῇ μανίδι βόακα καὶ σμαρίδας, 
and fr. 10 Tarán: Ἔστιν δ᾽ἡ κερκώπη ζῷον ὅμοιον τέττιγι καὶ τιτιγονίῳ, ὡς Σπεύσιππος παρίστησιν ἐν 
δ<ευτέρῳ> Ὁμοίων. 
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under it all share the same case.356 Lastly, group (iv) is a very interesting example. Indeed, 
most cases (3 out of 5) present a relation of similarity of one thing to another and, in those 
circumstances, the second term is expressed with the dative.357 However, one of these cases 
(fr. 12c Tarán), which expresses the relation of similarity precisely in this way (Σπεύσιππος 
δ᾽ὅμοιον φάργῳ τὸν ἥπατον) lists two items occurring in two other collections of the type of 
group (i), (i.e. frr. 12a; 12b Tarán).358 Accordingly, the relations of similarity so presented 
might in reality be an extrapolation of Athenaeus from groups that were originally listing 
more items together, as in the case of group (i).  
 
What complicates the situation even more is that there is only one fragment attesting to 
the difference between objects, where Speusippus distinguishes between the male and the 
female tuna. The same differentiation is attested in Aristotle as well (History of Animals, 543 
a 14ff; 543 b 11ff), who refers to the female tuna as having a small fin beneath its belly, 
differently from the male tuna. If this is the same explanation Speusippus appealed to,359 and 
if, accordingly, male and female tuna really belonged to different classes in Speusippus’ 
taxonomy, we might conjecture that in order to trace similarity and difference between 
sensible objects, a great dose of observation of plants/animals was required even for objects 
of the same ‘kind’.360  
 
The topic of differentiation is closely connected to a) an intricate discussion about 
Speusippus’ method of definition (Aristot., A.Po. II, 13, 97 a 6 ff = fr. 38 IP1) and b) a 
testimony preserved by Sextus on Speusippus’ criteria of truth which, however, would leave 
us astray from the present purposes if addressed in detail.361 I briefly mentioned the first 
point in Chapter 2, in the context of providing an explanation of why participation 
represented a problem Speusippus had in mind, and of his decision to formulate his world as 
episodic. In brief, the testimony attests that, according to some people362 it impossible to 
 
356 See, e.g. fr. 17 Tarán: Εἴδη δ᾽ἐστὶ πολυπόδων ἑλεδώνη, πολυποδίνη, βολβιτίνη, ὀσμύλος, ὡς 
Ἀριστοτέλης ἱστορεῖ καὶ Σπεύσιππος. 
357 See, e.g. fr. 16 Tarán: Ὅμοιον δὲ εἶναι τῷ μελανούρῳ φησι Σπεύσιππος ἐν δευτέρῳ Ὁμοίων τὸν 
καλούμενον ψύρον. 
358 See, fr. 12a Tarán: Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τῷ περὶ ζῴων καὶ Σπεύσιππος παραπλήσιά φησιν φάγρον, ἐρυθρῖνον, 
ἥπατον. Obviously, another reason for the difference in the case is related to the words chosen to denote the 
similarity (here παραπλήσιον in fr. 12a and 12b, while ὅμοιον in fr. 12c.) 
359 Funny enough, since tuna do not present any sexual dimorphism, and accordingly, male and female are 
undistinguishable on the basis of macroscopic differences, especially since their sex is not determined at their 
birth but is later defined on the basis of environmental as well as other circumstances. See, e.g., Santamaria, 
Bello and alia (2009: 41). 
360 I use kind here generically, to mean animals of the same species.  
361 For a detailed discussion of the topic and different reconstructions of the argument see Falcon (2000). At 
the recent conference Metaphysics and Epistemology in Plato’s Academy, Benatouïl convincingly connected 
the discussion to the context of the Theaetetus.  
362 Identified with Speusippus by an Anonymous commentator of the Posterior Analytics (see fr. 39 IP1). 
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know the differences each thing entertains with other things unless one knows everything 
severally. Ancient commentators (probably influenced by Eudemus’ reading of the doctrine) 
take the argument as against the possibility of definition. The argument has been read 
differently by scholars,363 who have reconstructed the order of the claims in various ways. 
In general, I agree with Horky’s conclusion that ‘Speusippus is not to be credited here with 
any sort of proto-sceptical argument that a regress implies that no essence can be known 
whatsoever’.364 On the contrary, if read positively, the testimony goes in the direction of 
affirming the need to differentiate the objects under analysis, if one wants to gain (some) 
knowledge about them. Accordingly, it seems likely that the whole procedure of knowing 
sensible objects implied both the collection of objects in groups of ‘similars’ (possibly, to be 
able to distinguish them from other groups) and the distinction of the individual sensible 
object itself even from items of the same ‘kind’.  
 
The topic of knowledge, and its relation to sensible objects leads us to b), a passage in 
which Sextus Empiricus365 presents Speusippus’ criteria of knowledge. I don’t want to linger 
on the testimony too much, since the identification of Sextus’ source for the material is a 
vexed question,366 but there are at least two aspects which are connected to our discussion. 
Indeed (1) Sextus divides Speusippus’ objects in two kinds: τὰ νοητά and τὰ αἰσθητά. 
Perhaps, this very distinction between objects is, more generally, reminiscent of a Platonic 
dichotomy. Although attempting an identification between Speusippus’ mathematical realm 
and ‘τὰ νοητά’ might not be totally orthodox, at the same time, such an identification would 
reiterate the idea of a unitarian conception of the mathematical realm as I was suggesting. 
What is even more interesting is (2) that Sextus gives us two different criteria for the objects 
in question: criterion of intelligible objects is the ἐπιστημονικὸς λόγος, or scientific 
discourse, whereas criterion of sensible objects is the ἐπιστημονικὴ αἴσθησις, or scientific 
sense-perception.367 If the material Sextus is preserving is even slightly trustworthy, this 
would confirm some of the suppositions previously advanced: the symmetrical separation of 
the two levels is, first of all, necessary. For, if some knowledge of the sensible world is 
 
363 Very differently interpreted: see, Cherniss (1962: 42); Isnardi Parente (1980: 256-260); Tarán (1981: 390); 
Barnes (1994: 245-247); Falcon (2000); Dillon (2003: 79-80), Burnyeat (1990 ad loc.); Horky (2018: 36-37). 
364 Horky (2018: 37) argues that the question of ‘knowing every single thing’ might be solved if one takes 
Speusippus to uphold a theory of recollection such as Plato’s. This way, a ‘previously’ obtained knowledge 
about each and every thing might be reactivated through discursive thinking.  
365 Sext., Adv. math. VII, 145-146 (=fr. 34 IP1).  
366 See, e.g. Sedley’s comment (2012: 102-103): ‘Consider, then, another aspect othe same Sextan doxography. 
No one, as far as I can recall, has defended as fully reliable its reports of Speusippus, Xenocrates and the 
Peripatetics (Math. 7.145–9 and 217–26), and according to the argument I have developed in this chapter that 
implicit distrust is well-founded. For they too are parts of the material from Antiochus’ Canonica, driven by 
the same radically syncretistic agenda as generated the distortion of Timaeus 27d–28a’. 
367 On Sextus’ testimony, see Isnardi Parente (1969) and (1992), and, more recently, Dillon (2018). 
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granted, it will require practices and methods that are different from those required for the 
mathematical realm. Accordingly, as argued previously, the separation of the levels would 
work in the direction of rendering each of them independent, granting epistemological 
autonomy (and differentiation) to the two practices.  
 
Before concluding this short overview of Speusippus’ consideration of the sensibles, I 
believe there is one last aspect which requires clarification: the notion of ὁμοιότης. Although 
scholars generally agree on advancing such a concept for explaining both Speusippus’ 
arrangement of sensible objects and for demonstrating that Speusippus’ system did have 
some internal coherence, ὁμοιότης is not as an intuitive a notion as it seems.  
 
First of all, similarity can be intended in at least two ways: literal similarity, or analogical 
similarity. Literal similarity statements imply the presence of two objects that entertain a 
symmetrical relation of likeness, and are of the form ‘cherries are like olives’. These kinds 
of statements are obviously reversible (at least in principle), and the relation of similarity 
between the objects is hence reciprocal. Differently, analogical similarity requires at least 4 
objects, as it is the relationship itself that those objects entertain which is judged to be 
similar; an example could be: ‘lambs are to sheep as kittens are to cats’.368 In this second 
case, what establishes the similarity between the objects is the relation they entertain to each 
other. The reason why I am pointing the attention to these two possible meanings is because 
scholars, by taking Speusippus’ notion of similarity from the context of the collection of the 
sensibles and employing it in order to justify some continuity in his system, are precisely 
employing the notion in these two different ways.369 When it comes to the collection of the 
sensibles, similarity takes on the literal meaning, whereas when it is understood as the 
unifying factor of different levels ὁμοιότης is intended analogically. Accordingly, it is hard 
to understand how literal similarity might be employed in order to justify continuity in the 
system, or what kind of relationships are pointed at (and, most of all, how precisely they 
work) when one affirms that the point370 and the One (insofar as principles) resemble one 
another. In what sense are they analogous? Do principles entertain an analogous relationship 
 
368 Ortony (1979: 175). 
369 See as an example, Isnardi Parente (1980: 380): ‘abbandonato il terreno del puramente quantitative-
matematico, passandosi nella ricerca dalla struttura generale dell’universo alla classificazione delle specie nei 
loro tipi il più possibile determinati, anche il criterio della ὁμοιότης perde il suo carattere rigorosamente 
matematico e accede a quella approssimazione che caratterizza il campo del qualitativo sensibile’. To say that 
the ὁμοιότης loses its mathematical and quantitative features (i.e. is intended as analogical similarity) in favor 
of a qualitative characterization (i.e. is intended as literal similarity) implies the appeal to two different notions, 
and not a conjugation of one. Moreover, the reason for such a ‘descent’ of ὁμοιότης, when the concept is 
conceived as some sort of ‘unifying aspect’ of Speusippus’ levels, would at least deserve some clarification.  
370 Admitting it can be taken as one of the principles in geometry. 
  84 
with their consequents (they are analogous insofar they work as principles), or are they 
similar the basis of the way they are conceived (for example, the One and the point are both 
minimal constituents)? Moreover: on what basis can we expand a relationship between 
principles and consequents to account more generally for similarity across different levels?  
A second problem arises in relation to the symmetry which should underlie literal 
similarity when more than one object comes into play. For, although similarity should 
intuitively be symmetrical (if cherries are like olives, olives should be like cherries as well), 
this does not seem to be the case absolutely. First of all, it is obvious that, in the case of more 
than two objects being considered as a group, the reason for their similarity is at least 
different from that of two objects only being compared and needs to rely on a third item, 
taken as a model.371 For, when two objects only are compared, their similarity may appeal 
to at least one (but possibly more) features that the two objects share. In this case the relation 
is clearly horizontal and symmetrical. If we say that cherries and olives are alike, we are 
saying that they are both round and small, that they both have a pit, and so on. If these are 
the criteria on the basis of which the objects are similar, clearly the features will be shared 
by both. But when the group of objects under consideration is of at least three items, it is not 
necessary that the relation between the objects be symmetrical in the same way. When a 
group of objects are considered as similar, it seems reasonable to say there is at least one 
predicate that can be predicated of all of them. In this case, the similarity between the objects 
in question is not necessarily horizontally and symmetrical if not by mean of one predicate 
they all share. To build on the examples taken before, we can add peaches to the group of 
objects that are round and have a pit. This way, we will have the following group: cherries, 
olives, peaches. But obviously, the similarity between cherries and olives is not the same as 
that between cherries and peaches. In such groups, the similarity works in fact vertically. 
The objects are similar insofar as they all share one or more features assumed as those that 
instantiate the group. I believe that it is in this aspect that lies the main difficulty for 
establishing what ὁμοιότης amounts to within Speusippus’ classification of the sensibles. On 
the one hand, none of the fragments in our possession provides us with this common 
predicate that the objects of the group should share. This is the case also for those fragments 
in which we are provided with a macro-grouping, sometimes referred to as an εἶδος. First, 
in none of those fragments we find a description of the macro-group; secondly, some of those 
macro-groupings are not even immediately intuitive: if we think of the kind of the mosquitos 
(κώνωπος εἶδος),372 it is not clear (i) why that of mosquito should be a kind, and especially, 
 
371 The asymmetry I am pointing at here is that between the items listed in the group, or, in other terms, some 
sort of horizontal likeness.  
372 Fr. 11 Tarán (= Photius, Lexicon, s.v. πήνιον (II, pp. 88-89)). 
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(ii) why the moth (πήνιον) should fall under it.373 Accordingly, we can certainly imagine 
groups for those objects to fall under, but we do not have suggestions as to what these should 
be precisely. Moreover, the relation of similarity between groups of sensible objects was felt 
to be problematic for Plato as well,374 and, in particular, when related to the relationship 
original-copy in the context of the resemblance between Forms and particulars. Indeed, a 
standard Platonic answer to the problem would be to say that sensibles grouped within a set 
are similar to one another because they all participate into the idea of Likeness. However, 
whatever way one accounts for such relationship, this relies precisely on some 
ontological/causal/paradigmatic dependence of the sensibles onto the Forms. But this aspect 
is precisely what is lacking Speusippus’ account in two particular respects: a) the absence of 
the Forms and b) the absence of ontological dependence of one level onto another. Under 
these circumstances, and in absence of decisive arguments, it may be plausible to think that 
Speusippus’ collection was a sort of empirical collection of items, rather than an already 
fixed taxonomy.375 This way, the vehicle for the similarity (the element on the basis of which 
the groups are organised) might have been a sensible particular itself, and classifications 
might have varied according to the circumstances. Or, maybe, the macro-groups (i.e. genera 
and species), instead of having a middle term as a referent, were conversely constructed on 
the basis of the group itself (having a creative middle term). To conclude, what continues to 
be problematic is precisely the notion of ὁμοιότης itself. For, in in the absence of precise 
criteria on which to establish such a notion, similarity is potentially traceable between any 
pair of objects, by reference to some predicate they share: if this is the case, it is clear why 
differentiation should play a very decisive role in attaining knowledge of sensible objects.  
 
4.2 The hunt for knowledge: Proclus’ report of Speusippus’ epistemology in the In 
Euclidem (fr. 35) 
This last section is meant as an ultimate test of the results obtained until now. In fact, the 
account of Speusippus, preserved in Proclus’ Commentary on the First Book of Euclid’s 
Elements, represents, in many ways, the counterpart of some of my claims about Aristotle’s 
testimonia. In Chapter 2, I argued that Speusippus’ postulation and conception of first 
principles work as a direct response to the Platonic problem of participation to the Forms, in 
view of a ‘correction’ of the system which aims at a better sustainability from an 
 
373 Tarán comments that this was not contended by Speusippus (while Lang does 1965:15), and he suggests 
that Speusippus posited a different and higher class for the insects listed here (differently, Lang suggests as a 
macro-class the Aristotelian ἔντομα δίπτερα ἐμπροσθόκεντρα, i.e. the class of two-winged dipterous insects).  
374 See, Sedley (2006), and Schofield (2004).  
375 Some scholars (see, Isnardi Parente and Tarán) also agree that the groupings we have may represent a first 
stage of the process, namely, that of the collection of the objects, to be later organised into genera and species.  
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epistemological point of view. Indeed, although the ‘episodicity’ of Speusippus’ system is 
harshly criticised by Aristotle for the disruption it creates, nevertheless this choice reveals 
to be epistemologically valuable inasmuch as it allows an independent and distinct inquiry 
into different kinds of object which do not need to rely on anything else for their 
intelligibility. Chapter 3 and section 4.1 have analysed, respectively, the mathematical and 
the sensible realms, so to highlight the independence each one is granted with, and the 
unitarian consideration they receive specifically. Given this premise, I believe that Proclus’ 
passage confirms such suppositions. Indeed, the fragment I am about to focus on is usually 
connected to the broader geometrical context in which it is preserved and to Proclus’ 
previous discussion about axioms and postulates. In the following sections I will a) question 
the exclusively mathematical/geometrical context usually attached to the fragment which 
strongly influenced its translations; and b) advance a new interpretation of the text that 
prevents an exclusively geometrically-related reading of it. Given these premises, the 
fragment will expose the broader significance of the fragment within Speusippus’ 
epistemology so to demonstrate the plausibility of my reading and prepare the background 
for next chapter. As Chapter 5 will be dealing with primary principles specifically, a 
comprehensive knowledge of Speusippus’ philosophy is required. To these purposes, the 
section will be organised as follows:  
 
Section 4.2.1 will present the fragment within the context of its preservation and offer a 
brief overview of its scholarly reception. The aim of such section is to establish to what 
extent we should believe the initial sentence, sometimes included in the selection of the 
fragment itself, and the context in general, to be genuinely Speusippean.  
Section 4.2.2 will examine the two kinds of object the fragment alludes to (τὰ μέν - τὰ δέ) 
and will attempt to provide limits for their identification.  
Finally, section 4.2.3 will illustrate why a different interpretation of the fragment is 
valuable and will explain the advantages of such interpretation in light of Speusippus’ 
epistemological theories. Accordingly, in order to introduce the topic, I will provide first the 
Greek text of the passage, together with my translation of it. As it will be clear from the 
following considerations, my intention is not that of questioning other grammatical 
constructions of the passage, which, I believe, can be constructed in at least two different 
ways by mantaing a very similar outcome in terms of meaning. On the contrary, my aim will 
be that of questioning the exclusively mathematical/geometrical reading of the passage. 
Accordingly: 
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[FR. 35] 
[δεῖ γὰρ 
δὴ πανταχοῦ τὰς ἀρχὰς τῶν μετὰ τὰς ἀρχὰς διαφέρειν  
τῇ ἁπλότητι, τῷ ἀναποδείκτῳ, τῷ αὐτοπίστῳ]. καθόλου  
γάρ, φησὶν ὁ Σπεύσιππος, ὧν ἡ διάνοια τὴν θήραν  (15) 
ποιεῖται τὰ μὲν οὐδεμίαν ποικίλην ποιησαμένη δι- 
έξοδον προβάλλει καὶ προευτρεπίζει πρὸς τὴν μέλλου- 
σαν ζήτησιν καὶ ἔχει τούτων ἐναργεστέραν ἐπαφὴν 
μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν ὁρατῶν ἡ ὄψις, τὰ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ εὐθέως 
αἴρειν ἀδυνατοῦσα κατὰ μετάβασιν ἐπ’ ἐκεῖνα δια-  (20) 
βαίνουσα κατὰ τὸ ἀκόλουθον αὐτῶν ἐπιχειρεῖ ποι- 
εῖσθαι τὴν θήραν. 
 
 [Principles must in every case differ from what follows after them in simplicity, 
indemonstrability, and self-evidence]. For generally, says Speusippus, of the things 
which thought (διάνοια) hunts after, some (τὰ μέν) it puts forward and prepares [them] 
for the coming enquiry without having undertaken any sort of elaborate excursion, and 
it has with them a clearer contact than sight has with visual objects; but because [it] is 
unable to catch others (τὰ δέ) immediately, [it] attempts to hunt after according to their 
(viz. of τὰ δέ) congruency/correspondence/conformity376 (κατὰ τὸ ἀκόλουθον), by 
crossing [them] (διαβαίνουσα [τά δέ]) with a transition (κατὰ μετάβασιν) over these 
(ἐπ’ ἐκεῖνα; viz. τὰ δέ377).378 
 
4.2.1 Context and traditional scholarly interpretation 
The fragment finds its place at the beginning of Proclus’ section on postulates and axioms. 
As he says, principles of geometry can be of three kinds: hypotheses, postulates and axioms. 
Since Proclus believes the differences between these three have been sufficiently explored 
in other parts of his Commentary, he sets aside the discussion of hypotheses and explains 
that the chief subject of inquiry in the section will be the difference between postulates and 
axioms. It is at this point that Speusippus’ quotation is presented. Indeed, before anything 
else, the extract affirms the priority of principles, explicating it in terms of simplicity, 
 
376 Taking the meaning from ἀκόλουθον + genitive, ‘in conformity with’ LSJ 3 (as in Plat., Phaed. 111c). For 
the meaning of the word in the Platonic corpus, Ast (1953) reads ‘consequens, coniunctus, etiam similis’.  
377 For the coincidence of the object of ἐκεῖνος and αὐτός (also in this order) see Smyth (2005) 1258. I take the 
two clauses to be stilistically constructed in parallel. Both τὰ μέν and τὰ δέ are placed in an emphatic position, 
and function as objects. Just as in the first clause, τὰ μέν is the object of προβάλλω and προευτρεπίζω I take τὰ 
δέ to be the object of both αἰρέω and διαβαίνω. With this construction, the sentence shows a second parallelism 
between the two clauses constructed with the circumstantial participles: ‘οὐδεμίαν ποικίλην ποιησαμένη 
διέξοδον’ and ‘ἐκ τοῦ εὐθέως αἴρειν ἀδυνατοῦσα’ which, also in terms of meaning, can be considered 
complementary. A second option for the construction (as in Bénatouil and El Murr 2010 and Horky 2018) 
would be to take διαβάινω with ἐπ’ ἐκεῖνα; this way, διάνοια would advance towards (τὰ δέ), rather then 
crossing them. Opting for this second construction, the second sentence could be translated as follows: ‘because 
it is unable to grasp others (τὰ δέ) directly, [it, sc. διάνοια] advances over them with a transition and attempts 
to hunt after according to their (αὐτῶν) congruency’ [sc. of what follows from τὰ δέ]. The αὐτῶν as well is 
placed in an equivocal position, as it can be taken both as referred to ἀκόλουθον (i.e. their congruency, sc. of 
τὰ δέ) and with ἐπιχειρεῖ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν θήραν (i.e. hunts after them). However, I don’t take αὐτῶν to be referred 
to τὰ μέν, as does Horky. 
378 Procl., In Eucl., 179, 12-22 Friedlein. I used as a model for my translation Horky (2018: 33). Our translations 
diverge especially in the last sentence. 
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indemonstrability and self-evidence, and then introduces two different objects that διάνοια 
hunts after: τὰ μέν and τὰ δέ. Even though both the existing collections of Speusippus’ 
fragments379 do include lines 12-14 (namely, those on the priority of principles) in the 
selection of the text, both dismiss them as part of the quotation.380 Nevertheless, the presence 
of those lines does actually inform the scholarly discussion of the fragment and its 
interpretations. On the one hand, Isnardi Parente speaks of two different kinds of knowledge, 
the first immediate while the second poietic, but locates them both within the domain of 
mathematical knowledge;381 on the other hand, Tarán speaks more explicitly of a distinction 
‘between the knowledge of indemonstrable principles and the knowledge that derives from 
them’.382 To my knowledge, the only real alternative option for the interpretation of the 
passage has been provided by Bénatouïl and El Murr,383 who argue that the processes 
described may be interepreted in two different ways, according to the stress one lays either 
on the references to the Republic and to the metaphor of the hunt (i) or on the initial καθόλου 
(ii). In the first case (i) the two processes would describe [τὰ μέν] the different procedures 
of the mathematician (both demonstrative and constructive) and of the philosopher [τὰ δέ]. 
In the second case (ii), both processes would underline the point of contacts between 
geometry and dialectics. For already for Plato ‘les deux recherches s’appuient sur des 
hypothèses évidentes à la pensée pour atteindre d’autres objets. L’une descend vers des 
objets objectivement plus complexes’ [τὰ δέ], ‘alors que l’autre remonte vers des principes 
plus fondamentaux mais plus difficiles à saisir’ [τὰ μέν].384 
 I will take into account their analysis in the course of my examination, as our analyses 
converge on many aspects of the fragment although diverging on the identification of the 
objects in question. 
 
First of all, then, should we accept such context and interpret the fragment congruently, 
as referred to principles and embedded in a mathematical/geometrical discussion only?  
 
The main reasons for scholars to interpret the discussion as related to mathematical and 
 
379 See, Tarán, fr. 30 and Isnardi Parente, fr. 35. 
380 In the online edition of the fragments (2005, Commento (a): 2-3 F2), Isnardi Parente changes her mind and 
accepts the first lines as reflecting Speusippus’ thought. Her second interpretation (although distinguishing 
between an intuitive and discoursive kind of knowledge) is very close to mine. Indeed, she takes discoursive 
knowledge to refer to sensibles as well. 
381 At least this seems to be the case for the first collection of Speusippus’ fragments, where Isnardi Parente 
considers this possibility probable (1980: 249) and invites further philosophical considerations of the passage. 
In the revised online version, Isnardi Parente is much more careful in regard to the identification of the objects 
and the location of the two kinds of knowledge and does not provide any of the two (pp. 2-3).  
382 Tarán (1981: 427). See also comments to frr. 72-74 (Tarán’s numeration), (1981: 422-431). Similarly, 
Horky (2018). 
383 Bénatouïl-El Murr (2010: 41-80). 
384 Ead. (2010: 61). 
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geometrical practices exclusively is provided not only by the mathematical context of 
Proclus’ quotation, but, most of all, by Plato’s own discussion of mathematics and geometry 
in the Republic (books VI and VII in particular), a text which offers a plausible background 
for the topics under analysis. It will be impossible, in the present context, to offer a detailed 
comparison of the two texts.385 As a matter of fact, it is not my intention to deny that the 
context of Republic lies in the background, nor to exclude that mathematical and geometrical 
practices are here considered at all. By contrast, I want to argue that mathematical and 
geometrical practices represent only part of the discussion, which, however, needs to be 
complemented. To this purpose, the only passages of the Republic I will take into account 
are those scholars considered fundamental in order to shed light on the passage under 
consideration.  
 
As Bénatouïl and El Murr note,386 a first link between Speusippus’ doctrines and the 
discussion of geometry in the Republic can be identified by reference to [FR. 36] where 
Proclus introduces the dispute between Speusippus and Menaechmus.387 The similarity in 
terminology is certainly striking; in the Republic, Plato distinguishes discourses (λόγοι) the 
geometers make ‘for the sake of business’ (πράξεως ἕνεκα, 527a7) and those made ‘for the 
sake of knowledge’ (γνώσεως ἕνεκα, 527b1) just as Proclus provides a distinction between 
a γνωστικῶς and a ποιητικῶς perspective concerning the objects of theoretical science. And 
this must be right: as they say, Speusippus is proposing an alternative view to that of Plato, 
according to which the hypotheses and demonstrations of the geometers are the means by 
which we get to know objects which exist eternally.388  
In light of this connection and on the basis of a third passage of the In Euclidem, Bénatouïl 
and El Murr offer a first possible interpretation, which is consonant with the interpretative 
direction of most scholars.389 The passage they refer to, which is provided in order to offer 
a link between Speusippus’ and Menaechmus’ discussion, [FR. 36] and the fragment under 
analysis here [FR. 35] reads that: 
 
[FR. 4 IP2] some people deemed right to name all of them [non-demonstrable 
principles] ‘postulates’, in the same way [they called] ‘problems’ all the things which 
are sought (τὰ ζητούμενα πάντα); […] while others named [them] ‘axioms’, in the same 
 
385 Béntouïl and El Murr’s discussion of the status of geometry in the Republic is particurlary accurate and 
detailed (2010: 40-57).  
386 Ead. (2010: 58). 
387 Procl., In Eucl., 76, 11-21 Freidlein. See infra section 2.3. 
388 And the ὡσανεί in Proclus’ text recalls the ὡς Socrates uses at Resp. 527a6, Bénatouïl and El Murr (2010: 
58). 
389 Bénatouïl and El Murr (2010: 60) do agree that such interpretation is not necessary nor the only possible 
and that, once tested more accurately, it reveals not to be consistent with the content of Proclus’ passage [FR. 
35]. I will incorporate their comments in my analysis of the fragment. 
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way [they called] ‘theorems’ all the things which are in need of a demonstration (τὰ 
ἀποδείξεως δεόμενα). 390 
 
In light of the passage, the focus of the dispute between Menaechmus and Speusippus is 
broadened; it did not focus on mathematical propositions only but addressed the status of 
principles too.391 Accordingly, the distinction between the two kinds of objects in [FR. 35] 
should be understood as that between undemonstrated principles (ἀξιώματα) and things in 
need of a demonstration (θεωρήματα). 
What is problematic given my methodological assumptions, is that the term ‘ἀξιώματα’, 
here interpreted as undemonstrated principles also occurs in Aristotle392 where it retains a 
much more general meaning.393 As my choice is to take Aristotle as the primary source for 
my analysis, it would be at least problematic to take Proclus’ testimony as providing the 
framework for the distinction. What is consistent both in Aristotle’s and Proclus’ testimonia 
is the description of mathematical number or mathematical objects (Aristotle), and of the 
objects of theoretical sciences (Proclus), as eternal and not featuring any kind of change. 
Accordingly, I will take only this point as granted. Moreoever, in [FR. 4 IP2] Proclus does 
not name Speusippus nor Menaechmus explicitly, and the reference seems to concern 
Hellenistic mathematics more generally, since Archimedes is quoted in favour of the first 
identification.394  
 
A second reference scholars usually rely upon is Republic 510b-511d, where Plato 
presents the image of the Divided Line and distinguishes between an intuitive and 
discoursive kind of knowledge (διάνοια/νοῆσις). The reference is exploited (i) in order to 
distinguish between an intuitive and a discoursive operation of διάνοια in [FR. 35], and (ii) 
to establish that the objects at stake are both of a mathematical kind.395 Nevertheless, as 
Horky acknowledges, in the Republic ‘Forms were unambiguously the unique first principles 
that could be grasped by ‘intellect’ (νοῦς) […], whereas Speusippus only speaks of grasping 
first principles in one of the operations of ‘thought’ (διάνοια)’.396 Moreover, I do not see 
 
390 Procl., In Eucl.,181, 21-23 = 74 Tarán. The text is not included in IP1 (1980), although Isnardi Parente 
discusses it briefly in her online edition (2005, Commento (b): 5; F4). 
391 Bénatouil and El Murr (2010: 59, n. 35). Cf. also Bowen (1983). This issue would require further 
investigation, as Menaechmus is also known to have provided a ‘circular’ definition for ‘element’. See Proclus, 
In Eucl., 72, 23–73, 14 Friedlein (=D6 Lasserre). 
392 Fr. 80 IP1 = Arist., Metaph., N2, 1090a35-1090b2. 
393 Cf. Crubellier (1994: 484): ‘Il n᾽est pas certain qu᾽ἀξιώματα désigne autre chose que θεωρήματα aux lignes 
a 14-15’ and Einarson (quoted by Tarán, who disagrees with him on the grounds of a ‘better sense in the 
context’, 1981: 429, n. 248): ‘(ἀξιώματα) is loosely used for mathematical theorems in general, arithmetical 
and geometrical’. 
394 This is the reason for Isnardi Parente to exclude the passage from genuine testimonia. Cf. IP2 (2005, 
Commento (a): 5; F4). 
395 See Isnardi Parente (1980: ad loc. and 2005: Commento (a), 5). Tarán (1981:) 
396 Horky (2018: 35. Cf. also n.22). 
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convincing reasons to accept the Platonic framework only partly. Indeed, if one takes the 
Platonic διάνοια to be a reference, it would be natural to accept both its discoursive nature, 
and its mathematical objects to be at stake. In other words, if the διάνοια in the passage is 
meant to evoke Plato’s, either I do not see why one should interpret one of its processes as 
an intuitive apprehension of principles, or, if one does so and bifurcates the process, why 
mantaining its object as mathematical exclusively. In the end, also the metaphor of the hunt, 
although retaining a clear Platonic inheritance397 cannot be traced back to Plato’s dialogues 
as unambiguously referred to mathematicals. On the contrary, as Isnardi Parente notes,398 
many occurrences of the metaphor, more broadly refer to the θήρα τοῦ ὄντος. Moreover, 
extant fragments make it hard to establish what Speusippus actually thought about νούς and 
whether he employed the term at all.399 Accordingly, the reference to διάνοια should not lead 
us to quickly conclude that the only objects at stake in [FR. 35] are of a mathematical kind.  
 
As to Proclus’ quotation, lines 15-22 of [FR. 35] bear no explicit reference to the 
principles nor to their consequents. If we look at the Greek, after the explicit mention of 
Speusippus, nothing in the fragment can independently be related to principles, a discussion 
on axioms or postulates in which the text is grounded, or a discussion exclusively related to 
mathematics and geometry. On the contrary, the fragment refers generically to the objects 
διάνοια hunts after and designates them with an uncharacterised neuter plural as τὰ μέν and 
τὰ δέ. In this respect, lines 12-14 clearly sound introductory, as they provide a context in 
which to place the quotation that is, on the contrary, unqualified.  
Moreoever, the quotation of Speusippus’ begins with a καθόλου. This suggests that either 
Proclus, in inserting the quotations, needs to broaden the discussion in order to quote 
Speusippus’ opinion, or that Speusippus himself was making a general claim about the 
objects hunted by διάνοια. In either case, the position of the καθόλου at the beginning of the 
sentence should at least warn us about the difference of the content quoted in respect to the 
previous context.  
 
I hope this will suffice for the momentary exclusion of the lines preceding the fragment. 
As for the lines which follow it, and provide examples for the processes undertaken by 
διάνοια, we have reasons to exclude that they can be attributed to Speusippus as well; since 
 
397 Phaed. 66a; Politicus. 285d; Soph. 220b and 261a; Phileb. 65a. 
398 E.g., Phaedo 66c2, Gorgias, 500d1, Theaet.198a7. For an analysis of the metaphor of the hunt in Plato’s 
dialogues, see Bertolini (2017) and Aronadio (2014). On Plato’s couplement of metaphors with specific 
sciences see Auffret (2013), (quoted by Rashed 2013b: 218, n. 2). According to Auffret: ‘Selon une métaphore 
constante chez Platon, la chasse pourrait figurer l’arithmétique/logistique; la peinture, liée à la surface, la 
géométrie plane; la menuiserie produit des artefacts solides; enfin l’agriculture des solides en mouvements’. 
399 Horky (2018: 34). 
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the majority of the scholars agree on this,400 I will only offer a short explanation as to why.  
 
Speusippus’ quotation is followed by four geometrical examples; a) and b) are quoted as 
examples of the first kind of knowledge, while c) and d) of the second. The examples are as 
follows: 
a) drawing a straight line from a point to a point;  
b) considering one of the two ends of a straight line as stationary, while the other 
end moves around as a process which describe a circle;  
c) constructing a one-turn spiral;  
d) constructing an equilateral triangle. 
 
The examples introduced hint at the ῥύσις theory, which I don’t take to be ascribable to 
Speusippus, but has been acknowledged as Speusippean by Cherniss.401 However, as Isnardi 
Parente underlines,402 Speusippus seems not to have granted great consideration to κίνησις, 
which appears only within his definition of time, but would play a fundamental role in the 
theory of the flow. If we take the reference to time to be significant, we can suppose, at most, 
that the role of κίνησις, for Speusippus, was relegated to the domain of sensible objects, 
since mathematical objects, on the contrary, do not allow any kind of change.403 
Moreover, the four examples listed, perfectly fit Proclus’ distinction between ἀξιώματα 
and αἰτήματα404 (for which, by the way, there is no other evidence for Speusippus), and their 
connection with postulates and problems.405 Indeed, cases a) and b) work as examples of 
postulates, while c) and d) as examples of problems.406  
Also, besides fitting perfectly into Proclus’ previous distinction, the examples also 
 
400 See Lang F 73, 8, who argues that the reference ends with θήραν at line 22; Isnardi Parente (1980: 316-317) 
refuses both kinds of examples; El Murr and Bénatouïl agree that examples are Proclus’ own, but they 
understand them as clarifying Speusippus’ position. Tarán (1981 and 2001) refuses the second kind of 
examples (1981: 427-428; 2001: 581-583); contra, see Cherniss (1945: 396-397, n. 322), who, however, relies 
on the ῥύσις theory for the identification. Horky (2018) does not explicitly dismiss the examples, but, as El 
Murr and Bénatouïl, he uses them to clarify the discussion.  
401 See, Cherniss (1945: 396-397). 
402 IP1 (1980: ad loc, fr. 35).  
403 See, Procl., In Eucl., 77,7ff Friedlein, as well as Aristotle, Metaph. N5 1092a21-1092a24; 1092a29-1092b5 
analysed in Chapter 4. 
404 Cf. Procl., In Eucl.,76,4ff Friedlein, where Proclus distinguishes axiom, postulate and hypothesis ‘according 
to Aristotle’. McIsaac (2014), for example, reports [FR. 35] two times as evidence for Proclus’ own view about 
the self-evidence of the principles and Speusippus’ fragments are not even included in his bibliographical 
references. 
405 Procl., In Eucl., 179 Friedlein. 
406 Procl., In Eucl., 181 Friedlein. The second two examples correspond to what Proclus lists as problems. 
Moreover, this also squares perfectly with the Euclid examples Proclus is drawing on. Indeed, proposition 1 of 
book 1 of Euclid’s Elements (Eucl., El. I 1.1-2), reads: ‘To construct an equilateral triangle on a given finite 
straight-line’ (note that this corresponds to example d) and is, in Euclid, a problem, and that in the 
demonstration it makes use of the first postulate, namely example a). On the distinction of problems and 
theorems in the Academy, see Bowen (1983) and Tarantino (2010).  
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contradict [FR. 36].407 For [FR. 36] states that, as to theoretical sciences, Speusippus argued 
in favour of the name θεωρήματα and rejected the name προβλήματα. But what Proclus 
concludes right after Speusippus’ quotation is directly connected to postulates, and to 
problems, and not to axioms and theorems.  
Lastly, as Proclus uses the same notions and vocabulary other times when he is discussing 
Euclidean postulates, this makes very implausible for him to be referring to Speusippus 
specifically when he exploits them here.  
This brief overview should have exposed the limits of the fragment under analysis, i.e. 
lines 14-22. Now, as the fragment presents two different kinds of objects, τὰ μέν and τὰ δέ, 
the next sections will address the identification of each kind of object separately. 
 
4.2.2 The identification of τὰ μέν (lines 14-19) 
Although I casted some doubts about the possibility of an exclusively 
geometrical/mathematical reading of the lines, we are still left with the possibility that the 
objects easily apprehended by the διάνοια are indeed the principles, as Proclus laid out in his 
introductory lines, and as the fragment is located in the section about postulates and axioms. 
Let us see, then, if this would be coherent with the general sense of the fragment. 
 
Precisely, in this regard a warning must first be expressed in relation to the term διάνοια. 
Indeed, the term can be considered in its direct connection with Plato’s epistemology, in 
which it denotes a discursive kind of faculty, directed towards the comprehension of the 
mathematical level (as, for example, in the Republic408). If we take this reference to be 
operative for Speusippus, principles can hardly be the object of apprehension of such a 
faculty. On the other hand, if we don’t want to necessarily assume a connection to Plato, we 
can still take the term in its broader and more general usage, as, for example, it appears in 
Aristotle. Indeed, if the fragment is here taking into account principles in the Aristotelian 
meaning, διάνοια could actually work as an appropriate faculty. However, there is no reason 
here to project an Aristotelian understanding onto the fragment. If we think of the way the 
 
407 The information about the dispute between Speusippus and Menaechmus seem to reach Proclus via Geminus 
(see Zhmud 2006: 169-185). Indeed, Zhmud excludes Eudemus as a source because of his interest in 
mathematical and geometrical discoveries, rather than in philosophical interpretation of mathematics (e.g. 
Zhmud 2006: 169; 178). However, Menaechmus is the last to appear in Eudemus’ History of Geometry, and 
information on Amphinomous, who is sometimes associated with Menaechmus in Geminus’ passages, seem 
to reach Proclus via Geminus. Accordingly, it might be difficult to actually identify the ultimate source for the 
discussion. For Lasserre (1987: 614ff), Posidonius is the middle source between Philip of Opus and Geminus. 
Another option is to consider as the ultimate source Heraclides Ponticus, whose name is attested in Geminus’ 
summary of Posidonius’ Metereologica (Zhmud 2006: 185, n. 79), or a popular treatise on mathematics 
possibly written by Menaechmus (although Zhmud doubts he can be identified with the Academic 
Menaechmus).  
408 See Plato, Resp., 511d3–5. 
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fragment is transmitted and reaches Proclus, which is probably via Geminus through 
Posidonius, there is no reason to suspect Aristotelian nuances in the language given 
Geminus’ (proximity to)409 and Posidonius’ Stoicism.410 Without wanting to deny a florid 
discussion and exchange between the Academy and the Lyceum nor the originality of 
Speusippus’ thought, it is important to remember that Speusippus was the first head of the 
Academy after Plato, and his nephew. Moreover, despite his original solutions, his 
discussions testify to his particular concern related to fixing the problems of his master’s 
theories, as well as accepting some of his frameworks.411 Therefore, it is more appropriate 
to suppose a Platonic echo and usage of the term, rather than an Aristotelian one. This 
supposition can be strengthened by the fact that also the metaphor of the hunt for knowledge, 
which has Platonic precedents,412 works in the same direction. Also, the metaphor of the 
hunt itself does not suggest an intuitive grasping. For however quick the hunt can be, a whole 
process for catching the animal is still required. 
In light of this background, it would be quite curious to attribute to διάνοια, a discursive 
faculty of reasoning, the responsibility of the apprehension of simple and immediate 
principles.413 Moreover, no extant fragment attributed to Speusippus even hints at the 
procedure of knowing the principles. As a matter of fact, none of the ‘metaphysical 
fragments’ mentions the question of our cognitive capacities: the possibility of knowledge 
related to the principles does not even occur as a topic. If an argument e silentio clearly 
cannot work as definitive, we can add that, on the contrary, all the ‘epistemological 
 
409 Although the extent to which Geminus can be considered a Stoic philosopher remains unclear. For hesitation 
about his attachment to Stoicism, see Zhmud (2006: 288-289, n. 5). By contrast, Kouromenos (1994) argues 
that Geminus’ theories are consistent with Stoic tenets. 
410 Besides Aristotle’s Meteorology, whose influence on Posidonius can be detected by his fragments, late 
sources attribute to Posidonius the use of De Anima, De Caelo, De gen. et corr., as well as a work of 
Theophrastus entitled On the genesis of the elements. However, evidence for these books is slight (cf. Pajón 
Leyra 2013: 726) and, in general, Posidonius’ interest for Plato as well as his commitment to appropriate 
Platonic philosophy incorporating it into his own system cannot be overestimated either (cf. Cooper 1999; 
Bonazzi 2007). 
411 As, for instance, the way mathematical objects are conceived, embracing Plato’s features for stable objects 
of knowledge.  
412 Indeed, the metaphor recalls dialectical procedures in Plato’s dialogues (Phaed. 66a; Thaet.198a; Polit. 
285d; Soph. 220b and 261a; Phileb. 65a). Cf. Dillon (2003), 84 n.121. Moreover, it is interesting is that the 
metaphor of the hunt occurs in another passage of the Posterior Analytics, and, specifically, in the context of 
book 2.13, where Aristotle speaks about definitions (An.Po. II 13, 96a20-23, 32-35) and has as a target the 
Platonic method of division. Indeed, the passage precedes the presentation of Speusippus’ thesis for the 
necessity to know in what each thing differs from every other thing in order to define it (see section 4.1 
footnotes 327-328). In this respect, if one takes the metaphor to be relevant, this would represent one more 
reason for shifting the focus of Proclus’ fragment from an exclusively mathematical/geometrical context to a 
broader consideration of the objects.  
413 Bénatouïl-El Murr and Horky take the soul to be the agent. (See, esp. Horky 2018:35, n.21: ‘It is worth 
noting, however, that Socrates in the Palinode (Phdr. 247c–d) does refer to the gods’ observation of true being 
as involving ‘thought’ (διάνοια) which is steered by ‘intellect’ (νοῦς ὁ κυβερήτης)’). Although this 
identification may be fitting, however, information preserved by Aristotle on the soul are, as already 
highlighted, extremely scant and do not allow conclusive consideration of how the cognitive process is 
articulated by Speusippus.  
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fragments’, and those related to definitions, seem to share the common worry of how to know 
individual sensible objects. And this worry does not seem to be equally addressed to 
mathematical realities. With Aristotle’s words: ‘those who treat number as separable assume 
that is exists and is separable because the axioms will not apply to sensible objects; whereas 
the statements of mathematics are true and appeal (σαίνει) to the soul’.414  
 
If this does not yet provide us with a conclusive identification for τὰ μέν, at least it 
provides us with an upper limit for it. If διάνοια, as it seems, cannot refer to principles, and 
is not referred to principles in any other early testimonia, it would be more cautious to 
consider its first objects as being, to speak metaphorically, at a lower level than the 
principles. Granted that this provides us with a satisfactory ‘upper delimitation’ for the 
candidates for τὰ μέν, which as we excluded, cannot be the principles themselves, the 
fragment gives us elements to reasonably suppose a ‘lower limit’ for our identification as 
well: 
 
- The fragment states that (lines 15-17), of the objects διάνοια hunts after, it 
(διάνοια) puts forward and prepares for the following inquiry τὰ μέν, without 
undertaking, or producing any kind of ποικίλην διέξοδον, that is, any kind of complex 
path.415 Even though the immediate meaning might be taken to allude to an intuitive 
grasp of the objects in question, nevertheless, it is worth considering the sentence 
with attention to details. The first meaning of the adjective ποικίλος, many-coloured, 
has to do with colours. Indeed, the term ποικιλία is usually used both by Plato and 
Aristotle (but not only), with a direct reference to sensible and changeable objects.416 
Accordingly, what the passage is also suggesting, is that διάνοια, in grasping these 
τὰ μέν, does not need a process that go through sensible objects. It may be objected 
that, in Plato, the term tends to refer to the highest sensibles (i.e., stars, astronomical 
 
414 Fr. 80 IP1 (=Arist., Metaph. N 1090a35-1090b2), transl. Tredennick.  
415 Note that Stenzel quotes Plato, Politicus 277b for a parallel use of διέξοδος with respect to the procedure of 
diairesis. Contra, Tarán (1980 and 2001) who, however, concludes his analysis of διέξοδος (2001: 585, n.69) 
by saying: ‘In short, the indirect knowledge referred to in the second part of F 73, need not be identified either 
with diairesis or with syllogistic inference, though it may include both’ (my emphasis). 
416 See, e.g. Plat., Phaed., 110b4-110d5; Resp., 7, 529d7–530a1; Arist., HA, 784 a 23-24. The usage of the term 
as ‘embroidery’ is also revealing. In the Republic both the noun and the adjective are used as a metaphor for 
representation (see, e.g. Resp. 557c: “There’s a good chance,” I said, “this will be the finest of the constitutions. 
Just like a cloak brightly embroidered with all kinds of flowers, so this state adorned with all kinds of characters 
would appear to be the finest. Perhaps too,” I said, “many would judge it to be so, just as children and women 
do when they see intricate embroideries (τὰ ποικίλα)”, transl. Emlyn-Jones; Resp. 401a-b “Again I imagine 
that painting and every craft of that kind is full of these qualities: weaving and embroidery (ἡ ποικιλία), house 
building and every trade concerned with household artifacts in general, and again the physical nature of animals 
and plants as well. For in all of these there is elegance or gracelessness. So too ugliness, poor rhythm and 
disharmony are close relatives of poor language and poor character, and the opposites of each of these are 
closely related and imitate the opposite, good sense and good character”, transl. Emlyn-Jones).  
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bodies).417 In this respect, particularly relevant is Resp., VII 529 d-e, where a 
comparison with sight is also provided. I report the text here:  
 
“The following,” I said: “these stars that adorn (ποικίλματα) the heavens, since 
they ornament the visible sky (ἐν ὁρατῷ πεποίκιλται), we think they’re the most 
beautiful and perfect examples of their kind (κάλλιστα καὶ ἀκριβέστατα τῶν 
τοιούτων). And yet they fall far short of the real ones—those courses, represented 
by real speed and real slowness in real number and in all the real geometrical 
shapes (ἐν τῷ ἀληθινῷ ἀριθμῷ καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἀληθέσι σχήμασι), which are 
conveyed in relation to each other and convey what is in them (πρὸς ἄλληλα 
φέρεται καὶ τὰ ἐνόντα φέρει), all of which can be apprehended by reason and 
intellect, but not by sight (λόγῳ μὲν καὶ διανοίᾳ ληπτά, ὄψει δ’ οὔ). Or do you 
have another view?” “Not at all,” he said. 
“It therefore follows,” I said, “that we must use the splendor of the heavens as 
models for the purposes of our study regarding those other things (τὸν οὐρανὸν 
ποικιλίᾳ παραδείγμασι χρηστέον τῆς πρὸς ἐκεῖνα μαθήσεως ἕνεκα), just as if one 
might resort to figures elaborately drawn in various ways (διαφερόντως 
γεγραμμένοις καὶ ἐκπεπονημένοις διαγράμμασιν) by Daedalus, or some other 
craftsman or artist. I imagine that anyone experienced in such matters (τις 
ἔμπειρος γεωμετρίας) would regard them as excellently executed, and yet it 
would be absurd to consider them seriously in order to apprehend within them 
the truth about equal, double, or any other proportion (γελοῖον μὴν ἐπισκοπεῖν 
αὐτὰ σπουδῇ ὡς τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐν αὐτοῖς ληψόμενον ἴσων ἢ διπλασίων ἢ ἄλλης 
τινὸς συμμετρίας).” 
 
Even in this passage, where Plato presents the study of the stars and the (visible) 
heaven as for the sake of understanding other kinds of objects, those objects which 
cannot be understood by sight, but are to be understood by reason and thought (λόγος 
and διάνοια) and are indeed mathematical and geometrical objects. Just as a 
geometer makes use of diagrams and images, the same usage should be reserved to 
the heavens. The comparison is once more played by a contrast between sensible 
objects (although the most perfect examples of their kind) and objects which should 
be grasped by διάνοια and are not immediately intuitive (especially since the use of 
diagrams or the observation of the sky is advised). As the usage of the adjective, even 
in the Republic,418 is not limited to the most perfect kind of the sensibles only, I 
believe this gives us a lower limit for our candidates. We established that διάνοια 
cannot address principles; from this it seems that it does not address sensibles either. 
 
- In addition, the following metaphor stresses the same point. The fragment 
states (lines 18-19) that διάνοια has with τὰ μέν ‘a clearer (ἐναργεστέραν)419 contact 
 
417 Although the usage of the adjective is not limited to them only. See the next footnote.  
418 Both with the meaning of ‘colorful’ (e.g. Resp. 8, 557c, τὸ ἱμάτιον; 8, 558c, ἡ πολιτεία; 8, 561e, ὁ ἀνήρ) 
and with the meaning of ‘varied’ (e.g. Resp. 589d (αἱ ἡδοναί); 10, 604d, ἡ μίμεσις), if the two can be 
distinguished meaningfully. 
419 With respect to the adjective, Ιsnardi Parente (2005: Commento (a): 3, F2) comments: ‘Speusippo aggiunge 
l’aggettivo ἐναργής, non ignoto a Platone seppur usato raramente (cfr. ad es. Resp 511a 8) e non mai, come 
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than sight has with visible objects’. Once again, although the immediate reading of 
the text implies a direct contact between διάνοια and τὰ μέν, the metaphor can be 
also read differently. Indeed, although the metaphor can be taken as referring back 
to book VII of the Republic, where the sight and the light of the sun offer a 
comparison for the intellect (νοῦς) and the the Form of Good, what makes it striking 
is precisely the word ἐπαφή, contact. The word does not recur very often in the 
Platonic corpus, as it occurs only 5 times and always with a clear sense-perceptive 
reference.420 Accordingly, if we take sight to be the clearest of the senses, διάνοια 
allows a comprehension that is superior to the senses themselves.421 Therefore, the 
metaphor exploits a comparison with sight, but goes beyond the metaphor to stress 
once more the superiority of thought over the senses in relation to these objects.422  
 
Although this conclusion might sound intuitive, the references strengthen the conviction 
that the lower limit for our inquiry of τὰ μέν excludes sensible objects from our candidates.  
 
 
qui, con ἐπαφή’. But the importance acknowledged by Geminus to ἑνάργεια in his interpretation of Euclid’s 
postulates 1-3 (Procl., In Eucl. 186,5 Friedlein) should at least cast doubts on the usage of the adjective by 
Speusippus, in particular given that those postulates (i.e. the construction of a line, and that of a circle) are used 
as examples for the first kind of knowledge. Moreover, the Stoic justification of the ἑνάργεια of Euclid’s 
postulates and the Stoic definition of straight line rely precisely on the notion of uniform flow or motion. (On 
this, see Kouremenos 1994: 443ff especially). The same comment may perhaps be extended to another term 
occurring in the lines preceeding the fragment, i.e. the adj. αὐτόπιστος (self-evident). Dillon (2003: 84, n. 120) 
notes it is ‘of doubtfully classical provenance, being attested no earlier than Hero of Alexandria (2nd cent. BC)’. 
And Kouromenos (1994: 446) in his analysis establishes a coextensiveness between the notions of οὐκ 
ἀναγκαῖον and πιθανόν on the basis of Procl., In Eucl., 192, 13-17). In this respect, αὐτόπιστος might be 
possibly paired with ἑνάργεια, as caractherising the epistemic assent required from postulates. Accordingly, 
this gives us another reason to reject a) the authenticity of the examples and, most of all b) the attribution of 
the examples to Speusippus on the basis of the theory of the flow (Cherniss 1945: 396–7 n. 322.). 
420 Stenzel refers to similar metaphorical usages of the verb ἐφάπτεσθαι in Plato (Phaed. 79 d and Symp. 212 
a). For this reason, Tarán (1981: 431) concludes that ‘if Speusippus had the word, this passage would be the 
first attestation of its metaphorical use to designate mental ‘apprehension’’. However, the context where the 
word itself appears, besides their striking relevance, seems to show the opposite. See, Crat. 404d: ‘Pherepapha, 
or something of that sort, would therefore be the correct name of the goddess, because she is wise and touches 
that which is in motion (ἐπαφὴ τοῦ φερομένου)’, transl. Fowler; the same justification for σοφία can be found 
at 412c; Theaet 186b, where Socrates and Theaetetus are discussing about sensations. Socrates asks: ‘Does it 
not perceive (viz. the soul) the hardness of the hard through touch (ἐπαφή), and likewise the softness of the 
soft?’ Theaetetus agrees and Socrates concludes: ‘But their essential nature and the fact that they exist, and 
their opposition to one another, and, in turn, the essential nature of this opposition, the soul itself tries to 
determine for us by reverting to them and comparing them with one another’, transl. Fowler. In the Sophist 
(246a) the word occurs in the discussion of the battle περὶ τῆς οὐσίας between the giants and the gods. The 
giants drag everything from heaven to earth and maintain that only ‘ὃ παρέχει προσβολὴν καὶ ἐπαφήν τινα’ 
exists. The last occurrence, in the Timaeus (46b) is possibly the most relevant. Indeed, the word occurs in the 
explanation of vision, and, in particular, in the explanation of how reflection in the mirror works. If this parallel 
is, at all, relevant, it would provide another reason in favour of the identification of τὰ μέν with mathematical 
objects in view of the acknowledgment, or mirror reflection, the soul has of them. See, infra, pp. 99-100 on 
Crubellier’s comment about the verb σαίνω, and n. 431. 
421 The metaphor as well recalls the metaphor of sight, exploited by Plato in the Republic (516b-517c). 
422 Bénatouïl and El Murr (2010: 60) also stress this point: ‘À propos des premiers objets, Speusippe ne décrit 
pas vraiment une connaissance intuitive: il insiste sur leur évidence par rapport aux sensibles et le fait qu’ils 
sont avancés et saisis par l’âme sans justification élaborée’. 
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At this juncture, our candidate for τὰ μέν needs to be something (1.) of which secure 
knowledge is granted; (2.) which is not identified with sensible objects; (3.) which allows a 
clearer comprehension than sight has to visual objects but (4.) does not correspond to the 
principles themselves.  
 
Given these premises, I believe that the best and most suitable candidate for τὰ μὲν are 
thus τὰ μαθηματικά: mathematical objects. As a matter of fact, this identification would 
square with Speusippus’ ontology as presented by Aristotle, in which, as underlined, 
mathematical objects are described as ‘the first of beings and separate from sensible 
things’.423 As we have seen, although testimonies are not consistent in presenting the same 
object in their reports, which can be numbers, mathematical objects and, sometimes, even 
mathematical propositions,424 what is usually consistent in Aristotle’s reports of Speusippus 
is the insistence in considering mathematical objects as the first ὄντα, the first of beings, and 
a ‘καθ᾽αὐτὴν φύσιν᾽,425 a reality by itself. In addition, we have shown how this picture can 
be complemented by the passage of Proclus’ In Euclidem, 426 where Speusippus is described 
as being so committed to the view that objects of theoretical science do not admit any kind 
of γένεσις, to refuse that they could be called ‘problems’; thus, according to the evidence 
preserved, Speusippus’ account of mathematical objects is pictured as follows: mathematical 
objects exist in the full sense as eternal, immutable, ungenerated ὄντα.  
 
If this is right, what does it mean that διάνοια puts τὰ μαθηματικά forward and prepares them 
for the following inquiry? Although the objects of mathematics are eternal, ungenerated and 
immutable, Speusippus, in order to guarantee the possibility of mathematical and 
geometrical practices, must have allowed some form of interaction and manipulation of 
them. This seems to be confirmed by [FR. 36], where Speusippus speaks about generations 
(γενέσεις) that we see as appearing in the domain of theoretical objects (Procl., In Eucl., 
77,15–78,8 Freidlein). By ‘taking eternal things as if they were in the process of coming to 
be’ mathematical and geometrical operations are safe, and so is their eternal status. Bénatouïl 
and El Murr offer an interesting perspective on the status of geometrical knowledge and its 
closeness with dialectic. Accordingly, in the passage Speusippus would be emphasising the 
closeness that geometry and dialectic obtain, by appealing to the processes of geometrical 
 
423 Arist., Metaph. M 1080b14-16, transl. Tredennick slightly modified. 
424 At least apparently. This is especially true for Proclus’ testimony, in which, as already emphasised, the 
objects addressed by Speusippus’ theories usually appear as neuter plurals; accordingly, the referent for such 
objects often needs to be understood from Proclus’ context. See, e.g. Procl., In Eucl., 179 Friedlein, 8-24. 
425 Arist., Metaph. N 1090a4. 
426 Tarán’s frr. 36 (Arist. Metaph. N 1090a2-b5) and 41(Arist., Metaph. N 1091a12-24), not accepted as 
genuine fragments by Isnardi Parente.  
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demonstration (exemplified by the hunt of τὰ μέν) and construction (exemplified by the hunt 
of τὰ δέ). According to their interpretation, the objects διάνοια puts forward and prepares 
for the following enquiry are indeed to be identified with hypotheses. I think the 
identification must be right and I believe it is particularly fruitful especially because it does 
justice to a process of manipulation of mathematical and geometrical objects which 
Speusippus, as noted, must have allowed (however, they acknowledge such a similarity as 
belonging to the second practice).427 They state: 
 
‘L’idée que l’âme «propose» ces objets sans explication et les «prépare» au début et en 
vue d’une recherche suggère que Speusippe songe à des points de départ simples posés 
par l’âme, donc sans doute à des «hypothèses», par lesquelles on se donne les objets 
que l’on veut examiner en les décrivant et en posant leur existence, comme en Resp. 
510c-d, où l’on retrouve l’absence de justification des hypothèses (οὐδένα λόγον), leur 
évidence (ὡς παντὶ φανερῶν) et leur lien avec le but visé par la recherche (καθ᾽ἑκάστην 
μέθοδον et ἐπὶ σκέψιν ὁρμήωοσιν)’.428  
 
The example is useful, as it provides an explanation for a process of knowledge of eternal 
beings, by stating what it means to employ mathematical objects and understand them ‘as 
if’ they were coming to be. However, there are details of this analysis I disagree with. Indeed, 
Bénatouïl and El Murr argue that there is no direct and intuitive apprehension of such 
objects.429 Although, as I also emphasised, it is true that Speusippus: ‘insiste sur leur 
évidence par rapport aux sensibles et le fait qu’ils sont avancés et saisis par l’âme sans 
justification élaborée’,430 knowledge of mathematical objects is described also by Aristotle 
as some sort of intuitive acknowledgment at least. For, as Aristotle says, ‘the statements of 
mathematics are true and appeal (σαίνει) to the soul’.431 The verb, analysed by Crubellier in 
 
427 ‘Ce second type de «recherche» pourrait être inclus dans la description de Speusippe, puisque κατὰ 
μετάβασιν pourrait aussi dési gner la nécessité où nous sommes d’analyser certains objets simples et éternels 
comme s’ils étaient engendrés ou composés. On notera en outre que Platon précise qu’une fois atteint «le 
principe du tout», en pregnant son «élan» depuis des hypothèses, le discours dialectique «s’attache (ἁψάμενος) 
à celui-ci et, inversement, suit ce qui suit de celui ci (ἐχόμενος τῶν ἐκεινης ἐχομένον)», (Resp. 511b7, cf. 
Phaed. 101d5), ce qui ressemble à la connaissance «d’après ce qui en découle» dont parle Speusippe pour les 
seconds objets’, Bénatouil and El Murr (2010: 61-62). 
428 Ead. (2010: 60). 
429 However, Bénatouïl and El Murr (2010: 59) translate the second part of the passage as follows: ‘alors qu’elle 
ne peut saisir directement les autres et marche vers elles par inférence et essaye d’entreprendre leur chasse 
d’après ce qui suit d’elles’. By saying that διάνοια cannot grasp τὰ δέ directly, the implication seems to me 
that, on the contrary, it was indeed able to grasp τὰ μέν this way.  
430 Bénatouïl and El Murr (2010: 60). 
431 Fr. 80 IP1 = Arist., Metaph. N 1090a35-1090b2, transl. Tredennick. In his commentary, Crubellier (1994: 
486-487) provides an analysis of the verb, which is quite unusual in Aristotle’s prose. For Crubellier, the verb: 
‘précise de quel genre de vérité il s’agit en en produisant le critère, à savoir le sentiment intérieur de la nécessité 
de ces propositions (my emphasis). C’est un critère de vérité indépendant de l’expérience; celui-là même 
auquel l’esclave du Ménon se réfère pour donner ou refuser son approbation à Socrate’. Indeed, the verb in its 
most direct sense is used to describe the well-known behavior of the dog when he recognizes his owner, 
describable as a: ‘cérémonial d’apaisement ou de reconnaisance’. The same meaning is preserved in the more 
figurative usage of the verb. To quote Crubellier: ‘C’est en ce sens qu’Aristote emploie ici σαίνειν. Le paradoxe 
est que la reconnaissance soit en quelque sorte décrite objectivement, parce qu’elle est fondée sur un signe qui 
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his commentary of books M and N of the Metaphysics, describes a ‘reconnaissance des 
vérités a priori (…) de façon immédiate et quasi affective’. Despite minor disagreements, I 
nonetheless take our interpretations on this section to be compatible. For the procedures of 
mathematics might indeed require processes of manipulation of these eternal entities (to be 
sure, such objects are not manipulated for real, but we perceive the process as if they were 
actually modifying),432 but once the demonstrations/operations are done, we intuitively 
acknowledge those objects which, to put it anachronistically, call for our assent and 
acknowledgement.  
At this point, we can finally turn to the analysis of the second part of the fragment and try 
to find a candidate for τὰ δέ as well. 
 
4.2.3 The identification of τὰ δέ (lines 19-22) 
In contrast to what is said with respect to mathematical objects, διάνοια is unable to grasp 
τὰ δέ directly. Of course, the correlation τὰ μέν - τὰ δέ requires these objects to be different 
from the previous ones. To test the results just obtained, we might well ask if mathematical 
objects are at stake here and must be identified with τὰ δέ rather than with τὰ μέν.  
 
Accordingly, since διάνοια was able to wholly grasp τὰ μέν directly and without any 
complicated path, it is clear that the difficulty experienced by διάνοια at this level cannot 
concern διάνοια itself but is, conversely, directly attributable to these objects. However, as 
we mentioned above, if these objects are hard to grasp, they cannot correspond to τὰ 
μαθηματικά, as their ontological status requires from them to be stable, eternal and 
immutable, and as they greet the soul. For I believe the difficulty here experienced by διάνοια 
is to account for a strong ontological difference of τὰ μέν with respect to τὰ δέ. Given the 
assumption that the first process (viz. that of τὰ μέν) accounts for a manipulation of 
mathematical objects more broadly (whether demonstrative or constructive it may be) it 
would not make sense to identify τὰ δέ with mathematical objects as well. In the end, the 
discussion between Speusippus and Menaechmus granted that the designation ‘theorem’ was 
the most appropriate whatever the process described may have been, i.e. either constructive 
or demonstrative (πάντα). In that context [FR. 36], it is the ontological status of 
mathematical objects which plays a strong role in the determination for the appellative, and 
not that of the processes described for reaching those eternals. The same consideration, I 
believe, can be extended to the objects in question in [FR. 35]. Accordingly, as I believe the 
 
vient de l’objet lui-même, et ne résulte pas d’une activité propre du sujet connaissant. L’argument veut donc 
souligner que cette reconnaissance des vérités a priori se fait de façon immédiate et quasi affective’. 
432 Contra, see Isnardi Parente (1974: 919), who affirms that Speusippus did not admit constructive and 
operative processes in mathematics. But this cannot be the case.  
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ontological distinction between τὰ μέν and τὰ δέ needs to be applied more radically, the most 
suitable candidates for the identification of τὰ δέ remain, indeed, sensible objects. But what 
does διάνοια do when it hunts after sensible objects? 
 
In order to answer this question, two ambiguities need to be ruled out first. Indeed, most 
of the translations of τὸ ἀκόλουθον either (i) connect the term to a formal or logical 
consequence of τὰ δέ or (ii) establish an ontological dependence of τὰ δέ on τὰ μέν. Both 
interpretations involve problems once the process of knowledge is analysed in more detail: 
on the one hand, to consider the hunt of τὰ δέ as associated to their (sc. of τὰ δέ) 
logical/formal consequences produces a third kind of objects which is easily grasped by 
διάνοια (and the risk of a vicious understanding of these latter by means of their 
consequences); on the other hand, to establish the ontological dependence of τὰ δέ on τὰ μέν 
diminishes drastically the ontological difference established between the two kinds of object.  
 
For the sake of clarity, I have chosen two sample translations here, which convey the two 
different meanings. Although both translations work, grammatically speaking, I believe the 
nuances they have can be misleading in trying to understand the meaning of the passage.  
 
a. The first is provided by Guthrie, who translates the second sentence: ‘Others it cannot 
seize upon immediately, but progresses towards them by inference and endeavours to 
track them (sc. τὰ δέ) down by way of their consequences’ with a logical meaning, 
strengthened by the term ‘inference’ as well. 433  
 
If we take the logical nuance at work (i.e. the ‘consequences of τὰ δέ’), we have a third kind 
of object involved: the consequences of τὰ δέ. But this is at least puzzling. Indeed, according 
to this interpretation, διάνοια would be able to grasp directly not only τὰ μέν, but also the 
consequences of τὰ δέ, by mean of which, by inference, would be able to finally hunt τὰ δέ 
(or at least this is how I take the translation to work). Besides involving a third kind of objects 
that would be immediately grasped, the interpretation is also potentially vicious. Indeed, 
without any clear identification for τὰ δέ, it is quite hard to establish what those 
 
433 Guthrie (1978: 467). It must be said that it was not Guthrie’s intention to provide a precise translation of the 
passage. However, his translation offers an example to show what interpretative problems such interpretations 
may imply. Timpanaro Cardini (1978:155) goes in the same direction by translating: ‘mentre altre, incapace di 
afferrarle di colpo, oltrepassandole per gradi cerca di perseguirle attraverso le loro conseguenze’ (my 
emphasis). Also Bénatouïl and El Murr opt for ‘par inférence’. However, if I understand their translation 
correctly, by translating κατὰ τὸ ἀκόλοθον with: ‘ce qui suit d’elles’, they consider such consequences as those 
that follow from them (viz. τὰ δέ), and not (after) them. I take this difference to be crucial. For, this way, it is 
the complexity of the objects themselves, which is in question, and not the implication of a third kind of objects 
(i.e. one needs to approach by inference the difficulties arising out of them, and not their logical consequences).  
  102 
consequences are. Are those objects, i.e. the consequences, different from τὰ δέ themselves? 
And in what respect? Because if they are, but they do pertain to the same ontological domain 
of τὰ δέ, their intelligibility as well would need to rely on their consequences and so on.  
 
b. The second is the most recent translation of the passage, by Horky,434 who translates: 
‘others it [sc. thought], because it is unable to grasp them immediately, attempts to 
hunt after by advancing on them step-by-step according to what follows after these [sc. 
the principles]’, with a positional/ontological nuance. In this case, the two practices 
are somehow independent and determined by the kind of objects διάνοια hunts after. 
Hence, if one is hunting after τὰ μέν (viz. simple mathematical objects), such objects 
are apprehended easily and, accordingly, only require basic epistemic operations. By 
contrast, if one is attempting the hunt of τὰ δέ (viz. complex mathematical objects, of 
which τὰ μέν are principles), multiple steps will be required, and the research will 
involve the use of τὰ μέν for their hunt.  
 
However, I believe the ontological dependence of τὰ δέ on τὰ μέν to be problematic. Besides 
the fact that, as we have seen, there is no indication at all, if we exclude Proclus’ lines 
preceding the fragment, that principles are at stake here nor that τὰ δέ can be constructed or 
proved by means τά μέν —and also, to connect ἀυτῶν with τὰ μέν grammatically is a stretch 
— to establish ontological dependence between the two objects means to diminish their 
ontological difference, and, consequently, the reasons for διάνοια’s capacity or incapacity to 
grasp objects easily. The difference between the two kinds of objects would indeed be 
reduced to the number of steps required for their demonstration. But how are we to consider 
the steps themselves? How can we justify the simplicity or complexity of the objects in 
question? By phrasing it with the soritis paradox, when are objects so complicated to require 
a step-to-step approach, and when, instead, can they be considered simple? In this respect, 
the ontological distinction grounding the διάνοια’s easeness or difficulty in grasping the 
objects almost vanishes. Indeed, mathematical procedures that have already been proven 
should probably be considered as simple and immediate (as well as logically prior and 
principles of) with respect to more complex ones. For, otherwise, διάνοια would not be able 
to grasp them as well. Besides fitting suspiciously Proclus’ own conception of theorems and 
problems and Euclid’s own use of proven theorems and problems,435 I believe the outcome 
 
434 Horky (2018: 33). 
435 See, Procl., In Eucl., 81.  
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of such an interpretation to be a completely deductivistic interpretation of mathematics, 
which I am not ready to accept.436  
 
To wrap things up, I believe that an interpretation that opts either for a logical or an 
exclusively geometrical/mathematical grounding of the fragment is misleading.437 Indeed, 
what I think is here at stake is something like the implications or, better, the inter-relation of 
such τὰ δέ that is, of the sensibles. In this sense, τὸ ἀκόλουθον represents the reciprocal 
congruency that sensible objects entertain when one investigates them. If this reference may 
not appear immediately legitimate, we may recall that instead, the sentence ‘<περὶ> 
ἀναλογίας τε καὶ ἀντακολουθίας’, preserved in ps-Iamblichus’ resumé of Speusippus’ book, 
offered most of the ground for scholars to suppose the existence of a connection between 
Speusippus’ levels.438 Why not, then, accept the same framework here? 
If we think about the sensibles, and about how Speusippus’ conducted his own inquiry 
into sensible objects, we find him occupied with a taxonomic arrangement of reality, 
investigating sensible objects by understanding the common properties that they hold.439 To 
investigate the sensibles means to know in what respect items are similar to one another, 
and, therefore, to know their reciprocal relationship. This horizontality of the research is 
continuously implied in the description of the second operation performed by διάνοια, which 
features references both to a horizontal movement acrosses the objects (διά) and to a 
connection between more objects (μετά). The movement of μετάβασις,440 for instance, 
 
436 Especially if we accept the identification of the One and Plurality as principles of numbers. Indeed, 
mathematics (and/or) geometry, if completely deducible, should probably be ultimately reduced to their first 
principles. However, the interpretation could possibly be defended by appeal to the testimony of a certain 
Diodore (Fr. 2 IP1= D.L., IV, 2), according to whom Speusippus was the first to consider what is common in 
ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασιν, and, possibly, by establishing that principles here have a less connoted meaning.  
437 In this respect, however, I believe that the construction of El Murr and Bénatouil’s translation of the passage 
is congruent with mine and differs only for a choice of the terms translated. For the sake of completeness, I 
report here their translation: ‘Il faut en effet dans tous les cas que les principes diffèrent de ce qui vient après 
les principes par leur simplicité, leur indémonstrabilité, leur fiabilité intrinsèque. En effet, dit Speusippe, en 
général, des choses dont la pensée entreprend la chasse, elle propose les unes sans produire d’explication 
compliquée et les prépare pour la recherche prévue, et a avec elles un contact plus clair que la vue avec le 
visible, alors qu’elle ne peut saisir directement les autres et marche vers elles par inférence et essaye 
d’entreprendre leur chasse d’après ce qui suit d’elles’, El Murr and Bénatouïl (2010: 59). 
438 See, Tannery (1887: 285) who emends ἀντακολουθίας with ἀνακολουθία); Isnardi Parente (2005, 
Commento (2): 15); Tarán (1981: 267-268) who rejects the Stoic meaning of ‘reciprocal implication’ (SVF II, 
p.121,7; III, p.67,44-45) on the basis of a supposed asymmetry of the relation, but accepts that of 
‘correspondence’. Note also that ἀντακολουθίας will become the technical term for the mutual involvement of 
virtues. 
439 See, infra, section 4.1. 
440 For parallel usage of κατὰ μετάβασις with a sense progression, or transition, rather than as a procedure of 
analogy or transposition (as, e.g. in Sextus, esp. with the verb νοέω Adv. Math., I, 25; III,40-44; 109-110), see, 
e.g. Nicomachus (Harmonicum enchiridion 7.16-18) also quoted by Iamblichus (VP, 120. 17-18): ‘and the 
semintone moved from the first to the middle to the third place’ (τοῦ ἡμιτονίου κατὰ μετάβασιν τήν τε πρώτην 
καὶ τὴν μέσην καὶ τὴν τρίτην χώραν μεταλαμβάνοντος, transl. Clark); Nemesius (De Natura Hominis VII): ‘Le 
mouvement ayant lieu par succession, il y en a une partie qui se fait d’abord, et une autre qui se fait ensuite’ 
(καὶ ἡ κίνησις δὲ κατὰ μετάβασιν γινομένη τὸ μὲν ἔχει πρότερον, τὸ δὲ δεύτερον, transl. Thibault). From a 
brief overview of the parallels, it looks like the meaning of transition is more common with verbs of movement, 
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neither implies a vertical nor a descending movement, but only a horizontal one, suggested 
by the verb διαβαίνω as well. In this respect, the verb διαβαίνω also metaphorically evokes 
the process of analysis required in order for these objects to be grasped. Thought goes across 
them and understands them by means of the properties these objects have in common. If this 
is right, we can picture διάνοια in the effort of analysing the objects of the sensible realm, 
enquirying them by analysing their reciprocal relation and congruency. This second 
procedure is not at all immediate for it requires the effort of a mediated collective analysis. 
 
4.2.4 The significance of the fragment within Speusippus’ epistemology 
If my analysis is right, the fragment presents two different kinds of operations performed 
by διάνοια and addressed to two different kinds of objects. On the one hand, a process 
culminating in a direct form of acknowledgment that, as I suggested, addresses the domain 
of mathematical objects. On the other hand, a collective and mediated kind of knowledge 
which addresses sensible objects, takes into account more objects at the same time and 
investigates them by means of their reciprocal relations. In the end, the fact that sensibles 
represent the counterpart of the direct grasp is hinted even from the first part of the fragment, 
since both the connotation of directness and immediateness and the metaphor of sight 
explain the hunt for τὰ μέν in a comparison with sensible objects. If this reading is right, my 
interpretation would allow an understanding of the passage that works independently from 
Proclus’ reading and gives back to Speusippus an original epistemological theory which is 
coherent with the evidence preserved by Aristotle both with reference to the mathematical 
level and to the sensible realm. Indeed, the passage would give a rationale for the pursuit of 
the ὅμοια, a horizontal process which addresses more than one object at a time and connects 
them by means of what is similar. Moreover, this interpretation would give a more explicit 
indication of the direction of the movements, suggested by the two prepositions διά and μετά, 
which is absent in previous translations.  
Lastly, and more importantly, the process of understanding mathematical and geometrical 
objects, considered by Speusippus eternal and immutable, and that of understanding 
sensibles, probably not stable by definition, is rendered independent. On the one hand, 
without denying the processes of manipulation required to reach them, we find a final and 
stable grasp of objects that, by nature, cannot allow modification or change; on the other 
hand, we find a collective inquiry that is able to take into account more than one object at 
the same time, and enables their understanding through the comprehension of their mutual 
similarities. This way, the fragment confirms the possibility of both inquiries, and the 
 
while that of analogy with verbs of knowledge. Accordingly, I take the verb διαβαίνω to be decisive in view 
of determining the meaning of κατὰ μετάβασιν. 
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preservation of the internal economy at each level. As confirmed by the analysis in section 
4.1., sensibles do not need a superimposed level in order to be understood and arranged 
taxonomically: their knowledge may be more complicated and indirect, but their inquiry is 
nonetheless safeguarded. Moreover, in this way Speusippus reveals at the same time his 
Platonic inheritance and his own original contribution: he preserves the Platonic features 
related to real objects of knowledge by stating that mathematical objects are separated and, 
subsequently, eternal and immutable, but finds in the separation of the two levels the 
possibility of securing a method of enquiry into and understanding of the world.  
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 CHAPTER FIVE: 
THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 
 
Now that we have provided an outline of how the different levels of Speusippus’ 
system are arranged, and how they stand in relation to one another, we finally get to the 
thorniest question, which relates to the principles, and, more specifically, primary 
principles.  
In the previous chapters, we have often witnessed Aristotle discussing Speusippus’ 
first principles in different contexts and providing information about the relation they 
entertain with what they are said to be principles of: mathematical number. Accordingly, 
aim of this chapter will be to analyse the information obtained from the previous analyses 
in the attempt to harmonise them into a consistent, or at least consonant, narrative. For 
obvious reasons, this chapter will present the most tentative conclusions on Speusippus. 
Indeed, as emphasised in the previous chapters Aristotle’s material (especially with 
regard to first principles) is very difficult to disentangle. The reasons for this difficulty 
are many: the information is sometimes biased (see, e.g., Chapter 2, ‘The absence of 
good in the principles’); sometimes Aristotle addresses the Platonists as a group 
rendering difficult the various differentiations (see, e.g., Chapter 3, ‘Mathematical 
number’); the identification of principles other than the primary is often difficult because 
of the absence of sufficient material (see, e.g. Chapter 4, ‘The sensibles’) therefore 
preventing the possibility to deduce information on the basis of other kind of principles. 
However, an account of Speusippus’ philosophy would not be complete if it did not 
explain its most puzzling aspect: the account of first principles. Thus, the following 
sections will attempt to find the most coherent explanation for the information collected 
up to this point.  
 
5.1 Methodological clarifications: gathering information about first 
principles 
In order to provide a coherent account, I shall first clarify some methodological 
assumptions which I will employ in gathering information about principles.  
 
First of all, I do not consider legitimate any gathering of information about first 
principles on the basis of an analogy with other sorts of principles. The reason for this is 
that in Aristotelian passages about Speusippus principles other than those that are 
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primary are never described clearly. A clear example is provided by geometrical 
magnitudes: Aristotle usually hints at a unified conception of the mathematical realm, 
and thus at a unified conception of mathematical and geometrical objects. Inasmuch as 
magnitudes are arranged separately from numbers in Aristotle’s list of Speusippus’ 
οὐσίαι in Z2441 and inasmuch as a unitarian conception does not imply necessarily the 
absence of specific principles for numbers and geometrical magnitudes respectively,442 
no other passage in Aristotle allows us an identification of what the principles of 
geometrical objects are to be identified with precisely. For instance, the only passage 
which would shed light on the issue, and on which scholars443 have relied on, does not 
specify what the second principle of magnitudes should be. Indeed, the passage states 
that: 
 
 these thinkers, then, generate (γεννῶσιν) geometrical magnitudes from this sort of material 
principle, but others generate them from the point (they regard the point not as a one but as 
similar to the one) and another material principle which is not plurality but is similar to it.444  
 
The second principle is usually identified with διάστημα, mentioned by Aristotle a 
few lines afterwards (b 30-33). However, as Crubellier highlights in his commentary,445 
there is no compelling reason to take the term to be Platonic instead of properly 
Aristotelian. Moreover, he notes that Aristotle’s reticence in naming the second principle 
is striking. Indeed, even in the lines following the extract just quoted, Aristotle insists 
precisely on the absence of a clear differentiation of the second principle (πλῆθος) in 
order to draw the following contradictions.446 Lastly, one may note that, in absence of 
further evidence, the distinction between a material and formal principle may not 
necessarily be applicable to Speusippus, and could be instead reminiscent of Aristotelian 
 
441 See Chapter 1, section 1.1. 
442 I do not take this to be the case. What I want to stress with ‘unitarian conception’ is only that geometrical 
magnitudes, although being usually referred to as having different principles than mathematical number, share 
the same ontological status of the latter insofar as both are eternal and not liable to change. This aspect, 
however, may constitute an argument against the supposition that analogical relationship between principles 
hold good in the system in absolute. Indeed, a unitarian conception of the mathematical realm might suggest 
that principles of geometrical magnitudes work analogically with respect to primary principles (those of 
numbers) but might also imply that this does not hold good for any principles (e.g. those of the soul). 
443 See, e.g. IP2 (2005: 39), Dillon (2003: 45). 
444 Arist., Metaph. M9 1085a31-34, Transl. Tredennick (241) slightly modified. 
445 Crubellier (1994: 345). The term διάστημα, however, occurs also in fr. 122 IP (ps-Iamblichus’ Theolog. 
Arithm.). 
446 Arist., Metaph., M9, 1085 b1ff: ‘for, if the matter is one, line, plane and solid will be the same; because the 
product of the same elements must be one and the same. if on the other hand, there is more than one kind of 
matter -one of the line, another of the plane, and another of the solid- either the kinds are associated with each 
other or they are not’, transl Tredennick. Note here that there is no further reference to points, although 
Aristotle, in other arguments (see, e.g. in M3) does decompose lines into points. In ps-Iamblichus’ quotation 
(fr. 122 IP1), the principles appear to be four: the point, the line, the triangle and the pyramid. 
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hylomorphism.447 Given this premises, it would be incautious to assume features of 
principles other than primary in order to deduce on this basis characteristics for the latter. 
And the same holds good for principles of the soul (of which Aristotle makes no mention 
at all) and for principles of sensible objects.448 
 
Secondly, I will take all the information gathered to be valid for both primary 
principles, even for passages in which only one principle is explicitly addressed, and I 
will assume the data to expose the functioning of principles. This is for the following 
reasons. First, as already shown in Chapter, I take Speusippus’ principles to be 
unqualified, save for their quantitative aspect. As argued in section 2.7, I believe 
participation was a crucial problem for Speusippus, who, in order to avoid the necessity 
of ontological grounding of the objects populating his world and to differentiate 
epistemological practices, decided to characterise his system as episodic. Moreover, the 
same problem seems to be echoed in Aristotle’s passages about mathematical number, 
and specifically in those addressing its relationship with the One: a connected problem 
to characterising the One as good would result in the production of many good units, and 
in an abundance of good(s) in the world. For this reason, I will take Aristotle’s 
suggestions about the principles (e.g., the claim that the One becomes ‘not even a 
thing’;449 the claim that the second principle is ‘universally predicated’450) to work more 
as information about the functioning of the principles insofar as they are principles, rather 
than as a characterisation of individual primary principles respectively. In this respect, I 
believe it is more natural to assume that the two primary principles work in one and the 
same way and, accordingly, that their features are, so to say, co-extensional, rather than 
understanding those features as differentiating the two.  
 
Lastly, as a clarification, I will take primary principles to be the principles of 
mathematical number only and not to be at work at more general levels. With this, I do 
not want to deny that the ‘geometrical level’ might have similar sort of principles, since 
this seems to be implied by Aristotle, nor do I want to conclude that we should 
understand primary principles as necessarily ruling over the whole mathematical 
 
447 Contra, see Dillon (1990a). Dillon, however, establishes as a premise that what he will say about 
Speusippus’ female principle will be particularly true ‘if we are prepared […] to accept as essentially 
Speusippean ch. 4 of Iamblichus’ De Communi Mathematica Scientia’ (1990a: 13). 
448 Isnardi Parente identifies these principles with ταὐτόν and θάτερον, and so does Bechtle (2010: 40-41) on 
the basis of (mainly) Arist., Metaph. 1004a1-10, but the passages he refers to are not included in Isnardi 
Parente’s collections of the fragments (IP1 and IP2) nor in Tarán’s. 
449 See, Chapter 2. 
450 See section 3.2. 
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realm.451 Simply, since the relationship between primary principles and mathematical 
number is the only one which is well attested in Aristotle’s corpus, it is better to address 
this relation only, before verifying whether it can be extended in any analogical way. 
Moreover, I will take the primary principles to be at work necessarily as a pair, to be 
opposed to one another,452 and to have the same status, except for their quantitative 
characterisation.  
 
Accordingly, we can now turn to the data obtained so far. 
 
a) In section 1.1, when analysing the list of οὐσίαι of Speusippus provided by 
Aristotle, I observed a difficulty in determining whether Aristotle is treating the 
One as included in the list or as excluded. I concluded that one option to resolve 
the ambiguity might have been to consider primary principles as having an 
ontological status that sounded ambiguous to Aristotle. If this is the case, the One 
and Plurality may retain a peculiar ontological status, which is difficult for Aristotle 
to define clearly. Indeed, the difficulty results also from the fact that mathematical 
numbers are often presented by Aristotle as the first ὄντα in Speusippus’ system. 
 
b) In section 2.3, in the context of Aristotle’s criticism of Speusippus’ principles, I 
took the claim that ‘principles are causes’ as genuine. In particular, I argued that 
such a claim had a specific designatum, i.e. first principles, and that first principles 
were indeed conceived as unqualified, save for their quantitative aspect. Indeed, 
their unqualifiedness is aimed at a separation of different ontological levels, in the 
attempt to grant epistemological as well as ontological independence to each of 
them. 
 
c) In section 2.6, in the context of a similar discussion about the absence of Good in 
the principles, I argued that Aristotle presents a different version of Speusippus’ 
thesis, phrased as follows: ἐξ ἀορίστων ἀτελῶν τε ἀεὶ τὰ τελειότερα, ‘the more 
perfect things always come from those which are indeterminate and imperfect’. In 
the analysis, I abstained from consideration of the first adjective used by Aristotle: 
ἀόριστος, to be taken as referred, in my reading, to first principles. In this regard, 
 
451 Possibly, in an analogical way.  
452 Indeed, if this was not the case there would be no reason for Speusippus to deny that the first principle is 
good on the basis that this would imply the second principle to be evil. With ‘opposed’, however, I do not 
mean that the principles are contrary. For, as Tarán notes (1981: 40), if the principles were to be contrary, the 
One, insofar as it is contrary to Plurality, would be ‘few’. 
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I only highlighted453 that although the context takes into account the One alone 
explicitly, the adjective is usually associated with the second principle and matter.  
 
d)  In the same section, the different version of Speusippus’ thesis presented by 
Aristotle leads, in Aristotle’s eyes, to a very puzzling conclusion: the annihilation 
of the One. For Aristotle concludes that: ‘ὥστε μηδὲ ὄν τι εἶναι τὸ ἓν αὐτό’. 
 
e) In section 3.2, I underlined that Aristotle criticises Speusippus for not having 
accounted for the generation of numbers out of the principles. In the section, I 
showed that the options of generation provided by Aristotle point at atomic forms 
of compounds, thus showing that principles fail to obtain unity in their 
consequents. However, in order to draw this criticism, Aristotle does not rely on 
his own notion of ‘element’ as basic constituent of compounds, a notion that 
would render the criticism much easier. Accordingly, I took Speusippus’ 
conception of element to be different than Aristotle’s own. Moreover, in the 
passage Aristotle connotes Speusippus’ second principle as ‘that which is 
universally predicated’ (ἐκ τοῦ κατηγορουμένου καθόλου). 
 
f) In the following section (3.3) I underlined another difficulty perceived by 
Aristotle, namely, that Speusippus and the Platonists did not explain in what sense 
something is derived out of something (πῶς ἄλλο ἐξ ἄλλου ἐστίν). In particular, 
the discussion addressed two aspects that are interesting for our purposes: a) kinds 
of production which do not preserve the principles in their results; and b) the 
characterisation of principles as elements. 
 
5.2 Problematising the data obtained 
In general, Aristotle raises two problems concerning Speusippus’ primary principles:  
 
i) The fact that although first principles are causes, it is not clear what kind of causes 
they are, and what kind of causal activity they exert on their consequents (see 
points e; f). 
 
And this problem is connected to: 
 
 
453 Chapter 2, p. 53, footnote 253. 
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ii) The fact that principles are connoted as elements, in a way that is not consonant 
with Aristotle’s own notion of element. An element, for Aristotle, needs to be 
prior to the things it causes, and it needs to be in some way preserved in the thing 
of which it is the cause. On the contrary, Speusippus’ principles are said to be 
‘universally predicated’, and indefinite (points b; c). 
 
These two aspects are closely interrelated and have a result what I have called the 
‘ambiguous ontological status’ of first principles (points a; d). Indeed, in the Aristotelian 
passages, Speusippus’ first principles fluctuate between somehow being included among 
substances and being reduced to ‘not even a thing’. This aspect is the result of Aristotle’s 
insistence that something, in order to be a cause of a substance (i.e. numbers in the specific 
context), needs itself to be a substance.454 Aristotle insistently maintains that: ‘substance 
cannot be a principle of what is not a substance, nor a non-substance, a principle of 
substance’.455 On the basis of this principle, one thing is clear: Speusippus’ primary 
principles are inadequate in the first place, because they are defined as elements, and 
elements of a substance must themselves be substances.456 Given this background, we can 
assert that Speusippus’ principles are causes, that they are connoted as elements, but are not 
strictly considered by Aristotle as being properly substances themselves. The obvious 
question to raise, then, is the following: what does Speusippus (or the Platonists) mean, by 
στοιχεῖον? And in what sense can an element be a cause? 
 
5.3  Being an element, being a cause 
In section 2.1, in the context of Aristotle’s criticism of Speusippus’ theory of the absence 
of good in the principles, I quoted a passage which is now again relevant for our purposes: 
 
[FR. 79] The difficulty arises not from ascribing goodness as belonging to the first 
principle as an attribute, but from treating the One as a principle, and a principle in the 
sense of an element, and then deriving number out of the One.457 
 
As we have seen, Aristotle provides his own definition of element in book Δ of the 
Metaphysics: 
 
Στοιχεῖον λέγεται ἐξ οὗ σύγκειται πρώτου ἐνυπάρχοντος ἀδιαιρέτου τῷ εἴδει εἰς ἕτερον 
εἶδος. 
 
454 In this respect, and particularly in relation to a similar discussion on principles and elements in Λ4 of the 
Metaphysics, see Crubellier (2000).  
455 M 10, 1087a1; N1, 1088b3, transl. Crubellier (2000: 146). 
456 See, ibid. (2000: 150). 
457 Arist., Metaph., N4 1091b2-3 (=fr. 79 IP1). 
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That from which something is composed, as a primary constituent that is in form 
indivisible into another form, is called an element.458 
 
The following examples provided by Aristotle (things into which syllables are divisible; 
things into which bodies are divisible; and the things into which geometrical propositions 
are divisible)459 confirm that the essential meaning for ‘element’ is that of first, indivisible 
constituent. However, after having provided his own definition, Aristotle mentions that there 
are some people who make use of the term ‘metaphorically’.460 
 
καὶ μεταφέροντες δὲ στοιχεῖον καλοῦσιν ἐντεῦθεν ὃ ἂν ἓν ὂν καὶ μικρὸν ἐπὶ πολλὰ ᾖ 
χρήσιμον· διὸ καὶ τὸ μικρὸν καὶ ἁπλοῦν καὶ ἀδιαίρετον στοιχεῖον λέγεται. ὅθεν ἐλήλυθε 
τὰ μάλιστα καθόλου στοιχεῖα εἶναι, ὅτι ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἓν ὂν καὶ ἁπλοῦν ἐν πολλοῖς 
ὑπάρχει ἢ πᾶσιν ἢ ὅτι πλείστοις· καὶ τὸ ἓν καὶ τὴν στιγμὴν ἀρχάς τισι δοκεῖ εἶναι. ἐπεὶ 
οὖν τὰ καλούμενα γένη καθόλου καὶ ἀδιαίρετα (οὐ γὰρ ἔστι λόγος αὐτῶν), στοιχεῖα 
τὰ γένη λέγουσί τινες […]. 
 
The term ‘element’ is also applied metaphorically to any small unity which is useful for 
various purposes; and so that which is small and simple and indivisible is called an 
‘element’. Hence it comes that the most universal things are elements; because each of 
them, being a simple unity, is present in many things—either in all or in as many as 
possible. Some too think that the One and the point are principles. Therefore, since what 
are called genera are universal and indivisible (because they have no formula), some 
people call the genera elements […].461 
 
According to this passage, there are some people who make use of the term ‘element’ in 
a different way, applying it to any small unit. For this reason, they call ‘element’ what is 
small (μικρὸν), simple (ἁπλοῦν), and indivisible (ἀδιαίρετον). From this usage of the term, 
it results that (τὰ μάλιστα καθόλου) the most universal things are called elements as well. 
Indeed, as each of them is one and simple, it subsists in many things.462 Others think that the 
One and the point are principles. Perhaps on the same basis, they concluded that since what 
 
458 Transl. Malink (2017: 187). 
459 See Crowley (2005: 372). In the paper, he argues that Plato, in making use of the term στοιχεῖον relies on 
an already current usage of ‘element’, which should not be considered as a metaphorical derivation (in a 
physical, metaphysical or cosmological context) from some other usage of the term.  
460 Important here, as Menn (unpublished MN: 42) notes, is to highlight that: ‘Plato and the other Academics 
are trying to compete with the physicists’ accounts of the generation of all things out of a few ἀρχαί’.  
461 Aristot., Metaph. Δ 1014b 2-14, transl. Tredennick slightly modified. The following lines of Aristotle’s 
passage state that, according to this identification, the genus is considered to be more universal than the 
differentia. It may be interesting to compare this criticism with Aristotle’s criticism of Speusippus’ method of 
division in biology to see whether the critques in the two contexts are compatible. 
462 Bechtle (2010: 37-58) has a very interesting interpretation of the ‘smallness of the One’, a feature which is 
evoked by later authors such as Damascius and the Anonymous Commentator of Plato’s Parmenides. For the 
scholarly reception of these passages, see infra, Introduction (xi-xv). In general, I take it to be more convincing 
to identify Speusippus in the Δ passage with those people who believed unity and the point to be the principles. 
As we have seen, the point occurs in Aristotle as one of the principles recognised by Speusippus for the 
geometrical realm, and in this sense the two passages are at least consistent. On the contrary, the interpretation 
of the One as something extremely small, occurs before this comment, which is introduced by the καί, suggesting 
that a different interpretation is being considered. 
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are called genera are universal and indivisible, genera were to be called elements as well. If 
we accept the identification of these few lines with the Platonists, and, in particular, with 
Speusippus, we are provided with more information about the theory of principles. Indeed, 
I believe the identification to be at least possible on the basis of the following reasons: 
 
i. The identification of genera with elements is provided right after the claim that, 
for some people, also the One and the point are principles. As we have seen, the point 
is listed by Aristotle as one of Speusippus’ principles for geometry, and this would at 
least grant some consistency for the identification. Moreover, the clause is introduced 
by the καί, which seems to signal that different people are here to be identified than those 
applying the term ‘element’ to any small unit. This does not mean, however, that these 
people here introduced necessarily diverge on the opinion that elements are to be 
identified with the most universal things. On the contrary, this second group of people as 
well seem to uphold the same belief, possibly on the basis of different reasons (i.e. not 
necessarily relying on the smallness of the One). 
 
ii. If we accept the identification with the Platonists to be at least possible, 
Aristotle’s claim that the Platonists (and Speusippus in particular) called the genera 
elements might shed some light on two other features that Aristotle attributes to 
Speusippus’ first principles, namely: 
 
a. the claim that Speusippus’ second principle, τὸ πλῆθος, is ‘universally predicated’ 
(κατηγορούμενος καθόλου); 
b. the fact that in Metaphysics Λ,463 if we take Aristotle to be re-formulating 
Speusippus’ thesis464 of the unqualifiedness of first principles, these latter are said 
to be ἀόριστοι, indeterminate.  
At this point, one final issue stands in need of clarification. Indeed, Tarán, on the basis 
 
463 See section 2.6. 
464 Or, as Tarán puts it, Aristotle is providing a reductio ad absurdum (1981: 34). However, I do not agree with 
Tarán that Aristotle is simply stating that ‘if the principles were indefinite and imperfect, the One itself would 
not even be an entity’, or, in other words, that the annihilation of the One is derived directly from the 
indefiniteness of the principles (in relation to their consequences). I believe that, even by taking the argument 
as a reductio of Speusippus’, it may well be that the consequences implied, although false for Speusippus’ 
principles, are somehow telling of how Speusippus’ principles are conceived. Moreover, in Tarán’s 
interpretation, Plurality, a definite multiplicity (Tarán 1981: 331), is not taken to work in the same way of the 
One, or, better, is not thought to have the same status; Tarán (1981: 40): ‘And so Speusippus may have seen in 
multiplicity the second principle of number, without saying or implying that it is an element of number, nor 
the material cause of number, nor the contrary of the One’). Despite the fact that Speusippus’ Plurality is 
defined as κατηγορούμενος καθόλου, in many passages, and in the passage in Metaphysics Λ in particular, the 
two principles are at stake, and not the One only. 
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that ‘Speusippus did not hypostatize the universals’465 argues that the One is the principle of 
number and the first number at the same time, i.e. ‘the first unit of units’.466 And the same 
holds good for the point, insofar as it is principle of magnitudes and first magnitudes. 
However, I take the One (and Plurality) to be other than numbers and to be something 
different from them. This is for two reasons. First, as already mentioned, I take information 
about each principle to be valid for the other as well. For, when principles are singled out, I 
take this to be usually the result of the context of Aristotle’s arguments, which are pointing 
at flaws in one of them specifically. Secondly, Speusippus’ principles are often paired 
together, when Aristotle speaks of them as elements, and this means, at least, that to the 
extent that they considered elements they work in the same way.467 It must be said that this 
strategy, however, leaves us with the difficulty of explaining the status of the principles, not 
assuming that they are entities themselves, since Aristotle’s testimony is at least consistent 
in saying that numbers are the first ὄντα, and not the One and Plurality. I believe that the 
best explanation for this aspect is to follow Aristotle’s suggestion and take primary principles 
as the most universal genera, and to consider them, in this sense, as principles and elements 
of numbers. For, if each number is a definite collection of units, each and one of them will 
be, to some extent, one and many. Indeed, this would make of the One and Plurality the most 
universal predicates of all numbers.468 In this respect, my interpretation is closer to Isnardi 
Parente’s,469 who takes Speusippus’ primary principles to be the ‘primary condition’ of 
numbers. However, Isnardi Parente is not at all clear as to what this amounts to. For there is 
another issue which remains to be solved and makes it difficult to understand what it means 
for the principles to be the condition of numbers: to what extent can principles, conceived as 
the most universal genera, be thought to be causes? In section 2.3, I concluded that of the 
premises of Speusippus’ thesis reported by Aristotle, the claim that ‘principles are causes’ 
was genuinely Speusippean.470 In this sense, it is worth asking what kind of causes Aristotle 
would identify them with.471 But it is quite clear from Aristotle’s reports that Speusippus’ 
principles cannot be material causes, for, otherwise, they would be somehow ‘contained’, in 
 
465 Tarán (1981: 34-37). 
466 Tarán (1981: 38). With this interpretation, however, the One itself is reduced to a unit, and therefore it 
would not be clear why Aristotle says that it becomes ‘not even a thing’. 
467 While in this respect, Tarán’s principles are indeed differentiated (see, above, footnote 468).  
468 It should be said that this interpretation does not offer a sufficient explanation of number one, if Speusippus 
actually took it to be a number, as for example Tarán believes (1981: 32-47) and as can be extrapolated from 
ps-Iamblichus’ quotation (=fr. 122 IP1). However, the consideration of the One as a principle does not exclude 
its arithmetical employment (see Acerbi 2010: 236ff). For a compatible view, see Burnyeat (1987: 170, n. 63 
in particular). 
469 Isnardi Parente (1980: 58-59). It must be said that in the second collection of the fragments, Isnardi Parente 
does not go back to primary principles in much detail.  
470 See, infra, Chapter 2. 
471 To understand the precise mean in which cause is meant by the Platonist is a usual concern for Aristotle, 
also with respect to Plato.  
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their consequents;472 they cannot be generative causes either,473 as the criticism in 
Metaphysics M has shown; and they can neither be efficient causes, as otherwise they would 
be required to be entities themselves, which, as we have just seen, cannot be the case.474 
Lastly, they cannot be final causes either, because the analogy with the seed implies precisely 
that the fulfilment of the seed will be plants, and it is the seed, and not plants, which is the 
vehicle for the identification of the principles. We are left with some kind of formal cause: 
principles are that by reason of which numbers are numbers. And they are so, in a precise 
way: they represent the explanatory cause, and therefore the analytical cause, for numbers 
to be numbers.475  
 
I take this interpretation to be possible, and to represent the best attempt to make sense of 
the frictions encountered so far in Aristotelian accounts of Speusipus:  
 
First of all, insofar as they are explanatory causes, Speusippus’ principles are not ‘entities’ 
themselves, or, as Aristotle puts it, ὀυσίαι. This would explain the ambiguity of the 
ontological status that Aristotle attributes to first principles in different passages of his 
corpus as well as why he characterises them as κατηγορουμένοι καθόλου and ἀόριστοι 
(possibly indefinite insofar as they are unqualified). First principles are not hypostatised, and 
as such they cannot be fairly compared to Plato’s Forms, and cannot receive the same 
criticisms (e.g. that of the Third Man, accounting for the qualification of sensible objects); 
at the same time, they are not substances themselves, and they are not separated, although 
they are prior.  
 
Secondly, this may shed light on Aristotle’s criticism related to the priority of the 
principles. In Chapter 2, I concluded that Aristotle is trying to show that Speusippus assumed 
what is prior in time to be also ontologically so. However, if Speusippus’ primary principles 
are conceived as explanatory causes and, as such, as the most universal genera of numbers, 
this may explain a) why Aristotle assumes them to be somehow prior in time, and b) why in 
the first place Aristotle is addressing this criticism at all. In fact, according to this 
 
472 See the criticism related to unity, in Chapter 3. Moreover, they cannot even be paradigmatic causes, since 
number is said to be a reality by itself, and since otherwise Speusippus would be liable to the Third Man 
argument. 
473 Pace, Dillon (2003: 40ff). 
474 Moreover, as it has been highlighted already, numbers do not allow any kind of movement or change.  
475 To put it anachronistically, we can think of Kant’s definition of analytical judgement (Kant, Critique of 
pure reason, A6, ‘the predicate B belongs to the subject A as something that is (covertly) contained in this 
concept’, transl. P. Guyer and E. Matthews. For numbers, for instance, this may be their quantitative aspect in 
the first place. One may note that such (modern) definition would also account for a conception of ‘element’ 
as basic constituent, conceived in a non-metaphorical way. On the use of a non-metaphorical meaning of 
element, see Crowley (2005). 
  116 
interpretation Speusippus’ primary principles would neither be prior temporally nor 
ontologically, but only analytically. This would result in a very strange ‘principle’, from an 
Aristotelian perspective, which is only nominally a cause.  
 
Third, this would account for the fact that Aristotle insists on claiming that Speusippus 
did not make any effort to explain how numbers are generated out of the principles: primary 
principles do not produce numbers, and they are not generative in any way, although they 
are the condition upon which numbers can be understood. Given this explanation, 
Speusippus would not be negligent for not accounting for how numbers are generated out of 
the principles; on the contrary, such an account is not required at all. 
 
Lastly, this might explain why Speusippus’ primary principles are to be considered 
elements of numbers as well, both from a metaphorical conception of ‘element’ and from a 
more material one (closer to Aristotle’s own definition).476 Indeed, if primary principles are 
analytically conceived, they are somehow ‘present’ in all numbers, insofar as they can be 
predicated of them all. However, taken metaphorically, primary principles are elements of 
number because they represent the explanatory cause of numbers, and their most universal 
genera.  
 
Unfortunately, as to principles, we cannot go further than this tentative answer. However, 
it would be fascinating to conjecture that it was precisely Speusippus’ conception of 
principles (insofar as they are explanatory causes and analytically conceived) that suggested 
to the philosopher a separation of the various ontological levels, and the consequent 
postulation of principles for each of them in order to obtain an epistemologically sustainable 
project. Or, at least, to suppose the two assumptions are intimately intertwined. In this 
respect, an explanatory conception of principles, would account also for an empirically-
based inquiry of the sensible world, as well as for a heuristic method of research. Lastly, one 
might be tempted to go further, and suppose that the discussion Speusippus held with 
Menaechmus was indeed, in the first place, a discussion about the notion of element itself.477 
If this was to be the case, it would reveal that the discussions taking place within the 
 
476 Although I am inclined to accept a ‘metaphorical’ interpretation of στοιχεῖον for Speusippus, rather than a 
material one. Indeed, in Metaphysics M (see Chapter 3), when referring to Speusippus, Aristotle takes into 
account principles which are not preserved in their results, so implying that Speusippus’ primary principles are 
also to be considered as ‘external principles’. 
477 For Menaechmus definition of element, see the frr. preserved in Lasserre (1987: 117-125, fr. 6 in particular; 
329-336; 545-559). On Menaechmus, see Fuentes Gonzáles (in Goulet 2005); on this discussion within the 
Academy and Menaechmus’ circular proof, see also Barnes (1976), Bowen (1983), De Haas (2011). For an 
opposite opinion about the possibility of identifying Menaechmus as an Academic, see Zhmud (1998). 
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Academy cannot be reduced to either purely mathematical quarrels or philosophical 
speculations. On the contrary, this would establish a much more fruitful interrelation and 
interchange between the two fields, resulting in refined conjectures about the ontological 
status of mathematical number and of the status of scientific research in general.  
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Section II: Xenocrates 
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CHAPTER SIX: 
The μία φύσις of τὰ μαθηματικά 
 
 
 
At the outset of the preceding chapter, I gathered a set of general claims to guide my 
interpretation of Speusippus’ philosophy. Similarly, this chapter on Xenocrates offers an 
initial examination of Xenocrates’ philosophy, and, in particular, of his metaphysics. 
Aristotle’s testimonia on Xenocrates, contrarily to those preserved about Speusippus, are 
less numerous, and accordingly, more suitable for a thematic arrangement of specific issues. 
Accordingly, this chapter will initially present Aristotle’s general views of Xenocrates’ 
philosophy, and, in particular, his analysis of numbers and Forms. 
 
Before advancing his core arguments against Plato and his successors, Aristotle usually 
provides a short presentation of the philosophical tenets of their systems. In such overviews, 
Xenocrates is usually referred to as that person who posited a μία φύσις for mathematical 
objects and Forms. This formula, beyond its immediate meaning, provides crucial 
information about Xenocrates’ metaphysics. Thus, the chapter will aim to: (i) identify and 
explain which objects are at stake when Aristotle speaks of ‘one nature’; (ii) consider what 
kind of relationships these objects entertain to one another. For this reason, both soul and 
principles will be excluded from my analysis here.478  
 
In order to fulfil these aims, the chapter will be divided into five sections. Section 6.1 will 
present Aristotle’s general views of Xenocrates’ metaphysical doctrines, where we learn that 
Xenocrates posited one nature for Forms and τὰ μαθηματικά. Section 6.2 will test the 
formula ‘μία φύσις’ in the broader context of Aristotle’s corpus so to understand what the 
formula implies, and what consequences the formula entails once it is transposed to the 
context of Xenocrates’ metaphysics. Lastly, section 6.3 will deal with Xenocrates’ claim that 
‘parts are prior to the whole’. Through a direct analysis of Form-Numbers and Ideal-
Geometrical objects, the section will show that the claim illuminates directly how Form-
Numbers and Ideal-Geometrical objects are conceived and can be explained through their 
reciprocal relation. By considering the line as the atomic counterpart of the unit in geometry, 
the structural similarities of both will immediately become clear.   
 
478 Soul will be the focus of the Chapter 7. 
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6.1 Aristotelian testimonia of Xenocrates: merging Forms with τὰ μαθηματικά (frr. 
27; 26; 29) 
Let us start with a brief outline of Xenocrates’ metaphysics as we find it in the Aristotelian 
corpus. At the beginning of Metaphysics M, Aristotle, while investigating the possibility of 
the existence of something immutable and eternal beyond sensible substances (πότερόν ἔστι 
τις παρὰ τὰς αἰσθητὰς οὐσίας ἀκίνητος καὶ ἀΐδιος ἢ οὐκ ἔστι),479 provides us with an outline 
of previous positions about the topic: 
 
[FR. 27] Δύο δ᾿ εἰσὶ δόξαι περὶ τούτων· τά τε γὰρ μαθηματικά φασιν οὐσίας εἶναί τινες, 
οἷον ἀριθμοὺς καὶ γραμμὰς καὶ τὰ συγγενῆ τούτοις, καὶ πάλιν τὰς ἰδέας. ἐπεὶ δὲ οἱ μὲν 
δύο ταῦτα γένη ποιοῦσι, τάς τε ἰδέας καὶ τοὺς μαθηματικοὺς ἀριθμούς, οἱ δὲ μίαν φύσιν 
ἀμφοτέρων, ἕτεροι δέ τινες τὰς μαθηματικὰς μόνον οὐσίας εἶναί φασι, σκεπτέον 
πρῶτον μὲν περὶ τῶν μαθηματικῶν, μηδεμίαν προστιθέντας φύσιν ἄλλην αὐτοῖς […].480 
 
There are two views on this subject. Some say that mathematical objects, i.e. numbers 
and lines, and things of the same kind, are substances; and others again that the Forms 
are. Now since some posit these as two classes - the Forms and the mathematical 
numbers - and others posit one nature for both, and yet others hold that mathematical 
objects alone are substances, we must first consider the mathematical objects without 
imputing to them any other characteristic [...].  
 
Although Aristotle is not immediately clear in his account (at first there are two positions, 
and then they seem to be divided into three), scholars have nonetheless agreed on the 
attributions of the positions under examination: 
 
The first distinction is presented as follows: view a) states that mathematical objects are 
substances, while view b) that Forms are. Since this first articulation presents two kinds of 
objects, a second distinction is necessary to explain which classes have been acknowledged 
by previous philosophers, and how. Accordingly:  
 
  1) some people recognise that there are two classes of substances: that of Forms, and 
that of mathematical numbers (and here Aristotle is thinking of Plato);481 
 
479 Linking back the discussion to books Ζ, and ‘forward’ to book Λ of his Metaphysics. On the reasons to take 
the inquiry of book Λ as being announced here, see, Crubellier (1994: 29). 
480 (=Arist., Metaph. M 1, 1076a16-24), transl. H. Tredennick, slightly modified. In Isnardi Parente’s edition, 
only the lines referring to Xenocrates (19-21) appear.  
481 Annas (1976: 136) comments that ‘Aristotle is slightly careless here’, and that ‘in line 20’ (namely, when 
he speaks of Plato), ‘we should understand ‘mathematical objects’ for ‘mathematical number’’. However, I 
agree with Crubellier (1994: 85), who finds a better explanation for the shift in terminology, explaining that, 
on the one hand, the τινές is meant to be more inclusive (and, according to him, it may refer to all the positions 
in the Academy), while, on the other hand, the second formulation (mathematical numbers) is referred to Plato 
only. 
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 2) other people regard both classes as having one nature, and here, the position 
presented is Xenocrates’;  
 3), some other people hold that mathematical substances alone exist: and here, even 
if it is not precisely described, this is Speusippus’ position.482  
 
According to Aristotle’s description, then, Xenocrates’ position can be summarised as 
follows: the philosopher posits one nature for both classes (οἱ δὲ μίαν φύσιν ἀμφοτέρων) of 
substances, i.e. Forms and mathematical objects. Owing to this account, Xenocrates’ 
position is usually described as merging Forms and Numbers in some sort of composite: 
Form-Numbers. Although this summary is certainly justified by another reference to 
Xenocrates in M (Metaph. M 6 26-31), which I will examine shortly, I think it is also 
important to draw the attention to another aspect. While describing the two classes of 
substances, Aristotle speaks generically of τὰ μαθηματικά and then qualifies his statement 
by saying that these do include, for example, numbers, lines, and things of this sort (οἷον 
ἀριθμοὺς καὶ γραμμὰς καὶ τὰ συγγενῆ τούτοις).483 Now, although the example could be 
considered not necessarily significant — as it is common to speak of τὰ μαθηματικά as 
including not only numbers, but also geometrical objects (in this specific case, lines 
minimally) — there are at least two reasons to consider the examples as more suggestive:  
 
1- In the second bifurcation the metaphysicised objects in question change 
according to the people Aristotle refers to. With respect to Plato, although 
Aristotle was initially speaking of mathematical objects in general (τὰ 
μαθηματικά), he specifies that the two classes are represented by Forms (ἰδέαι) 
and mathematical numbers (μαθηματικοὶ ἀριθμοί) — and Aristotle is consistent 
in attributing this position to Plato.484 Accordingly, Aristotle’s use of ἀμφοτέρων 
 
482 As emphasised in Section I, it is not easy to disentangle Aristotle’s information about the Platonists’ 
conception of οὐσία and its inclusivity. I take the lines about Speusippus to mean that, with respect to Forms 
and mathematical objects (presented in the first distinction as the two options), Speusippus would reject that 
the first exist, and will therefore accept only the existence of the second (as οὐσίαι, without implying that being 
an οὐσία is limited to mathematical objects only). In Crubellier’s words (1994: 86): ‘Il faut évidemment 
comprendre que ce seraient les seuls êtres non-sensibles et éternels, et non pas que ce seraient absolument les 
seules réalités existantes’. We should not forget that the focus of the discussion, as stated by Aristotle at the 
beginning of book M, is to inquire ‘whether there is or not some immutable and eternal substance besides 
sensible substances (παρὰ τὰς αἰσθητὰς οὐσίας)’ (Arist., Metaph. M1, 1076a11-12, transl. Tredennick). It is 
interesting to note, also, that Speusippus is referred to as having established the existence of ‘τὰς μαθηματικὰς 
οὐσίας’. If we want to square this information with the list provided by Aristotle in Z2, we may find another 
confirmation of a unitarian conception of the mathematical realm. Indeed, we can consider magnitudes as being 
included here, and, possibly, even soul (if we accept to consider it, to some extent, a mathematical substance). 
483 Crubellier (1994: 86) notes that the τούτοις is referred to γραμμάς. Therefore, the objects here at stake are 
precisely surfaces and solids. 
484 See, e.g. Arist., Metaph. Z2 1028b19-21: ὥσπερ Πλάτων τά τε εἴδη καὶ τὰ μαθηματικὰ δύο οὐσίας, τρίτην 
δὲ τὴν τῶν αἰσθητῶν σωμάτων. 
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in Xenocrates’ presentation could either refer to what is listed in Plato’s position, 
Forms and mathematical numbers, or to the two classes of substances presented 
at the beginning, Forms and mathematical objects (and I am inclined to accept 
this second option as more convincing since, even in the presentation of 
Speusippus’ position, we have again the more general term τὰς μαθηματικὰς 
οὐσίας). 
 
2- The reference to numbers and lines specifically, and not to other geometrical 
objects more generally, could (i) either recall Xenocrates’ theory of Form-
Numbers and of indivisible lines, or (ii) it could confirm that Xenocrates 
considered geometrical objects too in the class of τὰ μαθηματικά. 
 
Moreover, Aristotle’s consistency in describing Xenocrates’ position in this specific 
respect (i.e. speaking of Forms and mathematical objects in general) can be further 
evidenced by two other passages, which I will briefly analyse here. The first one occurs 
at the beginning of Λ, where Aristotle presents the inquiry he will pursue:  
 
[FR. 26] Οὐσίαι δὲ τρεῖς, μία μὲν αἰσθητή—ἧς ἡ μὲν ἀΐδιος ἡ δὲ φθαρτή, ἣν πάντες 
ὁμολογοῦσιν, οἷον τὰ φυτὰ καὶ τὰ ζῷα [ἡ δ᾿ ἀΐδιος]—ἧς ἀνάγκη τὰ στοιχεῖα λαβεῖν, 
εἴτε ἓν εἴτε πολλά· ἄλλη δὲ ἀκίνητος, καὶ ταύτην φασί τινες εἶναι χωριστήν, οἱ μὲν εἰς 
δύο διαιροῦντες, οἱ δὲ εἰς μίαν φύσιν τιθέντες τὰ εἴδη καὶ τὰ μαθηματικά, οἱ δὲ τὰ 
μαθηματικὰ μόνον τούτων. 485 
 
485 = Arist., Metaph. Λ1, 1069a30-35, transl. Tredennick, pp. 123-125 slightly modified. In Isnardi Parente’s 
edition, only lines 33-35 are reported. [FR. 23] IP (=Arist., Metaph. Z2 1028b24-27) provides a third overview 
of Xenocrates’ metaphysics: ἔνιοι δὲ τὰ μὲν εἴδη καὶ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχειν φασὶ φύσιν, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα 
ἐχόμενα, γραμμὰς καὶ ἐπίπεδα, μέχρι πρὸς τὴν τοῦ οὐρανοῦ οὐσίαν καὶ τὰ αἰσθητά ‘some again hold that the 
Forms and the numbers have the same nature, and that other things – lines and planes – follow closely; and 
so on back to the substance of the visible universe and sensible things’ transl. Tredennick slightly modified. 
Here Aristotle establishes that Forms and numbers have the same nature, rather than speaking more broadly of 
‘mathematical objects’ as he does, for instance, with respect to Plato (see n. 484. In this respect, Aristotle’s 
terminology is fluctuating with respect to both authors). And in fact, other objects we would expect to be 
inclusively considered as τὰ μαθηματικά, such as lines and solids, are labelled ‘τὰ ἄλλα’ and said to follow 
closely (or, on a stronger interpretation ‘to be dependent upon’, as in Tredennick’s translation). However, we 
should not forget that, in Z2, Aristotle is listing Xenocrates as part of that group who established the existence 
of substances beyond sensible bodies (i.e. with Plato and Speusippus). And it is not an accident, then, that such 
τὰ ἀλλά follow closely until the οὐσία of the visible universe and sensible things. Accordingly, (ideal) 
geometrical objects such as lines and planes are surely not identical with Form-Numbers, but they are 
nonetheless closer to them than to sensible substances (and this is paralleled by [FR. 26]). One may add that 
neither in [FR. 23] nor elsewhere Aristotle explicitly distinguishes numbers from lines and planes in kind (as 
he does in his list of Speusippus’ οὐσίαι). Indeed, in [FR. 23] we only have a distinction in terms of succession 
(on a weaker account) or dependence (on a stronger account). Accordingly, in trying to characterise what 
specific status geometrical objects are granted with in Xenocrates’ metaphysics, we cannot exclude the 
possibility that they are, too, merged with Forms. Moreover, the terminology employed by Aristotle is various, 
and he sometimes affirms (as observed in [FR. 26] and [FR. 27]) that the class of mathematical objects more 
broadly is merged with Forms. As a matter of fact, the apparent imbalance between different formulations can 
be inverted by considering [FR. 38] (=Arist., Metaph. N3 1090b21-24; 31-2) which will be taken into account 
in the next section. The passage reads: οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ταύτῃ προσγλιχόμενοι ταῖς ἰδέαις τὰ μαθηματικὰ 
διαμαρτάνουσιν. With Cherniss’ words (1971: 85, n.1): ‘προσγλιχόμενοι ταῖς ἰδέαις τὰ μαθηματικά’ here 
means ‘combining’ or ‘identifying’ the ideas and the mathematicals’, my emphasis.  
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There are three kinds of substance. One is sensible (and may be either eternal or 
perishable; the latter, e.g. plants and animals, is universally recognised); of this we must 
apprehend the elements, whether they are one or many. Another is unmoved, which 
certain thinkers hold to exist as separate; some dividing it in two, others placing the 
Forms and the objects of mathematics in one nature, and others (recognising) only 
the objects of mathematics as of this nature. 
 
Once again, we find Aristotle here describing the positions of Plato and his immediate 
successors: concerning the ἀκίνητος οὐσία, Plato and the Academics held different beliefs. 
Some of them, apparently, divided it into classes (here, once again, the description is 
reminiscent of Plato); others placed Forms and mathematical objects in one class (and here 
the reference is to Xenocrates); while others, namely Speusippus, recognised only 
mathematical objects (i.e. they refused the existence of Forms). Aristotle is more explicit 
here than in [FR. 27]. The formulation does seem to substantiate that the combination of the 
two classes concerns Forms and mathematical objects in general, and not numbers only. In 
this respect, one point needs to be clarified: what I am arguing is not that Xenocrates did not 
postulate the existence of Form-Numbers, but, rather, that Aristotelian testimonia are 
somehow consistent in showing that other objects as well, i.e. geometrical objects, have the 
same or a similar status granted to Form-Numbers.  
 
That other objects are granted a similar status to that of Form-Numbers might not be 
obvious from reports such as that we shall consider next. When Aristotle speaks of 
Xenocrates’ Form-Numbers, and represents his view as the most problematic, he usually 
points out at a difficulty that Form-Numbers specifically have: namely, that, according to 
Aristotle, the way they are conceived renders mathematical practices impossible. In this 
specific context, Aristotle does not need to show that Form-Numbers, as well as geometrical 
objects, subvert the rules of mathematical practices; it is enough for him to show only that 
Form-Numbers do. As Form-Numbers provide a better opportunity for Aristotle to criticise 
Xenocrates and show his anti-mathematical approach, in this context he does not need to 
address his criticism to geometrical objects as well. However, the testimony offers another 
parallel between Xenocrates’ treatment of number and his treatment of geometrical objects. 
For Aristotle’s complaint that Xenocrates constructs peculiar hypotheses in order to 
substantiate his views is addressed to geometrical objects too. Moreover, the testimony may 
be useful also in a different respect: if the two kinds of objects are actually comparable, 
features describing one may be used in order to establish Xenocrates’ views on the second. 
 
Accordingly, let us turn to Aristotle’s description of Xenocrates’ Form-Number: 
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[FR. 29] Φανερὸν δ᾿ ἐκ τούτων καὶ ὅτι χείριστα λέγεται ὁ τρίτος τρόπος, τὸ εἶναι τὸν 
αὐτὸν ἀριθμὸν τὸν τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τὸν μαθηματικόν. ἀνάγκη γὰρ εἰς μίαν δόξαν 
συμβαίνειν δύο ἁμαρτίας· οὔτε γὰρ μαθηματικὸν ἀριθμὸν ἐνδέχεται τοῦτον εἶναι τὸν 
τρόπον, ἀλλ᾿ ἰδίας ὑποθέσεις ὑποθέμενον ἀνάγκη μηκύνειν· ὅσα τε τοῖς ὡς εἴδη τὸν 
ἀριθμὸν λέγουσι συμβαίνει, καὶ ταῦτα ἀναγκαῖον λέγειν.486 
 
From these considerations it is also clear that the third alternative—that the number of 
the Forms and mathematical number are the same—is the worst; for two errors have 
to be combined to make one theory. (i.) Mathematical number cannot be in this way, 
but the propounder of this view has to spin it out by making peculiar assumptions; (ii.) 
his theory must admit all the difficulties which confront those who speak of ideal 
number.487 
 
The third alternative mentioned here is Xenocrates’. However, his view described here 
states that ideal number and mathematical number are the same.488 Just as we noticed for 
[FR. 27], also in [FR. 29] we have a clash between two different classes: that of ideal number 
and that of mathematical number. But the result is not a combination: rather, it is the 
conflation of mathematical number within the ideal one. Within this framework, by 
combination I mean a result that bears features of both classes (i.e. the number resulting out 
of a combination of the two classes would be (i) composed by units allowing for 
 
486 = Arist., Metaph. M8, 1083b1-8, transl. H. Tredennick. Isnardi Parente’s edition includes in the section the 
preceding lines 1083a31ff.  
487 Cf. Crubellier’s gloss (1994: 347) on this last sentence, which makes the reading more intelligible: ‘ils 
veulent attribuer au nombre une nature qui permette de soutenir l’affirmation: les idées sont nombre’. In 
general, Aristotle does not say much about the identification of mathematical and ideal number (and Crubellier 
(1994: 286) defines Aristotle’s references to this theory as ‘méprisantes’, comptemptuous), although analogous 
critiques occur in other passages of the Metaphysics (see, e.g. N3 1090b32-a5, and A9 991b27-31), and the 
same criticism returns in M9 1086a5-12 (=fr. 30 IP). Crubellier (1994: 354) concludes that, with respect to this 
doctrine, Aristotle seems to be pitting the arguments of the Academics one against the other. The general sense 
of the argument can be resumed as follows: there are no other principles, except for the One and the Dyad, out 
of which mathematical number could be derived. Accordingly, since the two kinds of number must be derived 
out of the same principles, there cannot be any difference between them. Crubellier (ivi) proposes as a solution 
the possibility that ideal numbers work as principles of mathematical numbers (e.g. the three mathematical 
units are recognisable as ‘three’ with reference to the ideal Triad). In general, if Aristotle is really pitting the 
arguments of different people against one another, we may speculate that Xenocrates either (i) did not postulate 
mathematical number at all or (ii) that, for whatever reason, he did not find his Form-Numbers problematic 
with respect to mathematical operations. This way, the conflation of mathematical and ideal number may be 
the result of Aristotle’s own criticism and may not reflect straightforwardly Xenocrates’ position on the topic. 
In the end, it would be enough for Xenocrates’ to say that Form-Numbers do allow mathematical practices, in 
order for Aristotle to conclude that ideal and mathematical number are the same. A third option (which I am 
inclined to accept) is that Xenocrates, when pressed about where mathematical number would fit in his system, 
or about the impossibility for Form-Numbers to allow for mathematical operations, answered that Form-
Numbers are also mathematical, or that mathematical number is nothing else than Form-Number. 
488 See also fr. 28 IP: ἄλλος δέ τις τὸν πρῶτον ἀριθμὸν τὸν τῶν εἰδῶν ἕνα εἶναι, ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ τὸν μαθηματικὸν 
τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον εἶναι) and 30 IP: οἱ δὲ τὰ εἴδη βουλόμενοι ἅμα καὶ ἀριθμοὺς ποιεῖν, οὐχ ὁρῶντες δέ, εἰ τὰς 
ἀρχάς τις ταύτας θήσεται, πῶς ἔσται ὁ μαθηματικὸς ἀριθμὸς παρὰ τὸν εἰδετικόν, τὸν αὐτὸν εἰδητικὸν καὶ 
μαθηματικὸν ἐποίησαν ἀριθμὸν τῷ λόγῳ ἐπεὶ ἔργῳ γε ἀνῄρεται ὁ μαθηματικός (ἰδίας γὰρ καὶ οὐ 
μαθηματικὰς ὑποθέσεις λέγουσιν). Moreover, the identification between mathematical and ideal number is 
used (in addition to the reference to ‘now’ at 1218a16) in order to identify other Aristotelian passages (as, e.g. 
Fr. 13 IP = Arist., EE I 8, 1218a24-8, as referring to Xenocrates. In the passage Aristotle is criticising a Platonist 
view about the relation between numbers and (the) Good. According to the testimony, Xenocrates held that the 
numbers ‘tend towards’ (ἐφίενται) the one - Aristotle does not give an object for ἐφίενται, but that the meaning 
should be understood as a conation towards something can be understood from the following lines. 
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combinability – as mathematical units do – and (ii) would be characterised as a Form, 
whatever way Xenocrates conceived of a Form); by conflation I mean that that features of 
one of the two classes are absorbed within or ruled over by the features of the second one 
(i.e., as Aristotle appears to complain here: although Form-Numbers are composed by units, 
their units do not allow for combinability, because Form-Numbers are conceived of as 
Forms). Now, Aristotle’s problem, as I shall point out in more detail further on in this 
chapter, is connected to Xenocrates’ conception of Form-Numbers. From a broader 
perspective, Aristotle complains that these two classes cannot be merged together without 
generating contradictions. From a narrower perspective, Aristotle objects that Form-
Numbers are composed by units, just like mathematical number, but their units, differently 
from what is granted by mathematical practices, are not properly combinable with units of 
other Form-Numbers. Accordingly, Aristotle accuses Xenocrates of rendering mathematical 
practices (especially arithmetic) impossible. But the charge of having created peculiar 
hypotheses, which do not accommodate mathematical practices, is not restricted to 
Xenocrates’ Form-Numbers.489 On the contrary, elsewhere490 Aristotle criticises Xenocrates 
on the basis of his geometrical assumptions too: Aristotle complains that for Xenocrates not 
every magnitude is divisible into other magnitudes, just as he complains that not any two 
units compose the Dyad.491 In this respect, Form-Numbers as well as (ideal?) geometrical 
objects do share the same status: for none of them respects the rules of mathematical or 
geometrical practices and both are constructed according to peculiar hypotheses.  
 
One might wonder why I am drawing so much attention to something that, in Aristotle’s 
testimony, may seem trivial. The reason is simple: my aim is to show that Aristotle’s 
testimony gives us ground to suppose the existence of Forms, or, at least, eidetic kinds of 
geometrical objects as well (for the moment we will leave aside the question of whether 
these are somehow identified with Form-Numbers, or whether they are derived from 
them492). I am not, to be sure, completely alone in considering this option.493 Whether 
 
489 Crubellier (1994: 286) notes that the charge of positing peculiar hypotheses can be understood in two ways: 
a) positing hypotheses peculiar to the person who enounces them; b) hypotheses ad hoc, which attribute to the 
objects in question paradoxical properties. The two options are not reciprocally exclusive, as he notes. 
490 See, e.g. fr. 39 IP = Arist., Metaph. M6 1080b23-30. 
491 Ivi. 
492 See footnote 485. 
493 For a positive view, see Robin (1908: 286-293), Cherniss (1945: 484; 1959: 47-48 specifically), Tarán 
(2001: 595) and Dillon (2013: 111-112ff). For a negative view, see Isnardi Parente (1986: 278ff). Most of the 
scholarly debate revolved around the expression ‘τὰ μετὰ τὰς ἰδέας’, employed by Aristotle in Metaph. M6 
1080b24, and about whether these objects are to be found in Plato or not (see, e.g. Ross, 1951; Gaiser 1998 
and Krämer 1971 for a positive answer). The passage reads: ‘The same applies in the case of lines, planes and 
solids. Some distinguish mathematical objects from those which come after the Forms (οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἕτερα τὰ 
μαθηματικὰ καὶ τὰ μετὰ τὰς ἰδέας)’, transl. Tredennick slightly modified. But right after this expression, 
Aristotle turns to those who speak differently (τῶν δ᾽ἄλλως λεγόντων, οἱ μέν […] οἱ δέ’ and lists two positions 
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Platonists postulated the existence of Ideal magnitudes or not, has been object of a very 
lively dispute among scholars, who have concentrated mainly on three Aristotelian passages 
(namely, Metaph. A9 992b 13-18; M 1080b 28ff; N3 1090 b2 ff; A9 992b 13-18) in order 
to establish (i) whether the passages can be considered determinant for attributing such a 
theory to Plato, and (ii) whether they allow us to project any views on Plato’s successors.494 
However, to my knowledge the attribution of a theory of Ideal Geometricals, or of eidetic 
kinds of geometrical objects to Xenocrates, has never been established on the ground of 
Aristotle’s overviews of Xenocrates’ metaphysics.495 But I believe such a possibility should 
be entertained for the following reasons:  
 
a) As we have seen, Aristotle’s terminology is not consistent. Forasmuch as one may 
want to play down this aspect as the result of the different objections raised against 
 
which are easily ascribable to Speusippus and Xenocrates (namely, some, i.e. Speusippus, speak of 
mathematical things in a mathematical way, while others, i.e. Xenocrates, speak of mathematical objects but 
not in a mathematical way). Accordingly, the debate about who to ascribe the position of a distinction between 
mathematical objects and objects which follow after the Forms will not concern our present inquiry. It is 
interesting to note, however, that Isnardi Parente cuts lines 1090b24-31 from [FR. 38], which are precisely the 
lines Cherniss (1945: 484) appeals to in order to show that Xenocrates ‘used the same material principle for 
the ideas (which he identified with numbers) and magnitudes, explaining the difference by different formal 
elements’. Once again, if Form-Numbers and magnitudes share the same material principle, they must have, at 
least, a similar ontological status. 
494 Winzenrieth has done a great job of summarising the main points at stake in the discussion (2018: 70ff), as 
well as of showing that a theory of ‘ideal magnitudes’ as such, cannot be attributed to Plato, but is, contrarily, 
the result of scholarly interpretations of Aristotle’s criticism on the topic. With his words: ‘Loin d’avoir 
commis un contre-sens grossier à propos des doctrines de celui qui fut son maître, Aristote aurait alors 
simplement tiré les conséquences de son refus de tels engendrements mathématisants à partir des principes. 
[...]Les entités géométriques, que Platon entend fonder et définir à partir du nombre, sont ainsi réduites à des 
vestiges à l’identité incertaine, planant au-dessus des lignes, surfaces et figures de la science mathématique’ 
(2018: 89). 
495 Isnardi Parente (1984b: 272-274) acknowledges that Aristotle sometimes refers to mathematical objects 
more broadly. However, she refuses to accept ‘that Xenocrates actually held a theory according to which the 
whole domain of mathematical science is absorbed by the metaphysics of Forms’ (my translation). Although 
she sees a parallel for such a ‘confusion between ideal and mathematical’ in the peripatetic treatise On 
Indivisible Lines, Isnardi Parente believes Geminus’ geometrical account of the indivisible lines’ theory to be 
the only ‘reasonable’ (1984b: 275, n.33). For Geminus (In Eucl. I, 277, 25ff Friedlein) ‘la résolution de l’espace 
en parties ultimes devient possible si l’on réduit ces parties – la ligne, en ce cas – à leur valeur infinitésimale: 
par cette voie on peut parvenir aussi à justifier cette théorie très singuilière qui semble démentir certains 
principes fondamentaux de la science géométrique, telle que la théorie des incommensurables’ (1984: 275). 
However, I do not see why we should prefer Geminus’ interpretation over Aristotle’s and that preserved in the 
Peripatetic On Indivisible Lines on the basis that the domain of Forms is beyond space. Indeed, the assumption 
seems to me to be justified only by appeal to Plato’s Theory of Forms. However, with similar assumptions 
analogous problems would arise with respect to movement, absent by definition in the characterisation of 
mathematical entities. Of course, movement does occur in Xenocrates’ definition of the soul as a ‘self-moving 
number’, although the soul qua number can be included among mathematical objects. For, establishing that 
Forms are beyond space and time, has, in Plato’s account, the aim of separating the realm of Forms from that 
of sensibles, in a continuous status of change. However, such a neat separation is precisely what seems to be 
absent in Xenocrates’ world, which appears to be thought as much more continuous than Plato’s. For this 
reason, I am not convinced that the only possible consideration of spatial extension should be physical. On the 
contrary, I believe Xenocrates establishes at least the formal conditions for spatial extension to arise, in the 
attempt to explain in a more continuous way than Speusippus’ how reality deploys. I do recognise, however, 
that my thesis implies a difficulty, when it comes to a precise identification of what these Ideal-Geometrical 
are precisely or, better, of what geometrical objects are postulated as Ideal. However, in absence of compelling 
evidence, I believe my thesis to be more natural on the basis of Aristotle’s reading.  
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Xenocrates (or other Platonists), the fluctuation between claiming that Xenocrates 
established a μὶα φύσις for Forms and numbers and a μία φύσις for Forms and 
mathematical objects, leaves open the possibility of a conflation of the whole 
mathematical level and Forms.496  
b) The conflation of mathematical and ideal number, I believe, offers one more reason to 
entertain the possibility of eidetic kinds of geometrical objects. If mathematical and 
ideal number are essentially coinciding, on what basis could Xenocrates justify that 
geometrical objects are granted a different status? It would be simpler to suppose that 
geometrical objects are to be granted either the same, or a similar status to that of 
Form-Numbers.497 For otherwise, the ontological hierarchy becomes much more 
difficult to account for. 
c) In support of this hypothesis, a comparison with Speusippus may also be advanced. 
As to Speusippus, Aristotle reports explicitly in [FR. 48] that he had distinguished in 
kind mathematical number and magnitudes, because each kind has its own principles. 
Despite this distinction, however, as highlighted in Chapters 1 to 5, Speusippus 
appears nonetheless to have a unitarian conception of the mathematical realm, 
comprising in itself both numbers and magnitudes. If this is right, we may now wonder 
why Xenocrates should not, given that Aristotle is not as explicit when it comes to 
distinguish them.  
d) Lastly the inclusion of ideal geometrical objects, which I will call Ideal-Geometricals 
(without attaching to the word any qualification, but just to intend that they are some 
 
496 An objection which is usually put forward (see, e.g. Isnardi Parente 1984: 263 and Wizenrieth 2018: 73), 
also with respect to Xenocrates, is that the formulation ‘εἰδητικὸν μέγεθος’ (parallel to εἰδητικὸν ἀριθμόν) is 
never attested. As Isnardi Parente and Wizenrieth underline, the first attestation of the term is by Ps-Alexander 
(In Met. 746, 21: ἕτερα τὰ μαθηματικὰ ἐπίπεδα καῖ στερεὰ καὶ ἕτερα τὰ εἰδετικά), who attests more specifically 
to ideal planes and solids, and not to magnitudes more generally. However, although a technical terminology 
for ‘ideal magnitudes’ is not attested, Aristotle does attest in various places of his corpus the existence of ἄτομα 
μεγέθη. Although in some passages the clear reference for the term is Democritus (e.g. De Caelo 307a 22; 
Metaph. 1039 a10), it is certainly interesting that behind other references commentators identify Xenocrates. 
See, e.g. Phys. A 3,187a 1 ἔνιοι δ᾽ἐνέδοσαν τοῖς λόγοις ἀμφοτέροις, τῶι μὲν ὅτι πάντα ἕν, εἰ τὸ ὂν ἓν σημαίνει, 
ὅτι ἔστι τὸ μὴ ὄν, τῶι δ᾽ἐκ τῆς διχοτομίας, ἄτομα ποιήσαντες μεγέθη. For the unanimous attribution to 
Xenocrates, see Alex. ap. Simpl. In Phys. ad loc., 138,10 (=Fr. 138 IP); Porph. apud Simpl. In Phys. ad loc., 
140,6-18 (=Fr. 139 IP); Themist. In Phys. ad loc., 12,6-17 (=Fr. 140 IP); Philop. In Phys. ad loc., 83,19-22 
(=Fr. 141 IP); Schol. In Arist. Phys. 334a 36ss. Brandis (=Fr. 144 IP); Simpl. In Phys. ad loc.142,16-27 (=fr. 
145 IP). For modern scholars inclined to see Xenocrates behind the Aristotelian allusion to ἔνιοι, see Gemelli 
Marciano (2007: 132-137) and Sedley (2009). In particular, Gemelli Marciano underlines how later 
commentators usually report that Xenocrates’ theories are prompted in response to Zeno’s paradoxes (as the 
author of On Indivisible Lines also does), something which is not the case for Democritus’ atomic theories.  
497 And this is indeed the conclusion of Robin (1908: 298): ‘Rappelons-nous que Xénocrate avait identifié 
l’Idéal et le Mathématique, et que d’autre part il considérait les Grandeurs comme des réalites seconds. […] Il 
admettait donc que les lignes, les surfaces et les solides étaient indivisibles, et il ne l’admettait pas seulement, 
comme son maître, pour l’Idée de la Ligne, de la Surface et du Solide, mais aussi pour la ligne, la surface et le 
solide mathématiques, puisqu’à ses yeux il n’y avait pas lieu de mantenir entre les uns et les autres la distinction 
qu’avait établie Platon. Pour lui, Idéal et Mathématique c’est tout un; les Grandeurs premières, ce sont des 
Grandeurs idéales et mathématiques à la fois’, my emphasis. 
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sort of eidetic objects), serves a second purpose. In the first fragment quoted, Aristotle 
speaks of a μία φύσις that Forms and τὰ μαθηματικά have in common, but he does not 
specify what it means to share ‘one nature’. As we have seen, for numbers this means 
that mathematical number498 has been somehow absorbed in its eidetic counterpart, 
resulting in a specific form of Number, called Form-Number. But as we have also seen, 
the class (γένος) of mathematical objects is more inclusive and should not be limited 
to numbers only.  
 
The natural question to ask, then, is: what status does Xenocrates grant geometrical 
objects? And, as the broad terminology Aristotle uses suggests, can they be taken to be 
merged with Forms as well? In this specific regard, I believe that investigating what Aristotle 
means by the ‘one nature’ of mathematical objects and Forms can be useful in order to gather 
more information. Indeed, if having one nature implies an identity of the objects considered, 
we are somehow left with nothing more than the usual position attributed to Xenocrates with 
respect to Form-Numbers, but the status of geometrical objects will continue to be a mystery. 
But if having one nature, instead, can be more loosely understood, this might lead to more 
interesting results. If, to some extent, in terms of status, both objects could be treated as 
sharing structural similarities, this strategy could prove even more fruitful from an 
interpretive position: if Form-Numbers and their Geometrical counterparts can be treated in 
the same way, conclusions on the first type of objects can offer us answers about the second. 
More simply, if, in Xenocrates’ metaphysics, both Form-Numbers and Ideal-Geometricals 
can be treated somehow in the same way due to their shared features, then, inferences about 
Form-Numbers might be extended to Geometrical-Forms, and vice versa. For inasmuch as 
it could be difficult to define precisely what a Geometrical-Form is, or how it actually works, 
knowing that it shares an eidetic status with Numbers might help us to understand both. 
Accordingly, let us assume this hypothesis to be at work and start by investigating what 
could Aristotle mean by μία φύσις. 
 
6.2 Having one nature 
Passages in which the formula μία φύσις occurs can also be found elsewhere in the 
Aristotelian corpus. Here I will briefly discuss three occurrences,499 all referred to theories 
 
498 If postulated at all.  
499 I excluded two occurrences from the De Caelo (276a 30; 300 a 26), both belonging to broader discussions 
related to natural movement (κατὰ φύσιν κινεῖται) as opposed to coerced (βίᾳ) movement and not relevant for 
our purposes. The same can be said for a passage in book Γ of the Metaphysics (1003b 23), referred to the 
identity of τὸ ὄν and τὸ ἕν, where Platonists are grouped together. I included in my analysis all other 
occurrences.  
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of Pre-Socratic thinkers, whose actual works are better attested than those of Xenocrates. It 
is obviously not my intention to deal with each passage in detail, as this would require a 
different focus for this section, but only to understand what implications the formula has 
when projected onto Xenocrates’ metaphysical doctrine. Accordingly, the first passage 
occurs in the De Anima.  
 
Ἀναξαγόρας δ᾿ ἔοικε μὲν ἕτερον λέγειν ψυχήν τε καὶ νοῦν, […] χρῆται δ᾿ ἀμφοῖν ὡς 
μιᾷ φύσει, πλὴν ἀρχήν γε τὸν νοῦν τίθεται μάλιστα πάντων· μόνον γοῦν φησὶν αὐτὸν 
τῶν ὄντων ἁπλοῦν εἶναι καὶ ἀμιγῆ τε καὶ καθαρόν. ἀποδίδωσι δ᾿ ἄμφω τῇ αὐτῇ ἀρχῇ, 
τό τε γινώσκειν καὶ τὸ κινεῖν, λέγων νοῦν κινῆσαι τὸ πᾶν.500 
 
Anaxagoras indeed seems to regard soul and mind are different, […] but he treats them 
both as of one nature, except that he regards mind as above all things the ultimate 
principle; at any rate, he speaks of it as the only existing thing which is simple, unmixed, 
and pure. But he assigns both the power of knowing and of moving to the same principle 
when he says that mind sets everything moving. 
 
In the passage, Aristotle comments on Anaxagoras’ theory of the mind and the soul. 
Indeed, Aristotle openly states that Anaxagoras did indeed define (lit. say) the mind and the 
soul as two different things but treats them both as one nature.501 What Aristotle appears to 
be complaining is that Anaxagoras did not sufficiently distinguish between the functions 
properly belonging to the soul and those peculiar to the Nous.502 Moreover, even though the 
relationship between the two is unclear even for modern scholars, since Nous is said to be 
alone by itself, and to rule ‘as many things as have souls’,503 we can nonetheless establish 
the priority of one (the Nous) over the other (the soul). Whether they were as such or not in 
Anaxagoras’ doctrine, surely Aristotle identifies a subordination of the soul in comparison 
 
500 Arist., De Anima, 405a 14-20, transl. Hett, modified. 
501 See Lanza (1966: p. 169): ‘È molto chiaro che Aristotele deduce la sua identificazione (viz. of Anaxagoras’ 
νοῦς and ψυχή) e non la trova già espresso in A’. For Lanza, the complaint addressed against Anaxagoras is 
meant to highlight that the latter did not distinguish the final and motive cause’. 
502 See Curd (2007: 146): ‘Anaxagoras has not sufficiently distinguished between soul and Nous, and […] 
attributes to Nous motive powers that more properly belong to soul. On Aristotle’s view, Anaxagoras should 
be more discriminating in his accounts of the powers of Nous and should not conflate the separate and 
fundamentally different powers of thought and sublunary motion’. 
503 See testimony B12 Curd (= Simpl., In Phys. 156.13ff): ‘καὶ ὅσα γε ψυχὴν ἔχει καὶ τὰ μείζω καὶ τὰ ἐλάσσω, 
πάντων νοῦς κρατεῖ. (but also B11 and B14 Curd). Unfortunately, we have no precise information about what 
Anaxagoras thought soul to be, or what its difference with Nous amounts to. Interpreters have proposed various 
accounts for Anaxagoras’ soul and combine fragments differently in order to account for its relationship with 
Nous. One interpretation for Anaxagoras’ soul is that when he ‘claims that νοῦς controls all things that ‘ψυχὴν 
ἔχει’, he does not mean that mind controls a metaphysically distinct entity called a soul, or that it exists ‘in’ 
such an entity. Rather, he just means that it controls all things that ‘possess life’, i.e. different kinds of living 
things that are amongst Anaxagoras’ seeds’, Carter (2019:8, n.25); similarly, also Laks (1999). Differently, 
Lanza (1966: 168) thinks the assimilation of Nous and soul for Anaxagora to be based on the 
‘compartecipazione di tutti gli esseri viventi al νοῦς’. Both accounts, if projected onto Aristotle’s passage, 
would establish an even more radical interpretation of the μία φύσις, now applied to Nous and ensouled things. 
However, whatever Anaxagoras’ historical view about the soul was, I take Aristotle to be speaking of two 
distinct entities: the Nous and the soul.  
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to mind, as he calls the mind the ‘ultimate principle’ (ἀρχήν […] μάλιστα πάντων).504 At the 
same time, though, Aristotle recognises that the two partly share similar features: even 
though mind is the ultimate principle of movement, both mind and soul are principles of 
knowledge and movement (or this seems to be the implication).505 Accordingly, although 
Anaxagoras says they are different, he employs them as of one nature. 
 
From this first comparison we can conclude that: a) sharing the same nature does not 
necessarily imply a shared identity of the objects in question. Or, at least, not in the present 
passage. Two objects can be defined as different, but they can be employed as of one nature. 
And what makes Aristotle comment that two objects are treated as of one nature is precisely 
the common features they share; for this sharing of features does not sufficiently account for 
their distinction. Moreover, the passage also tells us b) that things which share the same 
nature do not necessarily share the same status; for one may be primary over the other. 
Nevertheless, c) the features shared by both can account for their same nature.  
 
In order to test these preliminary conclusions, I want to call attention to a second 
passage, concerned with Empedocles’ treatment of the elements. 
 
ἔτι δὲ τὰ ὡς ἐν ὕλης εἴδει λεγόμενα στοιχεῖα τέτταρα πρῶτος εἶπεν· οὐ μὴν χρῆταί γε 
τέτταρσιν, ἀλλ᾿ ὡς δυσὶν οὖσι μόνοις, πυρὶ μὲν καθ᾿ αὑτό, τοῖς δ᾿ ἀντικειμένοις ὡς μιᾷ 
φύσει, γῇ τε καὶ ἀέρι καὶ ὕδατι.506 
 
Further, he was the first to maintain that the so-called material elements are four - not 
that he treats them as four, but as two only, treating fire on the one hand by itself, and 
the elements opposed to it - earth, air, and water- on the other, as one nature. 
 
In the passage, Aristotle comments on Empedocles’ treatment of the elements; although 
Empedocles posited four elements, he treats fire as distinct and opposed to air, water and 
earth, which feature one nature. One may note here that Aristotle appears to employ the same 
framework he made use of with respect to Anaxagoras: namely, he points out that items in 
the philosophical systems he is examining (viz., the elements for Empedocles, soul and Nous 
for Anaxagoras) have been formally distinguished by the philosophers, but that the similar 
way they are employed by them in their systems does not account sufficiently for their 
distinction. An analogous criticism recurs in the De Generatione et Corruptione where 
 
504 Lanza (1966: 170): ‘ciò che distingue il νοῦς dalla ψυχή è tuttavia quello che Aristotele definisce il suo 
carattere di ἀρχή, inteso qui in senso piuttosto logico che temporale’. 
505 So understands Carter (2019: 9): ‘Aristotle’s idea is that, despite Anaxagoras’s suggestions that mind and 
soul are distinct, nevertheless, he seems to ascribe to both of them the same nature, namely, the power to 
produce cognition and motion’. 
506 Arist., Metaph. A4, 985a31-985b2, transl. Tredennick. 
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Aristotle reiterates the claim that Empedocles set all other elements in opposition to fire, 
ultimately reducing the elements to two.507 It is hard to tell what Aristotle is precisely 
pointing at, since Aristotle concludes that one would be able to detect this tendency from 
Empedocles’ own verses.508 But elements, in Empedocles’ verses, appear to be described as 
all having the same status.509 What is important for our purposes, however, is that three 
different elements are, in Aristotle’s eyes, treated as one nature, while fire isn’t. Once again, 
the equation is established between objects which do differ one from the other (this time 
three very different objects!) but play somehow the same role within a philosopher’s 
doctrine.510  
 
In this respect, the evidence confirms a) that the formula μία φύσις implies no shared 
identity of the objects in question. Furthermore, the different treatment of fire (as opposed 
to the three other elements) tells us b) that one class can even comprise further subdivisions 
in itself. For we can consider as a higher class that of the elements, comprising all four of 
them; and then a further subdivision into two classes, one featuring fire, and the other the 
three other elements. Otherwise, if we are not ready to consider the elements as a whole as 
one nature (because Aristotle is not explicit about this) we can still consider the one nature 
of earth, water and air, as having further subdivisions. Indeed, it is clear that although they 
have similar functions, these elements are certainly not the same thing. To conclude, the 
passage confirms that the formula does not imply shared identity of the object in question, 
but it only accounts for features the objects share, notwithstanding their differences. 
 
Lastly, in the third passage Aristotle has the atomists as a target: 
 
Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἄτοπον καὶ εἰ μηθὲν ὑπάρχει ἀλλ’ ἢ μόνον σχῆμα, καὶ εἰ ὑπάρχει, ἓν δὲ μόνον, 
οἷον τὸ μὲν ψυχρὸν511 τὸ δὲ θερμόν·οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν μία τις εἴη ἡ φύσις αὐτῶν. […] ἔτι δὲ 
 
507 Fr. A36 Inwood (= De gen. et corr. 330b19-21): ‘Some say right away that they are four, such as 
Empedocles. But even he reduces these to two; for he sets all the others in opposition to fire (ἔνιοι δ᾽εὐθὺς 
τέτταρα λέγουσιν, οἷον Ἐμπεδοκλῆς· συνάγει δὲ καὶ οὗτος εἰς τὰ δύο, τῷ γὰρ πυρὶ τἆλλα πάντα ἀντιτίθησιν), 
translation Inwood. 
508 Tredennick points at fr. 67 Inwood as an example, where fire is given a prominent role in the development 
of human bodies. 
509 See Lloyd (1966: 217) who refers to fr. 25 Inwood: ‘For these things are all equal and of like age in their 
birth, but each rules over a different prerogative and each has its own character and they dominate in turn as 
time circles around’ (ταῦτα γὰρ ἶσά τε πάντα καὶ ἥλικα γένναν ἔασι / τιμῆς δ᾽ἄλλης ἄλλο μέδει, πάρα δ᾽ἦθος 
ἑκάστῳ / ἐν δὲ μέρει κρατέουσι περιπλομένοιο χρόνοιο), transl. Inwood.  
510 Philoponus, while commenting Aristotle’s De gen. et corr. 330b19-21, reports that the reason for fire to be 
divided from the other elements is because it is the only hot element, while others are to be considered cold. 
511 On the word ψυχρόν, and on why it should (or should not) be preferred to the word σχληρόν, preserved in 
the manuscripts of the a-family, there is a significant scholarly debate. The discussion is related to the reasons 
for the qualities to be appealed to by Aristotle: in the case of σχληρόν, Aristotle would make use of two 
qualities, hot and hard, accepted by the atomists; in the case of ψυχρόν, Aristotle would rather refer to opposite 
qualities which, on the basis of their opposition, belong to the same scale. Indeed, σχληρόν is preferred by 
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πότερον μία πάντων ἡ φύσις ἐκείνων τῶν στερεῶν, ἢ διαφέρει θάτερα τῶν ἑτέρων, 
ὥπσερ ἂν εἰ τὰ μὲν εἴη πύρινα, τὰ δὲ γήινα τὸν ὄγκον; εἰ μὲν γὰρ μία φύσις ἐστὶν 
ἁπάντων, τί τὸ χωρίσαν; ἢ διὰ τί οὐ γίνεται ἁψάμενα ἕν, ὥσπερ ὕδωρ ὕδατος ὅταν 
θίγῃ.512 
 
But further, not only is it absurd that no property except figure should belong to the 
indivisibles: it is also absurd that, if other properties do belong to them, one only of 
these additional properties should attach to each - e.g. that this indivisible should be 
cold and that indivisible hot. For, on that supposition, their nature would not even be 
one. […] Furthermore, is the nature of all these solids one for all of them, or do they 
differ from one another, as if, for example, some of them were fiery and others earthy 
in their bulk? For if there is one nature for all, what is it that separates one from 
another? Or why do they not become one when they come into contact, just as water 
does when it touches water?  
 
This last passage differs in many respects from the previous two. First of all, in this 
context, it is the atomists who claim one and the same nature for atoms, an aspect which 
Aristotle is not ready to concede easily. Second, in the passage Aristotle focuses precisely 
on qualitative aspects of the atoms in order to deny their sameness in nature (or, if their 
nature differs, in order to draw out other contradictions). For this reason, given that Aristotle 
is arguing against the atomists and attempting to demonstrate that atoms cannot share one 
nature, the passage might require a certain amount of interpretative effort. For, as Aristotle 
does not want to concede the point to his antagonists, his position on the topic may be more 
rigid than observed in the previous passages. However, this should not lead us to deny the 
results just obtained. Indeed, the first sentences do provide us with more information. 
Aristotle claims that it is absurd that, for the atomists, no property except figure (σχῆμα) 
belongs to the atoms. Moreover, he claims that it would also be absurd that, in the case where 
other properties would belong to atoms, only one property should belong to each. It is on 
this basis that he concludes that their nature would not even be one. Accordingly, the initial 
part of the passage already provides us with crucial information:  
 
a) The atomists’ claim that atoms are of ‘one nature’ seems to be grounded on the fact 
that atoms are indivisible but differentiated between one another according to their 
figure only.513 If this were the case, this would imply once more (i) that ‘one nature’ 
does not imply identity, and (ii) that it does not imply identity to a higher extent. 
 
Giardina (2008: 166-167, n. 346), Rashed (2005: 144, n.1) and Migliori (2013, 286-287, n. 46), while Joachim 
and Hussey (2004: 264) favour ψυχρόν. For the sake of my argument, which qualities are here implied by 
Aristotle is not crucial. Accordingly, my choice to leave ψυχρόν is related to the translation used (Joachim), 
and to the textual choices of the translator. 
512 Arist., De gen. et corr., I8, 326a14-17; 29-34, transl. Joachim, slightly modified. 
513 With this comment, I do not mean to enter into a historical discussion of what the atomists’ philosophical 
tenets were. On the contrary, my only intention here it to attempt an understanding of Aristotle’s passage with 
the purpose of exposing Aristotle’s conception of ‘one nature’ with respect to the atomists. 
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Indeed, figure would be the feature which prevents atoms from being one and the 
same thing.  
 
b) For Aristotle, having the same nature implies sharing the same properties. For, if 
atoms were granted with different properties, this would prevent them from having 
the same nature.  
 
The second part of the passage requires more unpacking, specifically because in the 
subsequent lines it seems that for Aristotle, at least in this context, having one nature 
necessarily implies the identity of the objects in question. For Aristotle’s implication seems 
to be the following: either atoms differ in nature, and therefore they are qualitatively different 
(e.g. some of them are earthy, others fiery in their bulk); or if they are of one nature, they 
are therefore qualitatively indifferent. Moreover, as the example used shows, if they are 
qualitatively indifferent, there is nothing which satisfies the conditions for their separation; 
for, as a drop of water which falls in water, they should somehow dissolve once they come 
into contact. Now, I believe that, in this context, the rigid implication of identity is 
contingently required by Aristotle’s argument and is not conclusive simpliciter. The 
requirement for the differentiation in nature Aristotle appeals to in this passage (i.e. that 
atoms would differ according to their being earthy or fiery in their bulks) is precisely what 
is denied in the passage about Empedocles. For, in the Empedocles passage, the qualitative 
difference between the elements is not a sufficient condition for them not to have one nature, 
or, better, to be treated as having one nature. On the contrary, in the present passage Aristotle 
plays precisely on a rigid conception of ‘one nature’ in order to show that atoms have not 
been differentiated by the atomists satisfactorily, and hold a middle status in between having 
one nature and being differentiated by the qualities they hold.  
 
What we can gather from this overview of Aristotle’s discussion of previous philosophers 
is certainly not conclusive. Nevertheless, it still works as a warning against possible 
prejudices that might lead us to think that having one nature necessarily implies being the 
same thing. On the contrary, the overview of Aristotle’s comment on Presocratic doctrines 
shows precisely the opposite. Having one nature or being treated as one nature does not 
imply necessarily a) that the objects in question are identical, nor b) that the objects under 
examination are granted with the same ontological status. These conclusions, however 
provisional as they may be, have important implications for my present investigation of 
Xenocrates’ metaphysical theory. For the sake of clarity, I will now briefly summarise what 
has been said until now, so as to understand the implications fully.  
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Aristotle presents Xenocrates as having treated Forms and τὰ μαθηματικά as one nature, 
or, as having held that Forms and τὰ μαθηματικά are merged into one nature. We have seen 
that there is some consistency in Aristotelian overviews of the Platonists’ positions and, in 
particular, on Xenocrates’: it is usually τὰ μαθηματικά and not numbers exclusively which 
are considered as having one nature with the Forms.  
 
With this in mind, possible conclusions unfold concerning Xenocrates’ metaphysical 
system:  
 
1) A first option to be excluded is to consider mathematical objects (in general) and 
Forms as sharing similar features, but not being coincident (namely, two different 
objects sharing the same features). This first path needs to be rejected on the basis of 
the extant Aristotelian evidence about Xenocrates. As we have seen, Aristotle’s harsh 
criticism of a peculiar form of Ideal Number supports the hypothesis of a combination 
of Forms and mathematical objects, rather than of their disjunction. At the same time, 
though, the equal treatment of τὰ μαθηματικά would imply that geometrical objects 
should be combined with Forms too.  
 
2) A second option would be to consider Ideal-Geometricals and Form-Numbers as 
somehow coinciding in one single body, which share features of the Forms. 
Nevertheless, the overview of Aristotle’s passages on Presocratic theories showed that 
the identity option is not necessarily the case, but that, on the contrary, within the 
passages examined, identity is not implied if not by a rigid conception of the formula 
μία φύσις.  
 
Accordingly, the most plausible option we are left with is the following:  
 
3) Form-Numbers and Ideal-Geometricals are not merged together, even though they 
are somehow related (whether this relation should be conceived in terms of derivation 
or not is something I will leave on hold for the moment). On the same basis on which I 
previously excluded option 1), namely that the equal treatment of τὰ μαθηματικά would 
imply that geometrical objects as well share the nature of Forms, in this case Ideal-
Geometricals and Form-Numbers would share some similar features, at least in their 
formal treatment. Since I don’t have strong reasons to refute option 2) at this stage, I 
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will assume option 3) as a working hypothesis, to be further tested on the basis of my 
final results.  
 
At this point, one further clarification is required. Until now, I have concluded very 
generally that objects sharing a μία φύσις share similar features or characteristics. However, 
at this stage, it is legitimate to push this conclusion a bit further. In the overview of the 
formula μία φύσις, I have shown that the formula only accounts for similar features shared 
by different objects without implying their identity. It is clear, though, that when speaking 
of mathematical and geometrical objects, these similarities cannot be qualitative. Indeed, 
this is coherent with Aristotle’s passages analysed so far because, both in Anaxagoras’ and 
Empedocles’ examples, what justifies Aristotle’s statement that the objects share one nature 
is the similar role they play within their system and not their qualitative similarities. 
Moreover, this seems to be further confirmed by the passage against the atomists, which also 
supports the same conclusion. The main reason for Aristotle’s rigid conception of μία φύσις 
in the passage is motivated precisely by the fact that if two objects shared the same qualities, 
they would not be distinguished (or distinguishable), just as a drop of water dissolves when 
it gets in contact with other water. In the same way, earth, water and air, just as the soul and 
the mind, cannot be simply considered as qualitatively similar as, for Aristotle, they would 
otherwise be just the same thing. Accordingly, the similarity between mathematical and 
geometrical objects within Xenocrates’ metaphysical system must be understood as a 
structural similarity, an aspect which stands in need of clarification. 
 
6.2.1 Interpretative clarifications (fr. 38) 
In the previous section, I established that, on the basis of Aristotelian testimonia, Form-
Numbers and Ideal-Geometrical objects must share similar structural features. I also 
assumed as a working hypothesis that the two entertain some kind of relationship. Before 
analysing a claim that is attributed to Xenocrates both in a preserved Arabic translation of a 
text of Alexander of Aphrodisias and in the pseudo-Aristotelian treatise On Indivisible Lines, 
which could shed light on the precise similarities that Form-Numbers and Ideal-
Geometricals do entertain, this section will serve as a preliminary clarification. Although I 
established that there are structural similarities between Form-Numbers and Ideal-
Geometrical objects, there still remains the question concerning the precise referents of these 
similarities. In order to shed light on the issue, this section is meant as a clarification with 
the aim to establish limits for my analysis and avoid possible misunderstanding. Indeed, at 
this stage of my analysis some questions need to be addressed.  
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a) Is it possible to establish precisely what Ideal-Geometricals are? Or, in other words, 
what kind of geometrical objects allow an eidetic consideration, and in what respect 
they differ from mere geometrical objects? 
b) What is the relation that Ideal-Geometricals entertain with Form-Numbers? Are they 
to be regarded as derived from these latter? 
c) How should we understand the comparability between Form-Numbers and Ideal-
Geometricals? Which of them, precisely, is to be compared with what? 
 
Let us address the three questions in order. To address question a) first, it is hard to 
establish precisely what kind of geometrical magnitudes are eidetically conceived within 
Xenocrates’ system. As a matter of fact, the problem is the same we face with reference to 
Form-Numbers; for Aristotle states that mathematical number is the same as Form-Number 
and, in this respect, it is not easy to establish precisely how mathematical objects strictu 
sensu were accounted for in Xenocrates’ world. Accordingly, we need to be cautious with 
respect to precise identifications. However, as we concluded that the two kind of objects are 
to be considered structurally similar, we can try to provide at least a suggestion with regard 
to how they operate and to their limitations. Indeed, in some passages, Aristotle points out 
that Xenocrates postulated a limited amount of Form-Numbers, which would end with the 
Decad.514 I agree with what Crubellier515 says about this aspect in his commentary: it is hard 
to understand the limitation by concluding that Xenocrates posited numbers up to ten only; 
more convincingly, the limitation should be probably understood as confined to Form-
Numbers.516 If we can consider this restriction to be extended to geometrical magnitudes as 
well,517 we can suppose that we should think of the first 10 items (or, better, of the first 4, as 
 
514 See, fr. 47 IP. Another relevant passage is Arist., Metaph., Λ8 1073a18-22, which is not included in the 
collection of Xenocrates’ fragments, but I believe may be helpful for clarifying the issue at stake. I give here 
Crubellier’s translation (1994: 299): ‘Les partisans des idées disent que les idées sont nombres; mais ils parlent 
des nombres tantôt comme s’ils étaient infinis, tantôt comme s’ils se limitaient à dix – quant à la cause qui 
déterminerait cette limitation des nombres, ils n’en disent rien qui soit logiquement solide’. 
515 Crubellier (1994: 299-300). 
516 A possible explanation for numbers other than the first 10 may be to consider the ‘production’ of other 
numbers by means of participation. Indeed, this would possibly explain Aristotle’s assertion that Xenocrates 
confused mathematical number and Form-Number, with the result that the first is absorbed in the latter. Indeed, 
if the existence of mathematical number is explained by means of participation, the reproach would possibly 
make more sense: mathematical number, to a certain extent, would not exist in its own sake, and, obviously, 
would not possess the same ontological status of Form-Number (being somehow derived and dependent on it).  
517 As fr. 25 IP (=Arist., Metaph. M8 1084a37-1084b2) appears to confirm: Ἔτι τὰ μεγέθη καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα 
μέχρι ποσοῦ, οἷον ἡ πρώτη γραμμὴ <ἡ> ἄτομος, εἶτα δυάς, εἶτα καὶ ταῦτα μέχρι δεκάδος; ‘Further, magnitudes 
and the like extend, they say, as far as a certain quantity; e.g. the first (or) indivisible line, then the two, and so 
on; these, too extend as far as 10’, transl. Ross (1924b: 451) modified. For the addition of <ἡ>, see Ross (1924b, 
ad loc.). The interpretation of the passage is quite difficult. Isnardi Parente (2012: 277) follows Ross in the 
translation, and supplies the article: ἡ. But, as Crubellier highlights (1994: 316) the fragment would therefore 
identify a heterogeneous list of terms (i.e. the first line, the Dyad, things up to 10). Despite disagreeing on the 
Greek, both Isnardi Parente and Crubellier interpret the second item as the ‘geometrical line’. As it will be 
clearer in the following sections of this chapter, I disagree with the identification for different reasons. In 
general, I don’t see how geometrical magnitudes can be limited to ten if the second item is to be identified with 
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it happens for the Decad)518 as laying the conditions for or, at least, allowing the construction 
of every other geometrical magnitude.519  
 
In the case of the second question b), concerning the relationship between Ideal-
Geometrical and Form-Numbers, information at our disposal is also limited. However, 
Aristotle seems to suggest at a derivation of Ideal-Geometricals out of Form-Numbers:  
 
[FR. 38] τοῖς δὲ τὰς ἰδέας τιθεμένοις τοῦτο μὲν ἐκφεύγει·520 ποιοῦσι γὰρ τὰ μεγέθη ἐκ 
τῆς ὕλης καὶ ἀριθμοῦ, ἐκ μὲν τῆς δυάδος τὰ μήκη, ἐκ τριάδος δ᾿ ἴσως τὰ ἐπίπεδα, ἐκ δὲ 
τῆς τετράδος τὰ στερεὰ ἢ καὶ ἐξ ἄλλων ἀριθμῶν· [διαφέρει γὰρ οὐθέν· ἀλλὰ ταῦτά γε 
πότερον ἰδέαι ἔσονται, ἢ τίς ὁ τρόπος αὐτῶν, καὶ τί συμβάλλονται τοῖς οὖσιν; οὐθὲν 
γάρ, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὰ μαθηματικά, οὐδὲ ταῦτα συμβάλλεται. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ᾿ ὑπάρχει γε 
κατ᾿ αὐτῶν οὐθὲν θεώρημα, ἐὰν μή τις βούληται κινεῖν τὰ μαθηματικὰ καὶ ποιεῖν ἰδίας 
τινὰς δόξας. ἔστι δ᾿οὐ χαλεπὸν ὁποιασοῦν ὑποθέσεις λαμβάνοντας μακροποιεῖν καὶ 
συνείρειν.] Οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ταύτῃ προσγλιχόμενοι ταῖς ἰδέαις τὰ μαθηματικὰ 
διαμαρτάνουσιν·521 
 
Those who posit the Forms do not realise this (difficulty). For they produce magnitudes 
out of matter and number – lengths from 2, planes from 3, presumably, and solids from  
4; or from other numbers, for it makes no difference. But are these (viz. lengths, planes 
and solids) going to be Forms? And if not, what is their mode of existence and in what 
do they contribute to the things that are? Just as the mathematical (lengths, planes and 
solids) contribute nothing, neither these do. Moreover, no theorem applies to them, 
unless one wants to put mathematical objects into motion and produce some peculiar 
doctrines. But it is not difficult to spin out at length whatever hypotheses are assumed, 
 
the geometrical (and therefore divisible) line. Indeed, this would open the path for the production of 
geometrical magnitudes in general and would not constitute a reason to limit their number. Moreover, as it will 
be clarified in the following pages, I disagree with an interpretation which roots the correspondence between 
the Dyad and the line in a conception of the line as composed or limited by points (as Crubellier does), and I 
believe the parallel to rest on different factors (specifically, the individuation of the three dimensions). 
However, what I believe is valuable in Crubellier’s interpretation of the passage is that the second term is 
considered as an ‘equivalent’ of the Dyad. In fact, Crubellier adds that: ‘certains Platoniciens font du Deux le 
principe générateur des lignes; et de même le Trois pour les surfaces, le Quatre pour les volumes’. 
518 As it happens with the tetractys, where the first four numbers – which, once summed up, make 10 as a result 
–, represented as a pebble figure, compose a pyramid. As Zhmud points out (2012: 302-303; 2015: 342ff), the 
tetractys, called by Burkert (1972: 72) the ‘Pythagorean kernel’, cannot be traced back to ancient 
Pythagoreanism. The first attestation for the word τετρακτύς is in fact late (Aët., Vetusta placita, I.3.8) and 
Aristotle bears no witness to it. However, a similar interpretation of the Decad is attested in verbatim fragment 
preserved by ps-Iamblichus’ Theologoumena Arithmeticae (61ff = fr. 122 IP) and, with Zhmud (2015: 342), 
the tetractys may thus have arisen ‘from the tetrad extolled by Speusippus in his work On Pythagorean 
Numbers’. 
519 I will abstain from arithmological consideration of what the parallels should be (although I believe 
arithmological parallels to lie behind the comparison), because it is hard to establish conclusive criteria for 
their postulation.  
520 For the unusual construction of φεύγειν and its compounds + the dative to describe the object or person who 
escapes, see Crubellier (1994: 498-499). Accordingly, Crubellier suggests nuancing Ross’ (1924b: 47), 
Tricot’s (1953: 819) and Annas’ translations (‘escape this objection’; ‘échappent assurément à cette objection’, 
‘this objection does not touch the people who posit Forms’). He interprets the dative as a ‘datif de point de 
vue’ and translates the line as: ‘ils n’ont pas conscience de ce < problème >‘. My translation follows this 
analysis. 
521 = Arist., Metaph. N3, 1090b 21-32 (lines 25-30 are excluded in IP), my translation. Cf. Crubellier (1994: 
497): ‘Et de fait, aux lignes 24-25, Aristote envisage une alternative entre une doctrine qui attribuerait aux 
objets géométriques le statut d’idées, et une autre possibilité qu’il laisse indéterminée (ἢ τίς ὁ τρόπος αὐτῶν b 
24) – place vide qui conviendrait tout à fait à Platon’. Accordingly, the other theory, which attributes to 
geometrical objects the status of Forms, seems to be ascribable to Xenocrates. 
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and string them together. These thinkers, then, are quite wrong in attaching 
mathematical objects to the Forms. 
 
At least two things are to be highlighted about the passage: first of all, Aristotle speaks 
of the production of τὰ μήκη, lengths, out of the Dyad, and he does not speak of lines.522 
Indeed, the succession which is stressed by Aristotle is that of lengths, planes and solids (all 
in the plural), and there is no mention of the line here. Secondly, it is interesting to note that 
Aristotle, in the following lines, explicitly questions the ontological status of these 
geometrical objects. If it may be hasty to take the sentence as a confirmation that such objects 
should be considered as Ideal-Geometricals,523 as we suggested in section 6.2, it is at least 
interesting to note that Aristotle says no mathematical theorem applies to them. As we have 
seen, Aristotle often underscores the fictionality of Xenocrates’ Form-Numbers by stressing 
that they conflict with the rules of mathematics.  
 
6.2.2 What is the comparability between? 
Given this background, it is now time to investigate question c), namely, how precisely 
the comparability between Form-Numbers and Ideal-Geometricals should be understood. In 
order to determine this, I will build on the results of a famous paper by Pines,524 where an 
Arabic fragment concerning Xenocrates’ metaphysics was translated and presented for the 
first time. Due to my diverse methodological principles, it will be impossible to evaluate 
Pines’ views conclusively here. In fact, in order to defend the authenticity of the information 
preserved in the fragment, Pines tests Xenocrates’ claim against a wide range of diverse 
sources and divides the discussion into thematic areas comprising (among others): 
metaphysics, mathematical theories, and physics. Moreover, the selection of the sources 
relies on entirely different premises than mine as, on the one hand, many fragments quoted 
by Pines (although Aristotelian) deal with theories which are difficult to attribute to 
Xenocrates directly, and mostly address Plato and the Academics as a group; on the other 
hand, Pines’ inclusion of later sources (e.g. Proclus) and commentators of Aristotle (e.g. 
Themisthius, Simplicius and Aquinas) clearly conflicts with my choice to concentrate on 
Aristotle alone. For these reasons, I will limit myself to consideration of the section dealing 
with Xenocrates’ mathematical theories only. Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that, 
despite the methodological departures, Pines’ conclusions wholly converge with my current 
 
522 The same happens in fr. 39 IP. 
523 As Crubellier (1994: 499) does too: ‘Ce ne sont donc pas des idées, mais ce sont quand même des entités 
idéales’. Both Crubellier and Cherniss (1945: 484) underline the parallel with another passage in Metaphysics 
A9 (992a 13-18), where Aristotle, in order to show the ambiguity of their status, established a fourth genus 
(besides those of the Forms, of the intermediates and of the sensibles). 
524 Pines (1961). 
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hypothesis: ‘As can be seen from the passage of Themistius (...) and as is suggested also by 
other sources, there is a close correspondence between the geometrical entities and the 
numbers. It may be assumed that both have a similar structure’.525 It is on the basis of this 
assumption, that Pines makes the ‘requisite transposition’ and tries to analyse these structural 
similarities between Form-Numbers and Ideal-Geometricals. He assumes that the similarity 
should be understood as follows: 
 
The two units of which the number two is composed, correspond to the two points which 
constitute a line, and consequently are eidē, in accordance with Themistius’ text, also 
the constituent parts of the other numbers (p. 16) [...]. The three units of which the triad 
consists do not correspond to the points of which the line consists, but to the three sides 
of a triangle; and the four units of which a tetrad consists correspond to the four triangles 
of a pyramid (p. 17)’.526  
 
As Pines himself underscores, Xenocrates’ theory of the incomparability of units in the 
Dyad, Triad and Tetrad has always been considered strange. Indeed, as I have already 
emphasised, this precise aspect of Xenocrates’ Form-Numbers drew the criticism of 
Aristotle, who accused him of having rendered mathematical practices impossible.527 For, 
according to Aristotle, the ‘conflation’ of mathematical number in Form-Number was in 
reality its destruction: as the units of the Dyad are not combinable with those of the Triad or 
of the Tetrad, the basic operations of mathematics are denied. This leads Pines to explain the 
incomparability of the units of the Dyad with those of the Triad on the basis of a difference 
of eidos. Just as one would not compare points with lines, the same would hold good for the 
units of the Dyad and the Triad. It is on the same basis that Pines establishes the comparable 
items. For those items are not homogeneous, just as much as, according to a difference in 
eidos, units in the Dyad, Triad, etc. aren’t. However, the way in which points, sides (and 
therefore lines) and triangles are not homogeneous to one another does not seem to me to 
correspond to the way in which units of the Dyad, Triad, etc. are not homogeneous. For, 
despite the incomparability of their units, all form numbers can be ultimately reduced to the 
same principle of composition: each of them is, indeed, a compound of (inaddible or 
incomparable) units. And insofar as all Form-Numbers respond to this definition,528 they can 
also fall under one and the same class: that of Form-Numbers.529 This, however, does not 
 
525 Pines (1961: 16-17). 
526 (Ibid., 17) 
527 See e.g. frr. 29; 30 (but also 38) IP, where Aristotle accuses Xenocrates of having posited ἰδίαι ὐποθέσεις.  
528 I am using ‘definition’ loosely here: I mean that all of them seem to be describable in one and the same 
way. 
529 Cf. Crubellier’s (1994: 336) reading of Aristotle’s main question at 1084b32-1085a4 (1994: 336): ‘La 
difficulté, telle qu’il l’expose, est liée à la notion de dimension : les dimensions sont conceptuellement 
distinctes l’une de l’autre ; en effet l’introduction d’une nouvelle dimension produit un type d’objet hétérogène, 
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seem to happen in the case of Ideal-Geometricals. For how can points, lines, planes and solid 
belong to one and the same class if they cannot be reduced, in the same way Form-Numbers 
can, to a basic principle for their organisation? A way to solve this problem may be found 
by appealing to [FR. 38] analysed above, and ground the diversity in eidos between points, 
lines, planes and solids, in the specific Form-Number they are derived out of. However, in 
the text Aristotle appears to be speaking of one and the same matter, out of which magnitudes 
are derived. And, at least in this respect, points, lines, planes and solids must be reducible to 
a common root, insofar as all of them are derived from the same matter.530  
 
For in the case of the Dyad, of the Triad and of other Form-Numbers, the unit appears to 
play the role of an atomic constituent. Thus, units composing different Form-Numbers may 
be different in kind, and may not be addible to one another,531 but for each Form-Number, it 
is always a unit which constitutes the atomic minimum for the compounds. Insofar as units 
constitute the atomic minimum, the homogeneity of the compounds is guaranteed: they will 
always be Form-Numbers. However, if we consider points, lines and planes, compounds do 
not seem to originate in the same way at all. In fact, although Pines’ correspondence is 
understandable on the basis of the transition line-plane-solid, I don’t think that there are 
elements enough to support the parallels. For this reason, I believe the analogy needs to be 
corrected, before approaching any analysis of the similarity of Form-Numbers and Ideal-
Geometricals. Indeed, the first problem arises with regard to the comparison Dyad-line. For 
even though the equation of the two units in the Dyad with the two points of the line is 
certainly suggestive, as it respects the correspondence of two units-two points, it is the case 
that while the composition of solids out of planes and of planes out of lines is well attested,532 
nowhere in the fragments can we find any reference which justifies either the composition 
of the line out of points, nor yet the conception of two points as limits of the line.533  
 
sans commune mesure avec les objets de dimension (n - 1). Mais en même temps l’espace est un et continu. 
Comment rendre raison à la fois de l’unité de l’espace et de la distinction nécessaire des trois dimensions?’. 
530 One may also note that matter is usually associated by Aristotle with the Dyad, when he considers the 
principles (see, e.g. Metaph. M5 1087b12-26). While the Dyad, as well as other Form-numbers, here appears 
to play the role of a formal principle. 
531 Although the inaddibility of units may also be dependent on the type of compound they accomplish. 
532 See, frr. 23; 25 IP but mostly frr. 38 and 39.  
533 The only fragment preserved which, if extrapolated from the context, might raise doubts in this respect is 
fr. 45 IP (Arist., De Caelo III,1, 299a6-11). Indeed, the fragment states that: ‘In addition, the composition of 
solids from planes clearly involves, by the same reasoning, the composition of planes from lines and lines from 
points (a view according to which a part of a line need not be a line); and this is something which we have already 
considered in the work on motion, where we concluded that there are no indivisible lines’ (ἔπειτα δῆλον ὅτι τοῦ 
αὐτοῦ λόγου ἐστὶ στερεὰ μὲν ἐξ ἐπιπέδων συγκεῖσθαι, ἐπίπεδα δ᾿ ἐκ γραμμῶν, ταύτας δ᾿ ἐκ στιγμῶν· οὕτω δ᾿ 
ἐχόντων οὐκ ἀνάγκη τὸ τῆς γραμμῆς μέρος γραμμὴν εἶναι· περὶ δὲ τούτων ἐπέσκεπται πρότερον ἐν τοῖς περὶ 
κινήσεως λόγοις, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀδιαίρετα μήκη). However, it is clear from the preceding lines (as Simplicius in 
his commentary on On the Heavens (563, 9-20) also makes clear) that it is Aristotle who is building the parallel 
between the relationship plane-solid (postulated by Xenocrates) and that point-line in order to contradict it; 
therefore, such a position should not be simply attributed to Xenocrates.  
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Precisely for this reason it seems that the line needs to be regarded as the spatial minimum, 
and not the point.534 Moreover, this obtains too from the perspective of what is usually 
considered Xenocrates’ atomism: once again, it is the line which provides the correct parallel 
for the unit,535 and not points. Just as the atomic constituents of Form-Numbers are units, 
the minimum in spatial magnitudes seems to be represented by the line. One might add, also, 
that it was Aristotle himself536 who argued for the impossibility to build a continuum out of 
points: it is precisely this discussion which might have led Xenocrates to take lines instead 
of points as constituting the spatial minimum. 
 
Now, since the correspondence between the Dyad and the line, as already apparent in [FR. 
38], is attested by Aristotle as well, this will require explanation.537 But before giving a 
tentative answer, we should keep in mind that the only direct reference to the pyramid is in 
Themistius’ passage and that this reference does not feature parallels anywhere else. On the 
contrary, what is consistent in Aristotelian testimonia is the procession from lines to 
planes538 or, in other fragments, from lengths to planes, and from planes to solid figures in 
general.539 Of course, if one wants to find a correspondence between numbers and Ideal-
Geometricals,540 the first plane figure will be the triangle, constituted by three lines, and the 
first solid figure the pyramid (with a triangular base), which would consist of four 
triangles.541 But, once again, we have a problem with the line as constituted or limited by 
 
534 Moreover, this seems to be the case even for fr. 25 IP. See infra, n. 517 and 537. Isnardi Parente seems to 
agree on this point (2012: 270ff) and highlights that this was not accepted by Speusippus. 
535 See fr. 58 IP (=Schol. in Arist. De Caelo, p. 469b 14-21 Brandis). 
536 Arist., De gen. et corr., 316a30-5.  
537 A hotly debated passage attesting to the correspondence between the line and the Dyad is fr. 25 IP (= 
Metaph. Z11, 1036b12-17). Scholars differ as to what is the right translation of the passage and, consequently, 
as to its right interpretation. Cf. Cherniss’ translation of the passage (1945: 567ff), followed by Isnardi Parente 
(2012: 263-264): ‘some of them, he says, make the dyad αὐτογραμμή while others make the idea of line 
αὐτογραμμή’; Ross’ translation (1924b: 201-202), ‘some make ‘two’ the line-itself, and others make it (i.e. 
‘two’) the form of the line’ is defended by Saffrey (1971: 32ff). On the passage, see also Rashed (2013: 107-
108); scholarly interpretations, however, depend not only on the grammar, but on considerations about the 
whole context and link of referenes. Accordingly, I will postpone the discussion of fr. 25 IP to a different 
context.  
538 Compare, e.g. fr. 23 IP (=Arist., Metaph. Z2 1028b24-27): ἔνιοι δὲ τὰ μὲν εἴδη καὶ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς τὴν αὐτὴν 
ἔχειν φασὶ φὺσιν, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἐχόμενα, γραμμὰς καὶ ἐπίπεδα, μέχρι πρὸς τὴν τοῦ οὐρανοῦ οὐσίαν καὶ τὰ 
αἰσθητά. 
539 Compare fr. 38 IP: ποιοῦσι γὰρ τὰ μεγέθη ἐκ τῆς ὕλης καὶ ἀριθμοῦ, ἐκ μὲν τῆς δυάδος τὰ μήκη, ἐκ τριάδος 
δ᾿ ἴσως τὰ ἐπίπεδα, ἐκ δὲ τῆς τετράδος τὰ στερεὰ ἢ καὶ ἐξ ἄλλων ἀριθμῶν· […] Οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ταύτῃ 
προσγλιχόμενοι ταῖς ἰδέαις τὰ μαθηματικὰ διαμαρτάνουσιν· and 39 IP: ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰ μήκη καὶ περὶ 
τὰ ἐπίπεδα καὶ περὶ τὰ στερεά […].  
540 As this seems to be the reason also for Pines’ identification of the correspondence. 
541 The background for the whole discussion is probably cosmological and has Timaeus 53c-56 a in mind, 
where Plato presents the smallest components of the elements. In the end, it is attested that both Speusippus 
and Xenocrates had their own interpretation of the Timaeus (although the only detail we have regards their 
interpretation of the Platonic story as pedagogical device, (διδασκαλίας χάριν)) and similar geometrical 
considerations can be paralleld by ps-Iamblichus’ quotation of Speusippus (fr. 122 IP1). 
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two points, as this has no other explicit parallel in other testimonia on Xenocrates. 
Accordingly, one possible answer could lie in the Aristotelian terminological shift from 
γραμμαί to μήκη; this way, one may consider the Dyad as related to length, and, accordingly, 
the Triad to width and the Tetrad to depth.542 In the end, this is also what Themistius himself 
does543 commenting on Aristotle’s De Anima and stating that the material is to be found in 
Xenocrates’ book On Nature. Now, whether we trust Themistius or not,544 I think the parallel 
is more convincing in at least two respects: 
 
- it provides an explanation for the line, by relating it to the dimension of length 
rather than to points. 
- it finds a justification in Aristotle’s language; indeed, instead of speaking of 
γραμμαί, lines, Aristotle speaks of τὰ μήκη, lengths, before moving on to planes 
and solids. 
 
Lastly, arithmological comparisons do not necessarily support the argument consistently. 
Indeed, if one wants to provide an argument against Pines’ identification, it can be noted that 
other arithmological correspondences can be found as well. For instance, just as Form-
Numbers do not go on ad infinitum but, once we get to the Tetrad, the sum of the numbers 
lays the conditions for the Decad, in the same way, if we take the line to be the atomic 
constituent of geometry and we sum up the number of lines in a triangle [the first plane 
figure] (3) + those in the pyramid with a triangular base [the first solid] (6) + the initial line 
(1), we would get to the same result (and here we wouldn’t have to sum up the indivisible 
line just like we do with the first unit, as this can be considered the μέτρον, and not a 
geometrical line).  
 
Accordingly, I take the parallel between Form-Numbers and Ideal-Geometricals to 
be explained by a different correspondence: just as the unit is, for numbers, the atomic 
 
542 I will explain the details of how I take the parallel to work in the next section.  
543 See fr. 178 IP (= Themist., Paraphrasis in Aristotelis De Anima, 11, 19ff): ‘Similarly too in the [books] On 
Philosophy the animal-itself is defined as existing from the form of the one-itself, plus the primary length, 
breadth and depth’, transl. Todd (2013: 26). However, it must be said that the attribution of these lines is highly 
controversial. See, below, n. 544.  
544 On this aspect, see the discussion between Saffrey (1955: 37-43) and Cherniss (1959: 75-79). Indeed, in a 
review of Saffrey’s Le Peri Philosophias d’Aristote et la théorie platonicienne des idées nombres, Cherniss 
argues that the passage is to be referred to Xenocrates, rather than to Plato. Todd, in his edition of Themistius’ 
On Aristotle On the Soul, agrees with Cherniss (2013: 159, n. 21 and 26). 
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constituent, the same can be said for the line within geometry. Here we are not yet speaking 
of specific, diverse geometrical figures,545 but of, so to say, their formal conditions. 
 
6.3. The ontological priority of the parts with respects to the whole (fr. 42) 
In this last section of this chapter, I shall analyse a claim attributed to Xenocrates in a 
preserved Arabic translation of a text of Alexander of Aphrodisias, namely, that parts are, 
by nature, prior to their wholes. Although it would be interesting to analyse the counterpart 
of this claim, namely, that species stand to their genus just as parts stand to their wholes, this 
would lead us beyond the scope of the present section.546 Thus, my aim for this section is to 
make sense of this claim within the context of Xenocrates’ Form-Numbers and Ideal-
Geometricals. In particular, I shall try to understand if, and to what extent, the claim may be 
equally applied to both objects. But let us deal with the fragment directly:  
 
Alexander says: Xenocrates says: If the relation between a species and a genus is like 
the relation between a part and a whole, and if a part is anterior and prior to the whole 
in virtue of a natural priority (for if a part is sublated the whole is sublated, this in view 
of the fact that no whole will remain if one of its parts is lacking), whereas a part will 
not be [necessarily] sublated if [its] whole is sublated, (it being possible that certain 
parts of the whole be annulled whereas others remain) a species is likewise indubitably 
prior to the genus. 
 
The fragment was translated from Arabic into English in 1961 by Pines547 who, in a 
famous and influential article, presented the text for the first time and demonstrated that it 
was consistent with other views attributed to Xenocrates. In particular, a similar claim occurs 
as well in a passage of the Peripatetic De Lineis Insecabilibus, which, however, will be 
impossible to discuss in depth here (both because of the textual problems of the document, 
and for the complexity of the theories involved). The fragment in question establishes a 
similarity between the relation parts-whole and the relation species-genus and justifies the 
 
545 Just as we are not speaking of mathematical numbers, or, better, of numbers after the Decad, in the case of 
Form-Numbers.  
546 I will offer a tentative conclusion of how the parallel between parts and wholes may be understood in the 
case of the genus-species relationship in footnote 554. The only Aristotelian fragment directly addressing the 
question is fr. 41 IP (=Arist. Metaph. B 3, 998b30- 999a14). Whether the reference in the passage addresses 
Xenocrates or not is a highly debated issue: e.g. Pines (1961) and Isnardi Parente (2012) consider the fragment 
to be referring to Xenocrates’ doctrine. Contra, Bonitz (1849) and Colle (1922) believe the argument to 
constitute the beginning of the second part of the aporia. Lastly, Berti (2009), together with Tricot (1953), 
Reale (1997), Ross (1924a) and Madigan (2000) consider the passage to be part of the discussion of the thesis. 
For more detailed information on scholarly positions concerning the issue, see Berti (2009: 128-129). Given 
the debated nature of the passage, its analysis would bring us astray from the present purpose. 
547 Of course, as my knowledge of Arabic is non-existent, my analysis will rely on Pines translation, and on 
the expert advice of Dr Rigolio, Assistant Lecturer in the Department of Classics and Ancient History at 
Durham University. The passage, referred to as the Réfutation de Xénocrate has been recently translated into 
French by Marwan Rashed (2004: 50). Part of ps-Aristotle’s De lineis Insecabilibus (972 b 25-33) has also 
been translated into French (O’Brien and Rashed 2001). For a more detailed discussion of the text and of its 
scholarly interpretations, see Verde (2012: 130-183). 
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second claim on the basis of the first. However, the priority of the parts is explained precisely 
in the opposite way Aristotle would do and seems somehow counter-intuitive. For, in fact 
the fragment states that parts are prior because parts would still exist even if the whole is 
sublated, whereas the opposite would not hold.  
 
If we think of examples, the conclusion keeps on being even more counter-intuitive 
indeed. If we consider the body as a whole, and the organs or limbs as part of it, my body 
would still be my body even if I donated a kidney, or if my arm were to be amputated. On 
the contrary, if my body were to be annulled, it is clear that neither my kidney nor my arm 
would still exist. But let’s try to apply the same to Form-Numbers, considered as wholes, 
and composed by units, and see if the comparison holds better in a mathematical context. 
Let us consider, for example, the Tetrad, or number 4. If we were to take out a unit from the 
Tetrad, it is clear that number 4 would not exist anymore. Indeed, instead of 4 units, we 
would now have 3. The whole would be destroyed, but its parts wouldn’t: we would still 
have three units, and a different number. At the same time, though, if we were to suppress 
the Tetrad, rather than one of its units, other units would still compose the Triad and the 
Dyad. Both these steps might be a bit more problematic than this, if we add that the units 
composing the Tetrad are not the same, or, better, are not combinable with those of the Dyad 
or of the Triad. Indeed, the comparison would hold only if we consider units generically, but 
not as parts, specifically, of the Dyad, Triad and so on. To reconsider the example of the 
body I have used before, it is not because there are other arms or other kidneys in other 
bodies that I can argue that even by annulling my body, parts would keep on existing. The 
same can be said for the units of the Dyad and the Triad. As the units in the Triad are the 
only units composing the Triad, if the Triad was to be suppressed, its units, and therefore, its 
parts, would be suppressed as well. A better explanation may be found if we take into 
account numbers after 10, since these indeed arise out of combinations548 of the previous 
numbers. As mentioned earlier, evidence attests that Xenocrates postulated the existence of 
Form-Numbers until the Decad, and not ad infinitum. Accordingly, if we were to take 
number 12 into consideration, for instance, the example seems to make more sense. By 
taking out units from number 12 we would indeed have a different number, but if we were 
to annul number 12 as a whole, this would not imply the elimination of all of its units, which 
would still compose other numbers. In the end, the fragment does not state that the 
implication is necessary, but only that it is possible. In this perspective, Xenocrates could 
still argue that the units of the Dyad, Triad, and Tetrad would be annulled, if the whole is, 
 
548 As emphasised, (footnote 516) an option would be to consider them to arise out of participation to (some 
of) the first 10 numbers.  
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but that this wouldn’t happen if we take into account numbers after 10. In this respect, an 
additional remark is required. The framework that Xenocrates is using here,549 follows 
precisely that which Aristotle underlines when differentiating a πᾶν and a ὅλον in chapters 
25-27 of Metaphysics Δ.550 Indeed, Aristotle himself uses number as an example of a πᾶν 
and not of a ὅλον (which would better fit my example of the body), since, as he himself says: 
‘if a cup is mutilated, it must still be a cup; but the number is no longer the same’ (1024 a 
16-17). Xenocrates here is then building from Aristotle’s own definitions (or, at least, on 
shared assumptions) to develop and explain his conception of Form-Numbers. Whether this 
had been a point of discussion between the two philosophers, or whether it was initially part 
of Aristotle’s criticism of Plato, it nevertheless shows that the points of contact between the 
two are more than Aristotle is ready to admit.  
 
In a mathematical context, then, the example seems to make sense when we consider 
Form-Numbers as wholes constituted by parts. But what about Ideal-Geometricals: would 
the relation parts-whole still make sense? Let us take the explanation given by Pines and see 
if it holds. In the explanation given by Pines, the incommensurability of units from different 
Form-Numbers is explained on the basis of different correspondences: the two units of the 
Dyad correspond to two points, the three units of the Triad to the three sides of a triangle, 
and the four units of the Tetrad to the four triangles of a triangular pyramid. If we try to 
apply the example to Ideal-Geometricals in the same way we did for numbers, this creates 
some problems. Indeed, if we take one point from the line, we don’t have a line anymore.551 
The same for the triangle: if we take out one side, we have no plane figure anymore, just as 
if we subtract a triangle from the pyramid we have no possibility of constructing any other 
solid figure. The problem here is that the incommensurability of the units composing the 
Dyad, Triad and Tetrad is not built on a reciprocal or parallel consideration of something 
which plays an analogous role in geometry, but, rather, on the impossibility of comparing 
them. Indeed, the example is built a priori and circularly relies on the impossibility to 
compare the units in the Dyad, Triad and Tetrad, instead of treating Numbers, and Ideal-
Geometricals as really sharing structural similarities. To put it simply, Pines’ demonstration 
of the impossibility of comparing units of the Dyad, Triad and Tetrad is justified by reference 
to the impossibility of comparing points, planes and lines, and not on the basis of common 
 
549 It would be interesting to investigate the Arabic terminology in more detail, so to to understand whether the 
word for ‘whole’ would better translate πᾶν or ὅλον, if the Arabic preserves such double possibility.  
550 Chapters 25-26: (Arist., Metaph., Δ 1023b 26-1024 a 10). It is interesting to note that Aristotle makes use 
of the same framework also in De Anima I 4, 408b 32-409a11 (= corresponding to the first section of fr. 112 
IP) when dealing with Xenocrates’ definition of the soul. 
551 If we take the points to be the boundaries of the line. Otherwise, according to the same subtraction we could 
possibly obtain two lines, a line and a point or even another line.  
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features that Form-Numbers and Ideal-Geometricals would share. But let us now try to take 
the line as the atomic constituent of geometrical figures and of their dimensions, as I 
supposed earlier, and test the example once more. If we consider the Dyad, Triad and Tetrad 
as establishing length, width and depth, the example could make more sense. In particular, 
we may find a fitting numerical correspondence in the number of angles that lines limit 
within a space. Accordingly, a single line can be considered as the limit of two flat angles, 
two lines meeting in a point as limiting a plane angle, and three lines meeting at a point as 
limiting a solid angle.552 On this account, one, two or three lines meeting at a point would 
identify the specific kind of angle required for the construction of lengths, planes and solids. 
And the minimum number of angles required for a space to be delimited, would in turn 
justify the numerical parallels. This way we would have a progression of 2, 3, 4 that matches 
the correspondent Form-Numbers, according to the number of angles that a minimum 
amount of lines limit in each dimension. In this respect, a single line individuates two flat 
angles, and, in this respect, it can be considered the origin or principle for lengths. In the 
same way, although the minimum amount of lines required in order to limit a plane figure 
would then be three, the correspondence would be rather played on the three plane angles 
they limit. For, the triangle is the first plane figure because three plane angles are required 
in order to delimit the simplest plane figure. However, progressing with the number of plane 
angles limited, other plane figures could be built. The same in the case of the pyramid built 
on a triangular base. Although the minimum amount of lines to delimit the simplest solid is 
six, the correspondence would be rather rooted in the number of angles they limit in a 
tridimensional space: namely, four solid angles (and not four faces).553 And this because four 
(solid) angles are the minimum number of angles which can be limited in order to construct 
a solid. On this account, we would avoid changing the basic constituent every time (point, 
line, plane), and the line, as limiting flat, plane or solid angles, would play the role of the 
minimum atomic constituent.  
 
 
552 If this move does not seem immediately legitimate, compare Plato, Timaeus, 54a-b: ‘And when four 
equilateral triangles are combined so that three plane angles meet in a point, they form one solid angle, which 
comes next in order to the most obtuse of the plane angle. And when four such angles are produced, the first 
solid figure (viz., the pyramid built on a triangular base) is constructed’, transl. Bury. Note that the construction 
of the solid angle is not dependent on the construction of the first solid figure, but, rather, the relationship 
works the other way around: a solid angle is built out of three plane angles meeting in a point. Cf. also Rashed 
(2013: 110) ‘But a triangle is essentially a figure having three angles, and not three sides. And the angles, as 
portions of the plane angle, are ratios, hence numbers. Thus, in Plato’s ontology, we have to claim that the 
numbers produce the surfaces and not that the numbers produce the lines which would in turn produce the 
surfaces’. For the line as a limit for plane angles, see Rashed (2013b: 225, n.3). On the absence of a ‘geometry 
of the line’ see Rashed (2010: 103-109) and Vuillemin (2001: 103ff). 
553 Note here that if one wants to find aritmological comparisons the number of lines required in total would 
amount to 10 (1+3+6).  
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If one desires to speculate further, we could possibly apply to Ideal-Geometricals the 
same restriction applied to Form-Numbers: namely, just as in the case of the Dyad, Triad 
and Tetrad wholes are not suppressable without eliminating their parts, this may be the case 
for the (first) line, as well as for the first plane (triangle) and solid (pyramid built on a 
triangular base). However, if we take lines to constitute the parts of plane and solid figures, 
this may make more sense. Each plane or solid figure is delimited by a specific number of 
lines, which delimit their (plane or solid) internal angles. By suppressing one line, any figure 
as a whole is eliminated as well, but not its parts, which would still be sufficient to build a 
different (plane or solid) figure, possibly by combining solid and plane angles. In this 
respect, just as by subtracting units from numbers this does not leave us without the 
possibility to build different numbers, the same may be valid in the case of geometrical 
figures.  
 
Conclusions 
At this point, it is worth wrapping up and provide some final remarks. In section 6.1, I 
have shown that Aristotelian overviews of the metaphysical position of Plato, Speusippus 
and Xenocrates are consistent in saying that the latter has posited one nature for Forms and 
τὰ μαθηματικά. If Aristotle testifies to a peculiar form of eidetic number, namely, Form-
Number, the consistency in speaking of τὰ μαθηματικά in general, and not of Numbers 
exclusively, led me to a parallel consideration of Form-Numbers and of what I have called 
Ideal-Geometricals. In section 6.2, I have examined three passages present in the Aristotelian 
corpus which shed light on the formula ‘μία φύσις’. It turned out that the formula does not 
imply the identity of the objects in question, but, rather, only accounts for their similar 
features. On the basis of the analysis undertaken and of the coherence with the Aristotelian 
passages, I have assumed that, in the context of Xenocrates’ metaphysics, the formula 
accounts for structural similarities shared by Form-Numbers and Ideal-Geometricals. This 
assumption revealed to be meaningful once examined in light of another Xenocratean claim, 
i.e. that parts are prior to the whole. Indeed, the examples provided in section 6.3 showed 
that, just as the unit is the atomic constituent of Form-Numbers, if we consider the line to be 
the spatial minimum in geometry, examples are coherent both in demonstrating a structural 
similarity of mathematics and geometry and in view of the demonstration of the priority of 
their parts with respect to the wholes.554   
 
554 As emphasised, in order for a whole to be eliminated if a part is removed, the whole must accomplish its 
unity as a πᾶν, and not as a ὅλον. But how can we make sense of this requirement with respect to the relationship 
genus-species? I will provide a tentative explanation here. Let us take the genus ‘animal’, for instance. In order 
to fulfil the requirement, the definition of such genus will necessarily be extensional (following Menn, 
unpublished, Ib3:12). The genus will be constituted by each and every of its species, or, in other words, by the 
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CHAPTER SEVEN:  
THE SOUL 
 
 
 
In the previous chapter I concluded that the Aristotelian formula ‘μὶα φύσις’ reveals a 
similarity in terms of structure which underlies Xenocrates’ consideration of Form-Numbers 
and Ideal-Geometricals: just as the unit can be considered the atomic constituent of Form-
Numbers, the line constitutes the spatial minimum in geometry. Philosophically speaking, 
this ontological and parallel articulation of Form-Numbers and Ideal-Geometricals is not 
limited to an exposition of their structural analogy; on the contrary the analogy reveals itself 
to be meaningful because: (i) it allows a parallel consideration of these objects; and (ii) it 
favours a gradual passage from numbers to spatiality.  
 
In this respect, Xenocrates’ metaphysical world already goes beyond that of Speusippus 
in the attempt to recover more coherently a fundamental aspect of Plato’s theory (at least 
from Xenocrates’ perspective): namely, Forms. Speusippus’ rejection of the Forms had 
indeed led him to develop an episodic system with different principles for every level. If the 
self-sustainability at each level of beings had allowed Speusippus to grant independence not 
only to their objects, but also to the different kinds of knowledge for their pursuit, his 
philosophical solutions caused disruption in the structure of his world. But as both Aristotle 
and Theophrastus underline, disruption in the structure implies also a great dose of 
disconnection, and, accordingly, a lack of overall coherence in the system. Xenocrates 
seems, at least, to be much more careful in this respect. For he appears to embrace Aristotle’s 
criticism in view of a more continuous, and therefore, coherent system, which takes into 
account Aristotle’s own conclusions about other topics as well (as, for instance, the 
impossibility of building a continuum out of points, or the differentiation between a πᾶν and 
a ὅλον).  
 
 
enumeration of all of its species (man, horse, etc.). Given the framework of an extensional conception of the 
genus, if one of the species is sublated (e.g. horse), the genus will not exist anymore: for the genus will be no 
more constituted by all of its species but will lack one. And, for this reason, the species is by nature prior to 
the genus, and not the other way around. Moreover, this background also accounts for why, if the genus is 
eliminated, the same would not happen to its species. Indeed, we said that in order for the genus ‘animal’ to 
obtain, we need that all its species are enumerated. For eliminating one species (or part) would not imply, as a 
consequence, that all other species (or parts) are eliminated as well; however, it would certainly imply the 
elimination of the genus (i.e. the whole). 
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The aim of the present chapter is to show that this framework also offers interpretative 
advantages with respect to Xenocrates’ doctrine of the soul. For what is immediately clear 
from Xenocrates’ definition of the soul as a ‘self-moving number’ is that a third condition 
(besides those accounted so far) obtains: that of movement. Through detailed explanation of 
his definition of the soul, I will argue that Xenocrates establishes the grounds for an 
ontologically justified intermediate position for the soul, as well as for continuity within the 
system of sensible objects.555  
 
7.1 The definition of the soul: methodological choices for the analysis 
Attempting to reconstruct Xenocrates’ doctrine of the soul by relying on the evidence 
preserved by Aristotle exclusively is no easy task. As a matter of fact, Aristotle does not 
even mention Xenocrates explicitly in his reports,556 and only preserves a definition of the 
soul which he does not ascribe to any philosopher specifically. Such a definition of the soul 
as a ‘self-moving number’ is in fact acknowledged as Xenocratean only by the Hellenistic 
doxographic tradition, which traces the connection back to Pythagoras himself.557 Moreover, 
Aristotle does not even seem to be clear in indicating what Xenocrates’ definition amounts 
to. For the interpretation of Xenocrates’ doctrine of the soul proved to be very challenging 
also for ancient commentators, who attempted an explanation of the formula in various ways. 
For instance, Alexander of Aphrodisias explains that the soul circumscribes (περιορίζει) the 
body, thus granting the body with the power of movement;558 alternatively, John Philoponus 
illustrates that the definition appeals to two different notions: those of number and 
movement, in the attempt to harmonise the Platonic and Pythagorean tradition together. 
Besides the fascinating history of the interpretation of Xenocrates’ definition of the soul, the 
six Aristotelian passages on Xenocrates’ doctrine can be approximately divided into two 
 
555 With respect to this ‘continuous’ consideration of the world, it is interesting to compare fr. 20 IP (= 
Theophrastus, Metaph., 6a23-6b9). In her collection (2012: 259-261), Isnardi Parente provides a long 
commentary on the passage and of the various scholarly interpretations propounded in particular with respect 
to the last sentence (‘but of the heavens and the rest they make no further mention whatsoever. And likewise 
neither do those around Speusippus nor anyone of the others except Xenocrates; for he does somehow provide 
everything about the universe, alike sensibles, intelligibles, mathematicals, and, what is more, the divine 
[things]’ (αἰσθητὰ καὶ νοητὰ καὶ μαθηματικὰ καὶ ἔτι δὴ τὰ θεῖα), transl. Gutas (2010: 127)). Isnardi Parente 
considers the passage as problematic both because it does not square with Sextus’ report about Xenocrates 
(=fr. 2 IP) and because it does not square with Aristotle’s account of Xenocrates, according to which Forms 
and numbers are identified. Although it may be difficult to find precise reference to the various levels, it is 
nonetheless interesting that Theophrastus identifies a progression of different domains. For an attempt to square 
Theophrastus’, Sextus’ and Proclus’ testimonia and understand the relationship between different levels of 
being, see Horky (2013b: 701ff specifically). 
556 For obvious reasons, it will not be part of the aim of the present chapter neither to discuss the attribution of 
the definition, nor to doubt about the authenticity of the doctrines preserved in De Anima 404b (=fr. 85 IP) as 
really belonging to Xenocrates. On the same passage, see Auffret (2015). 
557 See, e.g. fr. 90 IP (= Aetius, Placita IV, 2, 1) and 91 (= Theodoretus, Graecarusm affectionum curatio, V, 
17) IP.  
558 See, fr. 94 IP (= Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Arist. Topica, 493 21-2; 494, 1; 11-4). 
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types: doxographic and exemplificatory, or so to say, methodological. Indeed, apart from the 
two doxographic passages preserved in the De Anima, a book in which we would actually 
expect to find the soul as the main topic of the discussion, information about Xenocrates’ 
doctrine of the soul is also preserved in a passage of the Posterior Analytics, as well as in 
three passages of the Topics. These two treatises obviously do not have as an objective a 
detailed treatment of the soul and rather use Xenocrates’ definition as an example of wrong 
methodology. The information preserved in such contexts is completely decontextualised 
and aims at showing that Xenocrates’ definition is inaccurate according to the logical rules 
propounded by Aristotle. In this respect, these passages would appear to preserve material 
which is less subject to philosophical interpretation and, consequently, more accurate. 
Precisely for this reason, I will analyse those fragments first, in the attempt to expose 
Xenocrates’ rationale for his definition of the soul. My strategy will be as follows. In sections 
7.2 to 7.3, I will analyse frr. 86-89 IP. The aim is to understand whether the rationale for 
Xenocrates’ definition is in accordance with the framework provided in the introduction; 
subsequently, section 7.4 will consider the two Aristotelian descriptions of Xenocrates’ soul 
preserved in the De Anima so to test the results obtained within the bigger picture of 
Aristotle’s longer reports. 
 
7.2 Xenocrates’ definition of the soul: self-movement as explanatory for living (fr. 
86)  
The first mention of Xenocrates’ definition of the soul occurs in the Posterior Analytics, 
and, more specifically, in the context of Aristotle’s discussion of whether a syllogism or 
demonstration of the essence is possible or not (τοῦ δὲ τί ἐστι πότερον ἔστι συλλογισμὸς καὶ 
ἀπόδειξις ἢ οὐκ ἔστι).559 In book II of A.Po,560 Aristotle establishes that ‘a demonstration 
that an attribute P belongs to a subject S standardly assumes as the middle term what S or P 
is (i.e. the essence)’.561 To make it simpler, Aristotle’s objective is to test the possibility of 
constructing a syllogism, or a demonstration, that a feature A belongs definitionally to all 
C.562 The relevant syllogism would be of the following kind:  
 
 
559 Arist. A.Po II, 4. Aristotle’s answer to the question is a negative one.  
560 On the two models of demonstration in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, see Bronstein (2016: 48-50). For the 
analysis of Aristotle’s passage, as well as for the reconstruction of Xenocrates’ argument, I will rely on Charles 
(2001: 1080-186) as well as Barnes (1994: 209-210) and Bronstein (2016: 144-147). 
561 I am following Bronstein here (2016 :146), since Aristotle’s sentence literally states that that ‘a syllogism 
proves something about something through a middle term’ (ὁ μὲν γὰρ συλλογισμὸς τὶ κατὰ τινὸς δεὶκνουσι 
διὰ τοῦ μέσου) (91a14–15). 
562 I am following Charles closely (2001: 180ff) for the reconstruction of Aristotle’s argument in the first part 
of A.Po I2.4. 
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A Φ def all B563 
B Φ def all C 
A Φ def all C 
 
Let us take A to be ‘two-footed animal’, and C to be ‘men’ for illustration. Accordingly, the 
syllogism could be schematised as follows: 
 
Two-footed animal Φ def all B 
B Φ def all men 
Two-footed animal Φ def all men 
 
The problem Aristotle raises is that such a syllogism either begs the question or is not 
demonstrative of the essence. For if B (namely, the middle term) provides a definition of 
‘man’, then the syllogism begs the question because it assumes the essence as a premise 
rather than demonstrating it. Alternatively, if B does not provide a definition of ‘man’, then 
the syllogism fails to demonstrate that ‘two-footed animal’ belongs essentially to the 
definition of man.564 Now, the reason why I am drawing the attention on this background is 
because Xenocrates’ definition is mentioned right after this discussion, as an example of 
those people who attempted to prove the essence of something (in the case of Xenocrates, 
of the soul) through conversion (διὰ τοῦ ἀντιστρέφειν). I report the whole passage here: 
 
[FR. 86] οἱ μὲν οὖν διὰ τοῦ ἀντιστρέφειν δεικνύντες τί ἐστι ψυχή, ἢ τί ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος 
ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν τῶν ὄντων, τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς αἰτοῦνται, οἷον εἴ τις ἀξιώσειε ψυχὴν εἶναι τὸ 
αὐτὸ αὑτῷ αἴτιον τοῦ ζῆν, τοῦτο δ᾿ ἀριθμὸν αὐτὸν αὑτὸν κινοῦντα· ἀνάγκη γὰρ αἰτῆσαι 
τὴν ψυχὴν ὅπερ ἀριθμὸν εἶναι αὐτὸν αὑτὸν κινοῦντα, οὕτως ὡς τὸ αὐτὸ ὄν.565 
 
Those who try to prove the essence of ‘soul’ or ‘man’ or anything else by conversion566 
are guilty of petitio principii. E.g., suppose that somebody asserts that soul is that which 
 
563 With Charles (2001: 180, n. 316): by ‘Φ def’ I intend ‘belongs definitionally to’. Moreover, Aristotle 
provides restrictions for the argument. In seeking a definition for C, Aristotle is looking for something which 
should be (i) possessed by all and only Cs and (ii) be included in the essence of C (Charles 2001: 182). It is in 
regard to point (i) that I believe we should understand Aristotle’s statement that some people demonstrate ‘διὰ 
τοῦ ἀντιστρέφειν’. On this aspect, see footnote 566 below.  
564 See Bronstein (2016: 147). 
565 (=Arist., A.Po, 2.4, 91a36-91b2), transl. Tredennick slightly modified. 
566 In providing the requirements for the syllogism, Aristotle states that ‘ταῦτα (viz. A and C) δ᾿ ἀνάγκη 
ἀντιστρέφειν’ (A.Po, II, 2.4, 91a17), namely, that the terms must be convertible. This requirement ensures that 
A and C (and therefore the middle-term B) are co-extensive. And this seems to be confirmed by Aristotle’s 
conclusion that the soul is essentially a self-moving number ‘οὕτως ὡς τὸ αὐτὸ ὄν’, i.e. ‘in the sense of being 
identical with it’. For the second example Aristotle presents right after Xenocrates’ is that in which A is the 
essence of C and A is predicated of all B as genus of species (e.g. (A) animal is predicated of all men). In that 
sense, A is obviously not co-extensive with C, and the conclusion will not provide a demonstration which is 
peculiar to the species, but one that holds for the genus only. In that case, Aristotle concludes: ‘because it is 
true that all humanity is a species of animality, just as it is true that every man is an animal; but not in the sense 
that they are identical (οὐχ οὕτως ὥστε ἓν εἶναι)’ (A.Po 91b4 -7, transl. Tredennick). Accordingly, it would 
seem that Xenocrates is seeking a definition of the soul through a syllogism of the kind provided at the 
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is the cause of its own living, and that this is a self-moving number; he is necessarily 
postulating that soul is essentially a self-moving number in the sense of being identical 
with it. 
 
Now, Xenocrates’ argument has been reconstructed similarly by Charles and by Barnes, who 
attempted to provide a formulation of his thesis in a syllogistic form. Let us address Charles’ 
reconstruction first. According to Charles,567 Xenocrates may have argued that:  
 
Being a self-moving number Φ def to being explanatory of life 
Being explanatory for living Φ def all soul568 
Being a self-moving number Φ def soul 
 
Charles’ reconstruction squares precisely with the scheme provided above. So presented, 
Xenocrates’ argument provides a demonstration of the essence of the soul (i.e. a 
demonstration that the soul is a self-moving number); yet, since B already offers an essential 
feature of the soul (i.e. being explanatory of life), the syllogism begs the question because it 
assumes the essence rather than demonstrating it. Despite the persuasive framework, 
however, the reconstruction is less satisfactory from an interpretative point of view.  
 
Indeed, the order in which the claims are arranged is unconvincing. For if the order of the 
premises is indifferent insofar as the syllogism is constructed (since the middle term at stake 
i.e., being explanatory of life, remains the same) another question is whether the order makes 
some difference insofar as a reconstruction of Xenocrates’ argument is concerned. And I 
believe that, in view of a charitable interpretation of Xenocrates’ argument, the order does 
make a huge difference. Indeed, one thing is the heuristic context in which the demonstration 
is developed, and another the expository framework that the syllogism provides. In the end, 
the claim that the soul is cause of its own living is one that most of the Greek philosophical 
tradition would have easily accepted; on the contrary, a premise such as ‘being a self-moving 
number Φ def to being explanatory of living’ provides an explanation of the reason for 
Xenocrates’ definition, rather than a claim which is epistemically plausible or one that is 
assumed in order to be clarified. Accordingly, with respect to Xenocrates’ argument, what 
 
beginning of the section (in which terms A and C are convertible, and therefore co-extensive), and accordingly, 
doing something which Aristotle has established as impossible. Thus, in the case of Xenocrates, terms A and 
C that he provides would actually be co-extensive, but precisely for this reason the syllogism would beg the 
question and not be demonstrative of the essence, because the essence is assumed instead of being 
demonstrated. Barnes (1993: 2010) would generally agree with my interpretation. If this is not taken to be an 
ad hominem argument, ‘the argument is ‘through conversion’ in the weak sense of using a convertible premiss’. 
Differently, Charles (2001: 192) takes what he calls the ‘Unity condition’ to be referred to the unity of the 
definiens.  
567 Charles (2001: 185-186). 
568 Charles’ formulation is: ‘explanatory of life’. 
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Charles presents as the starting point of the demonstration is quite an odd premise: if 
Xenocrates were actually attempting to demonstrate the essence of the soul, it would be 
weird that the first premise chosen is the least intuitively acceptable.569 This aspect is even 
more puzzling if considered within the Aristotelian framework. For Aristotle establishes that 
a demonstration is a deduction from premises which are, among other requirements, primary, 
immediate, prior to and more familiar than the conclusion.570 Given this background, 
Aristotle would hardly consider a premise such as: ‘Being a self-moving number Φ def to 
being explanatory of living’ as a satisfactory premise at all. After all, Aristotle accuses 
Xenocrates of constructing a fallacious demonstration and not of offering an implausible 
one. In this respect, we may take Aristotle’s silence as confirming that Xenocrates’ mistake 
is to be found elsewhere, and that a different reconstruction is possible.  
 
A second aspect in need of elucidation, is to clarify which allegations Aristotle addresses 
against Xenocrates precisely. A problem Aristotle raises is that Xenocrates, in attempting to 
demonstrate the essence of the soul, assumes that the soul is just what a number itself is (τὴν 
ψυχὴν ὅπερ ἀριθμὸν εἶναι αὐτὸν αὑτὸν κινοῦντα). In the reconstruction provided by Charles, 
this aspect is, once again, well accounted for within the framework of the syllogism, but 
possibly less convincing from an interpretative perspective. Indeed, the assumption that the 
soul is just what a number is, results only from the conclusion, and is, so to say, derived from 
the premises, rather than assumed as one of them. For the demonstration is rooted in an 
equivalence between ‘being a self-moving number’ and ‘being explanatory for living’ 
(premise 1). Accordingly, the stipulation that the soul is a number (conclusion) is obtained 
through the assumption that ‘being explanatory for living’ belongs definitionally to the soul 
(premise 2). However, from an interpretative point of view, to say that Xenocrates’ assumed 
that the soul is just what a number is, might have a different significance. I will leave this 
aspect to the side for a moment, so as to analyse Barnes’ reconstruction571 briefly and return 
to the issues raised with more information. Barnes’ reconstruction, with respect to the order 
of the premises, seems to offer a more natural reading. Hence: 
 
The soul is what is explanatory for living 
What is explanatory of life is self-moving number 
The soul is a self-moving number. 
 
 
569 Although in this account the second premise is prior to and explanatory of ‘the soul being a self-moving 
number’. On this aspect, see Charles (2001: 189-191). 
570 This is Aristotle’s overall objective in A.Po I.  
571 Barnes (1993: 209). 
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In this case, although the middle term remains the same of the previous reconstruction (i.e. 
‘being explanatory of life’), the syllogism provides a more intuitively acceptable (as well as 
epistemically plausible) first premise and goes on to demonstrate that the soul is a self-
moving number. The syllogism proposed is valuable also insofar as the arrangement of the 
premises respects the order in which Aristotle himself presents them. Indeed, the first 
information Aristotle provides is precisely that the soul is cause of its own living (τὸ αὐτὸ 
αὑτῷ αἴτιον τοῦ ζῆν); accordingly, this will be premise 1. Secondly, Aristotle introduces 
Xenocrates’ definition. By exposing the essence of the soul, the definition will need to be 
demonstrated, and therefore it will constitute the conclusion of the proof (Conclusion). The 
rest (premise 2) can be easily obtained by combining the scheme provided at the beginning 
(AaB; BaC; AaC) with the information just gathered. It must be said that even in this case, 
the assumption that the soul is just what a number is only results from the conclusion. In any 
case, the reconstruction is again coherent with the syllogistic framework introduced at the 
beginning of the section; for (i) the proof aims at a demonstration of the essence of the soul 
(i.e. being a self-moving number); but also (ii) the proof begs the question because B (being 
explanatory of life) assumes an essential feature of the soul rather than demonstrating it. By 
contrast with Charles’ reconstruction, Barnes provides an opportunity to understand why 
Aristotle believes Xenocrates’ demonstration to be proved ‘through conversion’. For the 
conclusion and the first premise can be inverted without compromising the demonstration, 
or,572 in other words, not only the conclusion, but also premise 1 is taken to be demonstrable 
in exactly same way. Precisely for this reason, however, the proof also begs the question: 
for the essence of the soul, as in the first reconstruction, is provided in B already, thus 
anticipating the conclusion.  
 
Hence, both reconstructions are accurate insofar as the Aristotelian framework is 
concerned. But what about Xenocrates’ argument? Is it possible to find a more charitable 
explanation for his claims? 
Even from Aristotle’s own wording of the sentence, it does not seem that the argument 
was actually presented in a syllogistic form. For Aristotle says ‘ἀνάγκη αἰτῆσαι τὴν ψυχὴν 
ὅπερ ἀριθμὸν εἶναι αὐτὸν αὑτὸν κινοῦντα’, thus implying that it would be necessary to 
 
572 And therefore, A and C are co-extensive. This is how commentators understand the text. Indeed, they 
‘suppose that Xenocrates attempted to prove the first premise of his argument from the conclusion and the 
conversion of the second premiss’ (Barnes 1993: 209-210). Another option is to suppose a ‘weaker sense of 
using a convertible premiss’. This way, ‘when Aristotle says ‘it is necessary to postulate that X is Y in the 
sense of being the same thing’ he means ‘it is necessary to postulate that X is Z, where Z = Y’ i.e. Xenocrates 
must postulate that the soul is a number inasmuch as he postulates that the soul is explanatory of its own life 
and being explanatory of one’s own life is (on his account) one and the same thing as being a self-moving 
number’ (2003: 210). 
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assume the former, and not that Xenocrates actually did so. As previously pointed out, this 
sentence also provides a suggestion that, in restoring Xenocrates’ argument, one should 
justify the assumption that the soul is just what a number is. Before providing a different 
interpretive option, it is worth emphasising that both reconstructions identify the aim of 
Xenocrates’ argument with a demonstration of his definition. Thus, in both syllogisms the 
conclusion corresponds to Xenocrates’ definition of the soul. However, is this necessarily 
the case? Let us try to work with the elements provided by Aristotle. From Aristotle’s text 
we can gather that Xenocrates maintained that:  
 
a) The soul is that which is cause of its own living. 
b) The soul is a self-moving number. 
 
Statement a) provides an epistemically plausible claim about the function of the soul; 
statement b) provides Xenocrates’ definition of the soul. In the context of a demonstration 
such as that in which Aristotle presents the claims, it is crucial to find a connection between 
the two. Thus, it is not an accident that such connection is found by the interpreters precisely 
in the middle term: ‘being explanatory for living’. Accordingly, the linking sentence would 
provide a connection between Xenocrates’ definition and the claim that the soul is the cause 
of its own living. But what if claim b), and thus Xenocrates’ definition of the soul, is assumed 
by Xenocrates, precisely in order to show the significance of his demonstration? This way, 
rather than a demonstration of his definition, Xenocrates would put forward the reasons for 
providing it. To put it more schematically, the line of thought would be the following:  
 
Being explanatory of life pertains to the soul 
The soul is a self-moving number 
Being explanatory of living pertains to being a self-moving number 
 
With this I do not mean that Xenocrates actually presented his argument by means of a 
syllogistic scheme. On the contrary, the syllogistic scheme provided by Aristotle offers an 
occasion to think about Xenocrates’ definition, and, more specifically, consider the reasons 
for advancing it. Indeed, if we understand the argument in this way, Xenocrates would still 
have to explain how being a self-moving number can account for being explanatory of living, 
but his argument would nonetheless expose the reasons for his definition. Namely, the soul 
is defined as a ‘self-moving number’ in order to provide an explanation for the soul’s 
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capacity to produce life.573 This part of the argument, in the end, is precisely that which is 
the most in need of proof, since it provides the link for the definition to be applicable to the 
soul. But, at least in the framework I provided at the beginning of the chapter, such a link 
would be very reasonable. For, if Xenocrates actually conceived of his world in a continuous 
way, at this stage his universe would feature Form-Numbers in the first place, and Ideal-
Geometricals in the second, accounting for the derivation of dimensionality. But by 
definition, mathematical objects are not liable to change. And change is precisely the 
condition which is missing in order for life to arise.574 By characterising the soul as a self-
moving number, however, this last condition would not only add up, but it would also add 
up consistently with the rest of Xenocrates’ ontological schemes, as I shall argue below.  
 
First of all, the soul is a number. In this respect, the soul is a mathematical object, and it 
is conceived as ontologically continuous with the metaphysical realm, i.e. with Form-
Numbers and Ideal-Geometricals. But the soul is a moving number. This capacity for 
movement should not be underestimated; for, in the framework provided movement allows 
the consideration of another crucial condition: change. With this I obviously do not mean 
that movement grants the soul with physical extension nor that Xenocrates’ definition 
concedes that the soul is changeable.575 On the contrary: for the soul is in fact a number, and 
the consideration of the soul as a number prevents it from corporeal and physical 
consideration. What I want to suggest, however, is that movement offers the possibility to 
Xenocrates of being used both as a distinctive feature of the soul (insofar as it self-moving 
and insofar as it is applied to a non-sensible object) and as a condition to differentiate 
between the soul (and therefore living beings) and sensible bodies. For, if Xenocrates’ world 
were continuous, we would expect to find sensible bodies precisely after the soul. And, as 
we have shown, different levels are distinguished by appeal to specific differentia. In this 
respect, the soul’s capacity of self-movement is both what distinguishes it from other 
 
573 In her collection of the fragments, Isnardi Parente (2012: 296) keeps the commentary on fr. 86 quite short 
(7 lines in total). However, she briefly underlines that there is a ‘profonda ed essenziale affinità fra anima e 
vita: se l’anima è causa di movimento, κίνησις, essa è causa anche di vita a se stessa’. 
574 And, possibly, it is also the condition for solids to become physical solids. If we think of Speusippus’ 
definition of time as ‘τὸ ἐν κίνήσει ποσόν’ (=fr. 93 IP1), namely, a quantity in movement, this interpretation 
would maybe acquire more plausibility. In this respect, it is interesting to note that, precisely the example of 
time as something which moves is quoted by Aristotle in Topics, III, 6, 120a39-120b4 (=fr. 87 IP), before 
mentioning Xenocrates’ definition of the soul. The fragment is not remarkably useful for our purposes, as 
Aristotle’s intention is to refute Xenocrates’ definition by analysing the species of number and showing that 
the soul belongs to none of them (‘for if the soul is neither odd nor even, clearly it is not a number’). However, 
although the mention of time might not be relevant for our purposes, it is interesting insofar as Aristotle’s 
insistence on movement is constant in all other passages about Xenocrates.  
575 Although this may be considered as a possibility, if we distinguish different meanings of change. Moreover, 
these are precisely the consequences Aristotle will draw in his report in the De Anima.  
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mathematical entities, and what allows the body with its capacity to move. And it is plausible 
to concede that body is not to be considered a number as well.  
 
Now, let us think from an Aristotelian perspective, where motion can be characterized 
minimally by change in substance, quality, quantity or place.576 If we grant Xenocrates at 
least to be working with shared assumptions with Aristotle, by providing bodies with the 
liability to movement577 (n.b., not self-movement), then there are interpretative advantages. 
For Xenocrates is able to offer a theory of continuity of sensible bodies within his ontological 
system. If movement can be characterised as change in substance, quality, quantity or place, 
we are thereby provided with a condition which allows a differentiation of metaphysical and 
sensible substances, and, at the same time, grants the latter with their peculiar characteristics: 
physical extension, change, alteration and transience. But would this framework imply that 
every body which is liable to movement, is also alive? No, it wouldn’t. Because the soul is 
defined as a self-moving number, and the capacity to self-move, as we have seen, is 
introduced in order to account for life specifically. 
 
If we take this Aristotelian background to be at work, Xenocrates is able to offer a detailed 
and coherent explanation of his world, whose realities gradually deploy by appeal to specific 
differentiae. And the appeal to differentiae guarantees both the continuity of the objects 
under examination as well as their peculiarity. Of course, the recourse to such an explanation 
shows, one more time, the ontological concerns guiding Xenocrates’ philosophical 
commitments. Nevertheless, the explanation reveals that his definition of the soul has a clear 
philosophical aim, as it provides as explanation of the soul’s status within the system.  
 
7.3 Xenocrates’ definition of the soul: a middle status (frr. 88-89)578 
 
576 Arist., Phys. 3.1, 200b33-34. 
577 Or, at minimum, with the liability to motion. 
578 In the previous section, I concluded that Xenocrates’ definition of the soul acquires clarity and significance 
if understood within the larger picture of his continuous philosophical system. However, I voluntarily avoided 
addressing a fundamental question related to the application of this definition: is the definition meant to belong 
to the individual soul only, as Aristotle’s reports seems to suggest? Or, rather, is it intended to be applied to 
world-soul? Or, again, does it comprise both as Dillon (2003: 121-123) seems to conclude on the basis of a 
mirror-relationship between the two? Such questions are, given my methodological commitments, very hard 
to address at all. Indeed, all information regarding the individual soul as a daimon and Xenocrates’ demonology 
more generally is preserved in later authors. These sources are extremely hard to disentangle both with respect 
to the material they used and with respect to the attribution of the doctrines to Xenocrates. The same can be 
said about the reports on how Xenocrates conceived of his cosmos, or the arrangement of divinities within it. 
Although a conclusive answer cannot be offered in this context, I believe this definition of the soul to be 
perfectly fitting within Xenocrates’ cosmology, and especially so if taken to be the result of his continuous 
interpretation of the world. For a discussion of Xenocrates’ demonology, see Dörrie (1967), Schibli (1993) and 
Dillon (2003). For a detailed analysis of the sources and the different kinds of souls as associated to geometrical 
figures, see Horky (2013b: 697-702 specifically). As Horky’s chart shows (2013b: 701) there seems to be a 
triadic structure underlying Xenocrates’ epistemology, ontology and psychology (as detectable from the reports 
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The next two passages I want to briefly consider come from books IV and VI of the 
Topics. The two of them, do, in different ways, address the topic of the definition of the soul, 
by focusing in particular on the aspect of movement. This may not come as a surprise, since, 
in the end, the definition of the soul as ‘self-moving mover’ is already present in Plato579 
and criticised by Aristotle.580 However, as emphasised, I believe movement to represent the 
crucial link between Xenocrates’ metaphysical world and the sensible one, insofar as it 
accounts for life to arise, as well as for sensible objects to be gradually introduced (and 
differentiated) within the system. Accordingly, I will here report Aristotle’s passages within 
their context, so to test whether this conclusion can be equally gathered from these texts.  
 
[FR. 88] Ἔτι ὅταν ὄντος καὶ τῷ εἴδει καὶ τῷ γένει ἐναντίου τὸ βέλτιον τῶν ἐναντίων εἰς 
τὸ χεῖρον γένος θῇ· […] καὶ εἰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ εἴδους ὁμοίως πρὸς ἄμφω ἔχοντος εἰς τὸ χεῖρον 
καὶ μὴ εἰς τὸ βέλτιον γένος ἔθηκεν, οἷον τὴν ψυχὴν ὅπερ κίνησιν ἢ κινούμενον. ὁμοίως 
γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ στατικὴ καὶ κινητικὴ δοκεῖ εἶναι, ὥστ᾿εἰ βέλτιον ἡ στάσις, εἰς τοῦτο ἔδει τὸ 
γένος θεῖναι.581 
 
Further, there is the case when, both the species and the genus having a contrary, your 
opponent places the better of the contrary species in the worse genus […].You must also 
see whether, when the same species is similarly related to both, your opponent has 
placed it in the worse and not in the better genus, saying, for example, that the ‘soul’ is 
‘a kind of motion’ or ‘a moving thing.’ For the same soul is generally regarded as being 
in like manner a principle of rest and a principle of motion; so that, if rest is better, it 
ought to have been placed in this as its genus. 
 
[FR. 89] Ἢ εἰ ἔστι μὲν ἴδιον τὸ προσκείμενον, ἀφαιρεθέντος δὲ τούτου καὶ ὁ λοιπὸς 
λόγος ἴδιός ἐστι καὶ δηλοῖ τὴν οὐσίαν. οἷον ἐν τῷ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου λόγῳ τὸ ἐπιστήμης 
δεκτικὸν προστεθὲν περίεργον· καὶ γὰρ ἀφαιρεθέντος τούτου ὁ λοιπὸς λόγος ἴδιος καὶ 
δηλοῖ τὴν οὐσίαν. ἁπλῶς δ᾿ εἰπεῖν, ἅπαν περίεργον οὗ ἀφαιρεθέντος τὸ λοιπὸν δῆλον 
ποιεῖ τὸ ὁριζόμενον. τοιοῦτος δὲ καὶ ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς ὅρος, εἰ ἀριθμὸς αὐτὸς αὑτὸν κινῶν 
ἐστίν· καὶ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ αὑτὸ κινοῦν ψυχή, καθάπερ Πλάτων ὥρισται. ἢ ἴδιον μέν ἐστι τὸ 
εἰρημένον, οὐ δηλοῖ δὲ τὴν οὐσίαν ἀφαιρεθέντος τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ.582 
 
Or, again, you must see whether, though the addition is peculiar to the subject, yet its 
removal still leaves the rest of the description peculiar to the subject and demonstrates 
the essence. For example, in the description of ‘man’ the addition of ‘receptive of 
knowledge’ is superfluous; for, if it is removed, the rest of the description is still peculiar 
and demonstrates the essence. In a word, anything is superfluous the removal of which 
leaves a clear statement of the subject of the definition. The definition of the soul, if 
stated as a ‘number moving itself,’ is a case in point; for the soul is ‘that which moves 
itself,’ according to Plato’s definition. Or, perhaps, the statement, though it is peculiar 
to the subject, does not demonstrate the essence if the word ‘number’ is removed.  
 
of Sext. Emp. (fr. 83 IP); Theophr. (Metaph. 4b19–5a5) and Procl. (fr. 223 IP) respectively), which is also 
reflected in his arrangement of the world. For a recent appraisal of Early Academic cosmological theories and 
of methodological closeness they establish with geometrical practices, see Bénatouïl (2017). 
579 See, Plat., Phdr. 245c-e; Leg., 895e-896a. For an analysis of the passages which takes into account both 
definitions, see Cherniss (1964: 9-13). 
580 Arist., Topics 120b21-35. 
581 (=Arist., Top. 127b8-19), transl. Forster. 
582 (=Arist., Top. 140a34-140b7) transl. Forster. 
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I take the two passages to be complementary. Both of them are in fact directed against 
Xenocrates’ definition of the soul and aim at demonstrating that the definition itself is 
erroneous; on the one hand, Aristotle claims that the definition is wrong because it places 
the soul in the wrong genus;583 on the other hand, the definition, taken as a statement of the 
genus and the specific differentia, is wrong insofar as it states an aspect of the soul which is 
superfluous, and, therefore, it does not state its essence. However, the passages are 
complementary also insofar as [FR. 87] takes into account movement while [FR. 88] 
concentrates on the fact that the soul is defined as a number. What seems essential to 
Aristotle in both fragments, and especially in [FR. 87], is that the soul is characterised as a 
self-mover. However, as he himself admits, by removing ‘number’ from the definition, we 
may not have a statement of the essence of the soul, as defined by Xenocrates. Accordingly, 
[FR. 87] reveals that both specifications are equally essential and necessary for Xenocrates’ 
definition.584 For as I suggested in the previous section, it is the characterisation of the soul 
as a number and its capacity to self-move which prevent it from comparisons with bodies. 
This, once more, may be taken as a confirmation of the fact that the soul, in order to play a 
middle role, needs to be described both according to features of the metaphysical level, and 
features belonging to the sensible world. For the soul is neither a metaphysical entity, nor a 
sensible object, but is, to some extent, both. In the end, a number which moves itself can be 
viewed as almost a paradox. For how can a number be in motion or be the cause of motion, 
and in what sense can the soul resemble a number? In this respect, Xenocrates is possibly 
attempting to fix one problem inherent to Speusippus’ theory. Although Aristotle does not 
preserve much about Speusippus’ theory of the soul, the separation of Speusippus’ 
ontological levels might have constituted an obstacle in view of the acquisition of 
knowledge. If the soul constituted a different and separate level from the mathematical realm 
and that of the sensibles, and if each level is heterogeneous and independent, nothing in 
Speusippus’ system could ensure the possibility that such levels could be known. On the 
contrary, the continuity of Xenocrates’ system accounts precisely for this aspect. By 
describing the soul with features of both the metaphysical realm and the sensible one, 
Xenocrates is also guaranteeing the possibility of its middle epistemic status.  
 
583 In the comment of fr. 88, Isnardi Parente says that, possibly, the specification of a double aspect of the soul 
as source of movement as well as of rest was the result of Xenocrates’ interpretation of the Timaeus (as Cherniss 
(1964: 10-11) claims, relying on Plut., De animae procreat. 1012ff). However, it seems to me that, at least 
from fr. 88, it may be Aristotle as well who makes explicit the consequences of defining the soul in relation to 
movement, and that such an interpretation is not necessary.  
584 This, perhaps, also explains why Aristotle phrases Xenocrates’ definition with a double αὐτόν in the passage 
previously analysed (ἀριθμὸν εἶναι αὐτὸν αὑτὸν κινοῦντα). The soul is, indeed, in the first place a number, 
and, more specifically, a number which moves itself.  
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7.4 Xenocrates’definition of the soul: Aristotle’s testimony in the De Anima (frr. 85 
and 112) 
Despite the mentions of Xenocrates’ definition of the soul in the Posterior Analytics and 
in the Topics, the most extended account of Xenocrates’ doctrine of the soul is to be found 
in Aristotle’s De Anima (=fr. 85 and 112). First of all, Aristotle presents Xenocrates’ 
definition within the philosophical tradition he believes to be inscribed in: 
 
[FR.85] Ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ κινητικὸν ἐδόκει ἡ ψυχὴ εἶναι καὶ γνωριστικόν, οὕτως ἔνιοι 
συνέπλεξαν585 ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, ἀποφηνάμενοι τὴν ψυχὴν ἀριθμὸν κινοῦνθ᾿ ἑαυτόν.586 
 
But since the soul appears to be both a principle of movement and capable of 
knowledge, some thinkers have constructed it from both, defining the soul as a number 
moving itself. 
 
In the passage Aristotle lists Xenocrates among those philosophers who granted the soul 
both with the capacity for movement and knowledge. In section 7.2, I argued that the 
qualification of ‘self-moving’ needs to be understood as an explanation for living; in 
addition, the consideration of the soul as a mathematical object was meant to allow a 
differentiation between simple bodies and ensouled ones. For although sensible bodies 
(differently than geometrical solids) are also liable to movement (and therefore change), they 
cannot be the cause of their own movement. In section 7.3 I suggested that such a definition 
was prompted so as to grant the possibility for the soul to know, a possibility perhaps denied 
by Speusippus’ disruptive model. In this passage, Aristotle confirms this suggestion: the 
definition of the soul is meant to account for movement as well as for the production of 
knowledge. In this respect, the characterisation of the soul as a mathematical object should 
be understood as an assurance for its capacity to know. If we assume once more that the 
inhomogeneity of Speusippus’ world did constitute a problem in this respect, the fact that 
the soul is conceived as a number exposes a second aim. Not only the soul is conceived as a 
number in order to prevent its physical change but also, and most of all, the soul is conceived 
as a number because its ontological affinity with the metaphysical world grants it with the 
possibility to understand it. Nonetheless, Aristotle describes Xenocrates’ theory as the most 
 
585 Polansky (2007: 76) draws the attention to the verb, noting that it may be considered as particularly fitting, 
giving the importance Plato granted to weaving things together in the Statesman and in the Sophist.  
586 Arist., De Anima, 404b 27-28, transl. Hett modified. The authenticity of the lines preceding the passage has 
been highly debated (see Isnardi Parente (1979: 153ff); (1996: 146ff); contra, see Tarán (1961: 459-460)) 
especially with regard to the attribution of the thesis either to Xenocrates (Cherniss (1964: 565ff).) or 
Speusippus (IP1 (1960: 316ff) and IP2 (2005: 48-51).) Accordingly, I will not take the preceding lines into 
account for the present inquiry. It is worth mentioning, however, that in the preceding and controversial lines 
Aristotle mentions that the living universe (τὸ ζῷον) ‘is derived from the idea of the One and from the primary 
length, breadth and depth; and everything else in the same way’ (ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς τοῦ ἑνὸς ἰδέας καὶ τοῦ πρώτου 
μήκους καὶ πλάτους καὶ βάθους, τὰ δ᾿ ἄλλα ὁμοιοτρόπως, transl. Hett).  
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unreasonable of all.587 The passage is quite long, and it brings up many of the issues raised 
so far. In order to facilitate the reading, I break down the content into six sections, so to 
analyse the material step by step.588  
 
1. [number and movement: incompatible concepts] 
[FR. 112] Πολὺ δὲ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀλογώτατον τὸ λέγειν ἀριθμὸν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν 
κινοῦνθ᾿ ἑαυτόν· ὑπάρχει γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἀδύνατα᾿ πρῶτα μὲν τὰ ἐκ τοῦ κινεῖσθαι 
συμβαίνοντα, ἰδίᾳ δ᾿ ἐκ τοῦ λέγειν αὐτὴν ἀριθμόν· πῶς γὰρ χρὴ νοῆσαι μονάδα 
κινουμένην, καὶ ὑπὸ τίνος, καὶ πῶς, ἀμερῆ καὶ ἀδιάφορον οὖσαν; εἰ γάρ ἐστι κινητικὴ 
καὶ κινητή, διαφέρειν δεῖ.589 
 
But of all the unreasonable theories about the soul the most unreasonable is that which 
calls the soul a number which moves itself. In this theory there are inherent 
impossibilities, first those which are implied by the theory of the soul’s being moved, 
and also special ones which follow from calling the soul a number. For how can one 
conceive of a unit moving? by what is it moved, and in what way, being as it is without 
parts or differences? For if it can cause and suffer movement it must have differences. 
 
The main objective of Aristotle’s passage is to underline the short circuit that the notion 
of number and that of movement imply once they are considered together or combined.590 
Xenocrates’ theory is the most unreasonable of all because it is constructed out of two 
incompatible notions. In this respect, it is liable to criticisms addressed to each of them, as 
well as to both. In particular, the conception of a number capable of movement is something 
which could have indeed be charged with paradoxicality, in particular according to 
Platonists’ premises. But Aristotle’s compact questions illustrate various possible 
inconsistencies, aimed at showing that the concept of number and that of movement are 
conflicting at different levels.  
 
On a general level, Aristotle points out that mathematical objects (such as Xenocrates’ 
Form-Numbers) are in principle not liable to movement and change.591 Indeed, the first 
question Aristotle asks (πῶς γὰρ χρὴ νοῆσαι μονάδα κινουμένην) stresses precisely that a 
 
587 The whole passage corresponds to Arist., De Anima, 408b 32-409 a11; 409a16-30), transl. Hett. 
588 The numbers are not meant to break down the passage into its arguments, but to offer a better occasion to 
discuss the relevant topics. 
589 Arist., De Anima, 408b32- 409a4, transl. Hett. 
590 Moreover, the passage is preceded by Aristotle’s rejection of the theory of the soul as harmonia. This view 
has affinities with the theory of the soul as a self-moving number in various respects. Unfortunately, for the 
sake of the present purpose, it is impossible to analyse such similarities in detail. On this topic, see Polansky 
(2007: 103-122), who summarises the similarities as follows: ‘Number moving itself thus is quite figurative. 
And if Number actually means some relationship or logos of the Forms, then this position can be seen as a 
major refinement of the harmonia view. Whereas harmonia has soul as a logos of bodily components, but a 
logos rather functionless, the self-moving Number conception makes the soul a logos that is more substantial 
and functional’ (2007: 108). In my account, I take the fact that the soul is conceived as a number to work in 
continuity with what I have concluded about Form-Numbers in Chapter 6.  
591 The fact that mathematical objects are not subject to change and generation can be gathered from 
Aristotelian passages in M and N, which address Plato and the Academics as a group. See, e.g. Arist., Metaph. 
N5. 1092a21-1092a24; 1092a29-1092b5, analysed in section 3.3. 
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combination of the two notions is even difficult to conceive (νοῆσαι): a unit in motion is 
something which creates problems even at a theoretical stage.  
 
2. [the soul is a unit: simple objects cannot self-move] 
However, Aristotle asks specifically how it is possible for a unit (μονάς) to move. 
Accordingly, the general criticism entails a second and related one, at a more particular level: 
if the soul is a unit, and a unit is without parts, the soul cannot be a principle of movement. 
Indeed, according to Aristotelian premises nothing simple can be set to motion in its own 
right, but it can move only co-incidentally.592 And the formulation of the question implies 
the equation of the soul with a single unit. Although the equation might sound odd, Aristotle 
seems to imply precisely this step.593 For the simplicity of a unit necessarily implies that the 
cause of its movement is determined by something else. One thing to underline is that the 
implication that the soul is a unit does not seem to follow necessarily from the previous claim 
that the soul is conceived of as a number. In the end, for Aristotle himself a number is indeed 
a compound of units and not a single unit.594  
 
3. [the soul is a compound of units: therefore it cannot be uniform] 
This second option is presented right afterwards. Aristotle points out that, alternatively, 
if the soul is indeed in motion, then it is necessary for the soul to hold internal differences. 
This alternative offers a consideration of the soul as a number in the sense of a compound of 
units. I take the criticism to imply that if the soul is a self-moving number in the sense of a 
compound of units, it should have in itself a part which is moved and a part which is the 
cause of movement; thus, its units would differ the one from the others insofar as one (or 
some) moves and others are moved.  
 
592 Barbotin (1966: 101), Polansky (2007: 119) Shields (2010: 146) and Shiffman (2011: 41, n.41) refer to 
Physics 240b8-9. However, as Polansky notes (ivi) ‘this argumentation vitally depends upon Aristotle’s 
rejection of the possibility of self-movers that are partless, and this depends upon his rejection of motion for 
incorporeal beings. Could partless incorporeal beings be in motion, other than accidentally, they might be self-
movers with no distinction of mover and moved, and hence all the units or aspects of the unit would be self-
movers’. 
593 This is what Shields (2016: 146 and 148) takes it to mean. The same equation of the soul with a unit occurs 
later in the text, and this entails once again the criticism related to the impossibility of self-movement for 
something which is partless.  
594 In Metaph. Δ 219b3-5, when he is defining the meaning of ‘time’, Aristotle highlights that number has two 
meanings. Accordingly, time is a number in ‘the sense of what is counted or countable, not in the sense of what 
we count with’ (219b5-9; the same point is stated at 220b8-9, cf. Annas 1975: 97). And this interchangeable 
way of treating ‘measure’ and ‘number’ is frequent in Aristotle’s treatment of time. In this respcet, the claim 
can be illuminating in order to understand why Aristotle establishes a parallel between ‘number’ and ‘unit’ in 
the passage under analysis. If the soul is a number in the sense of a ‘measure’, then the conclusion that the 
soul, as a number, can also be considered as a unit, could be less biased than expected. For also in Metaph. I 
1-3, ‘one’ is a unit of measurement (see, e.g 1053b28ff). Nevertheless, it is hard to establish the impact of such 
a notion when projected onto the soul. In what sense the soul could indeed be considered a measure? For a 
more detailed analysis of this relation, specifically with respect to Aristotle’s treatment of time, see Annas 
(1975). 
  163 
 
Accordingly, the first part of Aristotle’s criticism presents us first with a general problem, 
the theoretical impossibility to conceive of a number in motion. Although this notion is 
impossible in principle, Aristotle provides us with two interpretative options for its meaning. 
The consideration of the soul as a number is in fact presented in two alternatives: either the 
soul is a unit, and thus it is partless, and it cannot move itself, or it is a compound of units, 
and therefore, in order to move, it needs to be internally differentiated. It is hard to imagine 
what Xenocrates would have to say on this point. Clearly, the combination of number and 
movement does not represent, for him, a theoretical impossibility. It is plausible to suppose 
that he would reject the identification of the soul with one unit only. In the end, if we think 
of immediate comparisons for the claim that the soul is a number, none of Form-Numbers 
seems to be composed by one unit only595 and, rather, they accomplish a higher kind of unity, 
as a result of the fact that they are wholes composed by parts.  
 
4. [the movement of the units in the soul imply the latter’s spatial extension] 
[FR. 112] ἔτι δ᾿ ἐπεί φασι κινηθεῖσαν γραμμὴν ἐπίπεδον ποιεῖν, στιγμὴν δὲ γραμμήν, 
καὶ αἱ τῶν μονάδων κινήσεις γραμμαὶ ἔσονται·596 
 
Again, since they say that a moving line describes a surface, and a moving point a line, 
the movements of the soul’s units will be lines. 
 
In the following part of the criticism, Aristotle introduces the theory of the flow (ῥύσις), 
to prepare the ground for the following discussion on the spatial location of the soul. 
According to the theory of the flow, by exerting movement on a point this latter produces a 
line, and the same happens with the line which produces a surface. It is clear, however, that 
Aristotle is being tendentious on this point. For, as highlighted in Chapter 6, the theory 
according to which a line can be resolved into (or derived from) points is nowhere to be 
found in Aristotle’s testimonia about Xenocrates. And Aristotle is aware that Xenocrates 
rejects the principle that a line can be resolved into points. Indeed, at the end of the passage 
he exploits precisely this rejection to expose other inconsistencies of Xenocrates’ theory. In 
fact, the whole passage ends with a rhetorical question (‘how is it possible to separate the 
 
595 Unless one wants to consider the One (and the Dyad) as Form-Number(s) as well. This point is actually 
quite difficult to determine. Indeed, on the one hand, if the One and the Dyad are to be considered Form-
Numbers, it is not clear in what respect they should be considered principles, if not only for the fact that they 
are the first of Form-Numbers. On the other hand, if the One and the Dyad are not to be considered Form-
Numbers, this does not square with the fact that, among Form-Numbers, Aristotle very often mentions the 
Dyad. 
596 Arist., De Anima, 409a4-6, transl. Hett. 
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points and free them from the bodies, if lines cannot be resolved into points?) which confirms 
our suppositions. 
 
5. [if the soul is in motion: its units will be in some place] 
[FR. 112] ἡ γὰρ στιγμὴ μονάς ἐστι θέσιν ἔχουσα· ὁ δ᾿ ἀριθμὸς τῆς ψυχῆς ἤδη πού ἐστι 
καὶ θέσιν ἔχει.597 
 
For a point is a unit having position; and the number of the soul is ipso facto somewhere 
and has position. 
 
Aristotle equates units with points in order to carry on with his attacks. The conditions 
for the discussion of space, however, were established already in the previous step through 
the introduction of the flow theory. Indeed, the rationale for the equation between units and 
point is, I believe, justified by the soul’s capacity to move. Aristotle says that a point is a 
unit having a position; but if a point, when movement is exerted onto it, produces lines, the 
same would happen once the units of the soul are set in motion: at minimum, they occupy a 
position, and therefore they can be equated to points. Alternatively, we might take the 
discussion to be generated just supposing that the soul is in a body and that the soul is a 
number in motion, although I find this option more difficult to justify.  
 
This way, the soul occupies a place by reason of its movement. Nowhere before had 
Aristotle raised the question of the spatial location of the soul. On the one hand, the topic is 
introduced in order to prepare for the comparison Aristotle will establish between 
Xenocrates’ doctrine and Democritus’: by equating units and points Aristotle has a parallel 
whereby to compare Democritus’ atoms. On the other hand, we might wonder whether the 
criticism raises a point which is relevant also beyond the comparison. Accordingly: does the 
soul occupy a place? If so, is it to be considered as spatially extended? The fact that the soul 
is characterised as a number would perhaps suggest a negative answer to the question. Yet, 
the addition of movement clearly creates some friction. In general, I take it to be possible 
that the soul has some sort of spatial extension, whether this is explained by appeal to its 
movement or by some other aspects. For, if Xenocrates’ world, as I have been arguing, is 
rooted in a continuous conception, dimensionality, and hence space, would have already 
been produced at the level Ideal-Geometricals. However, we do not have to necessarily 
suppose that the spatiality produced at a metaphysical level corresponds to physical 
spatiality.598 For, we have supposed that precisely the fact that the soul is a number prevents 
 
597 Arist., De Anima, 409a6-8, transl. Hett. 
598 The problem of spatial extension would require an adequate and separate discussion, which needs to be 
postponed to a different context. However, a differentiation between a physical space, occupied by bodies, and 
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it from being liable to change,599 as happens with sensible bodies. The same could be 
supposed with respect to its dimensionality.  
 
6. [the soul is not a πᾶν] 
[FR. 112] ἔτι δ᾿ ἀριθμοῦ μὲν ἐὰν ἀφέλῃ τις ἀριθμὸν ἢ μονάδα, λείπεται ἄλλος ἀριθμός· 
τὰ δὲ φυτὰ καὶ τῶν ζῴων πολλὰ διαιρούμενα ζῇ, καὶ δοκεῖ τὴν αὐτὴν ψυχὴν ἔχειν τῷ 
εἴδει. δόξειε δ᾿ ἂν οὐθὲν διαφέρειν μονάδας λέγειν ἢ σωμάτια μικρά· […].600 
 
Now, if one subtracts a number or unit from a number, another number is left. But plants 
and many animals continue to live even when divided and seem to retain in these 
fragments a soul specifically the same as before. It would seem to make no difference 
whether we speak of units or of minute particles […]. 
 
The passage is sometimes intended by scholars as pointing out a difference in species.601 
Indeed, if one number is subtracted from another, what remains is a different number, thus 
different in species.602 Obviously, this does not happen once we bisect plants or animals;603 
for when a plant or an animal is bisected the two souls resulting out of the division remain 
in the same species. However, the criticism also touches an aspect which we have already 
encountered with Form-Numbers and Ideal-Geometricals: the conception of wholes (either 
πᾶν or ὅλον) composed by parts. 
 
In the previous passages, Aristotle has progressively introduced the issue of location of 
the soul. First, with the introduction of flow theory, movement of the soul was used to 
motivate a dimensional consideration of its units. Such a dimensional consideration of the 
units prepared their equation with points, differing from the former by means of their 
‘position’.604 Now, the distribution of the soul’s units in the body is exploited in order to 
discuss physical division. If the units of the soul are distributed in the body, then when the 
 
a metaphysical or geometrical one is not necessarily an anachronistic conviction. In the end, already for the 
atomists void was the result a geometrical and logical conclusion. For a Platonic example, see e.g. Sattler 
(2012), who distinguishes between geometrical and physical space and takes dimensionality to be a 
requirement for the former.  
599 Or, as a minimum condition, to the same kind of change sensible objects undergo, and which implies their 
perishment. 
600 Arist., De Anima, 409a 8-12, transl. Hett. 
601 See, Polansky (2007: 120); Shields (2010: 148).  
602 And this, as we have seen in the previous chapter, is right. Form-Numbers differ in species the one from the 
other. On the topic of the dissection of plants and animals in relation to the soul, see Bos (2007). 
603 Ross (1955: 297), Polansky (2007: 120) and Shields (2010: 148) refer to Aristotle’s experiments of 
bisection, and to parallel loci where the example is provided. On Aristotle’s dialectical use of bisection, see 
Sprague (1989). For a recent evaluation of the topic of bisection in its connection to the impulse for movement, 
see Mittelmann (2010). 
604 This passage allows Aristotle to establish a parallel between Xenocrates’ and Democritus’ theories of the 
soul, which I have excluded from the text as not directly relevant to our analysis. However, it is noteworthy 
that the comparison between atomists and Academics is not an isolated case (as to Aristotle’s use of atomic 
theories against Speusippus, see, infra, Chapter 3). Indeed, it seems that Aristotle sometimes exploits the same 
theoretical schemes in order to refute both philosophical schools. 
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body undergoes a division, the soul is also mutilated. Given this background, it is 
understandable why Aristotle here points out that by removing a unit from a number, another 
number is left. The consequence is that if the soul is a number, then, physical division would 
produce, at least, a different number, and, consequently, a different soul. The underlying 
assumptions supporting the conclusion appear to be a) that units of the soul are distributed 
in the body; b) that the number of the soul is a precise number; i.e. the soul is the sum of its 
units c) that the subtraction of parts of the bodies imply the subtraction of units from the 
soul, therefore compromising its unity and its functionality. Indeed, Aristotle argues that 
plants or animals would continue to live, even when divided. This conclusion appears to be 
supported by the following and complementary assumptions (i) that the soul as a whole 
pervades every part of the body (i.e. the soul is not distributed); (ii) that the soul, insofar as 
it is not connoted quantitatively, does not change by means of subtraction; or, in other words, 
the soul is not the sum of its parts; and (iii) that the subtraction of parts of the body does not 
compromise the unity and functionality of the soul. More simply, Aristotle seems to point 
out that Xenocrates’ soul, insofar as it is a number, accomplishes a kind of unity which is 
that of a πᾶν. On the contrary, the unity accomplished by the soul seems to be, in Aristotle’s 
perspective, closer to that of a ὅλον.605 On this account, however, the soul’s unity depends 
not only on (i) the relationship established between the parts and the whole; but also, and 
most of all, on (ii) the behaviour of its parts as well. For the parts of the soul should be 
homogeneous to the rest so that, once divided, they can both constitute a unity. In this 
respect, the whole should be more than the sum of its parts, and its unity should be 
accomplished uniformly.  
 
 
605 Closer, but not precisely the same. Polansky (2007: 120) underlines the reference to two kinds of wholes: 
‘Souls seem to be wholes that are only complete rather than breaking up cleanly, since dividing certain living 
things results in new living things each having a whole soul of the same type, whereas a number is all the units 
(πάντα) or the sum (τὸ πᾶν) from which units can be taken rather than a strict whole᾽. However, the comparison 
of the soul with a ὅλον is problematic once division is at stake. It is the part, I believe, that is crucial for the 
argument, and not the whole. Indeed, the question is whether parts are homogeneous with the whole (which 
seems to be the case for the soul), or if they are to be considered as diverse (as in the case of numbers). For 
Aristotle’s claim would be that, the parts of the soul being homogeneous, by dividing an animal into two, one 
would obtain two animals with two souls. But if parts are not homogeneous with the whole and the whole is 
rather their sum, by dividing a living being into two, one would not have the totality of units anymore and the 
souls would have a number which is different than the original one. In this respect, it is true that the difference 
is played by the part, insofar as it is a part of a πᾶν or a part of a ὅλος. But there is something else going on 
here: for, precisely insofar as it is a ὅλον the soul should not be liable to division in principle. Because it is 
precisely according to its status of a ὅλον that by removing a part, the whole remains a whole. Let us take the 
example of the body from Chapter 6. By amputating an arm from a body, a body would not be less of a whole. 
But here Aristotle is contravening this principle. For, if the animal is divided, and so the soul, the result is that 
both parts of the animal would have whole souls. But if the soul was really a ὅλον, then the division, in 
principle, should result in a part with the whole soul, and the other part with any. Moreover, the two types of 
division Aristotle points out are not even the same. For how can one subtract a number from the soul? This 
possibility relies on the assumption that the soul has a precise location, or, as Aristotle says later, that it is to 
be identified with the points in the body. Because if the number of the soul corresponds to the points of the 
body, then it would be clear why, by cutting a part of the body, one would also be subtracting a part of the soul.  
  167 
In any case, the conclusion Aristotle reaches at the end is at least questionable. To say 
that animals, once bisected, continue to live amounts to saying that the soul is divisible, and 
that it is divisible homogeneously. In this respect, I take Aristotle’s criticism to be biased. 
For it makes a great difference what body undergoes the division (e.g., if it is a plant, an 
animal or a human being) and the way the division is brought forth. If we take a branch of a 
plant and transplant it somewhere else, we can be confident it would actually live again. But 
if we attempt to do the same with the arm of an animal or of a man, this would hardly be the 
case. Even by conceding to Aristotle that the example is consistent with exceptional cases 
such as, e.g. that of a lizard, whose tail continues to move even once it is cut, the impulse 
for movement does not endure for long. And this is even more evident once life itself is at 
stake.  
 
As to Xenocrates’ theory of the soul, however, Aristotle bears no witness to how its parts 
were accounted for, nor does he provide information about how soul and body are supposed 
to interact. As a consequence, it is hard to imagine how Xenocrates would have replied. 
Once again, if we rely on Form-Numbers and Ideal-Geometricals as the closer parallel, it 
may well be that, although composed by parts, the soul is not divisible. In the end, this is the 
case with Form-Numbers: although composed of units, their units cannot be subtracted or 
added. 
 
7. [the soul cannot be subject and object of the same action] 
[FR. 112] εἰ δ᾿ ἐν τῷ ζῴῳ τὸ κινοῦν ἡ ψυχή, καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀριθμῷ, ὥστε οὐ τὸ κινοῦν καὶ 
τὸ κινούμενον ἡ ψυχή, ἀλλὰ τὸ κινοῦν μόνον.606 
 
But if that which produces movement in the animal is the soul, then it is also so in the 
number, so that the soul is not both that which produces movement and that which is 
moved, but only that which produces movement. 
 
Aristotle starts off his new argument by distinguishing between what moves (τὸ κινοῦν) 
and what is moved (τὸ κινούμενον).607 This distinction is easily accountable for, when we 
have two objects at stake: on the one hand, the soul, principle of movement; on the other 
hand, the living being, which moves thanks to the action of the soul. Given this framework, 
it is easy to understand why things become more complicated when the soul itself is defined 
as a moving object already. If the theoretical framework is clear, it is harder to determine 
why Aristotle decides to emphasise the contradiction by establishing a parallel between the 
 
606 Arist., De Anima, 409a17-19, transl. Hett. 
607 Although ‘τὸ κινούμενον’ could be construed as a middle, i.e. ‘what moves itself’ I take the distinction here 
to be established clearly between an active mover and something which receives the impulse for movement. 
For also Aristotle’s criticism in the next portion of text (8) points exactly in the same direction: if the impulse 
for movement is originated by a unit, then such a unit must be different from the others.  
  168 
body and the number, both constructed with ἐν + the dative. Indeed, Aristotle appears to be 
saying that just as what produces movement in the animal is the soul, the same happens for 
the number, namely, the soul is responsible for the number’s movement. This way, however, 
the objects at stake become three: the soul, the number and the body. And the soul is the 
number Aristotle is referring to. The problem arises precisely because the soul appears to 
both perform and suffer the action: it is the subject responsible for movement as well as the 
object which is moved. Accordingly, Aristotle concludes that the soul is only that which 
produces movement. Given the explanation, the parallel established between the living being 
and number becomes clearer. For Aristotle’s intention is to show that given the impossibility 
for the soul to perform an activity and to suffer it at the same time, the soul needs to be 
distinguished into two different things: soul and number. In this respect, the problem keeps 
on being self-movement, and not how this movement is then transmitted to the body. For 
this reason, Aristotle can leave the body aside and concentrate on the contradictions that the 
definition of a self-moving object implies in principle.  
 
8. [the soul is a unit: simple objects cannot produce the impulse for movement] 
[FR. 112] ἐνδέχεται δὲ δὴ πῶς μονάδα ταύτην εἶναι; δεῖ γὰρ ὑπάρχειν τινὰ αὐτῇ 
διαφορὰν πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας·608 
 
But how can this possibly be a unit? Such a unit must differ inherently from the others. 
  
In these lines, Aristotle returns once again on the equation of the soul with a unit.609 
Granted that the soul cannot move and be moved at the same time, one of its units must be 
responsible for the impulse of movement. However, in order for this to happen, such a unit 
should be differentiated from the others. The insistence on the need for (at least) a unit to be 
differentiated from others in order for movement to arise may suggest that units composing 
Xenocrates’ soul are indeed not differentiated. This, of course, cannot be determined 
conclusively, as Aristotle’s comment, although repeated, is only indirect. Nevertheless, if 
we take again Form-Numbers as a working parallel, the supposition is consistent. Just as the 
units composing each Form-Number were not internally differentiated, so it is in the case of 
the soul.  
 
[FR. 112] στιγμῆς δὲ μοναδικῆς τίς ἂν εἴη διαφορὰ πλὴν θέσις; εἰ μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν ἕτεραι 
αἱ ἐν τῷ σώματι μονάδες καὶ αἱ στιγμαί, ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἔσονται αἱ μονάδες· καθέξει γὰρ 
χώραν στιγμῆς. καίτοι τί κωλύει ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ εἶναι, εἰ δύο, καὶ ἀπείρους; ὧν γὰρ ὁ τόπος 
 
608 Arist., De Anima, 409a19-21, transl. Hett. 
609 For the difference between the two parts of Aristotle’s complaints, see Polansky (2007: 121): ‘This 
argumentation, which sounds much like that of 409a1–3, differs to some extent because previously the units 
were considered merely partless units whereas now they are bodily magnitudes, though still lacking sufficient 
differentiation to permit any to be movers’. 
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ἀδιαίρετος, καὶ αὐτά. εἰ δ᾿αἱ ἐν τῷ σώματι στιγμαὶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς, ἢ εἰ ὁ ἐκ τῶν 
ἐν τῷ σώματι στιγμῶν ἀριθμὸς ἡ ψυχή, διὰ τί οὐ πάντα ψυχὴν ἔχουσι τὰ σώματα; 
στιγμαὶ γὰρ ἐν ἅπασι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι καὶ ἄπειροι. ἔτι δὲ πῶς οἷόν τε χωρίζεσθαι τὰς 
στιγμὰς καὶ ἀπολύεσθαι τῶν σωμάτων, εἴ γε μὴ διαιροῦνται αἱ γραμμαὶ εἰς στιγμάς;610 
 
But what difference can a monadic point exhibit, except position?611 If then the soul-
units in the body are different from the points in the body, the former will be in the same 
place as the latter, for each will occupy the place of a point. And yet if two units can be 
in the same place, why not an infinite number? for things which occupy an indivisible 
space are themselves indivisible. But if the bodily points are identical with the units of 
the soul number, or if the number of bodily points is the soul, why do not all bodies 
have a soul? For there appear to be points—infinitely many, indeed—in all of them. 
And again how is it possible to separate the points and free them from the bodies, if 
lines cannot be resolved into points? 
 
The conclusion of Aristotle’s report is an attempt to locate the soul within the body 
according to a relation Aristotle establishes between points of the body and units in the soul. 
Aristotle provides two mutually exclusive options and then rejects them both. Accordingly, 
I understand the argument to be as follows: 
 
If (a) the points of the body and the units of the soul are co-extensive, then: 
- Since the units of the soul are in one way or another located in the body, they 
would nonetheless occupy the space of a point. And if two things occupy the 
same space, why are these things not infinite?612 For things which occupy an 
indivisible space (such as points) will themselves be indivisible. 
If, alternatively, (b) the points of the body and the units of the soul are not co-extensive, 
then:  
- Every body would have a soul, although this is clearly not the case.  
- The soul cannot be separated from the body. 
 
It is obviously hard, in absence of further evidence, to determine the accuracy of 
Aristotle’s report. In general, I find unconvincing that the correlation between points and 
units was advanced by Xenocrates himself. In the end, Aristotle himself mentions that, 
 
610 Arist., De Anima, 409a21-31, transl. Hett. 
611 This is, once more, reminiscent of atomistic conceptions. On Xenocrates’ atomism as the roots for the 
Epicurean theory of minima, see Verde (2013: 128-183). 
612 Shields (2010: 148) interprets the argument slightly differently: ‘Aristotle first seems to reason that if the 
soul is a unit, and if there are a plurality of souls, then the soul must be a point, since a point is a unit having 
position (cf. 409a6)’. The assumption that the soul is a unit is in fact maintained throughout the argument. 
Building on the assumption that the body, as a magnitude, can be divided infinitely, Shields concludes Aristotle 
is arguing that ‘either each individual point of the body is to be identified with a soul, conceived as a point, or 
it is not. If not, then there are conceivably an infinite number of souls in the same place as each point in the 
body which is absurd’ (149). However, granting the same premise of the infinite divisibility of the body, I take 
the argument to show that the units of the soul would nonetheless occupy the same place of points in the body. 
But given that the space occupied by a point is indivisible, this is absurd. 
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according to Xenocrates’ premises, lines cannot be resolved into points. In this respect, a 
correlation between units and points would have certainly generated contradictions: if the 
body can be resolved into points, why wouldn’t the line? The reference to the line in the 
context of a spatial consideration of the soul, however, brings up a further issue. Throughout 
the chapter, I have argued that Xenocrates’ world is rooted in a continuous conception of 
reality, in which the soul too is inscribed. But if Xenocrates’ world is as continuous as I have 
claimed, why not rely on the concept of line, rather than on that of number, in defining the 
soul? In the end, a geometrical concept could have granted the same cognitive access to the 
metaphysical world. However, while the line can be considered with respect to spatial 
extension, number cannot. And this is confirmed by Aristotelian critiques; for, in order to 
discuss the location of the soul, Aristotle needs to equate units and points, so as to grant the 
latter with a position. Accordingly, the concept of number, besides granting epistemic 
functions to the soul, might have offered Xenocrates a further advantage: the absence of 
physical extension. This, as already emphasised in the previous sections, is crucial: on the 
one hand, it allows the soul to introduce movement in the system but prevents it from 
undergoing any kind of (physical) change. On the other hand, the introduction of movement 
is also crucial with respect to physical bodies. For when movement is considered with 
respect to these latter, it establishes the condition for change to arise.  
 
 Conclusion 
To wrap everything up, what can we say about Xenocrates’ theory of the soul?  
 
In section 7.2 I have argued that the ‘methodological’ passage preserved in Aristotle’s 
Posterior Analytics presents an occasion to think about the rationale of Xenocrates’ 
definition: the soul is defined as a ‘self-moving number’ primarily to account for its capacity 
to produce life. Given this objective, the definition of the soul exposes a larger goal: a 
coherent account of the middle status of the soul, which allows ontological continuity and 
diversity at different levels of the system. At a general level, the introduction of movement 
allows Xenocrates to account for change in the sensible realm; at a particular level, the 
connotation of the soul as a number grants the soul with epistemic capacities and excludes 
it from physical consideration. This way, self-movement is used to differentiate the soul 
from Form-Numbers and Ideal Geometricals despite its mathematical characterisation. At 
the same time, the capacity to self-move differentiates ensouled bodies from mere bodies. 
The latter, being defined by their liability to movement but incapable to move themselves, 
receive an explanation for their perishment and change.  
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In this respect, the definition of the soul as a ‘self-moving number’ brings together and, 
more importantly, accommodates, two equally essential factors, which, as I have argued in 
section 7.3, both concur in construing the linkage between the two worlds. It is precisely this 
double depiction of the soul that draws Aristotle’s sharp criticism. For Aristotle takes 
Xenocrates’ theory to be vulnerable to objections regarding both self-movement and its 
status of number. By doing so, however, he fails to realise that the paradox Xenocrates 
creates is indeed meant to be a paradox so as to explain functions of both the sensible and 
metaphysical worlds.  
 
Nevertheless, Aristotle’s criticism of the self-moving number theory offers an occasion 
to think about the details of Xenocrates’ doctrine. Even if such details must remain 
undetermined, we can at least provide some suggestions.  
 
Accordingly: (i) is the soul partless? And if it isn’t, (ii) should the units of the soul be 
considered its parts or, rather, its parts should be conceived of differently? Many Aristotelian 
critiques hint at a unitarian and partless conception of the soul: Aristotle compares the soul 
to a unit two times; he points out at the necessity for an internal differentiation of the soul, 
if the soul needs to be capable of the impulse for movement; he underlines how the soul 
would cease to be the same number if the body undergoes a division. In all of these critiques, 
Aristotle takes the soul’s unity to be constituted by the sum of all of its units, and, therefore, 
of its parts. At the same time, we cannot take these suggestions as compelling evidence to 
conclude that Xenocrates’ soul is partless:613 in the end, the question is equally complicated 
when asked in relation to Form-Numbers. And given that the soul is a number, it is legitimate 
to transpose the question. Form-Numbers are indeed constituted by parts (since their units 
can be considered as such), and yet their parts are not divisible. If the parallel is relevant, 
then the soul, although constituted by parts, is nevertheless not divisible. However, one could 
add that, although being conceivable as parts, the units constituting Form-Numbers are more 
like elemental constituents than actually differentiated parts. Units of the Dyad are different 
than those of the Triad, but nothing is said about a possible internal differentiation of the 
units composing the Triad themselves. Yet, to consider the soul as constituted by parts would 
 
613 The bipartition of the soul is usually attributed to Xenocrates (and Speusippus) on the basis of a passage of 
ps-Olympiodorus’ commentary on the Phaedo (In Plat. Phaed. 74=fr. 131 IP), in which the Academics are 
said to extend the immortality of the soul μέχρι τῆς ἀλογίας. (see, e.g. Rees 1957; Schibli 1993). Isnardi Parente 
also concludes that Xenocrates abandoned Plato’s tripartite psychology in favor of a bipartite one (309). For 
her conclusion, fr. 126 is particularly important (Theod., Graecarum affectionum curatio) as Theodoretus says 
Xenocrates’ soul to be τὸ μὲν αἰσθητικόν, […] τὸ δὲ λογικόν). Such a conclusion, is, on the basis of Aristotle’s 
testimony exclusively, impossible to reach. However, since the claim that the soul is partly sensible and partly 
intelligible (this is how Isnardi Parente translates λογικόν) can also be deduced from Xenocrates’ definition 
only, the passage does not need to be taken as a confirmation of the bipartition.  
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a) possibly be advantageous in terms of accounting for different functions and b) more in 
line with Plato’s psychology. But how can one maintain that parts of the soul are 
homogeneous and still perform different tasks?  
 
A possible answer may lie in the fact that the soul, despite its mathematical 
characterisation, is never characterised as a Form. This may grant more flexibility to the way 
we conceive of ‘number’. For example, one may think of the definition ‘self-moving 
number’ also as a number whose conformation is in constant modification. In that case, the 
soul would maintain the homogeneity of its parts,614 but it could develop different 
combinations of its units in order to perform its different functions.  
 
A second issue Aristotle raises is related to the spatial extension of the soul. Is the soul 
spatially extended or, to put it differently, does it occupy a place? Aristotle insistently 
establishes a relation between the units of the soul and the points of the body in order to 
show that, also from a materialistic point of view, the conception of the soul as a number is 
inconsistent. The topic is obviously complicated and cannot be determined conclusively. 
However, I suggested a few possibilities in line with my interpretative direction. We have 
seen that the production of dimensionality already takes place with Ideal-Geometricals. 
Hence, there must be a way in which ideal and physical magnitudes differ, and I suggested 
that this condition may be taken to be the liability to movement, a condition which adds up 
at the level of the soul. If this is the case, it is important to emphasise that, although 
magnitudes have been, so to say, already produced at an earlier stage of the system, the soul 
is not taken to be an Ideal magnitude, but rather a number. The difference is crucial, for 
Aristotle’s problem in trying to locate Xenocrates’ soul is precisely to establish a comparison 
with something which does have a position and occupies a place. But the fact that the soul 
is characterised as number does not admit such critiques. If the tentative reconstruction I 
provided is at least slightly reliable, we could conceive of Xenocrates’ world as follows:  
 
 
614 This suggestion, however, would maintain that the soul, to a certain extent, does change. In need of an 
explanation for this aspect, one could imagine that since the soul’s units would be constant in number 
nevertheless, change would be minimised to movement only.  
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Conclusions 
 
 
 
This study has proposed a new methodology for the reconstruction of the metaphysical 
and epistemological theories of the first two scholarchs of the Academy, Speusippus and 
Xenocrates. In particular, given the unsatisfactory picture of Speusippus and Xenocrates 
obtained from previous collections and studies, this thesis has sought to test a new 
methodology, consisting of an in-depth analysis of Aristotelian testimonia, with the aims of: 
a) understanding Early Academic theories as internal responses to problems raised in the 
Academy and connected to Plato’s doctrine; b) understanding the critical impulse Aristotle 
provided for this process of development; c) re-assessing Speusippus’ and Xenocrates’ 
Platonic inheritance on these bases. The overall goal of this thesis was to offer a starting 
point for the re-consideration of Speusippus’ and Xenocrates’ theories and pave the way for 
further studies on the topic. The expected outcome of this analysis was to show that 
Aristotelian testimonia allow a contextualisation of Speusippus’ and Xenocrates’ doctrines 
within the environment of the Academy, by exposing a set of problems the two scholars are 
targeting in order to defend Platonic theories from the inconsistencies detected by Aristotle.  
 
Accordingly, Section Ι revealed that, if we take participation to have constituted a crucial 
problem for Speusippus, the interventions in his system, as well as the rejection of Plato’s 
Theory of Forms, are understandable in view of his epistemological worries. Each 
ontological section of Speusippus’ system is symmetrically separated from the others so as 
to guarantee distinctive practices and independence to each of them. In this respect, the 
mathematical world does not constitute a paradigmatic model for the sensible, nor does it 
express any causality over sensible bodies, the enquiry into which deserves to be conducted 
according to different rules than those reserved for mathematical and geometrical objects. It 
is for the same reason that each ontological domain has its peculiar principles, conceived as 
the explanatory and analytical causes of its objects. On this account, the One and the Plurality 
are not conceived as principles of all things, but of mathematical number only. This permits 
objects populating each domain to remain homogeneous to one another and requires that 
they do not serve as explanatory for other levels.  
 
Given the separation of the ontological levels in the system, Aristotle harshly criticises 
Speusippus for not having accounted for a single and unifying principle ruling over his 
world. Although he is sympathetic to some of the choices Speusippus adopted, Aristotle 
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believed that Speusippus’ system could not account for the ontological priority of some 
elements over the others. The absence of causal function between different levels, in fact, 
rescinds the ontological link which was indeed needed for their ontological arrangement.  
 
The arrangement of Xenocrates’ world appears to be responsive to the two main 
shortcomingss Aristotle identified in Speusippus’ philosophy. As Section II highlighted, on 
the one hand, the transition from one ontological level to another appears to be justified on 
the basis of ontological similarities; on the other hand, these ontological similarities grant 
Xenocrates’ world with an exceptional continuity, whilst still accounting for the 
differentiation and progression at each level. Moreover, Xenocrates seems not only to be 
receptive of Aristotle’s criticisms of Speusippus, but also to justify his views on the basis of 
shared assumptions with Aristotle. It may not be an accident, then, that the criticism Aristotle 
addresses against Xenocrates insists almost exclusively on notions he finds contradictory: 
that of Form-Number and that of soul qua self-moving number. In the attempt to fix the 
problems Aristotle had raised against Speusippus, in fact, Xenocrates coined notions which 
combine features of different ontological levels. The continuity of his world is, in Aristotle’s 
perspective, only accounted for formally.  
 
The picture which emerges out of this analysis of Aristotelian testimonia is a continuous 
discussion taking place within the Academy. Both Speusippus’ and Xenocrates’ systems are 
shown to be extremely responsive of Aristotle’s assessment of their theories and demonstrate 
a strong awareness of the problems that previous formulations created. It is precisely in this 
awareness that their Platonic inheritance needs to be recovered. The theories of Speusippus 
and Xenocrates do not exhibit a total deviation from Plato’s thought; both accept the 
ontological hierarachy Plato established, which features mathematics and geometry in a 
prominent position. Speusippus’ doctrine, although it appears to present a more explicit 
departure from that of his master, is, in the end, motivated by the need to find an appropriate 
way to explain the objects populating this world, and to justify different modes of 
understanding. What decisively constitutes the diversity of Speusippus’ and Xenocrates’ 
solutions is their distinctive philosophical concerns, as well as the recognition of previous 
problematic explanations. If, for Speusippus, the main flaw of Plato’s doctrine lies in the 
epistemological complications it created, Xenocrates’ system appears to be driven by the 
worry to produce a more justified ontological transition, which is precisely what was missing 
in Speusippus’ system. In this respect, both philosophers sought to save the legacy left 
behind by their master, especially in the light of Aristotle’s polemic. 
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If the account I have provided is justified, the results of this thesis would compel us, once 
again, to go back to Plato. Not only would the Platonic legacy of his students (Speusippus, 
Xenocrates and Aristotle) need to be reconsidered, but also, and most of all, a novel 
understanding of their Platonic legacy could in fact provide us with completely new ways to 
read Plato’s own ideas and what we assume to be his key doctrines. For the picture of 
Speusippus’ and Xenocrates’ theories emerging out of Aristotle’s testimonia tells an entirely 
different story about the birth of Platonism: the first two scholarchs neither severed their 
connections with their master nor replicated his theories superficially; on the contrary: they 
took their lead from Plato’s doctrines because of the philosophical issues it addressed. In 
fact, in their individual reactions to his doctrine both Speusippus and Xenocrates appear to 
be much more committed to discuss specific philosophical problems rather than attached to 
specific Platonic tenets. If Cherniss’ exemplary works led scholars to determine Aristotle’s 
accounts essentially unreliable, a novel picture of Plato may emerge if one turns to 
Speusippus’ and Xenocrates’ theories for consideration. In the context of his students’ 
reactions to his work, whether favourable (Speusippus and especially Xenocrates) or less so 
(Aristotle), Plato’s immediate legacy may be revealed to be completely different.  
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